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THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES:
A STUDY IN SURVIVAL
Abstract
This present thesis seeks to account for the UAE’s remarkable socio-economic 
development path while also attempting to explain the survival of the state’s seemingly 
anachronistic political structures. In doing so, the thesis proceeds to set up a multi­
layered framework drawing upon and reconciling elements of the two major schools of 
development theory. Specifically, a dependency analysis is used to demonstrate the 
UAE’s inherited situation, including the region’s historic peripheralisation, its early 
rentier structures, and the external reinforcement of a client elite; while a combination 
of rentier-dependency models and revised modernisation theories are used to illustrate 
die way in which the UAE’s contemporary monarchies have managed to consolidate 
their position and secure considerable political stability, which is itself an important 
prerequisite of die modernisation process. With regard to the recent attempts of diese 
‘modernising monarchies’ to improve die more negative aspects of their dependency 
situation, it is shown that while there have been successes there have also been serious 
development pathologies, and in many ways these must be regarded as die hidden costs 
of escaping the inevitability of early modernisation predictions and the demise of 
tradition. Essentially, viewed within a Weberian variant of modernisation theory, the 
strengthening of the structures which allowed for the stability in the first place can in 
many cases be seen to have gone too far and has now made legal-rational objectives 
difficult to achieve. Finally, however, it is suggested that greater modernisation, 
especially in the form of positive globalising forces, may still provide solutions for 
tiiese problems. Indeed, while die first wave of globalisation may have reinforced 
entrenched dependency structures, there are nevertheless clear indications that 
something of a second wave may well lead to liberalising reforms, a more diversified 
economy, and a stronger civil society.
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Introduction
In one of history’s great ironies, tire past thirty years have witnessed die 
transformation of the shaykhdoms of the lower Gulf from sleepy, undeveloped 
backwaters of the British Empire into some of the world’s wealthiest oil producers, widi 
socio-economic conditions comparable, and in some cases superior to those of many 
western states. Furthermore, following the withdrawal of their superpower protector 
and in defiance of the critics, the federation of diese shaykhdoms, die United Arab 
Emirates, has remained a mainstay of stability in an increasingly volatile Middle East 
and, crucially, has managed to maintain and even consolidate an essentially traditional 
polity despite rapid modernisation and die often intrusive forces of globalisation. 
Underneath these layers of success and stability, the UAE’s development path has, 
however, been far from smooth and a number of problems, many of which would 
appear deeply ingrained, continue to surface. As such, it is the purpose of this thesis to 
consider not only die UAE’s significant socio-economic achievements and the survival 
of its seemingly anachronistic political structures, but also to provide a greater 
understanding of some of the key pathologies which have persistently undermined the 
development objectives of tiiis nascent state.
In doing so, diis study will on one level serve to build upon and update the 
empirical picture of the UAE offered by the small number of existing surveys on the 
subject, including those of Donald Hawley,1 Kevin Fenelon,2 Malcolm Peck,3 
Muhammad Morsy Abdullah,4 and most notably Frauke Heard-Bey’s From Trucial 
States to United Arab Emirates.5 Alongside these works, diis study will also attempt to 
locate and synthesise the arguments and writings of a number of indigenous Emirati and 
Gulf Arab scholars on the development of the region, including those of Fatma Al- 
Sayegh,6 Ibrahim Al-Abed,7 Fatima al-Shamsi,8 and Shaykha Shamma Al-Nuhayyan.9 
Crucially, and on a more theoretical level, the thesis will attempt to go beyond these 
primarily historical and socio-economic analyses by placing the UAE example within 
the broader academic discipline of Middle East development studies. In particular, the
1
UAE’s socio-economic and political development will be assessed within the context of 
the plethora of recent research conducted on some of the region’s other surviving 
traditional monarchies and oil-rich ‘rentier states’. As such, this volume will consider, 
among many others, the dependency theories applied by Jacqueline Ismael to the 
Kuwaiti example,10 the rentier models of Jill Crystal and Gregoiy Gause,11 the civil 
society approaches of Sheila Carapico and Mehran Kamrava,12 and the fascinating 
investigation of evolving ‘dynastic monarchy’ structures outlined in Michael Herb’s All 
in the Family: Absolutism, Revolution, and Democracy in the Middle Eastern 
Monarchies.13 Indeed, by testing the applicability of such varied arguments and 
findings to the UAE case study, and by attempting to reconcile these with existing and 
often competing theoretical frameworks, this work will demonstrate the need for a very 
specific and multi-layered conceptual model in order to fully understand and appreciate 
the survival and development path of this highly distinctive Gulf state.
In particular, by drawing upon elements of the two major schools of thought, it 
will be shown on die one hand how dependency theories can be used to provide an 
excellent starting point for explaining the remarkable stability of die many structures 
which remain in place and continue to shape the UAE’s development, whereas on the 
odier hand die tools of modernisation theory and its variants can be employed to 
provide not only a better understanding of the UAE’s equally significant attempts to 
adapt within this ‘dependent development’, but also to underscore the importance of 
some of die development problems which are now being faced and, under the guise of 
benign globalisation, to highlight also the potential for future change. Specifically, a 
dependency framework will be used to demonstrate the UAE’s inherited situation, 
including die historic peripheralisation of die region’s economy, die emergence of early 
rentier structures, and the external reinforcement of a client elite capable of blocking 
both participation and indigenous reform. Secondly, in an effort to account for the 
inaccuracies of early modernisation theoiy and to explain why diese pre-capitalist 
traditional structures were not swept away during the oil era, a combination of rentier- 
dependency models and ‘modernisation revisionism’ (emphasising how certain 
traditional forces can be adapted and made functional)14 will be used to illustrate die
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way in which the UAE’s monarchies have managed to secure considerable political 
stability, which of course is itself an important prerequisite of the modernisation 
process. Thirdly, however, with regard to the recent attempts of these ‘selective 
modernising’ monarchies to reduce some of the most obvious weaknesses of their 
dependent economies and thereby improve their situation, it will be demonstrated that 
while there have been some successes there have also been serious development 
pathologies, and in many ways these must be regarded as the hidden costs of escaping 
the inevitability of early modernisation predictions and the demise of tradition. 
Essentially, viewed within a Weberian variant of modernisation theory, the freezing and 
reinforcement of die structures which allowed for the stability in die first place can in 
many cases be seen to have gone too far, as neo-patrimonial / clientalist networks, non­
participatory structures, a lack of transparency, and retarded civil society have all made 
legal-rational objectives difficult to achieve. Finally diough, with regard to the future, it 
will be suggested that greater modernisation, especially in the form of positive 
globalising forces, may still provide solutions for these pathologies. Indeed, while the 
first wave of globalisation may have reinforced dependency structures and problems, 
and while there still remains great uncertainty, there are nevertheless clear indications 
diat somediing of a second wave may well lead to liberalising reforms, a more 
diversified economy, and a stronger civil society. See figure (i).
Working within this framework, the first chapter, an historical background, will 
therefore highlight the lower Gulfs many antecedents to the same socio-economic and 
political structures later recognised by dependency theorists such as Andre Gunder 
Frank (with reference to Latin America) and Samir Amin (with reference to the Arab 
world).15 Indeed, it will be shown that by the beginning of the twentieth century the 
region was already heavily reliant on foreign labour, foreign technology, and, critically, 
the export of a single primary product. Indeed, in much the same way as the oil exports 
later in the century, the export of pearls also suffered from the vagaries of the 
international market, and when demand fell, the peripheral economy of the lower Gulf 
suffered the consequences. Even more significantly, however, it will be shown how an 
indigenous economic power was effectively displaced and its rulers incorporated as
3
Figure (i) “The United Arab Emirates: a theoretical framework"
clients into a greater British-Indian network. Certainly, although this period remains a 
subject of great dispute with local revisionist scholars such as Shaykh Sultan al-Qasimi 
challenging the well-established ‘Arab piracy’ explanations expounded by JG Lorimer, 
John Kelly, Charles Belgrave and other British historians,16 there is nevertheless little 
doubt that die outcome resulted in overwhelming British dominance and a fundamental 
reshaping of the region’s structures. As this chapter will demonstrate, Ismael’s 
comparable argument for Kuwait which focuses on die detachment of the coastal towns 
from the hinterland and the external reinforcement of the local rulers would seem highly 
applicable to the lower Gulf given the multitude of treaties and ‘exclusivity agreements’ 
which were signed between Britain and the ruling shaykhs of the main ports.17 In effect 
diese new relations froze die centuries-old ebb and flow of tribal powers and suppressed 
attempts to revitalise autonomous development by local merchants, thus confirming 
bodi the rulers’ predominance and their increasing reliance on British support. 
Furthermore, it will also be revealed how the subsidies, air landing fees, and exploration 
concessions paid out by British companies during this period led to considerable 
unearned wealth and relative financial autonomy for these rulers, at least from their own 
people, thus providing important early evidence for the rentier development models 
now being applied by Crystal and Gause to die oil-era Gulf states.18
In the following chapter it will be observed how these strengthened traditional 
political structures, essentially by-products of the lower Gulfs historically dependent 
relations, have continued to survive long after British withdrawal as die ruling families 
have carefiilly developed multi-dimensional ‘ruling bargains’ between themselves and 
their populations. Indeed, it will be shown how the UAE has continued to refute the 
predictions of early modernisation theories, including those of Daniel Lerner and Karl 
Deutsch,19 as die demise of traditional monarchy remains far from inevitable, despite 
the furious pace of die region’s socio-economic development. Similarly, it would seem 
that the hypotheses of Samuel Huntington, writing shortly before the region’s 
independence, have also remained inapplicable to die UAE, as die polity has thus far 
managed to circumvent any form of ‘ Shaykh’s dilemma’ in which traditional rulers are 
expected to accommodate new groups created by modernising forces and thereby cede
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some or all of their former power.20 Secondly, this chapter will demonstrate how the 
modernisation theory revisions of Michael Hudson and others who argued that merged 
sources of personal, patrimonial, and structural legitimacy may delay such a 
predicament,21 along with the rentier-dependency arguments of Hazem Beblawi and 
Giacomo Luciani,22 have offered much greater optimism and, when combined, can 
provide something of a pragmatic explanation for the survival of such polities. 
Certainly, in the case of the UAE it will be shown how rentier theories can find much 
purchase as, with massive levels of oil-related economic rent accruing directly to the 
rulers and their governments, the rulers have been able to placate almost all segments of 
society with distributed wealth, employment, free education, a welfare state, and a host 
of other privileges. Complementing this body of rentier theory, the applicability of 
Crystal’s concept of rentier coalitions will also be considered.23 Specifically, it will be 
noted how the merchants of the lower Gulf, unlike those of Kuwait, were weakened by 
the collapse of their economic base long before the oil era and were therefore more 
easily absorbed into a new ruling coalition in which the shaykhs’ incomes could be used 
to guarantee political acquiescence. Moreover, also related to rentierism, it will be 
argued that although external support from the major oil purchasing states has at times 
compromised the polity’s legitimacy, Gause’s favourable superpower relations 
explanation must nevertheless be regarded as another important element of the rentier 
survival model.24 Finally, by building upon the neo-patrimonial legitimacy formula and 
these rentier theories, this chapter will also attempt to incorporate the study of ‘dynastic 
monarchy’ into the UAE example. In particular, it will be shown how Herb’s recent 
attempts to explain the survival of traditional monarchies through their development of 
self-regulating mechanisms are highly relevant to the seven shaykhdoms of the lower 
Gulf.25 Crucially it will be demonstrated how these continuously evolving and 
expanding monarchies, many of which are vast in membership, are now acting as 
surrogates for large political parties, thus allowing for an alternative means of 
expanding power and therefore yet another means of circumventing, at least semi­
permanently, Huntington’s dilemma.
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The focus of the third chapter will be the UAE’s remarkable socio-economic 
development and it will be shown how this, or at least tlie various development 
strategies employed in the two principal emirates of Abu Dhabi and Dubai,26 can be best 
explained within the context of the UAE’s rentier wealth and the attempts of the 
modernising monarchs and their planners to alter and remove some of the less desirable 
aspects of dependent relations. Indeed, it will be revealed that from a relatively early 
stage there was already an acute awareness of the shortcomings of the neo-classical and 
economic nationalism models employed elsewhere in the developing world,27 and 
instead a recognition of the more urgent need to address many of the long-tenn dangers 
of dependency to the UAE’s economy and society, including the state’s considerable 
over-reliance on oil exports, foreign technology, and foreign labour. Tlius, by 
diversifying the economy and building up the non-oil sectors, by encouraging greater 
technology transfers, and by attempting to ‘emiratise’ the workforce, it will be 
demonstrated how the development planners began to tackle many of the features of 
economic disintegration resulting from core-peripheiy relations, including many of 
those later summarised by Amin in The Arab Economy Today.28 While many of these 
plans have been moderately successful, this chapter will, however, also underscore 
some of the more serious and seemingly insolvable problems which continue to distort 
the UAE’s development, including chronic over-consumption and trade imbalances, the 
wasteful duplication of investments, and the substantial disequilibrium between the 
constituent emirates. In particular, it will be shown how these are the kind of 
pathologies which have not been easily overcome by injections of wealth and instead 
indicate much deeper dependency-related concerns.
As such, the purpose of the fourth chapter will be to explore further some of 
diese under-the-surface pathologies and to demonstrate how seemingly domestic 
problems must also be taken into account in explaining the path of socio-economic 
development. Crucially, it will be shown how the arguments of Todaro, Toye, and 
odier economic neo-liberals who have sought to place a greater emphasis on such 
internal problems29 can be easily reconciled with dependency theory, at least with the 
UAE example, given that the region’s historic rentier-dependent relations are actually
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responsible for the existence and resilience of many of the contemporary domestic 
structures. Indeed, this chapter will demonstrate how many of the structures which 
allowed for monarchical survival and political stability have persisted and in some cases 
have been reinvigorated to such an extent that they now undermine the UAE’s 
development objectives. Moreover, explaining more clearly how such internal 
structures may lead to a lag in development and inhibit any evolution towards Weberian 
legal-rational ideals, it will be shown how neo-patrimonial networks, bureaucratic self 
interests, and complex client elite orientations remain clearly identifiable in the UAE’s 
internal political process and in the interactions of its key interest groups. Indeed, with 
regard to the latter, it will be demonstrated how the seemingly liberal refonns of the 
emerging technocratic interest groups can also be seen as the products of rentier- 
dependency structures. Essentially these new groups, in much the same way as those 
conservative groups reliant on oil-related economic rent, are also aiming to secure 
rentier wealth, albeit from new sources such as real estate and business parks. As such 
they must be viewed as part of the same client elite seeking to perpetuate rather than 
inhibit certain existing rent-channelling structures.
The aim of the fifth chapter will be to assess the recent and future impact of 
globalising forces and the ‘new economy’ on what would seem to be this dependent 
development. Specifically, the anti-globalisation arguments, many of which concentrate 
on the predatoiy nature of intrusive external forces and thereby reinforce the earlier 
underdevelopment theories,30 will be considered alongside the more pro-globalisation 
literature of David Held and others who assert that greater global integration will 
provide substantial long-term socio-economic and political benefits for developing 
states.31 With regard to the UAE’s socio-economic development it will be shown, or at 
least indicated how, thus far, there is considerable evidence to back each viewpoint, 
with globalising forces seemingly capable of both reinforcing and overcoming existing 
development pathologies. With regard to globalisation and political development, the 
second section of this chapter will demonstrate how most of the preconditions for the 
successful emergence of civil society suggested by Weigle and Butterfield, Kamrava, 
and Carapico32 are currently absent from the UAE given the high levels of financial and
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organisational co-option and the absence of any real cultural milieu (problems which 
can be seen as the rentier-dependency products of persisting patrimonial networks and a 
continuing reliance on vast quantities of expatriate labour). However, it will also be 
suggested that certain external forces, including unproved communications and the 
increasing presence and influence of international NGOs, may be increasingly capable 
of surmounting such obstacles and strengthening indigenous civil society. Thus, this 
chapter will seek to illustrate the twin effects of globalising forces on the UAE’s 
development, emphasising how the same international forces which created the 
dependent structures in the first place may now, perhaps in a second wave of 
globalisation, be the forces most likely to engender liberalising reforms.
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1. An Historical Background
“In the name of God, the merciful, the compassionate. Praise be to God,
■who hath ordained peace to be a blessing to His creatures. There is 
established, a lasting peace between the British Government and the Arab 
tribes, who are parties to this contract. "l
Under the federal banner of the ‘United Arab Emirates’, the shaykhdoms of the 
lower Gulf were transformed by the massive oil booms of the 1970s. A development 
miracle was bom and, remarkably, these once impoverished territories suddenly found 
themselves guardians of the modem world’s richest resource. There is no doubt that 
this great and rapid wealth, more than any odier factor, has been die driving force 
behind almost all aspects of change and development in die region. Certainly, as die 
later chapters of this thesis will demonstrate, oil and its politics can rarely be separated 
from any study of the Gulf States, and die UAE is no exception. Nevertheless, it is die 
purpose of this chapter to establish that the oil era cannot be used as the sole starting 
point for any comprehensive study of the lower Gulf. Nor, for that matter, can one 
focus exclusively on the time of independence and die subsequent creation of the 
federal state. Instead, one must also consider the region’s traditional structures, its pre­
oil dynamic, and its historical relations witii odier powers. Indeed, while some of these 
features have now faded from memory, there are however a significant number which 
have survived and evolved, and, as important antecedents of the current order, many of 
these have continued to form the cornerstones of die contemporary state.
Firstiy, an historical background will examine the main characteristics of the 
traditional economic, social and political structures. The second section of this chapter 
will detail die increasing external influences in the region, most notably from the 
British, and will explain how some of diese early structures were reinforced while 
others were modified and in some cases even removed. Crucially, this chapter will 
view British involvement not only in the context of regional security and institution
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building, but also as part of a broader struggle for control over local economic 
networks. Moreover, the argument will be made that Britain’s attempts to displace and 
later incorporate these indigenous networks effectively created a client elite dependent 
on British guarantees of sovereignty and the core economies of Britain and India. In 
addition, with cash payments, concessionary agreements, and a host of other subsidies, 
it will also be shown how the local elite’s reliance on non-eamed, ‘rentier’ income was 
sealed long before the first shipments of oil began. Finally, this chapter will consider 
the important period of transition when, faced with the imminent withdrawal of Britain 
from the Gulf, the reluctant shaykhdoms were spurred on to seek greater unity and 
collective security on the eve of their independence. The agreements and 
accommodations reached during this vital episode not only ensured die short-term 
survival of the region from both external threats and internal fragmentation but, as this 
thesis will demonstrate, have also continued to provide die backdrop against which 
Emirati politics take place.
1.1 - The traditional economic structure
The first postage stamps to be issued in the region depicted a string of pearls, 
local sailing craft, and date palms.2 Together with animal husbandry, hunting, and 
fishing (and of course periodic desert raiding3), these activities formed the basis of the 
lower Gulfs traditional economy for much of the nineteenth and early twentietii 
centuries. Aldiough agriculture was severely constrained by the harsh climate, date 
fanning did provide some sustenance in the vast interior, especially for those near to the 
many oases which stretched across the Rub‘ al-Khali, and for those working die "falaj' 
irrigated lands in the shadow of the Hajar mountains.4 Animal husbandly, especially of 
camels and sheep,5 provided a similarly limited source of wealth and nutrition, as did 
the hunting of gazelles6 and die fishing grounds close to the northern coastlines.7 Pearl 
diving, however, provided a much higher but more seasonal source of income for those 
who travelled to die seashores or to the many tiny islands of the lower Gulf, and in turn 
numerous other associated activities and industries such as pearl trading and boat 
building were also able to flourish in the small coastal towns.
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Indeed, pearl diving soon became the region’s primary economic activity during 
the pre-oil era given the lower Gulfs abundance of oysters and the shallowness of its 
seas. Over time, however, it is important to note that the intensity of the activity did 
vary as a function of both international demand and regional security.8 The industry 
reached its zenith in the late 1890s; a period when wealthy merchants from Bombay and 
even as far a field as East Africa would frequent the Gulf during the pearling season and 
buy up all of the best specimens for export to their affluent foreign clients.9 
Furthermore, many of these merchants began to settle in the growing ports, and many of 
their descendants remain based there today, even if their present-day economic activities 
are very different to those of their ancestors. JG Lorimer provides a good insight to the 
scale of this boom, reporting in his Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf that in one year alone 
(1896-1897) pearls valued in excess of 100 lakhs were exported (approximately three- 
quarters of a million pounds sterling), this compared with just 10 lakhs per year in the 
1870s.10
Moreover, as by-products of the pearling industry and the pearling trade, a 
number of other economic activities began to emerge in these towns. Indeed, while 
there were some small-scale cottage industries producing pottery and items of metal and 
woodwork, most of tire manufacturing that did exist was in direct response to the needs 
of the pearling community. Most obviously, pearling led to a boom in the local boat 
building industry with Umm al-Qawain and Dubai establishing themselves as the main 
centres for the assembly of a wide variety of craft built from imported African ropes and 
sails.11 Furthermore, as pearling brought greater wealth to die region, other activities 
geared towards more luxury items were also able to develop, a good example being 
tailoring and weaving.12 Although weaving was already a well-established activity in 
the region, with many travelling great distances to buy from the many renowned tailors 
in Buraimi, the greater purchasing power during the pearling boom undoubtedly 
catalysed their growth in die coastal communities. Indeed, as a testament to this period 
one can walk the older quarters of Ra’s al-Khaimah today and still see row after row of 
professional tailors.
12
However, by the early 1930s the pearling industry and these associated coastal 
activities had already begun to decline due to a combination of worldwide depression 
and increasing competition from Japanese ‘cultured’ pearls.13 This rapid downswing 
illustrates how, even in pre-oil times, the lower Gulfs economy was already heavily 
reliant on the export of a single primary product and was therefore extremely vulnerable 
to external market forces. Indeed, as Lorimer noted:
“Were the supply ofpearls to fail... the ports of Trucial Oman, which have 
no other resources, would practically cease to exist; in other words, the 
purchasing power of the inhabitants of the eastern coast of Arabia depends 
very largely upon the pearl fisheries. ”14
Similarly, as Abu Jaml, the son of a wealthy Dubai ‘pearl king’, emphasises, pearling 
had led to an early form of dependency in the region, thus creating many dilemmas for 
his father’s generation:
"Pearl prices were governed by the dynamics of supply and demand, as is 
the case with oil today, and there were times when the catch of a whole 
season did not fetch enough money to cover the cost of the meals consumed 
by the divers and sailors. At one stage things got so bad that the British 
government decided to give pearl traders access to markets in Ceylon. But 
in return for this the traders had to forfeit two-thirds of their earnings to the 
British and Ceylonese governments to be shared equally between them. ”15
Clearly, as the operations of diese pearl kings expanded they became increasingly 
susceptible to the fluctuations of the international economy, and as this example 
describes, in some cases they even had to forego most of their profits simply to survive. 
Furthermore, and even more ruinously, many of these men were also resistant to the 
concept of diversifying their interests. Indeed, as Jaml explains, pearling and pearl 
trading had come to represent not only a source of income but also a way of life, and as 
such the pearlers were overly cautious when it came to considering any other activity:
13
"...even though some pearl merchants went bankrupt as a result of the 
slumps that hit the pearl markets from time to time, most of them would not 
explore new areas of business. I was with my father in Bombay when he 
sold pearls worth more than one million rupees and was advised by a 
Bahraini merchant to buyMadinat Hotel that was offered for sale at 70,000 
rupees. My father told the man that he was out of his senses to advise him 
to freeze so much money... that hotel is still in business in Bombay while the 
pearl era eclipsed more than 40years ago!”16
As will be demonstrated later in the study, this is entirely the fate that the contemporary 
UAE, specifically Dubai, has been trying to avoid. Hotels, commerce, light industry 
and all maimer of activities are being explored as part of an unceasing attempt to 
diversify the narrow base of the oil dependent economy.17
Although clearly not self-sustaining, another important aspect of the Gulfs 
pearling economy was that it was beginning to exhibit signs of indigenous capitalist 
development. Indeed, while the region has often been associated with non-capitalist 
relations of production in which capital and labour were rarely separated (the fanners 
would own their land, the Bedu would own their camels, the fishermen would own then- 
boats, etc.), tlie growth of the pearling industry nevertheless led to an evolution of 
capitalism not too dissimilar to that found in feudalist-capitalist Europe. The key to this 
change was the matter of ownership of the pearling boats. In the early years of pearling, 
tlie well-practised ikhluwi was a communal system in which the crew would jointly own 
a boat and would share all of file season’s profits, distributed according to the type of 
work each individual performed. However, as the size of boats increased and the period 
of expeditions lengthened, it became less easy for the crew to afford to maintain and 
equip such boats. This was further exacerbated by the influx of expatriate pearling 
crewmen who were present for only a short period and required a more tangible wage. 
As such, the 'Amil system became more prevalent. Under this system tlie boats were 
owned and fitted out by wealthier individuals who possessed the necessary capital 
outlay, and in return would receive a large part of the take at the end of the season,
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leaving the rest to be divided among the crew. Inevitably, this arrangement led to the 
emergence of two distinct groups: those who were unable to jointly equip a boat and 
therefore had to offer themselves as salaried crewmen, and those who were able to 
invest in pearling boats and thereby claim a share of the profits without even having to 
participate in the expedition.18 Furthermore, this system of financial interdependence 
was being continually reinforced by die captains, many of whom doubled up as brokers 
(musaqqam) and were often relied upon by tiieir crewmen to obtain die necessary outlay 
from the entrepreneurs. These intermediaries charged high rates of interest (between 10 
and 25%) and also claimed a further share of the profits for themselves.19 Thus, in 
many ways a clearly identifiable ‘pearling proletariat’, the ‘ghasa\ was beginning to 
emerge inidemeadi an early form of capitalist / entrepreneurial class.20
Lastly, alongside these pearling-related activities and their mode of organisation, 
it is also worth noting some of die other forms of commerce which were practised in the 
area, as before the nineteenth centiuy overseas and regional trading had provided 
another important means of livelihood for those in the coastal towns and for those based 
near the major souqs of die interior. Indeed, die lower Gulf maintained trade links with 
many foreign ports, including Manama, Basra, Muscat, and even Zanzibar. Similarly 
diere were many well-established land routes for caravans from Oman and other parts of 
Arabia. Many of the old trading posts, such as the camel market north of Buraimi oasis, 
still function today, and continue to help support the local economy while also boosting 
the tourist appeal. Simple commodities formed the bulk of the goods, but two 
especially lucrative activities are worthy of mention: slaves and gold. The lower Gulf 
has long been associated with the slave trade and, as will be discussed later, at one point 
its towns served as entry points for close to 12,000 African slaves a year, many of 
whom were then transported by land into the Arabian interior or across the Gulf to 
Persia.21 The gold trade was another important component of the pre-oil economy, and 
continued to grow in volume well into the twentieth century. Indeed it is believed that 
in the 1960s, on the eve of the creation of the federation, no less than one-tenth of all of 
the non-Communist world’s gold passed through the region’s ports.22
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With the exception of Dubai, which continued to position itself as the 
commercial hub of the lower Gulf,23 overseas trade did however begin to fall into long­
term decline with many of the towns’ commercial activities only beginning to pick up in 
more recent times as a result of the oil boom and the resulting improvements in 
infrastructure and ports. Britain’s controversial military actions in the early nineteenth 
century and its anti-slavery treaties, both of which will be considered later in this 
chapter, effectively capped the region’s trading potential and in many ways terminated 
what used to be a prosperous Arabian monopoly. Furthermore, with the development of 
more advanced ships requiring deeper berths the costal towns found themselves unable 
to accommodate many of the larger European vessels. As Frauke Heard-Bey describes:
"...a great number of coral reefs and sandbanks, together with the 
numerous low lying islands make navigation extremely difficult and 
hazardous. Due to the extreme difficulty of approach and. the lack of any 
sizable natural harbours there was comparatively little long distance 
shipping undertaken during the last few centuries from the ports of this 
coast... and overseas trading has consequently not been a very important 
feature of its economy until recently.1,24
In summary, most of the lower Gulfs traditional economic activities were 
centred around the scant geographical resources of the desert. The camels and gazelles 
of the hinterland allowed for some limited animal husbandry and hunting, while the 
oases and mountainous areas provided die opportunity for some small-scale agriculture. 
The exception to this scarcity was the richness of the Gulf itself, which provided both 
plentiful fish and, more importantly, an abundance of pearls. Indeed, pearling was 
especially significant given that it provided a lucrative source of income capable of 
fuelling other associated economic activities in the coastal towns. Nevertheless, 
pearling was unstable, highly vulnerable to the vagaries of overseas markets, and its 
eventual collapse had damaging repercussions for the entire economy. Thus, given the 
general impoverishment of die region and its over reliance on the export of single 
primary product, the lower Gulf was in many ways doomed to be a peripheiy of die
16
international economy long before the oil era. Finally, however, with tlie emerging 
capitalist mode of production clearly evident in tlie pearling industry, and with the 
trading links forged between the Gulf and other Asian economies, it also remains 
important to underscore the significant level of indigenous economic organisation and 
regional integration which was taking place; developments which were to be later 
blocked and reversed during the years of British control.
1.2 - The traditional social structure
Alongside die development of these economic activities, a distinct social 
structure was forming as a result of both the lower Gulfs natural resources and the 
circumstances surrounding their exploitation. Important social groupings and divisions 
have been evident in the region since nomadic times, and many of these were further 
stratified as a result of the shift of activity towards the coasts in pursuit of pearling. 
Moreover, the influx of foreigners and the described relations of production led to 
additional layers, as expatriate workers and pearling merchants gradually became a part 
of the new social fabric. Further related to these changing economic conditions, the 
increasing urbanisation of die population became another important feature of tiiis 
period as die region’s communities were permanently transformed and its people began 
to adapt to a more sedentary life.
In the years preceding British intervention and the pearling boom, the desert and 
the nomadic lifestyle were still the greatest influences on society. Tlie well-established 
Bedu tribes, many of which still exist today, at least in name, can be seen as having 
spawned the first set of distinct classes in die lower Gulf. As shown, many of these 
nomads survived simply by hunting or through animal husbandry. These activities 
afforded only a subsistence living given the meagre resources, but the importance of the 
latter cannot be understated as it reveals an important early difference between the 
region’s various tribes. Animal husbandry normally took two fonns: sheep herding and 
camel herding. Of these, camel herding was a far more mobile pursuit given the greater 
range and resilience of the camels, and as such the sharif or camel herding tribes were
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slowly able to achieve something close to hegemony over then sheep herding 
counterparts, many of whom were reduced to tending sharif flocks and maintaining 
sharif pastoral lands.25 Moreover, this distinction was reinforced by means of social 
exclusivity and selective inter-marriage, allowing the members of the sharif tribes to 
assume an almost aristocratic status over the less mobile tribes. Tlius, in an almost 
tributary system, these weaker tribes were left to evolve as a dependent class of 
producers and forced to accept a subservient role in exchange for economic and military 
security from their more powerful fellow tribes.
The origins of the lower Gulfs social structure can therefore be traced back far 
further than the relatively recent move towards the town life of the ports. Indeed, the 
desert hierarchy provides the first real example of social stratification in the region as 
well as underscoring the early significance of descent lineages, many of which are of 
course still carefully maintained today. Essentially, these lineages reinforced 
exclusivity and formed a key pillar of Bedu society, allowing tribesmen to claim 
authority and status based solely on their descent from esteemed ancestors, whether real 
or fictional. In practice, these lineages were inevitably subdivided given the large 
number of disparate tribes and the vast geographical area of the desert, but, as Ibn 
Khaldun foresaw, they continued to provide a strong sense of security and allowed for 
several economic advantages which were normally beyond the capabilities of individual 
families. Indeed, group endeavours were often only possible with the support of a tribe 
given the large membership and the mutual trust resulting from their shared ancestry.26 
As such, co-operative social labour often became the norm within a greater kinship 
organisation, or ‘ashTra, as competition over herds or pasturelands could be moderated, 
and as large-scale agricultural projects could be undertaken and shared for the benefit of 
the whole group.
The second major feature of file region’s early social structure developed out of 
the need to diversify and escape from the subsistence living afforded by the desert’s 
extremely limited wealth. Clearly, the climatic limits on all of the region’s traditional 
pursuits, coupled with the high population density relative to the available resources,
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prevented not only the expansion of any one activity but also the emergence of any 
distinct occupational groups such as fishermen or fanners. Indeed, unlike many of the 
neighbouring Omani and Yemeni tribes,27 a shortage of fertile land prevented most from 
leading any form of settled existence (the hadhr people), and, as the move to the coasts 
was a very gradual process, there was a long period in which many Bedu would engage 
in different activities at different times of the year. As such, a semi-nomadic pattern 
emerged, and led to a great deal of versatility among the tribes. In die winter tribesmen 
would tend to their herds in the desert, while in the summer they would move to the 
cooler coastlines to fish or, as later became die case, dive for pearls; and at various other 
times some would harvest dates or even harvest millet high in the Hajar mountains.28 
As one might expect, this level of versatility seems to have been particularly evident 
along the Indian Ocean coastline (Fujairah, Khor Fakkan, Kalba, etc.) where both the 
sea and die palm groves were widiin easy reach of die villages, dierefore discouraging 
any occupational specialisation.29 Moreover, in general very few of the region’s tribes 
were ever tied to one geographic location or to one specific activity as eventually 
circumstances would change and they would be forced to eitiier diversify or relocate. 
Indeed, severe droughts could push agriculturalists out into the desert to take up animal 
husbandry once more, and equally die nomadic tribes could plunder and assume control 
of agricultural lands, they themselves switching their primary occupation.30
Significandy, die pearling boom and die subsequent growtii of the ports 
exercised major changes on this traditional society as the growing foreign demand for 
Gulf pearls meant that many of die previously semi-nomadic Bedu who had 
occasionally participated in the aforementioned ikhluwi co-operatives finally had 
enough money to purchase more than the basic necessities, and, crucially, were also 
able to build houses in the expanding coastal towns.31 However, despite tliis greater 
urbanisation, in many ways the existing social stratification remained in place as a 
number of the sharif tribesmen, who were often the only pearlers possessing sufficient 
surplus capital, chose to re-invest in die pearling industry under the new ‘amil system, 
thereby becoming part of the new merchant / entrepreneurial class, and effectively 
transferring the old hierarchy of the desert to the pearling industry. Prominent figures in
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this emerging group included Khalaf Al-Utaibah of Abu Dhabi and Salim bin Misabbah 
of Dubai, both of whose families remain prominent in Emirati society today. Over the 
years, many of these wealthy notables came to exercise great political power behind the 
scenes, and, as Abdullah has shown, in tlie case of Sharjah they were even able to 
replace one ruler with another as they saw fit.32 Furthermore, given that their capitalist 
ventures were frequently more lucrative than the ruler’s sources of income, it was often 
they who were the main financiers of any local projects, or indeed any local wars.33
The relatively rewarding nature of the pearling industry and the ability to make 
substantial profits from successful ventures also attracted many foreigners to die lower 
Gulf for the first time. Many believe that it was only when the oil boom began that 
large numbers of expatriates moved to the area, but in fact this process had begun far 
earlier and the region was no stranger to such a phenomenon. Although the bulk of 
these expatriates were temporary crewmen, attracted by the high demand and high 
wages associated with pearl diving, there were, however, a large number of merchants 
who also began to arrive and take up semi-permanent residence. Interestingly, in much 
tire same way as the skilled expatriates working in the UAE today, these Hindu and 
Khojah merchants would often bring their families with them to Dubai or Abu Dhabi 
and would spend most of the year living and working in the town, but would always 
take their annual leave (and presumably their savings) back in India and did not 
consider their place of work to be their home.34 Moreover, the interests of diese 
foreigners soon began to expand beyond pearling, with many being equally attracted to 
the otiier economic activities that die boom had given rise to. Indeed, given that most of 
the local Arabs tended to limit themselves to dhow trading or pearling, which were 
considered to be honourable activities, this left plenty of opportunity for foreign 
entrepreneur s to monopolise shop-keeping and other retail activities.35
As such, tire region’s foreign population continued to grow as new socio­
economic groups began to form around countries of origin. Certainly, in a study 
presented to die Political Resident in 1901 there were already believed to be 500 
Persians and 52 Banians (British-Indian subjects) in Dubai, and 96 Persians and 39
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Banians resident in Abu Dhabi.36 Given their similarities in cultural background, many 
of the expatriate Muslim Arabs and Persians were easily assimilated by the existing 
society, and as time passed some of these were even offered citizenship. The Indian 
Hindus, with their religious and cultural differences were, however, less easily absorbed 
and remained a more distinct social group. Indeed, as Lorimer describes, the result was 
an almost alien cluster within society, but given their usefulness and the high demand 
for their labour and skills, they were tolerated and accepted; the parallels with the 
contemporary UAE’s reliance on Indian labour being very clear. There was though one 
complication at this time which is not an issue today: during the pearling era many of 
the wealthier Indian merchants held British-Indian passports which guaranteed them 
some degree of diplomatic immunity, and, crucially, exempted them from taxation.37 In 
the UAE most undesirable expatriates can simply be relieved of their visas and 
deported, but in earlier times the rulers did not possess the same level of control over 
their sizeable British-Indian population.38 A good example would be Heard-Bey’s 
account of the Banian Bin Lutah family. On leaving Dubai for ‘Ajman, the family 
decided to take their pearl divers with them, without first settling their debts in Dubai. 
The ruler of ‘Ajman, bound by an earlier British agreement to hand over fraudulent 
absconders, attempted to return these unwanted divers to Dubai, but the British Political 
Resident in Busliire intervened, sending a Royal Navy vessel to ‘Ajman to enforce Ins 
decision in favour of the Bin Lutahs.39 Indeed, there were many examples where 
Britain ended up supporting absconding subjects, especially if they were indebted to 
British creditors who would stand to lose upon then death.40
Following the pearling booms, the aforementioned decline of the industry in the 
1930s also had major ramifications for the region’s social structure, as most of the more 
able foreigners began to drift away, leaving something of a void in local society. 
Indeed, many of the activities formerly run by tire expatriates began to peter out, 
including, most notably, the running of the schools. Furthermore, it is worth noting that 
those foreigners who did remain during this time of hardship were far less easily 
integrated into society than during the boom time. The wealth and prosperity which had 
previously gelled the region’s heterogeneous society together had declined and tensions
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began to surface, the situation almost certainly being exacerbated by the many foreign 
moneylenders who had begun to gain something of a stranglehold over the locals given 
their earlier financing of pearling expeditions. These predominantly non-Muslim 
brokers, many of whom had been able to practise usury,41 were either attempting to call 
in their debts during a time of uncertainty or were simply capitalising on the situation by 
charging high rates of interest for bridging loans.42
In summary, the pearling booms transformed the region’s traditional social 
structure as large numbers of foreigners were attracted to the region for the first time, 
and in many ways tliis massive influx of expatriates can be seen as a clear antecedent to 
the contemporary UAE’s labour market. More importantly, however, a number of these 
new foreign contingents, especially the wealthy Banian merchants, can also be seen as 
having further reinforced the early peripheral nature of the lower Gulfs economy as 
many of diese British-Indian subjects operated autonomously of the local rulers,43 were 
exempt from taxation, and remained only semi-permanent residents, regularly returning 
to India, and diereby transferring the bulk of their accumulated capital from the region 
to a core economy. Nevertheless, alongside these foreign expropriators it is also 
important to note that there existed an extremely wealdiy indigenous class which had 
emerged as the stronger sharif tribes (often possessing surplus capital from their camel 
herding activities) were able to invest heavily in new pearling ventures. Moreover, 
many of these Arab merchants were also capable of funding local development projects 
and, on occasion, even checking the ruler’s power. However, as the remainder of this 
chapter will demonstrate, by the early twentiedi centiuy indirect British intervention and 
new sources of wealth had effectively restrained die expansion of this entrepreneurial 
class, thus shifting die crucial merchant-ruler balance, and thereby pennanendy altering 
the course of the region’s socio-economic development.
1.3 - The traditional political structure
In much the same way as the region’s traditional economic and social structures 
the geographical context, die great distances, the harsh conditions, and the tribal
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hierarchy primarily defined die traditional political structures of the lower Gulf. As 
such, in tenns of authority, the modem territorial concept of statehood was largely alien 
to the region’s traditional polity given the vagueness of the desert and the tribal way of 
life. Certainly, as Kevin Fenelon notes:
“The desert was like an ocean highway across which the nomadic tribes 
could move at will. Their organisation was tribal, and the ruler was not so 
much a territorial overlord as one who held the allegiance of several tribes 
or tribal groups. In times of emergency the tribes might rally round a 
shaykh of the strongest tribe, but the concept that the authority of a ruling 
shaykh had a territorial extent as well as a personal one was only brought 
in when the British gave the name of ‘state' to the sum of political influence 
that one of the undersigning shaykhs could muster among the tribes. ”44
Thus, in the period prior to British involvement, the political structure revolved 
primarily around the tribe and authority over people, radier than vast tracts of mostly 
worthless sand. Indeed, as Heard-Bey argues, even by the mid-twentieth century the 
establishment of a territorial state with distinct physical boundaries was still very much 
“...out of tune witii the traditional conduct of local politics given that sovereignty over 
people was far from permanently binding, let alone sovereignty over territory.”45
Two clear examples of this need for authority over people would be the long- 
running struggles for mastery over die tribes of Buraimi and Ra’s al-Jibal. Buraimi, as 
explained, was a strategically important oasis and trading post, with many of the local 
rulers believing that hegemony over tribes in this area would soon lead to great power 
over influential groups needing to visit the oasis. As such, control over the population 
of Buraimi has long been a source of conflict for die rulers of Abu Dhabi, Oman, and 
Saudi Arabia. Indeed, as will be described later in this chapter, the contest reached its 
most acute point only as recently as 1952, with the central argument still surrounding 
die allegiance of die local independent tribes. This aspect of die dispute was only 
resolved in 1959 when Abu Dhabi and Oman finally agreed to delineate boundaries
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through the area, thus dividing it into the present day towns of Burainu (in Oman) and 
Al-‘Ayn (in Abu Dhabi emirate). This physical demarcation was seen as the only way 
of preventing the local tribes from continuously attempting to play off one regional 
power against another. Similarly, the Ra’s al-Jibal example highlights the attempts of 
another major power, Ra’s al-Khaimah, to dominate an area in order to gain influence 
over local tribes. Certainly, given the Ra’s al-Jibal tribesmen’s preference for the 
distant and rather ineffective authority of the Sultan of Oman, Ra’s al-Khaimah needed 
to demonstrate its ability to exert control over nearby populations. For many years, 
however, Ra’s al-Jibal remained loyal to far-away Muscat, frustrating Ra’s al-Khaimah 
and thereby illustrating how tenuous die concept of political power was at diis time. 
Certainly, witii different tribes in close proximity to each other, and witii many 
accepting the sovereignty of different rulers, it was exceedingly difficult for any one 
power to form a coherent political entity.46 Indeed, even a close inspection of a map of 
the present day UAE will still reveal many pockets of territory which continue to exist 
many miles inside the territorial boundaries of neighbouring states; obvious examples 
being the Omani controlled Musandam Peninsula and the village of Madha close to the 
Wadi al-Hatta. This complex patchwork of enclaves serves as a reminder of the 
continuing relevance of tribal allegiances and the contemporary rulers’ desire to 
maintain control over certain groups even if there are considerable logistical difficulties 
in enforcing such authority.
Despite this rather vague sense of political control, the region’s traditional 
governments, or hukuma, did, however, possess certain key institutions which were 
deemed necessary for administering the ruling shaykh’s authority. Perhaps the most 
important of these institutions were the dfwan and the majlis. The semi-formal dTwan 
consisted of the shaykh’s appointed advisers, each of whom represented an important 
segment of society. The tribal nature of the political system was clearly present in the 
dTwan given that the ruler’s family tended to dominate, as they were always the largest 
tribe in the area (the one exception being tire ruling tribe of Ra’s al-Khaimah).47 On a 
more informal level the majlis (pi. majalis) provided a forum for the people to air then- 
grievances, often in the presence of the shaykh himself. Thus, in many ways this early
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form of government left room for a kind of consultation-based grass roots democracy, 
as in theory any member of a town’s population could find a channel of communication 
leading directly to their ruler.48 This may not seem a very democratic system in the 
western sense, but given the described nature of tire region’s loosely defined 
constituencies, the majalis nevertheless allowed for a form of ‘mobile democracy’. 
Indeed, any tribesman who raised an issue with a ruler and was left unsatisfied could 
simply move to another village or town under a different administration, thus ‘voting 
with his feet’.49
Underneath the ruler and these rudimentary institutions there were of course 
many other manifestations of administrative authority, and as society gradually became 
more sedentary a greater number of institutions and official positions were required to 
protect, supervise and govern the various towns and activities of the region: See figure 
(ii).
• Ruler - the principal shaykh assumed responsibility of all institutions and 
made himself available to hear any grievances from his population
• Diwan- tire ruler’s court of advisers
• Majlis / majalis - informal consultation chambers, often in the presence of 
the ruler or his representatives
• Ruler’s personal secretary - normally an educated expatriate Arab 
responsible for administration and communication between the ruler and 
other authorities
• Qadi - an important position for a religious man, responsible for dispensing 
justice according to Islamic law
• QadT court / Pearling courts - tribiuials presided over by either a qadi or 
representatives of the pearling committee to resolve disputes and dispense 
justice. As described, the complex system of financing employed by the 
pearling industry involved both creditors and debtors and as such was 
frequently the cause of dispute. As a result, pearling courts or salifa al- 
ghaus were set up by the ruler or wall and presided over by captains and
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Figure (ii) “The Hukuma’1
other members of the pearling community who ‘had a reputation for fairness 
and good judgement’.50
• WallI 'Amir (in Dalma) / Na'ib (in Al-‘Ayn) - the ruler’s representative in 
an outlying region
• Muzakki ~ an official responsible for the collection of taxes and customs
• "Arif- an official responsible for the maintenance of the falaj channels in 
agricultural towns such as Hatta and Al-‘Ayn. These men collected a fixed 
sum of money (the masha) from the owners of date gardens in exchange for 
diverting the flow of water from one channel to another as necessary.51
• Mutarizaya - the ruler’s armed retainers
• Haras - armed guards at the ruler’s fort in the main town
• "Askars - armed tribesmen paid a salary to enforce the ruler’s authority in 
outlying regions
• Duris - armed guards in die oasis towns and outlying regions responsible for 
protecting camels and other livestock from raiders
• Supervisor of the souq - an official responsible for ensuring the smooth 
functioning of die town’s marketplaces.52
Of these odier hukuma positions perhaps the most useful in contributing to a 
further understanding of the traditional political structure would be the ruler’s 
representatives, who were usually placed in charge of outlying territories, often beyond 
the range of the ruler’s personal authority. Broadly speaking, diis system of delegation 
was practised throughout the region, albeit with different titles and slighdy different 
responsibilities. In the northern shaykhdoms, for example, the rulers appointed waits to 
collect taxes from their more remote towns, and also to organise the defence of any 
outposts against raiders or attacks from rival shaykhs. Moreover, the walls were also 
expected to serve as the rulers’ de facto governors in these towns, holding local majalis, 
arbitrating disputes, and dispensing justice widi the assistance of qadTs and pearling 
courts.53 Similarly, Abu Dhabi employed 'amirs who would live and work on the many 
scattered islands belonging to die ruler. Their task, like that of die wall, was to collect 
pearling taxes and settle disputes with the assistance of the muzakki and various other
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customs officials.54 The crucial difference being that the ’amirs received a fixed 
payment from the ruler rather than a share of die local taxes, thus making them the 
region’s earliest form of salaried bureaucrat.
Significantly, and again illustrating the de-centralised and fluid nature of politics 
during this period, in many cases these representatives grew autonomous of the ruler as 
their control over local taxes and populations invariably allowed them to develop 
personal fiefdoms. Indeed, as Heard-Bey describes, veiy often the further away a wall 
was from die ruler’s town, the greater became his political weight.55 Certainly, tiiere 
have been many examples in the region’s histoiy of such representatives seceding and 
in some cases even returning to usurp the ruler’s control over the main town. A good 
example of such a struggle being how, in 1948, the nephew of the ruler of Sharjah used 
his position as a wall to gain immense local popularity and power by supporting those 
who wanted a reduction in die pearling tax imposed by die ruler. By successfully 
defying his uncle he managed to build sufficient support to enable him to take over as 
ruler of nearby Ra’s al-Khaimah.56 Of course a more recent example would be the 
events surrounding the accession of Shaykh Zayid Al-Nuliayyan during the 1960s. As 
governor or na’ib of the large agricultural town and the nearby villages of Al-‘Ayn, 
Zayid had proved himself a capable ruler in his own right and had amassed considerable 
popular support. Thus, as will be discussed in the following chapter, when the time 
came for pressure to be placed upon his older and more conservative brother in the 
capital, Zayid was seen as the natural successor and, given his existing power base, the 
transition was both straightforward and popularly accepted.57
Another crucial aspect of the traditional administrative structure was its ability to 
subsidise the population. This was an important manifestation of the ruler’s authority 
and in many ways a precursor to the system of wealth distribution practised during the 
oil era. Indeed, during this period the rulers frequently used heavy subsidies to buy 
influence and protection from other tribes, thereby keeping the peace.58 Lorimer 
illustrates this point showing how the rulers were able to maintain control over Bedu 
groups simply by giving their chiefs a steady stream of gifts.59 Even more noteworthy
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than these subsidies, however, were tlie taxes imposed upon the population at this time. 
Although the taxes collected were never particularly high and never reached the same 
levels as the European states, they nevertheless required the hukuma to operate certain 
extractive institutions and allowed the ruler to raise funds for various projects: fiscal 
capabilities which have rarely been employed by the contemporary state.
By far the most important of these taxes were those levied on pearling and its 
associated activities, especially during tlie boom period. Taraz taxes were collected to 
pay guards to protect towns during the height of the pearling season when many of the 
men were out at sea, and also to protect the many pearling boats which were left 
unattended along the coasts during the off-season.60 The taraz was levied from each 
two-man pearling team (a diver and hauler partnership called a qalta\ and die pearling 
crews had to pay collectively a naub tax on their boat in addition to royalties on any 
pearls valued at more than 1000 rupees.61 Other lucrative forms of dues included die 
customs duties the ruler imposed on die ports, the ruler’s collection of rent from shops 
in the souqs, and also the ruler’s ability to issue fishing licences and charge a 
commensurate fee.62 As mentioned, a number of taxes were also levied by die walls in 
order to raise funds for the town’s administration, the payment of its guards, and the 
upkeep of its forts and towers. Moreover, tiiere were specific taxes collected by 'arif 
officials for the upkeep of community projects such as the operation of the falaj 
irrigation channels, in addition to taxes on some of the agricultural activities 
tiiemselves. If a fanner produced more than the nisab, which was the tax-threshold 
quantity of dates, tiien it became necessary for him to pay between 5 and 10% of his 
income to the wall. In practice however, many areas failed to meet the nisab or were 
simply left untaxed, and even if die wall did begin to collect, it was usually just 
payment in kind in order to help feed his retainers.63 Similarly insignificant were the 
taxes on livestock, the zakat tax, which amounted to a mere 10 rupees per camel.64 
Nevertheless die zakat and nisab taxes, aldiough small, still served as a symbol of 
authority over tribesmen and in some cases were the only reminder for many Bedu 
people of exacdy who tiieir distant overlord was; tiiis being underscored during die
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aforementioned Buraimi disputes when the different sides began to claim sovereignty 
over the area based oil a history of zakat collection among particular tribes.
In order to understand better the impact of this taxation, a brief case study of one 
of the many pearling / fishing islands of Abu Dhabi clearly highlights the role of the tax 
collector, and provides something of an insight into the early extractive process. 
Dalma, a small island off the coast of Abu Dhabi, is still a base for fishermen, and used 
to be a major centre of activity during the pearling boom. In 1955 the ruler’s 
representative, the ’amir, gave a written description of the taxation system still in use on 
the island:
“(1) At the beginning of the pearling season a sack of rice, juniya, and 
four rupees tuman were collected from every boat; half of both amounts 
were taken from small boats. (2) A share equal to the season ’s income of 
one rope-puller, a saib, was collected as hdsila. This amount was 
calculated. The remainder was shared between the divers and saibs at the 
proportion of three for the former and two for the latter, after adding an 
imaginary saib. The share of that saib was the tax due to the ruler of Abu 
Dhabi. (3) At the end of a season a tax of two rupees was levied on every 
qalta (pair, a diver and a hauler). (4) On every pearl valued. 2000 rupees or 
more a tax of200 rupees was taken by the ruler (5) Naub was at that time 
the term for the tax levied on every pearl merchant or other merchant in 
Dalma or the islands and coastal tracts administered by the 'amir. The tax 
varied between 2 and 200 rupees a year for an individual, depending on the 
size of his business. (6) ‘Azima was a voluntary contribution of the pearl 
merchants towards the cost of a feast traditionally given in honour of the 
ruler when he or a close relative came to Dalma at the end of every diving 
season. ”65
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Thus, no fewer than six specific forms of dues existed on the island. With Dalma Island 
being a typical example of a pearling community, this demonstrates the way in which 
taxation was veiy much a part of life for the coastal region during the pre-oil period.
In summary, the lower Gulfs traditional political structures were in many ways 
products of the same factors which shaped the early economic and social structures; 
namely the region’s geography and the tribal system. Certainly, with well spread out 
and distant settlements, and with the need to control tribal populations rather than 
physical territory, there evolved a de-centralised and extremely fluid political system in 
which the power of rulers and governors would vary according to their popular support, 
and in which the people could exercise considerable mobile democracy by moving from 
one constituency to another. Eventually, as society became more sedentary the 
traditional governments did expand as, in Weberian terms, the system evolved from one 
of family-based patriarchal authority to one of patrimonialism,66 requiring new positions 
and institutions to arbitrate, subsidise, and tax the population. While many of these 
features, including the hukuma’s system of appointments and the early distribution of 
wealth, are certainly important antecedents of contemporary political structures, it is 
however quite apparent that other equally notable characteristics of the traditional polity 
have either faded or, in some cases, disappeared. Indeed, with well-established rulers, a 
more centralised state, and larger populations, much of tile former flexibility of political 
control has gone, which of course has also reduced the effectiveness of the old system 
of mobile democracy. Furthermore, whereas in the past the traditional government was 
routinely able to tax its population and was therefore a relatively ‘strong state’ with 
well-defined extractive capabilities,67 much of this ability would now appear to have 
been lost.
1.4 - External Influences and the ‘Trucial States’
To provide a better explanation of these important political changes and 
continuities in addition to the previously discussed socio-economic developments, this 
section will consider the substantial impact of external forces on the region, and their
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role in reinforcing certain traditional structures while removing and suppressing others. 
Although beginning with an assessment of tlie early Portuguese presence in tlie lower 
Gulf, the main focus will be the increasing influence of the British Empire and the 
expanding regional power of the British East India Company. In particular, it will be 
shown how Britain’s relationship with the lower Gulf evolved from one of open conflict 
to one of maritime peace, and then to one of increasing economic and political control. 
Moreover, it will be demonstrated how Britain’s intensifying efforts to dominate tlie 
region can be viewed as not only an attempt to preserve existing British economic 
networks, namely tlie trading route to India, but also as an attempt to incorporate and 
control indigenous Arab networks. Furthermore, it will be shown how this 
peripheralisation of the region also led to die creation of local client rulers, many of 
whom were reliant on die British core not only for their sovereignty but also for their 
economic livelihood and as a source of non-eamed wealth.
Portuguese interests in die lower Gulf were essentially limited to trade. 
Specifically, it was die empire’s intention to monopolise the trade route between Europe 
and its colonies in the East Indies by outflanking the traditional overland routes of 
Persia and the Mashriq.68 To tiiis end, Portugal concentrated on developing the entirely 
maritime route around the African Cape of Good Hope which their navigators had 
successfully charted in the fifteenth century. By using such a route it was critical that 
the periphery of the Indian Ocean was secured, and many in Lisbon believed tiiat the 
Straits of Hormuz were necessary for tiiis control.69 As such, some form of Portuguese 
presence was required in Oman, and naval bases were also established in nearby Khor 
Fakkan (a present day container port on the UAE’s Indian Ocean coastline) and in Ra’s 
al-Khaimah. However, unlike the Asian Portuguese colonies of Macao and Goa, these 
Arab ports never became major bases due to their lack of natural harbours and the few 
watering places along the coast of die Gulf. Consequently, no real settlement took place 
in the region, and as such the period of Portuguese occupation had little effect on 
indigenous structures. Certainly, as Heard-Bey claims, the empire’s only real impact on 
the region was to have reduced the lower Gulfs security as die imperial presence 
frequently endangered local Arab trade by bringing Ottoman, Dutch, and British rivals
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ever closer to the area. Furthermore, the well-documented Portuguese practice of 
putting to death entire communities if local harbours and fortifications were withheld 
may have imprinted lasting memories on the minds of the native population.70 As such, 
it has been argued that the longevity of these memories created an understandable sense 
of distrust and unease in the Arabs’ future dealings with foreigners, and may therefore, 
as much as any other factor, have contributed to the initial clash with Britain, the second 
imperial power to take an interest in the region.
Indeed, Britain’s first major contact with the lower Gulf was a hading dispute 
which soon escalated into warfare. In die early eighteendi century die Qawasim (adj. 
QasimT) tribes of Ra’s al-Khaimah and Sharjah had been growing in strength and 
prestige as dieir trading activities flourished. When QasimI power eventually extended 
to the island of Qishm71 tiiey began to establish a third trading base, but tliis new 
entrepot Arab port soon began to affect adversely the customs receipts which had 
previously been divided between die British and Persian empires. This loss of revenue 
prompted die British East India Company, a Bombay-based trading company, to send 
an armed expedition to the island to claim by force the Company’s share of the customs 
from die Arab traders.72 Thus, an intense maritime struggle over local trading networks 
began; a struggle which was to last well into the nineteentii century, the events of which 
have been clouded in historical controversy with the Qawasim being branded as 
fanatical pirates and the British as imperial aggressors.
With the benefit of hindsight, little is clear, although there appear to have been a 
number of different issues which contributed to this protracted and bloody conflict. 
Firstly, diere is no doubt that with the growtii of European competition along the Indian 
Ocean h ading routes, die decline of the narrow maritime-oriented economic base of the 
Qawasim was in many ways inevitable. As such, Heard-Bey argues that with so many 
QasimT boats and sailors out of action due to die decline in trade, it was foreseeable that 
at least some would him their hand to something more lucrative. After all, nomadic 
desert raiding, or ‘ghazu ’ was not uncommon in the hinterland and had always proved a 
popular alternative during times of austerity. Thus, piracy on the seas may have been
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viewed by some as simply an extension of such an activity, albeit with far higher 
rewards.73 Moreover, die power vacuum and die lawlessness following the concurrent 
decline of the Persian Empire may have compounded the economic downswing and 
provided even more conditions conducive to a serious conflict between the local power 
and the major foreign power. Indeed, Donald Hawley, a former British Political Agent 
in Dubai, supports such a view:
“ ...while the Gulf was far from peaceful during the eighteenth century, the 
blame did not lie entirely with the Qawdsim. Persia was in internal turmoil, 
and trade, which the Qawdsim shared with other Gulf Arabs, was carried 
on against a background of strife. Piracy was also endemic in the Gulf and 
had broken out periodically throughout history, when no strong government 
controlled the area. ”74
Certainly, Hawley believes that if the region had not been so turbulent and diat “if the 
Qawasim had not crossed swords with the rising power of British India and been 
branded pirates by die secure Victorians,” then their fame may have rested on more 
peaceful foundations.75
Regional politics may have also played a pail, with the Qawasim’s traditional 
rivalry with neighbouring Oman and the increasing influence of die Arabian Wahhabi 
movement both acting as catalysts. By the early 1800s the Omani fleet had grown to 
become a serious trading rival and, in 1804, the Sultan of Oman even began to claim the 
exclusive right to protect navigation in the Gulf, tiius making Muscat the sole 
distribution centre for foreign goods.76 The Omanis had therefore placed the Qawasim 
under considerable economic pressure, and, given Oman’s historic alliance with Britain, 
a backlash may have been unavoidable. Furthermore, it is also believed that the 
increasingly popular Wahhabi religious reformers may have exacerbated the situation 
given dieir strengtiiened alliance with the Qawasim, tiieir expansionist ambitions over 
Omani territory, and their hostility towards Britain and Britain’s polytheist and 
idolatrous Hindu Indian sailors and crewmen. Indeed, it is believed that the Wahhabism
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which had emerged from the heart of Arabia during the mid-eighteenth century 
eventually reached Buraimi and the Qawasim by around 1800. Its namesake, 
Muhammad ibn Abdul-Wahhab, launched the movement, and after his death it was led 
by its first Imam, tlie Saudi shaykh. The Wahhabis preached a more purified brand of 
Islam, a doctrine of pure monotheism and a return to the fundamental tenets of Islam as 
laid down by the Koran. As such, they were Unitarians, emphasising the ‘centrality of 
God’s unqualified oneness in Sunni Islam’.77 Essentially, they sought to renew the 
Prophet’s golden era of Islam, and all who stood in their way were to be swept aside, 
including other Islamic rulers who lived ‘impure’ lives such as the pro-British Sultan of 
Oman. As such, by the time of their contact with die Qawasim, Hawley believes die 
movement had become somediing of a “religio-militaiy confederacy under which the 
desert people, stirred by a great idea, embarked on a common action”,78 and sought 
constant expansion in the manner of die original Islamic concept of dar al-harb. 
Indeed, in his account of the period, Charles Belgrave notes how Abdul-Wahhab “told 
his followers diat it was tiieir religious duty to convert their fellow men with fire and 
sword, and to plunder and destroy all those who professed to be Muslims but did not 
accept Wahhabism”. He then draws the conclusion tiiat it was this prospect of 
authorised and religious sanctioned plunder which “may have attracted die desert Bedu 
and the pirates of the coast to align themselves under the green standard of die 
Wahhabis”,79 thus adding a tinge of religious fanaticism to an already serious conflict.
Wahhabism’s role as a catalyst would, therefore, seem very clear, especially 
given the Qawasim’s inclination to form alliances with any power hostile to their 
traditional Omani rivals. Furthermore, the clear evidence of Wahhabi control over the 
region during tiiis period, underscored by the imposing Wahhabi fort constructed in 
Buraimi to serve as a vantage point over the oasis and to sever trade routes into Oman, 
may even indicate tiiat the Wahhabis were as much to blame for die ensuing struggle as 
the Qawasim.80 Indeed, it is recorded that at one point die Wahhabis were able to claim 
one-fifth of all Qawasim booty and to confine the QasimI shaykh’s authority to just 
Ra’s al-Khaimah itself.81 Moreover, in 1809 they were even temporarily able to depose 
the shaykh and appoint their favoured ruler, the Shaykh of Rams (a small town just
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north of Ra’s al-Khaimah) in his place to be the Wahhabi governor and tax collector.82 
These examples of control may hint at the true extent of Wahhabi involvement, 
especially given that in 1809 the so-called acts of QasimI piracy were at their peak even 
though QasimT power was restricted to just one coastal town.
However, as both Lorimer and Belgrave note, the lack of an adequate British 
response to the initial QasimI and Wahhabi-inspired attacks must also be seen as a layer 
of explanation, at least with regard to the longevity of the conflict. Indeed, as the author 
of the Gazetteer reported, the initial strikes on British-Indian shipping, including the 
assaults on the Viper cruiser and the Bassein dhow, failed to elicit any real response 
from Bombay.83 With “no reparation seeming to have been exacted for this insult to the 
British flag”,84 it is argued that the Qasiml-Walihabi alliance was left to grow bold and 
over-ambitious. Certainly, Belgrave supports Lorimer’s view, believing that Bombay’s 
lack of steps to punish those responsible led to the Arabs “finding they could attack 
British ships with impunity... with the pirates becoming more audacious”.85 Moreover, 
Belgrave sums up what might have been the frustration felt by the British following 
these attacks:
“...still the Bombay government took no action. Not only was it inactive, 
but commanders of the Bombay Navy were ordered not on any account to 
attack or molest 'these innocent natives of the Gulf, and were threatened 
with 'the displeasure of the Government' if they failed to cany out their 
orders. This policy was due to the Government 'sfear of becoming involved 
with the Wahhabis, although it was known that they were supporting and 
encouraging the pirates, and receiving a portion of the spoil. The pirates, 
assuming that there would be no reprisals, became more daring. In 1805 
they captured two brigs belonging to Mr. Manesty, the Resident at Basra.
Many of the crews were murdered and the Captain of one of the brigs had 
his arm cut off because he was seen to fire a musket. He put his severed 
arm into some hot ghee, which saved his life. The two brigs were added to 
the pirate [Qasimi] fleet. ”86
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In 1809 an expedition was finally launched against the ‘pirates’ of Ra’s al-Khaimah but 
this too was seen as an inadequate response and one which failed to gain any formal 
submission from the Qasiml sailors, many of whom simply retreated inland. The 
British response in 1816 was regarded as similarly ineffective with Belgrave describing 
it as having been nothing more than a ‘badly managed demonstration’;87
“The [British] ships then opened fire on some pirate dhows which were 
anchored near the shore, but the dhows were too far distant for the gunfire 
to be effective. Guns from the town replied with slightly more success, for 
one of the shots carried away part of the sail from a British ship. ‘At least 
three hundred shots were discharged from the squadron, not one of them 
seemed to have done any executionThe ships then set sail leaving the 
pirates performingjubilant war dances on the shore... ”
Thus, this second fiasco, much like the earlier mission, also portrayed the British as 
weak and ineffective, and was seen as prompting “...the Qawasim to engage in piracy 
with new vigour. They had good reason to believe that the British, in spite of their 
superior ships and armaments, were incapable of resisting them.”89
The final expedition did not come until 1819/1820, but this time the British 
response was strong and well planned, with Ra’s al-Khaimah becoming die scene of one 
of histoiy’s first major amphibious assaults. The Qasiml stronghold had been able to 
rebuild its fortifications following the 1809 attacks, with Captain Loch of HMS Eden 
stating in his diary, “to say the least of it, Ra’s al-Khaimah was no mean or insignificant 
work of defence”.90 Indeed, the well-defended port was seen as a very tough 
proposition for the Bombay landing party. The force, comprising both British officers 
and Indian infantry was die largest to have ever appeared in the Gulf, widi over 3000 
soldiers, three battleships and nine cruisers. The plan was to assault simultaneously 
Ra’s al-Khaimah and die nearby pirate base of Zaya, and dien to sail further down the 
coast crushing each remaining Qasiml redoubt one at a time.91 Loch’s diary provides an 
understandably pro-British view of these events and although this view is unlikely to be
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shared by many today, Belgrave’s highly controversial summary of its contents is 
nevertheless useful in capturing somediing of the British perception and mentality 
towards the Arabs of the lower Gulf at that time:
“Loch's diary makes the reader realise how many British lives were 
sacrificed in suppressing piracy... Britain achieved these objectives, not 
with any ambitions towards territorial conquests, but in order to make the 
seas safe for the ships of all nations and to put an end to the people of the 
Gulf carrying off their fellow creatures into slavery. Unfortunately very few 
of the present generation of Gulf Arabs realise the part which Britain 
played in the past. ”92
An account of these events would, however, be incomplete widiout also 
considering the more recent Arab revisionist history of the Qawasim. Indeed, Shaykh 
Sultan al-QasimT, die current ruler of Sharjah and a descendent of the Qawasim, offers 
an entirely different perspective93 (which to some extent has now been corroborated by 
the work of die British historian Charles Davies94). Essentially, al-Qasiml presents an 
alternative explanation of die events surrounding Britain’s destruction of Ra’s al- 
Khaimah, or to be precise, the British East India Company’s important role in the 
suppression of the Qawasim. Central to his claim is that Lorimer, the author of the 
much-celebrated Gazetteer, was a civil servant of the British India government and as 
such his views were entirely pro-British and therefore need to be treated witii caution in 
any impartial study of the region. Furthermore, al-Qasiml emphasises that because 
Lorimer’s study was the first of its kind, it was heavily relied upon by almost all 
subsequent scholars, including John Kelly’s influential work on the Gulf.95 Al-QasimT 
has therefore sought to refute die generalisations and claims of Lorimer and diese other 
historians diat die Qawasim were simply marauders and pirates. Instead he argues that 
the Qawasim were instead accomplished maritime traders who were able to out- 
compete and undercut many of tiieir rivals, including the British Indian merchants.
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Indeed, al-Qasiml identifies the expansion of Imperial trade as the key issue 
behind the conflict, stating that the British East India Company, a finn with vast 
commercial interests in the region, was
"... determined to increase its share of the trade in the Gulf by all possible 
means. Any increase in the Company’s share would be at the expense of the 
Arab natives of the Gulf... the Company's government of Bombay realised 
that any real opposition to their plans in the Gulf would come from the 
Qawasim. ”96
In order for the Company to achieve the destruction of their enemies, they needed to be 
able to persuade the decision-makers in both Bombay and London of the need to 
mobilise British naval forces against their principal trading rival, the Qawasim. 
Accordingly, as al-Qasiml describes:
“A concerted campaign was mounted by Company officials to present, or 
rather misrepresent, the Qawasim as pirates whose depredations posed a 
serious threat to all maritime activities in the Indian Ocean...
Thus, al-Qasiml believes that any misfortune which fell upon any British ship in the 
area was immediately attributed to Qawasim ‘pirates’, and as such a ‘big lie’ was 
contrived, a lie so readily accepted that the coast of the lower Gulf even became known 
as the ‘Pirate Coast’.98
As such, al-Qasiml’s alternative histoiy attempts to demonstrate how many of 
the accidents and unexplained incidents which occurred at sea during this period were 
always reported to the British Political Resident, and in turn London, as being the work 
of dangerous pirates. His study is well researched, drawing heavily from the Bombay 
archives. These, unlike the India Office records held in London, house the complete 
files of the British East India Company and therefore contain a far more substantial 
quantity of the correspondence between the Gulf, Bombay, and London at that time.99
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Indeed, from this correspondence, al-Qasimi reveals how the Company hoped that a 
sufficient body of anti-Arab evidence could be presented to the Bombay government, 
enough to persuade the government that the Royal Navy needed to be used to remove 
by force their commercial rivals. Certainly, al-Qasiml’s argument would seem highly 
credible given that the British destruction of the ‘pirates’, their strongholds, and their 
means of livelihood led to a commensurate increase in the Company’s share of trade in 
the Gulf. Witii their main opponents removed by militaiy means, the Company’s 
imports to Bombay rose from nearly 1.7 million lakhs in 1801 (prior to the expeditions), 
to over 3.3 million lakhs by 1822 (following the final expeditions). Similarly, the 
Company’s exports from Bombay rose from over 1.2 million lakhs to over 3.3 million 
lakhs over the same period.100 In this light, the early Anglo-Arab conflict can therefore 
be seen as being far from an accidental clash of interests and ‘empire by absent- 
mindedness’, and instead as part of a long-term effort by the Bombay government and 
the Company to suppress and displace an indigenous Arab trading network.
1.4.1 - Greater British political and economic involvement
Regardless of these differing historical accounts surrounding the causes of the 
conflict, after the assault on Ra’s al-Khaimah and the destruction of the other pirate 
strongholds the immediate threat to British Indian, shipping and the Company’s 
commercial interests had subsided and left many in Bombay with the dilemma of 
whether Britain should continue to involve herself in the region, or should simply 
maintain a watching brief. As Malcolm Peck describes, many believed that a permanent 
military establishment in the Gulf was undesirable unless the cost of the upkeep could 
be recovered from the Omanis or from other local sources. Furthermore, it was felt that 
any greater interference in internal Arab affairs would lead to unnecessary 
complications, especially as the Wahhabi threat had diminished and the reinstated 
Shaykh Saqr of Ra’s al-Khaimah appeared to be a reliable and relatively pro-British 
ruler. However, a second, more hawkish camp intended to launch a frill-scale sweep of 
the Gulf destroying any remaining pirate bases and removing local rulers as they saw 
fit. Crucially, this interventionist camp had much support given that shortly before the
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1819 expedition tlie Qawasim had been blamed for a number of attacks just seventy 
miles from Bombay itself,101 and in 1816 had been held responsible for the plundering 
of three British Indian merchant ships in the Red Sea.102
Eventually something of a middle ground was taken with the Bombay government 
deciding to follow up their expeditions by seeking to retain influence over tlie tribes 
with periodic shows of force, while at the same time preparing the ground for greater 
co-operation between the British and the local Arab rulers. Captain Perronet 
Thompson, a former governor of Sierra Leone, was brought in to supervise and,103 one 
by one, individual treaties were signed between the Bombay government and the ruling 
shaykhs. The first of these was signed with the ruler of Sharjah in 1820, requiring him 
to surrender all remaining pirate vessels, fortified towers, guns, and British prisoners. 
In exchange he was given assurances by the British that all pearling and fishing vessels 
would be restored to Sharjah, and, significantly, that all Sharjah trading vessels would 
be granted access to British ports. Thus, given the recent economic decline and war 
damage both of these guarantees were major non-military incentives for the Shaykh to 
honour tlie treaty,104
Consequently, as a result of these early accords between Britain and the 
participating ‘Trucial States’ maritime peace was finally achieved. Many amongst the 
Bombay elite were, however, distrustful of such a loose arrangement and pressed for 
stricter treaties with additional provisions such as the banning of armed Arab vessels, 
the limiting of Arab commercial vessels, and the banning of timber exports from India 
to the Gulf (presumably to limit Arab shipbuilding).105 Although few of these 
draconian measures were implemented, further annually renewed maritime truces were 
called for, in which the rulers had to guarantee that all hostilities at sea would be 
outlawed. These began to be signed from 1835 onwards and culminated in tlie 1853 
Perpetual Treaty of Peace, an essentially self-enforcing truce given that the economic 
benefits of regional stability were enough to ensure co-operation from most parties.106 
Indeed, following these treaties Britain was able to scale back her naval presence in the 
Gulf, retaining only a small squadron to police the region and signal the Imperial
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presence.107 Thus, without having to become directly involved in internal security or 
other expensive complications, by the mid-nineteenth century Britain had found a cost- 
effective means of maintaining a strong influence over the area while containing 
indigenous power bases and trade networks.
Nevertheless, as an indirect result of diese peace treaties Britain did begin to be 
drawn into a closer relationship with the rulers of the coastal towns. Indeed, as Britain’s 
policing role inevitably expanded to include the arbitration of local disputes, many of 
die rulers and their courts became dependent on British support for tiieir judgements. 
Moreover, given that only recognised rulers were selected to be signatories of the 
Perpetual Treaty, some even began to draw strength from their treaty agreements as 
rival shaykhs were effectively delegitimised by tiieir non-signatoiy status. Furthermore, 
after a time, Britain also began to screen potential new rulers to check if they were 
likely to adhere to existing as well as future treaties. If a new ruler was deemed suitable 
he was then sent a fresh copy of die treaties, thus formalising his sovereignty in British 
eyes and often among his own people. Thus, British influence started to become 
paramount in approving rulers, and it often happened that if a Shaykh strayed from the 
terms of the treaties he would lose popular support from a community that preferred to 
tow tiie line and not endanger then pearling or trading operations.108
As such, even though Britain was not directly involved in internal politics, her 
distant authority nonetheless caused a massive change to the lower Gulfs balance of 
power. Most obviously, the treaties and their recognition of the region’s current rulers 
effectively froze a snapshot of local power struggles and stabilised formerly elastic 
territorial boundaries,109 thus preventing any indigenous challenge to the status quo, and 
thereby bringing to an end the previously described ebb and flow of tribal powers. 
Indeed, the immediate aftermath of the expedition against the QasimT capital of Ra’s al- 
Khaimah provides such an example. Spurred on by the Qawasim’s decline in regional 
prestige and power, the nearby towns of Umm al-Qawain and ‘Ajman seized the 
opportunity to claim independence, thus geographically splitting Ra’s al-Khaimah from 
Sharjah, the other main QasimT base. Moreover, revolts in Fujairah on the Indian Ocean
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coast had also weakened Qasiml power in Ra’s al-Khaimah, allowing Shaijah to emerge 
as the pre-eminent town of the lower Gulf.110 When die British treaties began to be 
introduced, all of these newly independent towns were well placed to sign, which 
effectively guaranteed their future sovereignty and prevented any reprisal from dieir 
former Ra’s al-Khaimah overlords.111 Although perhaps less obvious, another 
important consequence of these maritime treaties for the balance of power was their 
effective formalisation of the supremacy of die coastal tribes and towns over diose of 
the interior, thereby allowing the maritime rulers to absorb more easily large tracts of 
the hinterland into dieir ‘Trucial States’.112 Indeed, if one follows Ismael’s parallel 
argument for Kuwait, this superiority can be seen as adding another explanatory layer 
for die lower Gulfs increasing peripheralisation as the coastal towns’ absorption of the 
weakened interior further imbalanced the regional economy diereby reducing the 
likelihood of future indigenous development.113
In addition to indirectly altering the local power structures, the presence of the 
British also began to have a major impact on some of the region’s long-practised 
economic activities, especially the slave trade. As described, slaving had always been a 
highly profitable venture for many of the local Arabs, with even the ruler of Shaijah 
believed to have been levying a tax on each successfully imported slave.114 The slaves 
were shipped from the East coast of Africa to die lower Gulfs ports, most notably to 
‘Ajman and Umm al-Qawain, and from diese they would be transported by land into the 
Arabian interior where they would finally be sold to wealthy patrons. Although many 
British individuals also prospered from slaveiy,115 there was nonetileless a growing 
moral consensus against slavery in the Empire, and by 1838 this had culminated in die 
outlawing of slavery in all British dominions. Given that the shaykhdoms of die lower 
Gulf were not actually British colonies, but simply in treaty relations witii Britain, these 
developments did not immediately affect the region. Nevertheless, Britain did place 
increasing pressure on the rulers to abandon slavery voluntarily,116 and agreements were 
soon drawn up which allowed British cruisers to detain and search suspected slaving 
vessels, and which required all Somalis (who were British subjects) to be freed from 
slave labour in the Gulf. In 1847 a further treaty outiawed the export of slaves from
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Africa by Arab ships,117 and in 1856 the restrictions were further tightened, requiring all 
of the rulers to embargo and hand over any suspected vessels that arrived in their 
ports.118 These efforts gradually reduced slavery, but it took a long time and there were 
pockets of strong resistance to the policy of manumission even as late as the 1950s, 
especially in tlie interior,119 with some slaves even being employed by the oil 
companies.120
Significantly, tiiis persistence of slavery and Britain’s continuing opposition to tlie 
lucrative activity created a window of opportunity for certain other powers, including 
the French and the Ottomans, to gain influence in the region. This attempted 
intervention, together with a number of other factors, led Britain to seek even greater 
control over its Trucial States in order to prevent future interference from external 
powers, and to discourage any ‘playing off between the local powers and Britain’s 
rivals. Thus, by the latter part of the nineteenth century, the political relationship 
between Britain and the Trucial States expanded even further to include control over the 
region’s foreign affairs. This time, however, die catalyst was neither the Qawasim nor 
any other local maritime power, but instead the Bani Yas of Abu Dhabi; a powerful 
tribal agglomeration which controlled most of die slaving routes into die interior. 
Unlike the ‘QasimI pirates’, the Bani Yas had been relatively untroubled by earlier 
British involvement given that their other economic activities were centred around the 
date groves of Lrwa and the pearl fisheries close to Dalma island, both far away from 
die main trading routes of die Gulf. However, as the Bani Yas continued to prosper 
they also began to assume a position of supremacy over the weakened northern 
shaykhdoms, symbolised by their ruler’s defeat of the Ra’s al-Khaimah shaykh in single 
combat.121 Naturally tiiis emergence of a new indigenous power bloc became a cause of 
concern for the British who were keen to maintain the detached nature of die Trucial 
system. Far more importantly, however, the British were also becoming increasingly 
distressed by Abu Dhabi’s attempts to seek external support for their slaving activities 
from other regional and foreign powers. Indeed, Shaykh Zayid bin Khalifa of Abu 
Dhabi had begun to fonn a close alliance witii the Sultan of Muscat who, by this stage, 
was receiving overtures from the French. Indeed, by the 1880s the French had already
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given their flag and citizenship to the slave-trading sailors of the port of Sur in Oman,122 
with the clear intention of undermining the British anti-slavery agreements, stirring 
resentment amongst those in favour of slaving, and bolstering French support in the 
region. Furthermore, many of the region’s more enterprising slave traders were 
beginning to sail into the Gulf under French flags from Djibouti, thus avoiding the 
British restrictions.123
By 1890 this encroachment had become an even more serious threat with French 
diplomats reportedly having begun to visit the ruler of Umm al-Qawain, who, by all 
accounts was receptive to tiieir advances.124 Moreover, the ruler of Dubai was also 
believed to have been openly discussing the advantages of taking die French flag 
thereby “escaping the malice of the English”,125 or, as one local historian has described, 
“courting the French in an effort to evade die British protection grip”.126 What is more, 
by the end of the nineteentii centiuy Britain not only had to face possible interference 
from the French but also from the Ottomans. Indeed, Ottoman influence had already 
begun to reach as far as Qatar and, at one point, the official Baghdad Gazette even listed 
Bahrain and eight towns in the Trucial States as being part of the Turkish controlled 
province of Najd.127 Similarly disturbing for the British were die reports of Persian 
representatives attempting to gain a foothold in the region. These agents were thought 
to be stirring religious sentiments among the local Arabs and were reported to have met 
widi die rulers of Abu Dhabi and Dubai in an effort to persuade them to denounce 
‘Christian influences’ and allow for their towns to come under die Persian sphere of 
influence.128
Inevitably, Britain regarded all such contact with foreign powers, including 
correspondence, as undermining botii the Trucial system and Imperial authority. If 
French, Ottoman, or Persian agents were allowed to visit and gain influence with the 
local rulers, the British stood to lose some or all of the control they had carefully 
established over die region earlier in die centiuy. Britain’s low cost and almost self- 
enforcing maritime treaties would be imdone and her crucial trade routes to India and 
the Far East would once again face competition and possible security threats. The
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solution was seen as being an ‘Exclusivity Agreement’ which would require all of the 
signatories of the earlier maritime truces to accept complete British management of their 
foreign policies. Consequently, in 1892 and at the height of the Bani Yas ‘violations’, 
such an agreement was proposed, and although it was viewed by many of the locals as a 
“reinforcement of the eternal subordination of the shaykhdoms”,129 it was nevertheless 
accepted by die rulers, many of whom remained wary of British naval power and the 
economic consequences of renewed instability. Essentially, this new contract bound the 
rulers and then future heirs not to
"... enter into any agreement or correspondence with any power other than 
the British Government... and. they were not allowed to... cede, sell, 
mortgage or otherwise give for occupation any part of their territory except 
to the British Government... The exact international effect of these two 
agreements [referring to the 1892 agreement and the final maritime truce of 
1853] is a matter for publicists to determine, but taken together they 
evidently create preferential and. almost exclusive relations between the 
British Government and the Trucial Chiefs, - relations which might be held 
to imply the dependency of the Shaykhs on the British Government in 
foreign affairs and a moral obligation on the part of the British Government 
to protect the Shaykhs in so far as they be endangered, or disabled from 
defending themselves.... ”130
1.4.2- Greater peripheralisation and the emergence of rentier structures
Although, as described, British Indian merchants had long been involved in the 
lower Gulfs pearling industry on an individual level, by the turn of the twentieth 
century the Bombay government had, however, also begun to take far more interest in 
the activity. Essentially, in much the same way as the fear of foreign intervention in the 
region’s slave trade had prompted die British to assrnne control over the lower Gulfs 
foreign affairs, the attempts of European merchants and entrepreneurs to capitalise on 
the region’s pearling boom and to develop technologically the local industry led the
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British to seek greater economic protection for its Trucial States. Specifically, a number 
of German and French entrepreneurs had decided tiiat by co-operating with the local 
Arabs and by offering them more modem equipment and access to new markets, both 
parties could make considerable profits. Indeed, foreigners made several requests for 
pearling rights in the Gulf during this period, but Bombay’s policy remained unchanged 
and Britain began to police strictly the pearl banks against any unauthorised foreign 
intrusion. Furthermore, tlie British Political Resident explicitly advised against any of 
the Arabs accepting foreign assistance, arguing that he needed to create an Anglo-Arab 
monopoly in order to protect the Arabs’ primary source of income,131 because if tlie 
industry ever failed then many of the Arabs would be driven to gunrunning, piracy and 
slaving.132 Indeed, a later letter from the Resident to die government made his position 
quite clear, warning of the danger of granting pearling concessions to Britain’s rivals 
and forbidding die use of any modem technology in what should remain a ‘traditional 
activity’.133 Thus when this policy was eventually formalised in 1905 the following 
statement was issued:
“Within the three mile limit, and in any other water which might justly be 
considered territorial, the tribes of the Arabian Coast were entitled to the 
exclusive use of the pearl fisheries. As regards pearl banks outside 
territorial waters it was held that, as a matter of international law, such 
banks were capable of being the property of the tribes to the exclusion of all 
nations. ”134
Moreover, in 1914 this decision was reinforced by a new agreement which prevented 
the rulers from giving any concessions for pearling or sponge fishing without first 
consulting the British Political Resident.135 Given diat permission for such concessions 
was never granted,136 the Gulf had dierefore been transformed into a ‘British lake’ under 
the total control of Bombay and effectively sealed off from all other economies. 
Significantly, this protection, by inhibiting domestic and externally assisted 
development and by restricting access to other markets, can be seen as having limited
46
the opportunities of the aforementioned indigenous merchant class and thereby further 
strengthening the already peripheralised nature of the region’s economy.
As the century progressed, this economic dependency on Britain and India 
continued to increase with many of the rulers beginning to receive and rely upon 
generous income from Imperial air landing rights. During the late 1920s refuelling 
facilities were required for military aircraft en route from Britain to India, and Sharjah 
was deemed an excellent refuelling point. An agreement with the ruler was duly signed, 
dictating that he would host a British airbase and in return would receive a personal 
income of 500 rupees per month and a further 5 rupees for every aircraft that landed in 
Sharjah.137 In 1932 another agreement was reached in which Sharjah would provide 
similar civilian landing facilities for Imperial Airways aircraft,138 also in exchange for 
generous remuneration.139 These air concessions were not restricted to Sharjah, and 
similar agreements were signed in 1937 with the ruler of Dubai allowing Imperial 
Airways to land flying boats on die Dubai Creek.140 Even Kalba, a small town on the 
Indian Ocean coast, was temporarily granted independence from Sharjah and declared 
to be a Trucial State in its own right precisely so it could be used as a landing facility.141
Oil, or rather oil exploration concessions added another layer of dependence and 
of course another source of income for the rulers. In 1922, in a further example of 
increasing British protection and control over the region’s foreign relations, all of the 
rulers undertook not to consider any oil concessions which were not supported by the 
British government. In other words the rulers were made to refuse any offers from the 
rival American oil companies which had already begun prospecting in other parts of 
Arabia. At this early stage there was no firm proof of oil in the lower Gulf, but given 
that Britain had already imposed similar agreements on the rulers of Kuwait and 
Bahrain, it seemed practical to lock the Trucial States into die same system. As such, in 
1935 the London-based Iraqi Petroleum Company (IPC) formed a wholly owned 
subsidiary, Petroleum Concessions Ltd., which was to be the sole operator of 
concessions in the lower Gulf.142 Unsurprisingly the Political Resident soon issued an 
ultimatum binding the Trucial rulers to deal only with Petroleum Concessions. As Peck
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notes, this ultimatum, in much the same way as the 1922 agreement, should not 
necessarily be seen as a reflection of British interest in the discovery of oil deposits in 
the region (given that Britain already had a great supply at that time), but instead as an 
expression of the continuing British desire to exclude other foreign parties from the 
economic and political affairs of the Trucial States: “the oil agreements might thus be 
seen as symbolising the considerable degree of isolation that British protection imposed 
on the Trucial States.”143 Crucially, these concessions also provided another high 
stream of income for the rulers, which, in some cases, even dwarfed the generous air 
landing fees. Indeed, the Dubai concession (signed in 1938) provides such an example 
as the ruler was to be given 60,000 rupees on signing; a substantial annual income of 
30,000 rupees, and then the oil company would pay 200,000 rupees upon the discovery 
of any oil.144 See figure (iii).
In addition to increasing the rulers’ dependency on Britain as a source of easy 
non-eamed income, the very nature of this new wealth must also be seen as an 
important historical antecedent of more contemporary structures. Although this subject 
will be discussed in greater depth in the following chapter,145 it is nevertheless 
significant to note how much of the lower Gulfs pre-oil wealth was also derived from 
‘economic rent’ (Economic rent being the difference between the return made by a 
factor of production and the return necessary to keep the factor in its current 
occupation146). Indeed, upon closer inspection, it would appear that the region has 
experienced a long history of such ‘rentier wealth’, with some of the aforementioned 
activities such as the booty from Bedu raids and the issuing of fishing licences,147 
together witii examples of income from guano collecting concessions148 and red oxide 
mining authorisations149 all providing early indications of rent-gathering. With the 
generous air landing fees and oil exploration concessions this rentier wealth was, 
however, raised to a new level. Significantly, although now enormous, these payments 
continued to accrue directly to the ruler, with the bulk of the population remaining 
uninvolved in the wealth creation process. Indeed, Shaykh Sa‘id Al-Maktum, the ruler 
of Dubai at that time, believed, as did the other rulers receiving such vast incomes from 
concessions, that these guaranteed annual rents were to be his personal profit.150
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Figure (iii) “Layers of control and dependency”
Consequently, the previously described power balance between the wealthy indigenous 
merchant class and the rulers began to shift, especially as die newly rich Shaykhs were 
able to reduce their reliance on taxation and instead distribute wealth to their people. As 
such, many of the traditional extractive institutions fell into decline and, eventually, a 
new ‘rentier’ relationship was bom between die riders and their populations, a 
relationship which is still in evidence today. See figure (iv).
1.4.3 - Local resistance and the suppression of the Dubai reform movement
Given diat the early oil exploration concessions were all land-based, the IPC 
needed Britain to provide a more extensive security umbrella across the region, 
providing a secure environment for its personnel and better protection for die 
Company’s interests. These concerns, togedier widi the rise of Ibn Saud and the 
perceived threat to British airbases from resurgent Wahhabism,151 led to fresh calls for a 
greater British commitment to die region’s internal stability. Quite simply the stakes 
were now higher than before. Aldiough creating a frill-blown protectorate was still 
deemed unnecessary,152 many in the British Indian government, including the Political 
Resident of die Gulf, argued diat these new circumstances required Britain to assume 
greater responsibilities in die Trucial States: to ensure more directly die orderly 
succession from shaykh to shaykh, to maintain the shaykhs’ individual powers, and to 
protect die Trucial States by land as well as sea. Thus, in light of these 
recommendations, togedier with Air Staff memoranda along similar lines, the British 
Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary responded by setting up the Persian Gulf sub­
committee of die Committee of Imperial Defence.153
The sub-committee’s role was clarified when, in 1934, it was decided that for 
die first time Britain should openly intervene in a local struggle. As described earlier in 
tliis chapter, Dubai had emerged as one of the region’s main ports and by diis stage had 
become a key distribution point for the oil companies. Thus, when the ruler narrowly 
escaped an assassination attempt by two of his cousins, Britain immediately responded 
in an effort to secure die city. British armaments were overtly delivered to the surviving
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Figure (iv) "A History of economic rent in the lower Gulf’
Shaykh Sai’d Al-Maktum. Moreover a British message of support for the Al-Maktum 
was circulated throughout Dubai and backed up by Iraqi-based British aircraft which 
flew over the town several times. Following this armed response, the Shaykh*s cousins 
immediately relinquished their claims.154
Even more significant than this succession dispute and Britain’s early show of 
force were, however, the events surrounding the Dubai reform movement of 1938, 
especially with regard to the reinforcement of the local rulers’ client status and the 
continuing isolation and peripheralisation of the lower Gulfs economy. In much the 
same way as Ismael’s example of the Kuwait commercial class which had tried to re­
establish trading links with other parts of Arabia during the inter-war period,155 and the 
Bahraini merchants who had begun to demonstrate during at this time,156 Dubai’s 
merchants also attempted to re-adjust existing structures by imposing reforms on their 
ruler. Essentially, faced witii economic decline and marginalisation following the 
collapse of the pearling industry, they were trying to revitalise the lower Gulfs 
autonomous development but, as with the other Gulf merchant communities, their 
movement was suppressed by a ruler who had the clear support of the British.
Indeed, given that the decline in pearling was concurrent witii the described rise 
in tlie rulers’ rentier income; the increasing disparity prompted many of the merchants 
to request the rulers to share their wealth and to allow much more of it to be managed 
by the community in the interests of improving social conditions and boosting 
indigenous development.157 Crucially, however, unlike previous rulership contests, 
Dubai’s merchants did not necessarily intend to depose their ruler. Instead the 
merchants and other notables decided to set up a new consultative majlis in which the 
ruler would be recognised as the president of a fifteen member chamber, but in 
exchange would have to share seven-eighths of Dubai’s total revenue. The shared 
revenue was to be spent in the name of the state and only with the prior approval of the 
members of the new majlis. Although the merchants’ majlis operated for only a very 
brief period, Heard-Bey nevertheless shows from the correspondence and minutes of 
their meetings how it is clear that they were not only concerned with practical economic
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reforms, but also intended to bring about key changes in the political and social 
structures.158 Indeed, the majlis quickly established a number of important institutions 
including a municipal council, in addition to planning for a social security system for 
the elderly, and electing new customs officials to be employed by the state, not the 
ruler.159 Moreover, Abdullah highlights the movement’s considerable financial 
contribution to Dubai’s education system and its concerted efforts to re-open Dubai’s 
schools. Indeed, the majlis established an education department, appointed a Director- 
General for Dubai schools, and, as noted in the majlis’ documents, they even managed 
to recruit tlie majority of teachers from the local population (many of whom were older 
Dubai men who had been educated when schools had flourished during the pearling 
boom).160
Thus, in fight of these efforts and then many other innovations and 
recommendations the majlis believed tiiat tiieir presence was welcomed by all of Dubai, 
and also felt that
"...their mandate carried a responsibility towards all groups and 
communities within the state, and that to reform certain aspects of 
government improved the lot of the common man and was therefore a 
national duty. ”161
The ruler and those loyal to his regime were, however, far from defeated, and when in 
1939 the majlis decided to add even more limitations to the ruler’s income by allowing 
him to retain just 10,000 rupees of the state’s revenue for liis personal use, the ruler was 
forced to resort to military means. The majlis responded by blocking all access to Deira 
(the merchant-controlled northern half of the town) from Shaykh Sai’d’s armed men in 
Bur Dubai, but a plan was drawn up when, in an apparent peace-offering, the ruler’s 
younger brother Rashid decided to marry a Deira inhabitant. The merchants made tlie 
mistake of relaxing their control to allow Rashid’s men to cross the creek to participate 
in a gun salute at the wedding.162 Thus, when this loyal contingent of Bedu was 
unleashed, the majlis and tiieir members were attacked and quickly dispersed, thereby
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allowing Shaykh Sa‘id to regain control over Dubai.163 Crucially, this collapse of the 
majlis would, in any event, have been inevitable given Britain’s continuing support for 
the Al-Maktum. Given that Shaykh Sa’id and die other Trucial rulers remained the 
preferred clients of the Bombay government, the prospect of any potentially 
autonomous reform movement was unacceptable to British interests.164 Certainly, 
although the British publicly viewed the merchants’ majlis and tiieir refonn attempts 
with indifference, British misgivings over the movement were nevertheless clearly in 
evidence. Indeed, in a revealing effort to bolster indigenous support for die beleaguered 
ruler following the dispersal of die movement, the British Political Resident’s statement 
erroneously claimed that the majlis had collapsed due to mismanagement and a lack of 
popular support:
“Recently there has been democratic movement in the State of Dubai which 
is in special treaty relations with His Majesty’s Government. This was an 
internal matter and HMG however advised the Shaykh to associate his 
people with himself in his government according to immemorial Arab 
custom by formation of a Council. The Shaykh did not take this advice and 
a Council was forced on him by the people which owing to 
maladministration later grew unpopular. At the end of March Shaykh Sai'd 
with his supporters dissolved the Council... ”165
Finally, despite the movement’s collapse, it must also be noted how many of its 
actions and suggestions were not widiout some long-term achievement, widi many of 
diem forming the blueprints for later initiatives undertaken by die niters themselves. 
Indeed, in the 1940s and 1950s Shaykh Sa‘id and liis new "Majlis al-tujjdf attempted to 
rejuvenate many of die merchants’ planned improvements in an effort to boost the 
emirate’s commercial prosperity.166 Furthermore, upon his succession in 1958, one of 
Shaykh Rashid’s very first acts was to re-establish die Dubai Municipal Council, despite 
championing his brother’s cause against it just twenty years previously. The Municipal 
Council, when founded, appointed councillors to represent different sections of the 
community for periods of two years. It was empowered to make the necessary orders
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for the administration of the town and to administer Dubai’s first official development 
plans, all of which were commissioned by die ruler and prepared by British experts.167 
The key difference between this council and the merchants’ majlis was of course that it 
had to subject all of its decisions to the ruler’s confirmation and had to seek its financial 
support from the ruler’s office. Thus, die rulers of Dubai chose to reform only when 
they had complete control and the approval of British advisers, and when the previously 
powerful merchant elites had completely lost their ability to operate autonomously of 
the core-periphery relationship.
1.4.4 - Britain and the path to Federation
Shortly after the suppression of the merchants’ movement another important 
step took place when, in 1940, Britain decided to land troops in die region for die first 
time since the 1820 landings in order to enforce peace attempts between the squabbling 
emirates of Dubai and Sharjah. As before, a visible and direct response was effective 
with the conflict soon subsiding and the security of die British airbases being 
maintained.168 The most extensive British intervention did not, however, take place 
until die 1950s. As described in the earlier discussion of the traditional political 
structure, the Burainu Oasis and its surrounding villages had been a bone of contention 
between many of the local powers for hundreds of years, and once again the dispute had 
come to the fore, but this time becoming international news. Increasing friction 
between Britain and the United States had manifested itself in a major struggle between 
dieir respective oil companies. Thus, when ARAMCO, the American concession holder 
for Saudi Arabia, pressed its host country to stake a fresh claim on die area, conflict was 
inevitable. The aforementioned zakat tax was used as a lever in the struggle and 
ARAMCO devoted all of its scholarly resources to proving the legitimacy of die Saudis’ 
claim.169 In 1952, when a Saudi force was finally sent to secure the area, Britain 
responded by backing an armed Omani contingent and demanding the surrender of the 
ARAMCO / Saudi troops. This British force temporarily secured die area but, as a side 
note, this dispute was so difficult to resolve that it lingered on until 1974 when Shaykh 
Zayid, the president of the UAE, reportedly had to offer Saudi Arabia the Zarara oil
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fields and a strategic corridor of land to the Gulf in exchange for Saudi recognition of 
UAE sovereignty.170 Even then, tins agreement remained informal until 1992.171
The severity of the Buraimi crisis therefore highlighted the need for the region’s 
improved collective security, as the British had little desire to make repeated and 
expensive deployments. As such, believing that greater regional unity would better 
guarantee such security, by the mid-1950s Britain began to become more directly 
involved in tlie region’s institutional development. Thus, in addition to providing 
limited militaiy support as and when required, Britain also started setting up a Trucial 
States Council with the aim of bringing the various Trucial rulers together in much the 
same way as the contemporary Supreme Council of Rulers. Although this early council 
was merely an advisory body and had no fonnal constitution, it nevertheless did 
engender some sense of unity between the previously disparate shaykhdoms and, as all 
decisions tiiat were reached had to be implemented by the rulers themselves,172 it 
provided valuable experience for those involved. The British Political Agent in Sharjah 
presided over the Council up until 1965 when it was decided that the chairmanship 
should be rotated among the seven rulers, and tiiat the task of examining and preparing 
proposals for the Council should be given to a Deliberative Committee comprising two 
delegates from each emirate.173
Even so, the British Agent still remained involved in the Council’s affairs and 
sat in on all of its subsequent meetings. He also remained active in hying to put 
forward Britain’s views on what should be tlie region’s key development priorities.174 
Indeed, as Heard-Bey describes, tlie Agent or his deputy continued to preside over many 
board meetings ranging from hospitals to trade schools, and over many other 
committees engaged in local development projects.175 The representatives of the British 
oil companies were also involved, and it became increasingly common for them to sit, 
with their Arabic interpreters, at the rulers’ majalis and discuss matters of mutual 
interest such as local employment, framing, and healthcare.176 Initially the budget for 
the Council was provided from a British administered Trucial States Development Fund 
which, as an earlier version of tlie federal budget, allowed for a Trucial States
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Development Office to assume responsibility for the implementation of various region­
wide five year plans.177 Initially, Britain’s contributions formed the bulk of the budget, 
but as the region’s oil revenues began to increase, so too did the indigenous 
contributions, and by die time the office was transferred to a federal ministry Abu Dhabi 
was already contributing several million pounds per annum and over 70% of die total 
fund.178 However, as the remainder of the chapter will reveal, this greater financial 
independence in no way reduced die rulers’ reliance on British tutelage and support.
As Britain had anticipated, the Council’s first priority was to secure the 
hinterland and to allow for safe transport and communications between die shaykhdoms 
without the fear of raiders. To tliis end the Trucial Oman Levies (renamed the Trucial 
Oman Scouts in 1956) were fonned as a British-officered standing army and were 
placed under the command of die Political Resident in Bahrain. As die first visible 
reflection of Britain’s greater institutional involvement, the force was regarded as a 
great success given its important role in policing die Buraimi area, in mopping up the 
remnants of die slave trade, and in assisting the oil companies in their exploration of die 
desert.179 Indeed, with a more secure environment and a greater degree of regional co­
operation, the Levies provided the necessaiy foundations for die Council to press ahead 
with its other objectives. Indeed, by the mid-1960s, many odier institutions had already 
been established, and many other services were being provided under the auspices of the 
Development Office. Among odiers, these included:
• The provision of agricultural services180 See appendix (i).
• The operation of trade and technical schools in Sharjah and Dubai
• Offering scholarships abroad for talented subjects of the Trucial States
• Offering courses of instruction for Trucial States Council administrative staff
• Offering healdi services (centred in Dubai’s Al-Maktum Hospital), in 
addition to providing a touring doctor service, several rural clinics and 
another hospital in Ra’s al-Khaimah.
• Creating a department to survey and develop the fisheries resources
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• Creating a public works department to execute the capital works programme 
with overall responsibility for the development of water resources, buildings, 
road maintenance, and the supervision of public utilities.181
Moreover, in addition to the Development Office’s efforts it is also worth noting 
that considerable aid and assistance began to flow into the region from some of the 
other British-backed Gulf States. By far die most significant of diese benefactors was 
Kuwait, which, after attaining formal independence in 1961, chose to establish a Gulf 
Permanent Assistance Committee (GUPAC) to recommend and administer economic 
aid to die less developed areas of die Gulf. Soon after, a GUP AC office was set up in 
Dubai to co-ordinate Kuwaiti aid to the Trucial States, the bulk of which was 
concentrated in the education sector. Kuwait financed the salaries of most of the 
expatriate teachers, helped to train up local teachers, helped to construct schools, and 
contributed to the Development Office’s overseas scholarships. On a smaller, but still 
notable scale, Qatar and Bahrain also contributed, not only to die Development Fund 
but also by assisting in the construction of highways and the provision of fresh water 
supplies.182
However, despite diese British and British-Gulf administered developments, 
many believed diat London’s long-term post-war retrenchment would soon lead to a 
British withdrawal from the region, and that the Trucial States were still inadequately 
prepared for such an eventuality.183 Without more improvements, new institutions, and 
new legislation, it was thought unlikely that the regional administration would be able 
to function smoothly and, given die ambitions of neighbouring Saudi Arabia and nearby 
Iran, it was feared diat diat the area would quickly be absorbed by a foreign power. As 
such, the mid-1960s witnessed even more rapid development, especially in the co­
ordination of actions between the various Trucial States, witii many of what were soon 
to become die UAE’s federal institutions being set up. The announcement, however, 
came sooner than expected when in 1967 a Westminster white paper was published 
calling for the termination of Britain’s bases east of Suez and a proposed withdrawal by 
1971. Although there was a brief period of uncertainty following a surprise
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Conservative election victory in 1970,184 no reversal of tlie Labour Party’s policies took 
place, and all tiiat happened was a long-drawn out delay before Edward Heath’s 
government finally re-affirmed its predecessor’s original departure date.185
The local reaction, at least from Hie ruling elite, was one of intense 
disappointment, as many felt that much of the recent development work would stall or 
be undone without further British support. Similarly, those Britons working in Hie Gulf 
believed that the couple of million pounds that London spent maintaining British forces 
and the administration hi tlie Trucial States was a more than worthwhile insurance for 
the £2 billion in annual revenues from tlie oil companies operating there.186 Indeed, it is 
believed that Shaykh Zayid Al-Nuhayyan and tlie rulers of the other oil producing 
sheikdoms were so reluctant to lose British protection that they even offered to pay 
towards maintaining an Imperial presence in the lower Gulf. As a report to die British 
Cabinet described:
“...he [Zayid] would be happy to contribute the funds himself from his oil 
revenues to secure the continuance of the benefits he and his fellow rulers 
derived from the British presence in the Gulf. His neighbour, Shaykh 
Rashid of Dubai, made a like proposal a fortnight later. The four oil- 
producing Shaykhdoms under British protection - Dubai, Abu Dhabi, 
Bahrain and Qatar - would be perfectly willing, Rashid said, to meet, in 
proportion to their respective means, the annual cost of retaining the British 
forces in the Gulf. ”187
This willingness, more than anything else, points to the closeness of the relationship that 
Britain had built widi her clients by the eve of the withdrawal. New wealth was on the 
horizon and without British support the rulers were actually disinclined to accept their 
‘independence’.
57
1.5- The federation of Emirates
Although scaling back her military presence in the Gulf in the late 1960s, Britain 
did, however, remain closely involved in the region. Besides continuing to help create 
many of the institutions which any new independent state would need to inherit, British 
advisers also continued to encourage plans for even greater unity and for some kind of 
federal framework of collective security between the various shaykhdoms.188 Indeed, as 
Fenelon contends, the British had long been aware of the possibility of such a union 
given that the Political Residency in Bahrain had been imposing some degree of 
uniformity on the seven ‘emirates’ for over a century.189 Furthermore, as Hawley 
explains, die British were also conscious of the historical effectiveness of inter-emirate 
co-operation, with the Residency having recorded examples of successful meetings 
between die Trucial shaykhs as far back as 1905.190 More significantly, in die 1930s 
there had also been a British-foiwarded proposal for a ten-member association 
comprising of Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait and the Trucial States. Among other tilings this 
had called for:
• The establishment of a council in which each emirate would field a 
representative
• The establishment of an assembly to propose regulations and ratify draft 
legislation
• The unification of the judiciary and legislative systems
• The creation of a common nationality, widi the abolition of the necessity 
of passports for travel between the member emirates
• The establishment of a unified education system, widi a central 
administrative headquarters in Bahrain
• The creation of a unified postal service191
Although the outbreak of the Second World War had temporarily distracted Britain 
from die Gulf and little further energy was given to implementing the proposal, its 
contents nevertheless became widely known throughout the region, widi the subject
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sparking much discussion in educated circles, especially from the Manama-based 
magazine, 'Al-Bahrairi,192 and with many of the proposal’s elements later being 
incorporated into the institutions of the 1950s and 1960s.
Thus, many administrators, both British and Arab, viewed federation as a natural 
progression for the region, especially as the Trucial States Council and the Development 
Office had already allowed the rulers to perform jointly many of the functions which 
had previously been Britain’s responsibility.193 Certainly, as a former Political Agent in 
Dubai has noted, while it still remained Britain’s policy to protect the Trucial States 
right up until her departure, in these final years Britain did, however, become far more 
open to granting the rulers freedom to make collective decisions of their own.194 In fact, 
by this stage Britain was actively encouraging the rulers to gain as much administrative 
experience as possible, even in the previously restricted field of foreign relations. As 
such, tlie rulers were invited to attend international conferences, were allowed to create 
foreign trade offices in their towns, and were even allowed to participate in a number of 
the Arab League’s committees.195 Moreover, during this curious period of transition 
between British rule and full independence, Abu Dhabi was also permitted to join file 
Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC); the first of the Trucial States 
to do so, and in 1968 Shaykh Zayid Al-Nuhayyan was even allowed to visit Jordan and 
establish relations witii the Palestinian leader, Yasser Arafat, on behalf of Abu Dhabi 
and the other Trucial States.196
The first clear step towards a federation came in 1968 when Shaykh Zayid met 
with Shaykh Rashid Al-Maktum, tlie ruler of Dubai, and formally agreed to merge the 
two emirates into a union capable of jointly conducting foreign affairs, defence, 
security, social services, and a common immigration policy. Shortly afterwards, with 
the added support of the British, the rulers of the five other Trucial States in addition to 
the rulers of Bahrain and Qatar met together in Dubai. These nine rulers held a 
constitutional conference to discuss the future of their states. The initial plan, as 
proposed by Qatar, called for the amalgamation of the five smallest Trucial States 
(Sharjah, Ra’s al-Khaimah, ‘Ajman, Fujairah and Umm al-Qawain), which was to be
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known as the ‘United Arab Coastal Emirates’. This union would allow these emirates 
to be considered as one state, thereby guaranteeing them a collective voice and easing 
future federal negotiations with the larger emirates of Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Bahrain and 
Qatar.197 Later that same year, a second meeting was convened, tiiis time in Abu Dhabi, 
where once again tlie nine rulers and their advisers met to discuss the region’s post­
British future. Most importantly, all were agreed on the pressing need for some kind of 
federation, but already, even at tiiis stage, deep divides were beginning to emerge over 
tlie exact nature of the association. Bahrain and Ra’s al-Khaimah demanded a popular 
referendum to decide upon the presidency, and some even saw the federation as being a 
vehicle for evolving towards democratic representation. The most important division, 
however, was the one emerging between die two principal Trucial States of Abu Dhabi 
and Dubai. Dubai wished for a president and a capital city to be decided upon as soon 
as possible whereas Abu Dhabi and some of die smaller emirates advocated proceeding
10Rmore slowly to allow everyone to adjust to the new situation.
Nevertheless, despite diese disagreements the meetings continued, and in 1969 a 
conference was held in which Shaykh Zayid was to be elected as president of die new 
federation, with Shaykh Rashid as his vice-president, and with Shaykh Khalifa bin 
Hamad (the deputy ruler of Qatar) serving as the first prime minister. It was also hoped 
that the growing city of Abu Dhabi would be accepted as the federation’s temporaiy 
capital until a new, permanent capital city could be built along the border of Abu Dhabi 
and Dubai. The name of die proposed site was the Wadi al-Mawt or ‘Valley of Deatii’, 
not exactly an encouraging omen, and for a multitude of reasons and differences of 
opinion the conference collapsed and the nine shaykhs never again met as a council.199 
By this stage, Abu Dhabi and Dubai had to come to tenns with the fact that any 
proposed federation would be smaller tiian originally anticipated, as it was becoming 
increasingly unlikely that the wishes of Bahrain and Qatar could be fully 
accommodated. One factor was Bahrain’s detennination tiiat the federation’s 
parliament or council needed to be based on a system of proportional representation, but 
given that Bahrain possessed die largest population, this was strongly rejected by the 
less populous Trucial States. Later, Bahrain did briefly agree to a system of equal
60
representation in which each member state would supply four members, but by 1970 it 
had renewed its demands for representation based on population size.200 Secondly, as 
the British Ambassador to Bahrain explained, the emirate was also becoming reluctant 
to join any kind of union that the increasingly wealthy Abu Dhabi may come to 
dominate.201 Another factor was the fear of the reaction of other regional powers to 
such a federation. In particular, Bahrain did not want to be caught up in Abu Dhabi’s 
continuing dispute with Saudi Arabia (as Saudi Arabia continued to claim nearly four- 
fifths of Abu Dhabian territory), and equally Abu Dhabi and the other Trucial States did 
not wish to be involved with Iran, which had laid claim to Bahrain. Duly, for diese 
reasons, Bahrain and Qatar decided to opt for independence, thus reducing the proposed 
federation to just seven potential members. However, as Zaki Nusseibeh, the Press 
Secretary to Shaykh Zayid at that time stated, tliis withdrawal was of little real concern 
to the Trucial States, and in many ways Abu Dhabi began to view Bahrain and Qatar as 
being the real losers:
“Bahrain was the real loser because she had so much to gain because she is 
not a wealthy country and by joining she would have shared the UAE’s 
wealth. The sophistication of her people and their educational level would 
have given Bahrain a natural leadership role in the federation. ”202
Even so, as the date for British withdrawal drew closer, diere was a great feeling 
of uncertainty, and for many a feeling of negativity given the troubled negotiations, die 
absence of the two most developed emirates, and the Trucial States’ uneasy relations 
with the odier regional powers. Even many of the British were pessimistic, with a 
number of commentators describing die lack of confidence felt at that time. In 1966 
David Holden described a distinguished journalist of the Middle East as having 
declared:
“There is no realistic possibility of the present Gulf rulers coming together 
of their own accord in any political grouping worth mentioning... and the 
prospects of the British pushing them into doing so are equally weak".203
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Writing later, just a few months before the federation in 1971, Holden also reports it 
having been said that:
“Whatever happens, the Gulf has already entered a period offlux in which 
neither existing boundaries nor traditional regimes can he expected to 
prevail. ”204
Even the British Political Resident of the Gulf at that time, Sir Geoffrey Arthur, 
reflected on the negativity of the period:
“The UAE looked loose and ramshackle, and it was born, so said the facile 
commentator of the day, under the ill star of British patronage... it [the 
UAE] has since acquired a host of fair weather friends, but I do not 
recollect that a single special correspondent of a major western newspaper, 
let alone a politician or a statesman, took the trouble to attend the ceremony 
of its formation. ”205
Similarly, as Joseph Sisco, the US Undersecretary for Political Affairs announced to 
Congress in 1975, the USA had also expressed grave doubts about the UAE holding 
together back in 1971.206 Thus, both die old and new superpowers in the Gulf had little 
confidence in the UAE surviving its infancy; with many believing it would soon 
succumb to either internal fragmentation or external threats.
The worst fears of many were confirmed when British forces finally left. Iran 
immediately and forcibly occupied the island of Abu Musa belonging to Shaijah, and 
seized two smaller islands belonging to Ra’s al-Khaimah207 Secondly, Saudi Arabia’s 
territorial dispute with Abu Dhabi remained unresolved witii die former deciding to 
withhold diplomatic recognition of the newly independent state. Thirdly, a Marxist-led 
rebellion was taking place in neighbouring Oman.208 Nevertheless, despite this 
unpleasant cloud of doubt a federation was officially proclaimed on tlie 2nd December 
1971, and the United Arab Emirates came into being with Shaykh Zayid as its president
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and with Abu Dhabi as its temporary capital. Soon after, a Council of Ministers was 
formed; a federal government in which each emirate was given a proportionate number 
of portfolios,209 and within a few more days the new state had joined both the Arab 
League and the United Nations as a full member. As was expected, the transition was 
not entirely smooth given that certain institutions did not yet exist to take over all of the 
responsibilities previously fulfilled by the British; also the Trucial Oman Scouts 
required a new command structure and tlie judicial system still relied on British 
arbitration, but after a series of federal laws and with some further help from the British, 
the takeover was finally complete.210
There was, however, one internal security flaw which remained unresolved, and 
that was the absence of Ra’s al-Khaimah from the federation. In much the same way as 
the early disputes between Abu Dhabi and Dubai, Ra’s al-Khaimah’s early stance is 
also worthy of attention as its relative independence also had an effect on the later 
evolution of federal politics. The emirate had initially refused to join given that it was 
not accorded equal status with the other larger emirates of Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Bahrain 
and Qatar. Indeed, as this chapter has shown, Ra’s al-Khaimah had enjoyed a long 
history of regional dominance, at one point being die main stronghold of the QasimT 
traders, and as such felt that its proud past should have been better taken into account.211 
Secondly, the emirate had strong hopes for oil strikes of its own, which, if well- 
founded, would have transformed the emirate’s economy and would have given it a far 
better bargaining position. Thirdly, die emirate refused to sign an agreement witii Iran 
over its two occupied islands in the same way that Sharjah had negotiated with Iran over 
die loss of Abu Musa. Eventually, a year later, Ra’s al-Khaimah was persuaded to join 
the UAE, but only after the other emirates first agreed to a number of conditions. They 
had to adopt die question of Iranian occupation as the main dirust of then foreign policy 
objectives, Ra’s al-Khaimah was to receive generous federal aid for its development 
projects, and the emirate was to receive the same number of seats in die government as 
Sharjah.212
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Lastly, as another important product of these early federal negotiations, it is also 
worth noting the rulers’ careful creation of a provisional federal constitution. Aldiough 
die main body of the constitution was nothing remarkable, what did make it unusual 
was the large number of emirate-specific clauses, including those articles which 
permitted die individual emirates to retain control over their own oil revenues and local 
political institutions. Many of these were the result of long and complex debates, and 
were seen as necessary if a balanced compromise was to be reached. Indeed, as Heard- 
Bey noted:
“The realities of political life in the UAE did not encourage rapid, 
unification in every aspect, and this helped to maintain the integrity of the 
various local systems. It was eventually realised that these systems still had 
a very valuable role to play because of their immediate proximity to the 
citizen. ”213
This attitude may explain why the constitution remained temporary for so long (until 
1996) and is also perhaps one of die reasons behind the federation’s initial stability. 
Indeed, as Ali Muhammad Khalifa has indicated, the intention to preserve certain 
existing laws and traditional institutions may well have eased the transition and kept the 
channels of access open to the people, thus allowing a more gradual shift of power 
between local and central administration.214 Certainly, as will be explained in greater 
detail in die study of federal and emirate level politics later in diis thesis,215 a more rigid 
and uncompromising constitution at this early stage would have probably unravelled 
within a few years with each emirate seeking to reassert its independence and quickly 
falling back on more parochial forms of government.216
1.6 - Conclusion
As the first section of this chapter described, in many ways the lower Gulf was 
doomed to a future of peripheralisation given die region’s scant geographical resources 
and the local economy’s early reliance on both foreign labour and the export of a single
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primary product. Nevertheless, despite these conditions there were important signs of 
indigenous socio-economic development. Indeed, with the pearling booms there began 
to evolve something of a capitalist mode of production and, significantly, a domestic 
merchant / entrepreneurial class began to emerge from the wealthier strata of the old 
desert hierarchy. Capable of funding local development projects and even checking the 
power of their rulers, these merchants were powerful players in lucrative economic 
networks stretching from South Asia to East Africa. Moreover, alongside these 
formations there also existed remarkably flexible and relatively de-centralised political 
structures which allowed for direct channels of access to the rulers and highly effective 
systems of mobile and consultative democracy. Crucially these traditional polities were 
also comparatively strong given that they possessed efficient extractive institutions 
which were capable of both collecting taxes and financing a range of rudimentary 
government services.
Working within a dependency framework, the chapter demonstrated how this 
inherited situation was fundamentally altered as the lower Gulfs increasing contact 
with tlie core economy and Imperial power of Britain led to die elimination of certain 
traditional structures and the reinforcement of others. In particular, it was shown how 
Britain’s initial conflict with the Qawasim traders of Ra’s al-Khaimah not only secured 
the British East India Company’s trade routes but also displaced a major indigenous 
economic network and, through a system of maritime treaties, effectively transformed 
die remaining local rulers into a British client elite. Indeed, by guaranteeing lasting 
peace in exchange for recognition of their sovereignty, these externally strengdiened 
Trucial riders, many of whom would have otherwise held only precarious control over 
dieir rivals, effectively formalised their dependence on British support and thereby 
brought to an end the fluidity of the traditional tribal political structure. Moreover, as 
die region’s strategic worth and die value of its resources increased, these clients were 
gradually persuaded by a combination of economic benefits and die implicit threat of 
renewed conflict to allow almost total British control over their foreign affairs and their 
local industries. Thus, by excluding all forms of outside intervention, Britain had for all 
intents and purposes turned the Gulf into a ‘British lake’ isolated from other economic
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Figure (v), “The United Arab Emirates: a historical background”
and political powers. Certainly, without such control and the detachment of the lower 
Gulf from the wider region it is highly likely diat die Trucial States would have either 
fallen under French influence, or would have been absorbed into a Persian, Ottoman, or 
odier indigenous economic bloc.
By die 1920s die dependency and responsiveness of diese clients to dieir core 
patron was further reinforced as the rulers began to receive substantial and often 
personal incomes from British air companies and British oil exploration firms. 
Although, as demonstrated, the lower Gulf has experienced a long histoiy of rent­
gathering, these new sources of unearned rentier wealth were on a much greater scale 
and can be seen to have laid the foundations for many of the region’s contemporary 
structures long before die first oil exports. Indeed, widi access to such revenues die 
rulers were not only able to discontinue most of the existing extractive institutions and 
instead distribute wealth to their populations, but were also able to shift the traditional 
ruler-merchant balance of power. Certainly, with the rulers no longer reliant on their 
merchants for taxation, they were able to assume a new degree of autonomy over their 
people and, although diere were attempts to reinvigorate indigenous development and 
share the rentier wealth (most notably the Dubai reform movement), these were easily 
suppressed by die British-backed clients.
Finally, even as the Empire began to withdraw in die late 1960s, the British went 
to great lengdis to ensure die survival of tiieir fonner clients and their future oil 
suppliers by helping to build up region-wide institutions such as the Trucial States 
Council and die Trucial States Development Office. Indeed, by encouraging greater 
regional unity and a federal framework it was hoped that the newly independent state 
could be guaranteed at least some measure of security from nearby powers and the 
threat of internal fragmentation. Significantly, many of the region’s existing local 
systems and preferences, such as the emphasis on consultation and the direct channels 
of communication, were incorporated alongside these seemingly more central 
institutions, and as such the new state was able to ensure a relatively smooth transition 
without any significant break with the past. Thus, through careful negotiation and
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compromise the federation was able to steer its way through the initial complications, 
and in its early years, against the expectations of many, became one of the most stable 
and successful examples of Arab political union. See figure (v).
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2. The Survival of Monarchy - An Overview
As the historical background has shown, following the British withdrawal in 
1971 the newly independent United Arab Emirates had little more to rely upon than its 
traditional political structures and a few hastily established federal institutions. 
Although, as demonstrated, careful negotiations and a spirit of compromise did allow 
die fledging state to survive its troubled inception, many observers believed that the 
lower Gulfs traditional monarchies and rudimentary institutions could never represent 
anything more than a transitional phase. Indeed, given the region’s massive oil wealth 
and accelerating socio-economic development, such polities were seen as being bodi 
anachronistic and irreconcilable widi any modernisation process. More than thirty years 
later the UAE continues to experience such rapid development and now boasts one of 
the highest GDPs per capita in the world,1 comparable with and in some cases higher 
dian many of the western industrialised economies2 At die same time, however, 
despite these massive changes the seven ruling families are still veiy much in place, and 
have retained, or at least appeal' to have retained much of their traditional authority. 
Indeed, of the world’s eight remaining absolute monarchies, the UAE’s autocratic 
structures and its lack of political freedom are consistently ranked second only to Saudi 
Arabia.3
The purpose of this chapter is, dierefore, to provide an explanatory overview of 
the survival and continuing relevance of what were in effect die end-products of the 
region’s histoiy of dependent relations and its reinforced client elite formations. 
Essentially, by combining die tools of modernisation revisionism and rentier- 
dependency tiieories this chapter will demonstrate how there has been a subtle evolution 
of these primarily traditional structures and die creation of a carefully managed ‘ruling 
bargain’ between the rulers and their population; a bargain which relies heavily on a 
number of key criteria. The first section will consider the UAE’s cautious fusion of old 
and new sources of legitimacy, highlighting the rulers’ astute balance of traditional 
sources of legitimacy alongside seemingly new institutions in their efforts to circumvent
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permanently the ‘ Shaykh’s dilemma’.4 Secondly this chapter will assess the role of oil 
and material resources in continuing to build up a distributive ‘rentier state’ capable of 
further strengthening the rulers’ authority, and capable of providing them with enough 
structural space to forge new and mutually beneficial ruling coalitions with their people. 
Also relating to oil wealth, tlie third section will consider die UAE’s favourable 
international relations, and will determine die extent to which external support has 
strengthened the rulers’ authority in one of the world’s most volatile regions. Finally, 
this chapter will demonstrate how die UAE’s monarchies have transformed over die 
years into powerful and resilient ‘dynastic monarchies’.5 With far larger ruling families 
in control of far more unitary and resource-rich states, these evolving monarchical 
structures have allowed for improved collective security, more scope for internal 
bargaining, better stability mechanisms, and, in many ways can be seen to be 
functioning as surrogates for large-scale single political parties.
2.1 - The Shaykh ’s dilemma
At the time of the Trucial States’ independence, many political scientists 
maintained that most of the world’s remaining traditional monarchies would soon 
collapse, as pressures for political reform would inevitably overload tiieir ‘weak’ 
traditional polities. Early examples of such hypotiieses included Daniel Lerner’s 
‘passing of traditional society’ theory and Karl Deutsch’s ‘social mobilisation’ theoiy; 
both of which asserted that modernising forces and their consequences for society 
would soon render traditional monarchies anachronistic. Writing in die late 1950s, 
Lerner demonstrated in his studies that in eveiy country where individuals could be 
classed as experiencing the effects of modernisation, they would be considerably 
‘happier’ than those still living by traditional means. From his socio-scientific analysis 
he therefore chew the conclusion diat traditional society was passing from the Middle 
East simply because “relatively few Arabs still wanted to live by its rules.”6 In much 
the same way, Deutsch argued that modernising forces in such states would invariably 
expand the size of die educated and literary middle classes, thereby leading to increased 
social mobilisation, which would in turn outweigh the capabilities of die traditional
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polity and would eventually catalyse some kind of political development.7 Indeed, in 
many ways the newly rich oil monarchies of the Persian Gulf were seen by such 
theorists as providing perfect examples of future change given that their ambitious 
development programmes and their inevitably fast-paced modernisation were predicted 
to engender increasing levels of political consciousness and greater demands on the 
state.
Published just three years before the United Arab Emirates came into being, 
Samuel Huntington’s influential Political Change in Traditional Polities was similarly 
pessimistic with regard to the survival of traditional monarchies. Indeed, central to one 
chapter’s framework was the assumption diat in order to cope successftilly with 
modernising forces, traditional rulers would eventually be faced with an inescapable 
‘King’s dilemma’ or, in the case of Arabia, a ‘Shaykh’s dilemma’. Essentially, in much 
the same way as Deutsch and the other early modernisation theorists, it was reasoned 
that the modernisation process and the necessaiy innovation of economic and social 
development policies would invariably create new groups which the polity would have 
difficulty assimilating alongside existing traditional groups.8 As such, the traditional 
monarch would either have to resist modernisation in some way or would instead have 
to accommodate the new groups, a route which would invariably lead to the ceding of 
former powers.9 Thus, believing there was no adequate long-tenn solution to such a 
quandary, Huntington predicted the eventual demise of those traditional polities 
presiding over rapid modernisation by arguing that
“... a gap opens between the increasingly modern society and the traditional 
polity which gave it birth; able to transform the society, but unable to 
transform itself the monarchical parent is eventually devoured by its 
modern progeny ”.10
However, for the purposes of this study it is also important to note that although 
Huntington claimed the key question for these monarchies would ultimately “concern 
simply the scope of the violence of their demise and who will wield the violence,”11 he
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nevertheless accepted that certain short-term strategies could temporarily postpone such 
a fate. Indeed, it was believed tiiat under certain circumstances a traditional monarch 
could provisionally circumvent the assimilation predicament by either seizing the 
initiative and allowing for some degree of voluntary transformation of the polity (while 
still retaining some traditional power), by institutionalising coexistence within tlie 
polity, or by carefully maintaining the polity (resisting reform), and thereby limiting the 
effects of modernisation.12 To varying extents all of these strategies have been in 
evidence in the remaining Middle Eastern monarchies and, although only deemed to be 
temporary measures by western political scientists, they have nevertheless been 
recognised by the rulers as important ways in which to prolong traditional authority and 
sidestep the Shaykh’s dilemma. Although the UAE has at times made limited attempts 
to follow such strategies, by discussing these three measures it will, however, be 
demonstrated how die UAE’s survival and legitimacy has never had to rely heavily on 
such methods, and therefore how the remarkable longevity and resilience of traditional 
polity in the UAE must be seen as being distinct from the less assured survival of some 
of the other Middle Eastern monarchies, including even the neighbouring Gulf emirates 
of Bahrain and Kuwait.
2.1.1 - Voluntary transformation
Both Huntington and Manfred Halpem suggested that some kind of voluntary 
transformation of the polity might extend monarchical rule. Essentially the ruler 
himself could become the main modernising force by pre-empting demands for political 
reform and by instituting constitutional reforms on his own terms. In such a scenario it 
was felt that “the King may be able to reserve liis power as a symbol of unity above 
particular parties by acting as a moderator, but never engaging himself as a final 
authority except in crises that party politicians cannot remedy”.13 Certainly, as early as 
the 1930s tiiere was evidence of such a strategy having been suggested to tlie rulers of 
tlie Trucial States when, during a brief period of instability, the British Political 
Resident in tlie Gulf actively encouraged the ruler of Dubai to voluntarily yield a 
portion of his authority:
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“You are a wise man, O Shaykh! And must be aware that all over the world 
cases have occurred of demands which have been made on their Rulers by 
their people for reforms, and which demands have been refused. The result 
has often been that in the end the Rulers have had to give much more than if 
they had given a little in the beginning, and in some cases the Rulers have 
even lost their thrones. Briefly then, O Shaykh!... I can as your friend, 
advise you to look carefully to the future, and to profit by the experience of 
other countries where early and generous reforms have deprived those who 
wished to oppose the Rulers of the popular support on which they relied. ”14
Although no such development took place in Dubai or indeed any of the other Trucial 
States at diis time, Shaykh ’Ahmad Al-Sabah of Kuwait was nevertheless coaxed by the 
British into devolving some of his powers to restless merchants.15 Moreover, when the 
subject of pre-emptive political refonn was revived during the federal negotiations of 
die late 1960s16 die Tmcial rulers again shied away from such suggestions, whereas 
Bahrain chose to “modify its position in the light of the recent survey of public opinion 
conducted by die UN emissary and in response to die popular requests for more 
democratic institutions”.17 Of course the more recent developments in Bahr ain can also 
be seen as evidence of such willingness.18 Indeed, while die Bahraini Emir’s 
encouragement of democratic elections and his creation of a national charter or cAl- 
mithacf may still represent little more than political window-dressing,19 such a move 
nevertheless underscores how the strategy of voluntary transformation continues to be 
recognised, at least in the background, by die other Gulf monarchies.
2.1.2 - Institutionalising coexistence
An alternative strategy for a ruler attempting to escape the Shaykh’s dilemma 
would be to hy to combine his traditional rule with some form of representative 
government. In odier words die ruler could choose to institutionalise coexistence within 
the polity. In die UAE this strategy has also remained extremely limited. Although, as 
demonstrated in the historical background, during the pre-oil and pre-urbanised era the
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traditional majalis and the easy access to the rulers’ representatives did allow for a 
certain degree of consultative democracy and an opportunity for the people to air their 
grievances at the highest levels,20 no such direct representation really takes place in the 
contemporary UAE. Indeed, witii rapidly expanding populations and a plethora of 
ministries and bureaucracies, the only representative government bodies are the Federal 
National Council and, at the emirate level, the Abu Dhabi National Consultative 
Council. Moreover, as will be described in greater depth later in this diesis, even these 
are extremely inadequate institutions,21 and in many ways it would appear that in real 
terms there has actually been a contraction of access in die UAE, Conversely however, 
in many of die odier Middle Eastern monarchies there have been highly visible attempts 
to institutionalise at least some fonn of coexistence, although it remains important to 
note that in most cases these have lacked any genuine commitment. In Jordan for 
example, latent pressures for political participation from under-represented groups 
including the Palestinians led to national elections and the creation of a National 
Assembly comprising of a Senate appointed by the King and a popularly elected House 
of Representatives.22 Similarly in Morocco a bicameral parliament exists, comprising 
of an appointed Chamber of Counsellors and a popularly elected Chamber of 
Representatives.23 This multi-partyism or la'addudiyya has, however, had little 
structural impact, with parliamentary discussion often limited to local and procedural 
issues, with the political parties functioning as little more dian ‘loyal opposition’, and 
widi die more radical parties being marginalised.24 Moreover, with the case of the 
Shah’s Iran, while coexistence was certainly institutionalised, the strategy’s inherent 
weaknesses soon became apparent as the government was fragmented by dual 
responsibilities to both the monarch (royal sovereignty) and die elected assembly 
(popular sovereignty).25 As such die traditional polity was seen to have provided 
insufficient structural space for adequate manoeuvre. This led to mutual frustration and 
repeated attempts by the monarch to limit the new authorities, most notably by 
suppressing the Prime Minister, Mussadiq. Indeed, as Dilip Hiro describes, Mussadiq’s 
clash with the Shall over the subject of oil nationalisation led to die elected premier’s 
dismissal, and when Mussadiq returned to power on a wave of popular support, the 
Shah had no option but to reassert his authority with what was essentially a military
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operation.26 The Kuwaiti example is also important to note, not least due to its close 
proximity and its seemingly similar socio-economic structures to tlie UAE. In much the 
same way as these other monarchies, Kuwait’s National Assembly was seen by the Al- 
Sabah rulers as providing a necessaiy degree of coexistence within the polity in order to 
preserve stability and control the assimilation of new groups. In reality however, die 
level of representation was minimal with all candidates being restricted to individual 
platforms and with all political parties being banned.27 Moreover, when electoral 
platforms finally did begin to emerge around blocs and groups in die 1970s, the Kuwaiti 
executive felt compelled to dissolve the assembly and place restrictions on the press.28 
Only in the 1990s, following the country’s liberation from Iraq was a return finally 
made to the original constitution and the limited coexistence of the 1960s.29
2.1.3 -Maintaining the polity /resisting reform
Thirdly, a traditional monarch can attempt to circumvent the Shaykh’s dilemma 
and seek to maintain his traditional authority simply by resisting reform and avoiding 
the assimilation of new groups, often by balancing modernisation alongside 
repression,30 To some extent, such maintenance has been evident in tlie UAE, but 
although tiiere has undoubtedly been an appreciable increase in internal security,31 there 
has never been a heavy reliance on coercion, and at no stage has tlie country suffered 
from a particularly repressive atmosphere.32 Instead, there have been subtle controls 
placed on almost all civil society organisations, religious groups, media organisations 
and workers’ associations. Though these restrictions will be analysed in more detail in 
the discussion of Emirati civil society later in tiiis diesis, it is worth noting diat these 
controls have usually been limited to financial co-option,33 government licensing,34 self- 
enforcing censorship35 and, in the case of the UAE’s mosques, the supervision and 
approval of practising ulama ’.36 As with the two other monarchical survival strategies, 
there has, however, been far more evidence of strict maintenance in other Middle 
Eastern monarchies and potentates than in the UAE, perhaps most notably in die 
Imam’s Yemen. Indeed, as Muhammad Zabarah notes in his study of Yemeni state 
formation, although a maintenance strategy may have temporality delayed the collapse
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of die traditional polity, the Imam’s lack of responsiveness to demand for political and 
socio-economic refonns eventually reached such a level that die country became openly 
divided between traditionalists and modernists?7 Crucially this struggle soon extended 
to the army when, waiy of die new officer class whose political notions were seen as 
running contrary to his own, the Imam chose to inhibit the development of a strong 
Yemeni army.38 Thus, driven by the need to keep modem ideas away from his domain, 
the ruler attempted to undermine his armed forces and instead began to rely upon the 
tribes in an effort to preserve traditional values, thereby irrecoverably compromising 
Yemeni national security and leading to a coup.
2.2 - The Legitimacy Formula
While voluntary transformation, the institutionalisation of coexistence, and often 
maintenance strategies have been used to varying degrees of success in many other 
Middle Eastern monarchies throughout the twentiedi century, and even in some of the 
other Gulf monarchies, the UAE’s reliance on such methods has clearly remained 
limited. Moreover, the Shaykh’s dilemma and the problems of balancing traditional and 
modem forces appear to have been largely avoided without resorting to diese temporary 
measures. Indeed, as political scientists began to argue in the late 1970s, certain 
monarchies were, if anything, more stable tiian ever before, even after experiencing 
great wealth and extensive socio-economic development programmes. Thus, given that 
these traditional monarchies were surviving despite considerable evidence of 
modernising forces in their countries, there was clearly a need for a re-examination of 
die belief in the inevitability of the passing of traditional political systems. Among 
these modernisation revisionists, Michael Hudson effectively began to contest the early 
assumption diat monarchical legitimacy was necessarily anachronistic and reasoned 
that, in certain circumstances, a traditional polity could evolve towards more long-term 
legitimacy and stability. More specifically, it was argued that, within a Weberian 
framework, certain traditional sources of legitimacy could be utilised and adapted by
*1A
monarchies as part of a more comprehensive survival strategy. By assessing die 
carefiil use of personal, patrimonial, cultural, and ideological legitimacy resources this
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section will attempt to underscore die evolution of the UAE’s legitimacy formula over 
die past thirty years and, moreover, by considering die polity’s far-sighted attempts to 
develop greater structural resources alongside these traditional resources it will also be 
shown how die UAE’s traditional polity is now beginning to survive within a much 
broader ‘neo-patrimonial’ network.40
2.2.1 - Personal resources
As demonstrated hi the historical background, personal resources have always 
been a cornerstone of the traditional polity’s legithnacy. Indeed, for centuries the lower 
Gulfs political structures were dominated by personalities and the need for personal 
audiority over populations, even more so than over territorial or geographical 
resources.41 Central to such audiority was the principle of bay 'a\
“Bay ’a is the act by which a certain number of persons acting individually 
or collectively recognise the authority of another person. Thus, the bay 'a of 
an emir/king/caliph is the act by which one person is proclaimed and 
recognised as the head of the Muslim state.”42
Certainly, prior to the oil era, many of the region’s rulers drew considerable legitimacy 
from their citizens’ public endorsement of their personal ability. Without the bay’a 
tiiese rulers would have been unable to command sufficient respect for their traditional 
patriarchal governments or ‘hukuma Moreover, for the purposes of diis study it is 
important to note the continuing relevance of the bay’a mechanism and the efforts of the 
contemporary rulers’ to shore up the old Bedu notions of citizenship.43 Indeed, 
although family and polity may no longer reach the point of absolute congruence,44 and 
although the personal competence of Emirati rulers may no longer be judged in terms of 
their ability to fight, ride camels, or arbitrate tribal disputes, diere is nevertheless little 
doubt that personal authority remains most significant. The possession of sufficient 
charisma or ‘barakn ’ together with the ability to personally mediate and supervise are 
still regarded as being essential functions of successful rulership, and as such it is
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widely believed among tlie local Emirati populations that new rulers must still be seen 
to have informally earned the bay’a from respected members of the community.45
Among the present-day rulers tlie clearest example of such personal authority has 
of course been that of Shaykh Zayid Al-Nuhayyan, the ruler of Abu Dhabi and the 
UAE’s long-serving president. Having secured considerable popular support 
throughout the emirate during his time in Al-‘Ayn and Buraimi, Zayid is widely 
credited as tlie ‘Father of tlie UAE’ and as tlie driving force behind much of the UAE’s 
success.46 Indeed, as an Emirati minister claimed in a recent international conference, a 
significant portion of the UAE’s political stability must be attributed to Zayid’s 
consensus rule and the enormous personal respect he continues to command from die 
people of all seven emirates:
“Fortunately for us and our neighbours, we have developed without 
undermining the social, cultural and political fabric of our society. This has 
been due in large part to leadership. Shaykh Zayid has served as president 
of the UAE since its inception in 1971. And his leadership is based on 
consensus among the seven emirates. In keeping with Islamic tradition, he 
is seen as first among equals, continuing to serve as president because he 
commands the respect of the nation's other leaders and the reverence of the 
people. ”47
Similarly at the emirate level, another good example of strong leadership would be the 
highly personal and very popular rule of Shaykh Rashid Al-Maktum, tlie ‘Father of 
Dubai’, who closely presided over an era of rapid socio-economic development in the 
emirate until his death in 1990.48 Indeed, in Hudson’s study of monarchical legitimacy, 
Shaykh Rashid was singled out for his considerable input into the running of Dubai, liis 
intensiveness, and his extraordinary level of individual commitment:
“In the early period Shaykh Rashid's personal involvement in the day-to­
day running of Dubai Emirate was extremely intense: “he rises every
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morning at 6am, before anybody else is up, and after prayers takes an 
inspection drive around the town. Then, after coffee he is off to the office 
for a morning of routine royal duties: receiving distinguished visitors and 
petitioners, checking the status of various projects and signing cheques.
After lunch he turns his attention to new projects and planning... ”49
Thus, in these cases, and in Sharjah and the other smaller emirates where, from informal 
research, it would appear that die Qawasim, the Sharqiym, and the odier ruling families 
also continue to command considerable support from then local populations, it would 
therefore seem there are still strong indications of personal resources playing a key role 
in the rulers’ legitimacy formulae. Indeed, spontaneous rallies and public displays of 
agreement with the ruler’s decisions are a frequent spectacle in almost all of the 
emirates.50 This of course contrasts markedly with the former monarchs of Iraq, 
Afghanistan, and Libya where, as will be demonstrated later in tliis chapter, for a 
multitude of reasons including their lack of public accessibility and their unpopular 
foreign relations, it would seem diat the ruling families failed to foster any real 
admiration or respect from their subjects.51
2.2.2 - Patrimonial networks
However, as described, even in the pre-oil era the region’s political structures 
were already beginning to evolve from a total reliance on personal authority following 
the growth of the coastal towns, die increasing urbanisation, and the greater 
administrative demands being placed on the state.52 In more recent years, with rapidly 
expanding populations and a plediora of new bureaucracies the distance between the 
ruler and his people has continued to grow, and although personal resources have 
certainly remained an important legitimacy component, these have now been augmented 
by the development of extensive intermediary networks. Indeed, the rulers have 
actively encouraged and nurtured new and extended patterns of authority based on 
informal relations, kinship groups and long-standing traditional loyalties. The result has 
been an extension of the ruler’s personal network to a much greater patrimonial
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network; one that filters down through all sections of society with the ruler at the veiy 
top of the pyramid and with all other echelons tied into die system at various strata 
beneadi him. Patrimonialism therefore provides additional layers of legitimacy by 
reducing the traditional polity’s total reliance on personalism and potentially 
unpredictable resources such as charisma and popular veneration, and in addition has 
created important vertical linkages between the ruler and his people which have helped 
to provide individual mobility widiin the polity while at the same time fostering some 
degree of loyalty at all levels.
Indeed, witii regal'd to reducing the reliance on personal authority, patrimonial 
networks have been seen as an increasingly important method of ensuring ongoing 
support for die various ruling families. Shaykli Rashid has now been succeeded by four 
sons and, as an old man, Shaykli Zayid will soon be approaching the end of his long and 
illustrious reign. Despite his considerable administrative experience, few would doubt 
that Shaykh Khalifa Al-Nuhayyan, Zayid’s eldest son and Abu Dhabi’s Crown Prince, 
could ever hope to draw upon the same level of personal legitimacy from his peers as 
his distinguished father. As such, for die long-term survival of the traditional polity it 
has become essential that the UAE’s elites, both inside and outside of politics, are all in 
some way vertically connected to the ruler, and therefore ‘clients’ dependent on the 
ongoing stability of die polity for die preservation of their social status, economic 
advantages and whatever other privileges they have been accorded within the 
patrimonial-clientalist network.
At the political level, tins incorporation has been largely based on ‘consolation 
prizes’ for powerful elites outside of the ruling family and for other aspiring individuals; 
an important feature of Emirati politics which will be returned to later in this chapter 
and tiiroughout die remainder of this diesis.53 Indeed, evidence of this strategy was 
readily apparent even at the time of Shaykli Zayid’s succession as ruler of Abu Dhabi. 
As Abdullah describes:
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"From 1966 onwards, Shaykh Zayid adopted the wise policy of sharing the 
responsibilities of his new government between members of the ruling 
family, notable local figures and certain graduates from the more prominent 
families... This was an example that was quickly followed in the other 
emirates. The trust the Shaykh showed in the young educated generation 
won him their affection and in due course they proved, their reliability. ”54
Similarly in Sharjah, when Shaykh Khalid al-Qasiml succeeded as ruler in 1965, one of 
his first actions was to give young Sharjah graduates a share in die local 
administration.55 Of course, as will also be demonstrated later in this thesis, die obvious 
weakness of such individual incorporation into the patrimonial network is that in future 
years the size of the UAE’s graduate and educated ‘technocratic’ population may begin 
to exceed the polity’s capacity for providing them with meaningful public sector 
employment.56 Thus, as explained, die patrimonial network must also be much broader, 
providing other rewards and incentives to the Emirati elite.
Perhaps the strongest example of such rewards has been die polity’s overt 
attempts to encourage and foster the emergence of a privileged ‘local’ class comprising 
of the UAE’s entire indigenous population which of course has now become dwarfed by 
the UAE’s massive expatriate populations. Given die small size of this national 
population the ‘locals’ fonn a natural elite group, easily identifiable by their adherence 
to traditional dress codes,57 and the majority openly receive a number of generous socio­
economic benefits from the state, tiius making diem reliant on die rulers’ munificence 
and therefore more favourably disposed towards the survival of the traditional polity. 
Indeed, as Frauke Heard-Bey noted in her updated 1996 study of the UAE:
"Every UAE national, however humble his or her material and educational 
circumstances and status within this society, by virtue of not being part of 
the non-national majority, has a vested interest in the continued integrity of 
the traditional society with tribal shaykhs and rulers at its apex. Being part
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of this structure is the basic reason why a national family is able today to 
lead a life in which poverty has been left behind. ”58
In recent year’s one of the clearest examples of such largesse has been Shaykh 
Zayid’s scheme to provide substantial ‘marriage funds’ for young locals. Ostensibly 
these funds were designed to tackle the problem of large dowries and extravagant 
weddings, but more importantly they are a means of ensuring the preservation of the 
local population by ensuring Emirati inter-marriage, and of course a means of providing 
large state-sponsored subsidies to young Emirati men:
“He [Zayid] has been particularly critical of the growing habit of 
extravagant weddings and of the reluctance of some young people to 
contribute in a positive way towards society. 'Extremely high dowries, 
extravagance at wedding parties and everything else which burdens young 
people with debt when they are on the threshold of their lives as a family are 
matters for which there can be no justification,' he said... To counteract 
this trend, Shaykh Zayid ordered the creation of a special Marriage Fund to 
offer grants to young men wishing to marry, and also urged the country's 
tribes to take action to discourage expensive parties and large dowries. The 
response was immediate, both from tribal elders throughout the UAE, and 
from young nationals, who flocked to apply for help from the Marriage 
Fund. Unique of its kind in Arabia, the Fund seems set to make a major 
contribution to the stability of society and the preservation of local 
culture. ”59
Other important examples of such privileges would include the considerable 
business advantages conferred on the local population. Indeed, with reference to Abu 
Dhabi, an identifiable government aim has been to:
"... institutionalise a number ofprivileges for nationals so that they can earn 
income, for instance from trade agencies, renting property built with
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government provided loans on freely distributed land, renting vehicles to 
companies operating in the desert or competing on favourable terms for 
projects. Thus, the illiterate Bedu as well as the urbane chairmen of trading 
empires are well aware of the benefits of being one of the small number of 
Abu Dhabi nationals. ”60
Chiefly, this financial assistance is provided by the ‘Social Services and Commercial 
Buildings Committee’ otherwise known as the ‘Khalifa Committeee’, which ensures 
that loans are available at low interest rates to all Abu Dhabian nationals.61 
Furthermore, as figures from Citibank UAE indicate, these considerable advantages also 
extend to the private sector with different loans and terms being made available to 
different groups, clearly indicating those favoured by the broader patrimonial-clientalist 
network:
Category of loan UAE Nationals Non-nationals
Start-up loans available on 
first day of job:
100,000 Dirhams 60,000 Dirhams
Loans available on 
completion of six months 
employment:
250,000 Dirhams 120,000 Dirhams
Maximum repayment 
period allowed:
84 months 48 months
[Source: Citibank UAE, 2002]62
Evidently, non-nationals, regardless of the strength of their connections with the UAE, 
do not have access to the same benefits as the nationals. Moreover, in some cases these 
differences in privileges have even been formalised in UAE legislation, as indicated by 
the Federal Commercial Companies Law which states:
”...Each company incorporated in the State shall hold its nationality but it 
shall not necessarily be entitled, to privileges reserved only to U.A.E 
nationals. ”63
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More specifically, Article 22 of the Companies Law provides an important advantage 
for UAE nationals. Certain commercial activities are restricted to UAE nationals, and 
in those areas that are not, all companies must be ‘sponsored’ by one or more UAE 
nationals
“...whose share shall not be less than 51% of the company's capital.
Therefore, any company's contract that does not incorporate such a 
provision shall be considered to be null and void. ”64
Lastly, it is important to emphasise the extent to which such rewards and 
advantages have also been extended to the veiy poorest UAE nationals, with many 
houses and other amenities being provided free of charge to those in the lowest income 
brackets and with many fully equipped farms being provided for those closer to the 
main agricultural areas 65 Indeed, as Kevin Fenelon observed in his survey of the 
region, even in the early 1970s the lives of many of the most impoverished Emirati 
citizens were being dramatically improved as the governments began to construct 
thousands of new free homes and public facilities:
" ...for lower income families, a considerable number of one-storey low cost 
houses were erected by the governments, including those of Ajman and 
Umm al-Qawain. These two towns in consequence began to look far less 
picturesque, but in compensation, the inhabitants were far better housed 
and were better provided for by modern amenities such as piped water and 
electricity. In Abu Dhabi more than 3000 low cost homes were erected and 
were freely distributed to Abu Dhabi nationals with limited incomes. Other 
Abu Dhabi nationals were given building plots on which to build houses of
their own.”66
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2.2.3 Cultural and religious resources
Alongside the continuing use of personal legitimacy resources and the 
development of a patrimonial network of socio-economic privileges and loyalties, it is 
important to note how die role, or rather die revitalised role of cultural resources 
(fturath] has also formed a key component of the traditional polity’s legitimacy 
formula. Essentially, by preserving and restoring memories of the region’s rich history 
of traditional activities, the ruler’s position at the head of a contemporary patriarchal 
and patrimonial society can be further reinforced. Indeed, as Davis explains in liis 
study of oil and historical memoiy, a state’s ability to draw upon cultural resources and 
revive traditional experiences can in many cases greatly enhance the legitimacy of its 
polity:
“... [the state has] an ability to reconstruct, synthesise and even invent 
symbols that will touch a psychological nerve in the populace at large. A 
strong slate is one that can exercise this craft and that continues to forge 
emotive links with the populace over which it rules. ”67
Certainly, many of the lower Gulfs traditional customs and practices are still in 
evidence today, and in some cases diese are now being reintroduced and formalised as 
‘living memories’ for the increasingly urbanised and modem population. Indeed, in her 
recent study of Emirati society, Sally Findlow supported this view by concluding diat
" ...this modern Muslim Gulf Arab nation-state retains strong elements of 
traditional conservatism while endeavouring simultaneously to preserve 
indigenous cultural authenticity. ”68
Although the UAE’s cultural revival and the state’s massive investment in new 
museums, cultural foundations, and various otiier heritage centres will be discussed in 
greater detail later in this thesis,69 at this stage it is worth noting how certain cultural
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symbols have been used (or in some cases even invented) with the specific intention of 
augmenting die ruler’s traditional legitimacy.
A good example of such symbolism would be camel racing in the UAE which, in 
recent years, has evolved into a highly lucrative and widely televised sport. In an 
attempt to preserve a part of their Bedu heritage, die UAE’s rulers have spent millions 
of Dirhams on racing circuits, prize money and thoroughbred racing camels. However, 
as Sulayman Klialaf has recendy demonstrated, the competitive racing of camels was 
rarely a popular pursuit in traditional times witii most camel races being more of a show 
(ardha) reserved for special occasions. Thus, in the contemporary UAE the status of 
these races has been greatly elevated.70 Indeed, as Dubai camel expert and author Sa‘id 
Abu ‘Atiiirahas explained:
“Camel races used to be run [only] on special occasions such as weddings.
Now they are sponsored by governments to help people keep their camels 
and not lose their traditional way of life. "7l
Other important and almost mytiiological symbols would include the many monuments 
and displays dedicated to die memory of the pearling industry; the many preserved 
examples of jalbuts, baggalas, and other traditional Arab vessels, and of course the 
region’s numerous forts and towers, almost all of which have now been restored.
In a similar fashion to these cultural resources, the region’s long history of 
Islamic tradition must also be seen as an important legitimising bridge between the 
traditional polity and contemporary Emirati society, as religious association has united 
both modem and traditional groups behind a common cause.72 Certainly, Islam has 
continued to be an integral part of the UAE’s legitimacy formula, not only serving as 
the official state religion, but with Islamic sharT'a law and the traditional qadi system 
still providing many of the principles upon which the state’s constitution and judicial 
system are based.73 Although die discussion of globalisation and civil society in the 
final chapter will further expand upon the state’s relationship with Islam and Islamic
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groups,74 it is nevertheless necessary to underscore the polity’s clear commitment to 
bolstering its religious resources. Unless preserved and well maintained it is 
undoubtedly feared that any future erosion of Islamic standards and criteria will reduce 
the importance of an Islamic variant of Weber’s ‘natural law’ as an additional basis for 
legitimacy and survival.75 To this end many of the UAE’s constituent emirates and their 
rulers have embarked on massive Islamic-oriented projects, including the building of 
new mosques and Islamic centres, the funding of Islamic charities, and in some cases 
the introduction of new local legislation to combat declining standards.
As a result, in much the same way as in Saudi Arabia where it estimated there 
are just 100 male citizens for eveiy mosque,76 any visitor to Abu Dhabi would be 
overwhelmed by the incredibly high density of mosques; a number that grows every 
year, with some of the largest and grandest mosques in the world now being built on the 
outskirts of the city. Furthermore, in Sharjah, the Saudi insistence on maintaining the 
outward appearance of Islamic propriety is also very much in evidence. Indeed, the 
emirate is now entirely alcohol free (even in hotels and private residences), and only 
very recently a number of stringent ‘decency laws’ have been declared (and enforced) in 
an effort to preserve and improve the Islamic nature of the community. These have 
covered matters such as dress codes, public conduct, gender separation, and 
promiscuity.77 While some have privately voiced their disapproval, the majority seem 
to accept the necessity of such measures and the legitimacy of their ruler’s actions.78 
See appendix (ii).
Moreover, given that in recent years Islamic fundamentalism has emerged as one 
of the greatest political opponents and internal security threats to the surviving 
traditional polities in the other Gulf States,79 the need for die continued incorporation of 
mainstream Islamic resources into the UAE’s legitimacy formula remains as crucial as 
ever. Although the UAE survived the aftershock of the Iranian revolution and has not 
suffered from car bombings, ambushes, or assassination attempts as have Saudi Arabia 
and Kuwait, there has nevertheless been an appreciable rise in the number of Islamic 
related terrorist incidents. Early examples would include the 1981 bomb attack on the
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Hyatt Regency in Dubai following the hotel’s serving of alcohol to locals in traditional 
dress, thereby violating an unwritten code of conduct for UAE Muslims.80 Otiier 
examples would include the disco veiy of explosives in Dubai ‘City Center’, an 
upmarket shopping mall hosting a number of western outlets and popular with both 
expatriates and Dubai locals.81 Most significantly, however, has been the growing 
evidence linking Al-Qaeda activity to the UAE in the wake of the September 11th 
attacks. Recent indications are that a number of tlie conspirators received their initial 
funding in the UAE, with US Intelligence tracing $500,000 used to pay for flight 
training, airplane tickets and other logistics back to Abu Dhabi; with Muhammad Atta, 
the ringleader, believed to have received $100,000 into liis bank account via 
moneychangers in Sharjah; and with Marawan al-Shehlii also believed to have received 
money while in Shaijah.82 Indeed, in late 2002 this link with the UAE was finally 
confirmed with tlie discreet arrest of Abdel al-Nashri in Abu Dhabi.83 As Al-Qaeda’s 
head of Gulf operations, al-Nashri was believed to have masterminded the 2000 attack 
on the USS Cole, and more recently was alleged to have been planning suicide attacks 
using oil tankers as weapons. Most worrying for Emirati internal security, he was 
reportedly captured as, “he prepared to blow up economic installations in the country... 
aimed at causing tlie highest numbers of casualties among nationals and foreigners.”84
2.2.4 - Ideological resources
In addition to these cultural and religious resources, ideology can also form 
an important component of tlie legitimacy formula.85 As this section will demonstrate, 
while secular nationalism has had relatively little impact on Emirati politics, there have 
nevertheless been certain key issues, especially the Palestinian question, which have 
undoubtedly formed important ideological symbols and, when harnessed by the state, 
have provided additional layers of legitimacy for the UAE’s polity.
Perhaps tlie first example of organised secular nationalism in die region was in the 
1930s when a group was set up in the Falah School in Dubai. Many of the expatriate
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Arab teachers had begun to spread the nationalist sentiments existing in Iraq at that time 
and, as Abdullah describes, they encouraged many of their pupils to
“...parade through the narrow streets of the town, carrying flags and 
chanting Arab nationalist songs, applauded by their parents and citizens. ”86
More significantly, in 1953 a number of Dubai merchants formed a loose organisation 
called the National Front, Although few in members, the front attempted to voice its 
concern over the growing influence of Persian and Indian merchants, and called for 
greater privileges and protection for local Arab merchants.87 Later, at the time of the 
Suez Crisis there were again demonstrations, this time by a number of locals wishing to 
express their sympathy witii Egypt in the fight against Israeli invasion and what was 
perceived to be an anti-Arab Anglo-French collaboration.88 Indeed, a group of students 
were even caught trying to set fire to the British air base in Sharjah as an act of 
protest.89 More recently, in the 1970s, the Arabic language newspaper Al-Azmina al- 
Arabiyya kept pressing the UAE government to assume stronger Arab nationalist 
positions and to oppose more firmly an expanded American presence in the Gulf.90 
Although on certain occasions the government did seek to acknowledge such 
sentiments, most notably the Dubai administration’s naming of a new city square after 
Nasser and a new city quarter after Port Sa‘id,91 secular Arab nationalism has 
nevertheless remained firmly in the background of Emirati politics, perhaps due to the 
abovementioned persistence of kinship loyalties,92 and of course also due to the contrary 
demonstration effect of failing Arab republics,93 their military defeats, and their 
economic collapse.94
A far greater concern has, however, been the plight of the Palestinians, and 
predictably, given the issue’s unifying popularity and its much closer association with 
Islamic brotherhood, this has been one of the chief ideological symbols to be adopted by 
the polity, both publicly and constitutionally.95 Indeed, the rulers’ support for the 
Palestinian people has a long histoiy in the region. In response to the Palestinian 
Islamic Congress in Jerusalem of 1930, a meeting was held in the chief mosque in
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Sharjah during which young educated locals were encouraged to give enthusiastic 
speeches and to help collect money for the cause. Moreover, during die inter-war 
period, a number of articles published in pro-Palestinian Cairo magazines were believed 
to have been sent anonymously from various locals in die Trucial States.96 In more 
recent years there have of course been a multitude of carefully organised state- 
sanctioned anti-Israeli demonstrations, many of which are televised, and some of which 
are attended by the rulers and other notables.97 In addition, generous government- 
sponsored aid packages are supplied to Palestine via die UAE’s Red Crescent Society or 
through agencies such as the Abu Dhabi Fund for Arab Economic Development. 
Finally, again underscoring the polity’s commitment to die cause, it is also important to 
note how die federal government has even sought to formalise its total boycott of all 
tilings Israeli by introducing prohibitive legislation:
“Articles 1 & 2 of this law [Federal law I5J stipulate that 'any natural or 
legal person shall be prohibited from directly or indirectly concluding an 
agreement with organisations or persons either resident in Israel, connected 
therewith by virtue of their nationality or working on its behalf., ’ Also the 
entry, exchange or possession of all types of Israeli merchandise, 
commodities or products, or any form of trading in them, is forbidden and 
the embargo shall apply to monetary papers and other Israeli movable 
amounts in the UAE".98
2.2.5 - The two-level Emirati identity
Closely related to these ideological resources is the role of identity in the UAE’s 
legitimacy formula. Although, as will be argued later in this diesis, the UAE is in many 
ways more a loose confederation than a true federation and on one level retains many 
emirate-level identities and loyalties,99 the greater awareness of communal solidarity 
arising from the union of the seven emirates should nevertheless not be underestimated. 
Certainly, a sense of identity and membership of a distinct political community that 
does not conflict widi odier sub-national or supranational identifications may be crucial
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in a heterogeneous population comprising of differing tribal affiliations, different 
emirate loyalties and different ethnic populations. Indeed, it has been claimed tiiat such 
an identity can serve as a necessaiy horizontal axis in the state-building process, an axis 
which can actually complement die vertical patrimonial axis between the ruler and die 
ruled.100
Even before the creation of die UAE, die need for some kind of greater ‘Emirati’ 
identity was already beginning to be recognised by the various Trucial rulers. A 
broader identity was seen as providing a stronger platfonn upon which to build future 
legitimacy without necessarily weakening odier personal, cultural and religious 
legitimacy resources. Indeed, even in 1966, upon his accession in Abu Dhabi, part of 
Shaykh Zayid’s speech underlined his commitment to die building of such an identity:
"It is the way to power, the way to strength, the way to well-being, a high 
reputation... Lesser entities have no standing in the world today, and so it 
has ever been in history."10i
Throughout the 1970s identity building continued unabated with the introduction of a 
new national flag, a new national antiiem, national holidays, a ‘national university’, and 
many other highly visible symbols of the new UAE / Emirati identity. At die time most 
observers viewed tiiis overt process within the context of nationalism and as part of the 
Gulfs commitment to ‘Arabism’,102 but as Findlow has demonstrated in her recent 
study of contemporary Emirati identity, these were not the true foundations of the new 
identity.103 As already shown, secular nationalism had only a limited impact on the 
region, and although the UAE’s provisional constitution and various other official 
documents in the 1970s did emphasise the need for a broader Arab identity, Findlow 
convincingly argues that because the majority of these were constructed during die 
Nasserite era of pan-Arabism they were merely historical by-products.104 Certainly, as a 
wealdiy oil-producing Arab state die UAE and its population did provide considerable 
economic aid and moral support to the Arab republics during tiiis period,105 but this 
assistance should be perhaps be viewed as more of a commitment to Arab brotherhood
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than Arab nationalism. The UAE / Emirati identity should not therefore be regarded as 
simply another derivative of pan-Arab nationalism but instead as a part of a distinct 
identity fostered by the traditional polity, an identity which serves as another key layer 
in the UAE’s legitimacy formula.
In an effort to determine the success of the identity building process in the UAE, 
Findlow’s 1999 survey attempted to demonstrate how UAE citizens not only possessed 
an Arab identity but also a strong UAE / Emirati identity. Her results were rather 
disappointing given that only 30% claimed to be ‘UAE / Emirati’, with the remainder 
claiming either a more general Arab identity, an emirate-level identity, and in some 
cases even their home town or village.106
Findlow identity survey response (1999)
'UAE/
Other
response
70%
/
Emirati' 
response - 
30%
[Source: Sally Findlow, “The UAE: Nationalism and Arab-Islamic Identity”]107
However, it is important to note that this low Emirati response may have been due to the 
non-contextualised and geographic nature of the survey question (“Where are you 
from?”), the single location of the survey (Al-‘Ayn), and the lack of a broad 
demographic cross-section.
The author’s own survey, conducted in 2002, canvassed a similar number of 
citizens (250 male UAE nationals) but applied a more specific identity-related question 
(“Which of the following best describes your identity?”), and provided three possible 
choices: 'UAE / Emirati', an emirate-specific response (e.g. Abu Dhabi for those 
surveyed in Abu Dhabi), and a more general "Arab' response. Furthermore, the survey 
was conducted in five separate locations across the UAE, and aimed to question a 
variety of age groups.
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Location ‘UAE / Emirati’ 
response
Emirate-specific
response
‘Arab’ response
Abu Dhabi 86% 8% 6%
Dubai 36 60 4
Sharjah 76 16 8
•Ajman 98 0 2
Al-‘Ayn 100 0 0
Overall 79% 77% 4°/0
[Source. Davidson identity survey, 2002]
Unsurprisingly the ‘UAE / Emirati’ results from Abu Dhabi, the federation’s capital, 
and Al-‘Ayn, also part of Abu Dhabi emirate, were very high. Similarly in ‘Ajman, the 
UAE / Emirati response was also very high, perhaps due to the emirate’s small size, its 
non oil-producing status, and its dependence on federal aid for much of its economic 
and social development. Conversely, in Shaijah and far more notably in Dubai, the 
UAE / Emirati response was much lower with many more giving emirate-specific 
answers, clearly reflecting the relative economic power and the proud history of the 
emirate.108 Nevertheless, despite these important regional variations, it is clear from the 
overall results of the survey that a sense of a UAE I Emirati identity is emerging, with a 
significant number of UAE citizens now regarding themselves primarily as Emirati 
rather than ‘Arab’ or any more localised identity:
Davidson identity survey response (2002)
'Arab'
Emirate- response
specific .. " 4%
response -
17%
'UAE / 
Emirati' 
response
79%
[Source: Davidson identity survey, 2002]
Indeed, a substantial 79% gave a UAE / Emirati response to the survey question, with 
17% giving an emirate-specific answer such as ‘Abu Dhabi’ or ‘Dubai’, and with only 
4% giving a more general answer such as ‘Arab’ or ‘Middle Eastern’. See appendix 
(di).
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2.2.6- Structural resources and lneo-patrimonialism ’
Alongside these essentially traditional resources, it is also imperative to consider 
the increasing importance of structural resources and tiieir role in tlie UAE’s evolving 
legitimacy formula. As explained in tlie discussion of patrimonialism, the increasing 
needs of die region’s expanding and rapidly urbanising population required the polity to 
create many new intermediaries and bureaucracies. Although the resulting institutions 
have remained extremely limited and, as will be analysed in the fourth chapter of this 
study, are still veiy far from the Weberian legal-rational ideal,109 these new institutions 
have nevertheless appreciably enhanced the traditional polity’s legitimacy. Indeed, if 
well balanced, it would seem that a ‘neo-patrimonial’ network can provide some degree 
of durable legitimacy without necessarily short-circuiting the polity’s more traditional 
structures. Essentially, by openly institutionalising processes and introducing accepted 
regulations, both new and existing organisations and procedures can acquire much 
greater value and stability,110 even if these seemingly modem institutions are still 
controlled by older personal and patrimonial networks.
Writing in die early 1960s, Halpem had argued that any political system which 
still relied upon ‘face to face relationships’, monarchy or otherwise, could never hope to 
establish any lasting authority or any firm consensus on public purpose, public interest 
or public duty.111 Although, as will be demonstrated in the following section, the 
UAE’s oil wealtii certainly removed some of die urgency for institutional development, 
at least by allowing the polity to avoid the need for the kind of penetrative extractive 
structures championed by Tilly and Kiren Aziz Chaudhry,112 Shaykh Zayid and his 
fellow Trucial rulers were nonetiieless keenly aware of the need to supplement tiieir 
personal and patrimonial networks with more elaborate structures. Indeed, as described 
in the historical background, the need for institutional development was a key issue in 
federal negotiations and, following the creation of die UAE in 1971, a number of federal 
laws immediately sought to streamline the new government by creating a Supreme 
Council of Rulers, a Council of Ministers and a national consultative council.113 Given 
that these new structures effectively institutionalised the authority of the traditional
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rulers and their patrimonial subordinates, their position and legitimacy at the apex of all 
networks was undoubtedly strengthened. Certainly, at this time both indigenous 
popular opinion and the view of foreign observers was that such structures were most 
definitely worthwhile,114 adding an air of legitimacy to what were previously very 
simple traditional governments and, as Hudson noted with direct reference to the UAE, 
clearly reflecting the way in which
”... both the royal and the technocratic sectors of the elite seemed convinced 
that future legitimacy would depend upon the building of a modern 
government apparatus”/15
The functioning of these institutions, together with the plethora of other structures 
and establishments including the chambers of commerce, the industrial parastatals, and 
the various supreme councils116 will be explored more thoroughly in the study of the 
UAE’s political process later in this thesis,117 but at this stage it is important to note how 
the rulers’ views regarding structural legitimacy from the early 1970s have remained 
relatively unchanged, with die present (and next) generation of Emirati rulers continuing 
to stress not only the need for strong personal leadership and innovation, but also the 
need for greater institutionalisation. Indeed, speaking at a recent conference, Shaykli 
Muhammad Al-Maktum, the Crown Prince of Dubai and one of the leading political 
personalities in the Gulf effectively summed up these notions:
”... we [Gulf leaders] realise that the challenges we face are crucial and 
difficult... naturally, new realities create new challenges and 
responsibilities for Arab leadership... The modern leader, lays the cultural 
basis of questioning and accountability, as well as forges ahead and cares 
for others. In addition, the leader needs to crystallise an innovative vision 
that provides the platform for the takeoff for humane resources capabilities, 
and realise the projected targets endeavoured. It is therefore imperative 
that we increase the participation of people by developing institutions, while 
emphasising transparency andfighting corruption. ”118
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Similarly, presenting at a recent symposium, Shaykh Faliim al-Qasiml, the UAE’s 
Minister of Economy and Commerce, described tlie continuing need for neo- 
patrimonialism and the balancing of the ‘best of the old with the best of the new’:
"Our system, like the American, is based on a living constitution. Our 
system combines the best of the old with the best of the new. We have 
retained democratic Islamic traditions, foremost amongst which are the 
majlis, the open council in which national and local leaders meet regularly 
with citizens to discuss issues of concern. Another pillar of our 
constitutional system is the national assembly, our parliament, which serves 
as a forum for debating government policies and legislation. ”119
Finally, with reference to the actual mechanisms used for promoting such 
institutionalisation and structural legitimacy, the UAE’s efforts, like those of many 
other developing states, can be seen as falling into two main categories: those of 
bureaucratic development and those of ‘constitutional engineering’. Certainly, most of 
the institutionalisation that has taken place in the UAE has been through the 
development of a large number of bureaucracies. While these are used primarily for 
administrative purposes with innovation and policymaking remaining within die rulers’ 
domain, diese new bureaucracies nevertheless provide an important link, and often 
represent die sole means of contact between the government and die population.120 
Alongside these, constitutional engineering can be used to establish die prevalence of 
certain principles and the routinisation of seemingly modem political procedures, and in 
some cases can be used to guarantee certain civil liberties and democratic rights. In 
more authoritarian regimes, the mechanism can of course also be used to fulfil specific 
political purposes and to provided ‘window-dressing’ legitimacy to cover up abuses of 
power and any nouns or practices usually considered unpopular.121 As this diesis will 
reveal, the UAE’s constitutional engineering would seem to fall somewhere in between 
the two extremes. On the one hand certain articles of the federal constitution do claim 
to guarantee certain basic rights, including equality before the law, the abolition of 
torture, the freedom of worship, and the right of assembly:122
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“Article 14 guarantees equality for all before the law, without distinctions 
between citizens on the basis of race, nationality, religion or social status. A 
person's liberty is also protected, and no individual may be arrested or 
detained except in accordance with provisions of the law. Torture and 
degrading treatment are forbidden.
Articles 29-34 guarantee freedom of movement and residence, freedom to 
hold opinions and expression of the same, freedom of communication, the 
freedom to exercise religious worship, right to assembly and the right to 
choose one's occupation, trade or profession.
Article 40 describes how foreigners shall enjoy, within the Union, the rights 
and freedom stipulated in international charters which are in force or in 
treaties and agreemen ts to which the Union is party.
Article 41 details how every person shall have the right to submit 
complaints to the competent authorities, including the judicial authorities, 
concerning the abuse or infringement of the rights andfreedoms. ”123
Indeed, in some respects the actual existence of such articles has provided the polity 
with a degree of structural legitimacy, given that they are components of a national 
constitution seemingly predicated on internationally accepted standards.124 However, 
on the other hand it remains important to note that not only has the constitution 
remained in a provisional state for much of the past tliirty years,125 but, as die final two 
chapters of this thesis will demonstrate, in many cases these original constitutional 
guarantees have now been clearly contradicted and undermined by numerous other 
official documents and revisions, many of which seem more concerned widi covering 
up potentially unpopular controlling practices including die limitation and co-option of 
civil society organisations, the restrictions on clergy, and even the enforcement of press 
censorship.126
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2.3 - Rentierism
Building upon this neo-patrimonial network of old and new legitimacy 
resources, the region’s vast oil wealth has of course also reinforced the polity’s 
legitimacy, and indeed has enhanced its prospects for survival in almost every way. 
This section will therefore attempt to highlight how enormously significant material 
resources have been, will provide an overview of the manner in which the rulers’ 
newfound wealth has been carefully used and distributed as part of a new ‘rentier 
network’, and will explain how such wealth and its associated structures and relations 
have fonned another key component of the ‘ruling bargain’ between the polity and the 
population.
Even as late as the 1960s, Halpem felt it, “doubtful that most Middle Eastern 
countries would be able to muster such savings from domestic sources during the next 
decade so as to enable them to invest a sufficient proportion of national income to keep 
up with population growth and to create a modem society capable of self-sustaining 
growth.”127 By this stage, however, die Trucial States and the other Gulf monarchies, 
while still comparatively poor, were already beginning to emerge as important regional 
exceptions. With relatively small populations and, especially in the case of Abu Dhabi, 
with easily exploitable oil reserves, these new Arab states were seemingly on the cusp 
of great prosperity. Thus, as a model for die early modernisation theories, the UAE in 
the 1970s should have been perfect, as Abu Dhabian oil wealth and die resulting 
abundance of capital should have facilitated extensive socio-economic development 
programmes, which in turn should have engendered greater political mobilisation and 
the rapid disintegration of the traditional polity. While socio-economic development 
has indeed taken place, such political development has clearly not happened and, to the 
contrary, oil wealth and selective oil-financed modernisation can instead be seen as 
having greatly strengtiiened the traditional polity’s legitimacy.
Central to explaining tins crucial relationship between oil wealtii and die 
monarchy is die concept of the ‘rentier state’; a state that can rely on very high levels of
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unearned economic rent which, in some circumstances, can often sustain the economy 
without any real need for a strong productive domestic sector.128 While tlie concept was 
originally applied to the Latin American ‘cash crop’ states, there has however, also been 
a long history of rentier activity in the lower Gulf. Indeed, as demonstrated in the 
historical background, since the beginning of the twentieth century tlie Trucial rulers 
were able to gather economic rent from a number of important natural and geographical 
resources including Abu Dhabi’s guano deposits, Abu Musa’s red oxide deposits, the air 
bases in Sharjah and Dubai, and of course the exploration concessions granted to the 
Iraqi Petroleum Company.129 The oil exports of the late 1960s were, of course, on a 
much larger scale and by tlie early 1970s, following a four-fold price increase, oil began 
to provide die region witii enormous levels of economic rent.130 Indeed, towards the 
end of this period the extent of this new wealth was such that the oil producing Gulf 
States, particularly Abu Dhabi and Kuwait, became seen as tlie purest examples of 
rentierism. After all, given the relatively low labour requirements of their oil industries, 
accounting for less than 2% of the total workforce,131 these Gulf states seemed much 
closer to the rentier model than any of tlie agrarian developing states, which always 
required the involvement of at least some of then domestic workforce in the wealth 
creation process.132 Thus, as Beblawi described of these oil monarchies in liis study of 
rentier wealth in die Arab world:
"... their promotion to the forefront of world trade and finance resuscitated 
the concept of rentier economies. A windfall wealth of unprecedented 
magnitude in such short time revived the idea of unearned income, hence 
the epithet of rentier econom ies. The impact of the oil phenomenon on the 
role of the state and on economic behaviour in general has been so 
profound in the Arab world during the seventies as to justify special 
treatment... ”133
Given diat tiiis vast unearned wealdi accrued direcdy to the rulers and their 
offices, the new opportunities for state-sponsored largesse soon became boundless. 
Indeed, although subsidies had always played a key role in traditional politics, the oil
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revenues of the 1970s allowed for far greater wealth distribution and the creation of a 
new allocative state.134 By providing schools, hospitals, jobs, housing, and in some 
cases even direct payments such as the aforementioned ‘marriage hinds’, rentier wealth 
enabled the state to become the principal economic actor,135 and consequently created a 
new material link between the polity and the population. Thus, while die relative 
achievements of these various projects and the hill impact of rentier wealth on the 
UAE’s development planning will be discussed more dioroughly in the following 
chapter, it is nevertheless important to note in the context of legitimacy and monarchical 
survival how this ‘rentier package’ has served to consolidate and boost the existing 
patrimonial network of vertical linkages and socio-economic privileges. Certainly, it 
will emerge diat UAE nationals are clearly the primary recipients of the bulk of the 
distributed wealdi (recent surveys indicate that nearly 11% of per capita income for 
UAE nationals is now made up of government transfers136), widi most fitting into a 
well-defined hierarchy of rentiers with the rulers at the top and with other locals linked 
into the material network at different layers beneath. Indeed, it has been claimed of 
‘rentier’ Gulf citizens:
“... a rentier is more of a social function than an economic category, and is 
perceived as a member of a special group who, though he does not 
participate actively in the economic production, receives nevertheless a 
share in the produce and at times a handsome share...1,137
Moreover, it is important to note that the rentier network also has the flexibility to tie in 
virtually all other members of the community, including die UAE’s many expatriate 
workers. Although undeniably more closely involved with die wealth creation process 
and of course not in receipt of explicit government transfers,138 expatriates are 
nevertheless also a part of tliis rentier network as the majority reap the rewards of the 
generous salaries afforded by the oil-rich state. They may not be accorded widi the 
same privileges as the local rentiers, but then access to wealth is nonetheless high, and 
likely to be much higher than in then country of origin.139 Thus, it would seem that 
something of a material pact may have emerged in the UAE; an unwritten and unspoken
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contract in which almost all of the population accept the legitimacy of the polity in 
exchange for the stability and rewards of their well-paid and tax-free employment.
2.3.1 - Rentier wealth and ruling coalitions
Expanding upon the concept of rentier networks, it is also important to consider 
the manner in which rentier wealth has allowed the traditional rulers to break down old 
and well-established ruling coalitions and replace them with newer, materially based 
arrangements with segments of the Emirati population more likely to support the 
longevity of their traditional polities. As described in the historical background, direct 
and often personal access to the early sources of rentier wealth had already allowed the 
rulers to gain some degree of structural space and political distance from the merchant 
elite.140 However, with the massive economic rent from oil exports this structural space 
widened to such an extent that the historical ruler-merchant relationship soon became 
irrelevant, and was eventually replaced by a much broader ruler-citizen coalition in 
which all members of the national population, including those of the hinterland and the 
recently urbanised Bedu, became materially bound to the ruler and the traditional polity. 
Thus, with a well-financed distributive state in place, the formerly politically active 
merchant elites were essentially marginalised:141 the rulers were no longer reliant on 
their support and taxes and, by generously allocating the new wealth,142 could instead 
forge a more one-sided political relationship with the remaining bulk of the population.
Moreover, in most cases these sidelined merchants were themselves 
incorporated into the new rentier coalition, effectively trading in their former political 
clout for a share of the new wealth. Indeed, using the example of Kuwait, Crystal 
illustrates this important political adjustment by showing how the merchants
“...renounced their historical claim to participate in the decision-making 
process, and in exchange the rulers guaranteed them a large share of the oil 
revenues... where economic elites once entered politics to protect their
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economic interests, after oil, merchants left the realm of formal politics to 
preserve those [same] interests. ”143
However, as shown in the earlier discussion of the Shaykh’s Dilemma and the various 
short-term strategies available to traditional rulers, even in Kuwait there have been a 
series of parliament-related pohtical concessions made to the non-ruling elites. 
Similarly in Bahrain there are constitutional developments underway which appear to 
point to die re-entry of non-ruling ehtes into the emirate’s fonnal political structure. 
Once again, die UAE appears to be distinct from its oil-producing neighbours in the 
Gulf, given diat the rentier ruling coalition and the pattern of political control remains 
relatively unchanged, and, as this thesis will demonstrate, die non-ruling elite remains 
firmly outside of the highest levels of die decision-making process. Thus, while one 
might expect that oil wealth should lead to a patterned response in state building, the 
variation between these nearby states clearly indicates this may not always be the 
case.144 Obviously, on one level this discrepancy can be explained by the comparative 
oil wealth and the corresponding rentier packages of these Gulf states, especially given 
diat die Abu Dhabi-backed UAE controls nearly 10% of die world’s proven oil reserves 
and its exports now rival diose of Iran and Russia,145 whereas die oil wealth of emirates 
such as Bahrain and Qatar is considerably more finite.146 This in itself cannot, however, 
be a sufficient explanation given that Kuwait, like the UAE, still commands 
considerable material resources.147
Instead, as Crystal has convincingly argued in her comparative study of rulers 
and merchants in Kuwait and Qatar, the answer may lie in the historic foundations of 
the Gulfs rentier ruling coalitions. In Kuwait for example, oil production began far 
earlier than in the other Gulf States, and at that time die merchant classes and otiier 
economic elites remained strong and powerful. They had not yet been weakened by 
economic depression, the collapse of the Gulfs pearling industry, and the aftermath of 
die Second World War. Instead tiiey were able to bargain from a position of strength 
when the ruler first began to receive oil revenues, and as such the new Kuwaiti riding 
coalition had to make at least some attempt to incorporate rather than sideline the non­
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ruling economic elite.148 In complete contrast, the Trucial States did not begin to 
receive significant oil revenues until the late 1960s and even then only Abu Dhabi and 
Dubai were in any way affected. By tliis stage the old merchant elites that had 
previously held the rulers’ powers in check were already considerably weakened with 
their main sources of livelihood having long been in decline. As such, they had little 
option but to accept the rulers’ new coalitions, and thus began to receive distributed 
wealth and many of die described financial patrimonial-clientalist favours in exchange 
for their complete political acquiescence.149
Indeed, as the example of the Dubai reform movement demonstrated in the 
previous chapter, by the 1940s the merchant elites had already lost much of tiieir former 
bargaining power.150 Similarly in Abu Dhabi and die other Trucial states, witii little 
hope of re-establishing the old and more equitable ruler-merchant ruling coalition, the 
merchants became relatively easy targets for absorption into a new ruling coalition 
which offered diem tempting distributed wealth for the mere price of political 
compliance. Essentially dierefore, the historic foundations of the UAE’s rentier 
coalition can be seen as being far stronger dian those in die other Gulf States, primarily 
due to the rulers’ almost complete co-option of the economic elites by the beginning of 
die oil era. Aldiough, as will be discussed later in this diesis, there have certainly been 
occasions in which former merchant elites have attempted to re-enter UAE politics,151 
the severity and frequency of these demands have clearly been far less than in the 
UAE’s neighbours, again pointing to the legitimacy and stability that a traditional polity 
can derive from a well-established rentier ruling coalition.
2.3.2 - Rentier wealth andfavourable international relations
Further related to rentier wealth, die region’s favourable international relations 
with its oil purchasing customers must be seen as adding another materially based layer 
to die traditional polity’s survival formula.152 While a full discussion of UAE foreign 
policy remains beyond the scope of this study, it is nevertheless crucial to consider the 
key role of external support in ensuring the continuing survival of the monarchy.
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Indeed, without oil and the continuing military support of its former patron, Britain, and 
the new superpower, the USA, it would seem unlikely that the UAE would have been 
able to secure itself from foreign aggression in an increasingly volatile region. As 
demonstrated in the discussion of the federal negotiations, on the eve of independence 
Iran had already forcibly occupied three strategic Emirati islands.153 Moreover, witii the 
fresh memories of Iraqi annexation threats on Kuwait in the 1960s,154 and with 
increasing Marxist activity in neighbouring Oman and southern Arabia,155 powerful 
western backing became seen as more important than ever before. More recently, the 
continuing territorial disputes with Saudi Arabia, the ongoing Iranian occupation of Abu 
Musa, and of course die clear ambitions of Ba’thist Iraq to assume greater control over 
Gulf oil, have also constituted considerable threats to UAE security and, with the 
exception of Iraq, continue to underscore the need for external military support.156
Although sizeable western forces have rarely been based on Emirati soil since 
British withdrawal in 1971, the perceived support and belief in the rapid reaction of a 
military superpower to a local conflict has nonetheless been of equal significance. Like 
the populations of Kuwait, Bahrain, and Qatar, many UAE nationals accept that their 
own aimed forces, albeit modem and well-equipped, cannot realistically expect to expel 
any determined foreign invader,157 but do believe that these forces can still serve as a 
vital ‘tripwire’ buying enough time for western military support to arrive and reinforce 
their country’s defences.158 The rulers’ close military relations witii the western powers 
are therefore commonly viewed as necessary and legitimate measures in safeguarding 
national security and preserving the Emirati way of life.159 Indeed, symbolised by Abu 
Dhabi’s annual IDEX event (International Defence Exhibition) which attracts over 800 
leading arms manufacturers, the UAE’s Defence Minister recently claimed of this 
international presence that:
“The fact that many renowned defence manufacturers from around the 
world are showcasing their products here is a proof of the success of this 
year's show. It is also a message that the UAE, under the leadership of the
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President, His Highness Shaykh Zayid Al-Nuhayyan, is a stable and secure 
country. "16°
Of course, this continuing western militaiy support may prove something of a 
double-edged sword for the rulers unless a necessary balance is reached. Indeed, there 
are many instances where a ruler’s other legitimacy resources, namely the commitment 
to Islamic and Arab brotherhood, have been seriously compromised by an all too public 
presence of foreign and non-Muslim support. Particularly strong examples would 
include the Iranian Shah’s very open backing from the USA, and of course die Iraqi 
monarchy, which almost certainly suffered from its overly close relationship with 
Britain, eventually alienating most segments of its largely anti-western population.161 
Indeed, Elie Kedourie argues that the rapid decline in the Iraqi polity’s legitimacy 
stemmed primarily from
“...a nagging feeling that it was a make-believe kingdom built on false 
pretences and kept going by a British design for a British purpose.9,162
Thus, in die case of the UAE, the rulers have had to ensure diat diey carefully weigh up 
their country’s immediate security needs against a potential backlash caused by any 
overt non-Muslim and non-Arab alliance. In 1990 and 1991, in the months preceding 
Operation Desert Stonn and the liberation of Kuwait this legitimacy balance was 
particularly keen given that the proposed target of the western troops was a fellow Arab 
state.163 In retrospect, the carefully managed ‘coalition’ which included many other 
Arab nations, togedier with the relative invisibility of western forces in the UAE (with 
the majority of personnel being stationed outside of the cities and restricted in dieir 
‘downtown’ activities164) circumvented tiiis problem, allowing the UAE’s rulers to be 
seen as supporting a joint Arab military initiative while playing host to a discreet and 
essential foreign force.165 The military build-up of late 2002 and 2003 was, however, 
far more difficult to contain widiin the legitimacy formula given diat no Arab coalition 
emerged to enforce the disarmament of Iraq, given that many of the UAE’s neighbours 
remained reluctant in supporting the deployment of western forces,166 and given that a
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number of anti-US grass roots movements were already beginning to emerge in the 
UAE with the aims of boycotting American goods and promoting solidarity with the 
Iraqi people.167 Thus, although the UAE quietly permitted the use of its Dhafrah 
base,168 if future situations are not adequately addressed then any further non-UN and 
non-Arab League sanctioned attacks in and around Iraq that are launched from UAE 
territory may considerably delegitimise the rulers’ positions by weakening their 
religious and ideological unifying resources.
2.4 - Dynastic monarchy and the evolution of the traditional polity
Rentier coalitions and materially based legitimacy resources may, however, still 
be unable to guarantee the long-tenn survival of the neo-patrimonial polity. Most 
obviously, hydrocarbon reserves are finite, and although Abu Dhabi’s oil will last for at 
least another generation, the other oil-producing emirates of Dubai and Sharjah will not 
be so fortunate.169 If austerity measures are ever required due to declining revenues it 
may become difficult to impose extractive measures and placate a once privileged 
population.170 Furthennore, no matter how historically well-founded the UAE’s ruling 
rentier coalition is, new and younger generations of Emiratis unfamiliar with the 
region’s early state formation may begin to assume the distributive economy as a 
birthright, and may therefore begin to regard rentier pacts of political acquiescence as 
being both illegitimate and anachronistic. Added to this, it still remains possible that 
the formerly weakened merchant elites, or rather their sons, may be able to re-enter 
politics via the back door: the described plethora of new institutions and bureaucracies 
required by the neo-patrimonial state and its extensive distributive economy may 
provide future opportunities for parallel power bases and,171 in much the same way as 
tlie walls of file pre-oil era, may allow for personal fiefdoms to develop outside of the 
patrimonial and rentier networks.
Although, as will be explored in the following chapter, the UAE’s development 
planners and ‘modernising monarchs’ are keenly aware of the need for economic 
diversification in order to supplement and reduce the reliance on rentier wealth and
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rentier derived legithnacy, it is also important to consider at this stage how the ruling 
families themselves have actually evolved in an effort to better ensure their stability and 
longevity, and to bolster their polity’s material resources. Parallel power bases have, as 
of yet, largely been prevented by the rise of a more unitary and more extensive state 
which has allowed for greater power-sharing opportunities for royals and notables 
within the patrimonial network. In addition, alongside the maintenance of the described 
bay’a mechanism there has been the institutionalisation of a dynastic crown prince 
mechanism which has practically put an end to damaging succession struggles. Thirdly, 
the evolution of collective action mechanisms and ‘bandwagoning’ have served to 
reduce the divisiveness and factionalism winch has historically plagued and 
delegitimised the Gulfs monarchies for much of the last century. As will be shown, the 
result of these mechanisms has been, in Michael Herb’s terms, the emergence of 
‘dynastic monarchy’ in the lower Gulf: with greatly expanded membership these 
extensive ruling families can be seen as having become self-regulating proto­
institutions,172 perhaps providing the strength and stability normally associated with 
large-scale single-party political systems.
As demonstrated in the historical background, the Trucial States were originally 
rather segnented as the rulers often had to delegate control over their more far-flung 
provinces to local representatives; the waits, "amirs, and na'ibs™ Furthermore, before 
oil wealth, the state was simply too small to accommodate any real power-sharing 
mechanisms. Consequently, any attempts to allow powerful relatives key positions 
tended to lead to the creation of parallel states, or in some circumstances even resulted 
in the wall returning to the main town and usurping the ruler. Indeed, as mentioned, the 
nephew of the ruler of Sharjah’s takeover of Ra’s al-Khaimah in the 1940s, and of 
course Shaykli Zayid’s succession in Abu Dhabi in the 1960s, were both facilitated by 
their relative autonomy and their development of independent power bases in relatively 
remote regions.174 With the beginning of the oil era, however, the region’s segmentary 
politics were considerably reduced: the explorations and advanced communications 
required by the new industry brought the region’s many outlying regions within much 
closer range of the rulers’ influence, but far more importantly die increasing size of the
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distributive rentier state began to provide the rulers with many more ‘safe’ consolation 
prizes. Indeed, the many new posts created by the new government ministries, tlie 
bureaucracies, the oil companies, and crucially, the armed forces, could be distributed to 
powerful and potentially influential members of the ruling families and tiieir associates. 
In this more unitary state, the ruler could therefore share power within a more closely 
supervised patrimonial hierarchy without fearing autonomy or any loss of personal 
authority.
Abu Dhabi provides a very strong example of this power sharing mechanism, 
with Shaykh Zayid having made great effort to create and fill executive positions in the 
expanding rentier state with less powerfi.il members of die Al-Nuhayyan family. 
Indeed, of particular interest during this period was the seemingly successful 
accommodation of die two rival branches of die dynasty whose disputes had frequently 
destabilised die ruling shaykh’s position over the previous two centuries. Whereas both 
Shaykh Zayid and liis brother, the former ruler Shaykh Shaklibut, were both from the 
Sultan family line, a number of other prominent Abu Dhabi shaykhs were of the Khalifa 
line. Shaykh Zayid therefore accorded all members of the Bin Khalifa Al-Nuhayyan 
with an appropriate share of power in the new administration. Indeed, diis astute 
dynastic balancing act involved appointing Shaykh Mubarak Al-Nuhayyan as the 
UAE’s first Minister of the Interior, while liis brother, Shaykh Surur Al-Nuhayyan, was 
elevated to serving as one of Zayid’s closest advisers.175 Although die Al-Maktum of 
Dubai remained segmented and quarrelling for longer; following British intervention 
against the trouble-causing Shaykh Juma and liis sons,176 the emirate’s ruling family 
was also able to consolidate itself in a similar fashion to the Al-Nuhayyan by using die 
new positions and opportunities created by the rentier state to share power and to 
accommodate potentially divisive members of the family and the ruling elite.177 More 
recently in Sharjah, which has remained the least stable of the seven emirates;178 
following a failed coup attempt in 1987, the re-instated ruler immediately ensured that 
liis new administration accommodated the main protagonists and provided diem with 
significant consolation prizes. Most notably, Shaykh Abdul-Aziz al-QasimT, the leader 
of the coup, was appointed Crown Prince and deputy chairman of the new Sharjah
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Executive Council. Although these appointments were only temporary, with the ruler 
eventually dismissing Shaykh Abdul-Aziz in favour of his son, high-level power 
sharing was nevertheless a useful stopgap measure until the ruler was able to re-affirm 
his position.179
Conversely, it can be demonstrated diat diose traditional monarchies which have 
not allowed for greater power sharing and accommodation of other members of the 
ruling family have often suffered from considerable internal instability and, as a result, 
have been more vulnerable to divisive and revolutionary forces. The example of Libya 
is especially appropriate for this study as, with a small population, a tribal structure, and 
oil wealth, it in many ways used to resemble die Gulf States. However, unlike the 
dynastic monarchs of the Gulf, King Idris of Libya effectively blocked all of his 
relatives and dieir key associates from gaining any positions of power. Thus when 
revolution came in 1969, the monarchy quickly collapsed as all stood to gain, bodi those 
inside and outside of the ruling family.180 Similarly in Afghanistan, the traditional 
monarch Shall Zaliir forced through a new constitution which barred ail other members 
of the ruling family from occupying significant posts. Once again, when die inevitable 
struggle for power occurred, the monarchy soon disintegrated and a republic was duly 
formed.181 Thus, in states which fail to develop additional patrimonial mechanisms 
widiin the ruling families, their non-dynastic monarchies are more prone to failure as 
die ruler has to balance all forces of opposition on his own, and when he falls die 
monarchy will fall widi him. Indeed, the crucial difference between these ‘one bullet 
regimes’ and the power sharing dynastic monarchies of die Gulf, and to a lesser extent 
Oman and Morocco,182 is that, quite apart from increasing the polity’s vulnerability to 
assassinations,183 these regimes are far more likely to succumb to internal challenges 
from disgrunded rival claimants, many of whom will have nodiing to lose given their 
existing exclusion from power.
A second identifiable priority of diese dynastic monarchies has been to 
safeguard the succession process from divisive and weakening forces. By maintaining 
the traditional bay’a mechanism and by institutionalising a crown prince mechanism,
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instability arising from succession disputes has now largely been eliminated in the Gulf 
States, and especially in the UAE. Indeed, many of the weaknesses normally associated 
with primogeniture have been avoided by requiring potential successors to have wide 
political support within the family in order to receive the necessary bay’a and approval 
from their elders. Thus, instead of following a clear succession pattern from father to 
eldest son, the strongest member of the family is able to succeed, thus preventing any 
unworthy or potentially discordant rulers from coming to power.184 Although 
technically a contradiction to the bay’a mechanism, the practice of appointing crown 
princes has further strengtiiened the succession process by formalising the inheritance of 
power and delegitimising rival claims. Crucially however, crown princes do not 
necessarily follow the primogeniture system and can therefore be used to complement 
bay’a approval by guaranteeing the succession of the most popular and able future 
ruler.185
Dubai provides a particularly strong example of such succession arrangements. 
When Shaykli Rashid Al-Maktum, the aforementioned ‘Father of Dubai’, died in 1990 
he was left witii four sons. As would be expected, his eldest son, Shaykli Maktum Al- 
Maktum, immediately succeeded his father and became the new Emir, while the second 
eldest son, Shaykh Hamdan Al-Maktum, predictably became the deputy ruler. 
However, in April 1994, the late ruler’s third son, Shaykh Muhammad Al-Maktum, was 
proclaimed crown prince.186 To most observers accustomed with primogeniture this 
would seem an unusual development given that in most monarchies the crown prince 
would have automatically been the eldest son (or at least one of the sons) of die new 
ruler, Shaykh Maktum Al-Maktum, and certainly not one of his younger brothers. This 
awkward arrangement serves to indicate the internal bargaining that must have taken 
place within the dynasty shortly after their father’s death. The highly motivated and 
ambitious Muhammad was satisfied with crown prince status and therefore the promise 
of future rulership. Moreover, nine years later die internal dynamics of Dubai’s 
dynastic monarchy seem to be working given that the status quo is maintained, there 
exists a formal division of powers, and Muhammad is effectively able to run the day to 
day affairs of die emirate widi the approval of his older brothers.187
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In the near future Abu Dhabi will also be faced with the need for careful 
succession compromises. Although, thus far, the crown prince appointment remains in 
accordance with the customs of primogeniture, it is nevertheless important to note how 
Shaykh Zayid has attempted to balance the ambitions of the numerous other Al- 
Nuhayyan princes in an effort to safeguard his eldest son’s succession. Essentially, tlie 
problem stems from the perceived division between the crown prince, Shaykh Khalifa, 
and Shaykh Zayid’s other prominent sons, many of whom are half brothers from die 
‘Bani Fatima bloc’: the sons of Shaykh Zayid’s favoured wife, Shaykha Fatima. Such a 
rival faction may be led by either Shaykh Muhammad Al-Nuhayyan, the eldest of 
Fatima’s sons and a dynamic personality who has carved out an important niche for 
himself in Abu Dhabi politics, or by the second eldest Bani Fatima, Shaykh Sultan Al- 
Nuhayyan.188 Moreover, in addition to their common bloodline, these sons are 
predominandy western university educated and, as will be detailed later in this diesis, 
given the recent emergence of more technocratic blocs in Emirati politics, the Bani 
Fatima bloc may be more favoured by the UAE’s government than Shaykh Khalifa.189 
As such, Shaykh Zayid has been actively brokering a detente between the different Al- 
Nuhayyan factions by distributing positions of power in the federal and Abu Dhabi 
administrations amongst liis various sons, with the objective diat all factions should 
recognise the succession.190 Thus, on die one hand Shaykh Khalifa’s position has been 
consolidated by a nmnber of important appointments including die chairmanships of 
Abu Dhabi’s Executive Council, Abu Dhabi’s Supreme Petroleum Council, and the 
Khalifa Committee, which, as Abu Dhabi’s highest financial body is responsible for die 
distribution of Abu Dhabi’s funds. On the other hand, however, significant succession 
consolation prizes have included the appointment of Shaykh Muhammad Al-Nuhayyan 
to die important position of Army Chief of Staff,191 Shaykh Sultan Al-Nuhayyan’s 
appointment as die UAE’s Deputy Prime Minister,192 and more recently Shaykh Zayid’s 
creation of a new ministerial post, Head of die Presidential Office, specifically for liis 
other Bani Fatima son, Shaykh Mansur.193
Thirdly, also related to power sharing and die distribution of consolation prizes, 
the increasing evidence of collective action both within and between the dynastic ruling
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families of the Gulf must be seen as another key stabilising mechanism. Although it 
may be preferable for individuals to seek absolute rule, for tlie rest of tlie ruling family 
it is, however, collectively preferable for them to prevent such an occurrence and 
instead to preserve the dominance of tlie family as a group. Conforming to a ‘prisoner’s 
dilemma’ model in which one’s options have to be carefully considered alongside 
another’s, collective action therefore promotes ‘groupthink’ logic.194 Thus, the 
preservation of dynastic monarchy may rest on the crucial ability of tlie majority of 
family members to bandwagon against any breakaway factions, normally exiling die 
renegade princes or accommodating tiieir supporters within the dynasty.195 A key 
example of such collective action would of course be the replacement of Shaykh 
Shaklibut with liis younger brother, Shaykh Zayid, as ruler of Abu Dhabi. In 1966 
several key members of tlie Al-Nuhayyan family approached die British and requested 
that the ruler be removed and that measures be taken to preserve law and order during 
the transition.196 Thus, while it is popularly believed that the British ousted Shaklibut in 
favour of tlie more energetic and forward thinking Zayid,197 it was really more of an 
internal decision within die ruling family. By building upon liis popular support as 
governor of Al-‘Ayn and by offering his relatives positions of power in the new oil 
state, Zayid effectively became tlie leader of a bandwagon among tlie Al-Nuhayyan 
dynasty, one which eventually grew to include every single member of the family 
except, unsurprisingly, Shakhbut’s eldest son.198 More recently, following the 
aforementioned 1987 coup attempt in Shaijah, a bandwagon soon emerged which 
included not only members of the Sharjah ruling family, but also members of the otiier 
Emirati ruling families. Indeed, although initially supported by Abu Dhabi,199 Shaykh 
Abdul-Aziz and liis supporters soon found tiiemselves opposed not only by tlie many 
Shaijah notables still loyal to Shaykh Sultan, but also by the Al-Maktum of Dubai and 
even by the ruling families of otiier Gulf states.200 Similarly, in 2003 the government of 
Abu Dhabi chose to send tanks to the smaller emirate of Ra’s al-Khaimah in an effort to 
safeguard the octogenarian QasimI ruler and his new crown prince following a 
controversial decision to remove power from his eldest son, Shaykh Khalid, who had 
effectively been regent for twenty years.201 Accordingly, it would seem there is 
growing evidence that Emirati rulers can now be reinstated or considerably reinforced
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following collective action from other neighbouring dynastic monarchies, which in turn 
suggests the emergence of a strong network of mutual support between these families.
2.5 - Conclusion
This chapter has provided an overview of how die UAE’s polity and its 
traditional monarchies have managed to circumvent the ‘ Shaykh’s Dilemma’ of 
assimilating new groups alongside old by carefiilly combining traditional sources of 
legitimacy witii structural and material resources in an effort to create a stable and 
resilient ‘ruling bargain’.202 Specifically, it has been demonstrated how the polity has 
continued to draw upon personal legitimacy resources and, by fostering a patrimonial- 
clientalist system of privileges, loyalties, and vertical linkages; how personal authority 
has remained a key component of the UAE’s legitimacy formula even during an era of 
rapid population growth and urbanisation. Moreover, by reviving and in some cases re­
inventing cultural, religious, and ideological resources, the polity has further augmented 
its position by unifying most segments of the population behind shared memories, 
common causes, and a greater sense of identity. Thirdly, through astute constitutional 
engineering and the development of new bureaucracies and institutions it is also clear 
how the polity has managed to provide some degree of structural legitimacy while at the 
same time retaining its carefully managed patrimonial, or rather ‘neo-patrimonial’ 
network of relations.
At all levels, the region’s substantial oil wealth has strengthened the UAE’s 
legitimacy formula by providing enormous material resources and by facilitating the 
development of a distributive economy which, in turn, has allowed for a powerflil 
‘rentier pact’. Essentially, by providing the bulk of the population with a package of 
distributed wealth and a comprehensive welfare state, the rulers have been able to 
purchase political acquiescence and considerable popular support from both locals and 
expatriates. Moreover, it is also important to note how this rentier pact has been 
particularly strong in the UAE given the relative weakness of the region’s merchant 
elites at the beginning of the oil era. Unlike many of the other Gulf States, whose
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Figure (vi) “The Survival and evolution of traditional polity”
merchants were comparatively powerful when oil exports began; in the lower Gulf the 
merchants had suffered numerous setbacks and years of economic depression, thus 
making it easier to absorb them into a new rentier coalition and less likely for them to 
press for political refonn. Further relating to the UAE’s material resources, there is also 
little doubt that the region’s favourable international relations with its powerful oil­
purchasing allies have provided an important security umbrella. Indeed, without such 
protection and perceived support it would seem likely diat die UAE and its monarchies 
would have eventually succumbed to the threat of more powerful expansionary states in 
an increasingly volatile region.
Finally, by evolving into large-scale dynasties complete with their own internal 
self-regulating mechanisms, the UAE’s traditional monarchies have been able to 
warrant even better stability and far greater longevity. By carefully sharing positions of 
power in die new and more unitary rentier state, by safeguarding and guaranteeing the 
succession process, and by promoting greater collective action and bandwagoning 
against harmful factions, the ruling families have managed to avoid both internal 
divisiveness and damaging external influences. Essentially, die family itself has 
become an institution and has formed a layer of structural legitimacy in its own right. 
Indeed, as surrogate political parties, dynastic monarchies can be seen to have 
developed tiieir own internal dynamic; a dynamic capable of making their members act 
positively for the group as a whole, and ultimately capable of reinforcing the existing 
neo-patrimonial and materially-based legitimacy formulae. See figure (vi).
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3. Socio-economic Development and the 
Diversification Effort
Alongside the consolidation of the polity and the preservation of political 
stability, which are themselves key prerequisites for successful modernisation, the 
United Arab Emirates has undergone significant socio-economic development over the 
past thirty years as its ‘modernising monarchs’ have sought to consolidate the material 
components of their ruling bargain while also attempting to adapt to their situation by 
carefiilly removing and reducing some of the most patent weaknesses of their dependent 
economies. As such, viewed within the context of selective modernisation shaped by 
inherited and persisting dependent circumstances, it will be the purpose of tliis chapter 
to consider the UAE’s major development plans and objectives and, crucially, to 
determine not only their level of achievement, but also to highlight some of tlie key 
problems which have yet to be overcome and which continue to face tlie Emirati 
planners.
In particular, following a discussion of the planners’ early recognition of Hie 
need to modify many of the UAE’s dependent socio-economic structures, it will be 
demonstrated how there have been concerted efforts to diversify the oil-reliant 
economy, to boost the UAE’s indigenous social growth, and to reduce the state’s 
chronic reliance on foreign labour. Firstly, therefore, it will be revealed how the 
industrial, agricultural, commercial and tourist sectors are all being developed as part of 
an ongoing strategy to boost tlie non-oil sectors of the economy; secondly how a 
comprehensive welfare and educational state is being built to provide for a healthy and 
skilled national population; and thirdly how there are now numerous initiatives focusing 
on the nationalisation or ‘emiratisation’ of the workforce and the gradual replacement of 
expatriates. Moreover, aldiough it will be shown how diere have been moderate 
successes in attaining these goals, especially with the emergence of mutually supportive 
development initiatives in the two wealthiest emirates, the final section will, however, 
serve to underscore those development padiologies which still remain, including many
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which have not been readily solved by injections of oil wealth and which in some cases 
continue to induce costly duplication, regional disequilibrium and otiier features of 
damaging ‘lopsided’ development.
3.1 - Modifying dependent development
Orthodox neo-classical economic tlieoiy predicted the emergence of an 
interdependent world economy within which each national economy would seek to 
maximise its comparative advantage. In turn, it was suggested that tiiis interdependence 
would eventually lead towards the long-term equalisation of incomes,1 and for some 
time many of tlie developing world’s rulers accepted the inevitability of tiiis argument. 
By the 1920s, however, the prevailing model had become one of ‘economic 
nationalism’, as adverse economic conditions prompted many developing states to 
intervene and assist in building up and protecting their domestic industries.2 As tiiis 
chapter will demonstrate, while certain aspects of both these models did find some 
purchase amongst die planners and co-ordinators of the UAE’s development strategies, 
these early economic development theories were nevertheless seen as insufficient in 
addressing the key concerns of die small and oil-rich Gulf state. Instead, the UAE’s 
continuing reliance on the export of a single primary product export, its reliance on 
foreign technology, its international division of labour, and its asymmetrical 
relationship widi the oil-purchasing economies were seen as being die most pressing 
issues.
Indeed, while die oil industry and its various requirements had certainly allowed 
the region to prosper and to escape from immediate poverty, it was nonetheless feared 
tiiat any long-term dependency would eventually lead to serious structural problems and 
underdevelopment. Certainly, as Samir Amin warned, even by the late 1970s tiiere 
were already several very marked features of economic disintegration beginning to 
appear in the ‘dependent Arab oil economies’ as a result of persisting peripheral 
relations witii the core economies and unchecked dependent structures:
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• The economic structure of most Arab countries had become more 
externally orientated than that of any other group of countries in the 
developing world. Taken as a whole, die Arab world had become one 
of the most fully integrated and potentially dependent regions in the 
contemporary global economic system.
• Despite die availability of vast capital, industrialisation remained 
comparatively weak and desultory, trailing behind other developing 
regions such as Latin America.
• Domination by the multinationals was leading to a corresponding 
technological dependency. The Arab world imported virtually all its 
industrial means of production and depended more and more for its 
agricultural development on multinational ‘agribusiness’. As such, the 
economy of die Arab world had become a disabled one, characterised 
by disjointed industrial development, growing consumerism and 
widening inequality in income distribution, growing distortion of 
development orientation, and the increasing waste of human and 
natural resources.
• Oil wealth, which rose astronomically after 1973, served only to 
aggravate distorted development and to strengthen economic, military 
and cultural dependency on die West. Thus, die illusion of wealth 
created by oil was having the same effect on the Arab world as 
American gold had on Spain in the seventeenth century: it was 
delaying the fundamental changes that are necessary for any genuine 
renaissance.3
As such, in addition to straightforward growdi and expansion, the reversal, or 
rather the reduction of dependency-related features soon became a main feature of 
socio-economic development planning in the UAE. Certainly, if the UAE needed proof 
of die precariousness of its economy dien the oil price fluctuations and slumps of the 
1980s soon provided clear indicators as Saudi Arabia and other neighbouring oil 
exporters were forced to contemplate austerity measures,4 thereby highlighting the
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unpredictable nature of tlie international oil economy and the dangers of relying on a 
narrow economic base and the demands of odier economies. Moreover, it was 
recognised that many other external factors could also adversely affect the UAE’s oil 
economy; including changing global energy consumption patterns resulting from 
stronger international anti-pollution legislation,5 and new oil-producing regions in 
Central Asia and Latin America coming on-stream.6 Of course, further compounding 
tiiis vulnerability was the continuing insistence of die core economies on purchasing 
only crude oil, thereby preventing any refinement or value addition to the commodity in 
the UAE. Indeed, as former Egyptian oil minister Hussain Abdullah recently explained 
to the Dubai Cultural and Scientific Association:
"... the real benefits of oil as a support for the industry were being gained by 
the West who refused our repeated attempts to sell them refined oil and 
insist on buying it from us as a crude product. We were not making enough 
profit from oil as far as selling it for a good price as well as refining it and 
manufacturing its products is concerned. ”7
Internally, it was feared that any long-term dependency on oil rents and distributed 
wealdi would lead to the emergence of a consumerist society as the population’s 
purchasing power accelerated independently of their productive capacity. Ultimately 
this would lead to excessive imports and a serious trade imbalance, while of course also 
reducing employment incentives and creating a potentially parasitic national workforce 
dependent on the labour of foreigners.
Initially, a partial solution to reducing the UAE’s dependency on oil was seen to 
be dirough savings and investment. Undoubtedly, overseas assets have long been 
considered an important safety valve for die region’s future and, as will be shown later 
in this chapter, such savings continue to play a key role in Abu Dhabi’s financial 
planning. By investing billions of ‘petrodollars’ abroad it was hoped that the UAE 
would be able to survive a post-oil future and maintain its oil boom standard of living 
by relying on considerable interest payments. Certainly, the UAE’s investments have
130
steadily increased over the years as in 1994 it was revealed by the Central Bank that 
almost 97% of its assets were placed overseas,8 and by tlie end of 1999 it was reported 
that the UAE’s total foreign reserves had climbed to over $100 billion, with the UAE 
also holding substantial assets with many of the Bank for International Settlements’ 
reporting banks.9 However, no matter how substantial the interest payments, it was also 
accepted that such investments would never be able to provide long-term solutions for 
reducing the actual structures of dependency and the resulting domestic socio-economic 
problems. Indeed, as early as the mid-1970s the UAE’s planners had already begun to 
favour a more multidimensional approach based on economic diversification with the 
hope that the non-oil based sectors and the necessaiy physical infrastructure could all be 
developed using the UAE’s massive oil revenues. As such, the planners began to regard 
oil not merely as an expendable resource, but as a ‘gift from God’ with which to 
develop a diverse, multiple-sector economy for future generations.10
3.2- Diversification through industrialisation
Industrialisation has historically been one of the most favoured tools for the 
governments of developing states attempting to achieve economic growth and self­
sufficiency, The UAE has been no exception as, in the 1970s, the planners identified 
industrial expansion, specifically that of the non-oil related manufacturing sector, as 
being the best hope for successful diversification. In particular, as the 1979 Federal 
Industrial Law states, tiiere were four main objectives associated with such 
development:
1) “For the government to prepare a productive base capable of allowing 
manufacturing industries to thrive and thereby reduce the reliance on 
oil.
2) To give the manufacturing sector priority at all times with the aim of 
creating a sector capable of generating significant production 
linkages.
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3) To encourage industrialisation as a way of providing foreign 
exchange.
4) To use the UAE’s comparative advantage of low-cost energy to best 
effect by helping to make the UAE’s industries regionally and 
internationally competitive ”.n
Moreover, with regard to the context of these aims, it is important to note that during 
this early period of Emirati development planning two different industrialisation sub­
strategies were prevalent elsewhere in the developing world: export-oriented 
industrialisation (EOI) and import-substitution industrialisation (ISI).
On the one hand, an EOI strategy based around large-scale industries was 
regarded as a means of quickly achieving industrialisation and limited diversification. 
Although the plants would continue to rely on foreign technology, then growth would 
nevertheless serve to raise GDP, would provide a base for further domestic 
industrialisation, and would make the best use of die UAE’s comparatively low energy 
costs. Certainly, it was reasoned that if the UAE could develop internationally 
competitive industries and diereby penetrate other regional markets, then die reliance on 
oil exports and the dependence on external economies could be reduced.12 Indeed, as 
Mehran Kamrava has shown, a number of developing states have embarked upon this 
strategy, some having met with considerable success in supplying other emerging 
markets witii competitively priced and reliable goods.13 On the otiier hand, while the 
alternative ISI approach was also to rely upon the importation of foreign technology, 
this was only to be a temporary stopgap measure until the UAE could substitute 
imported technology with its own domestic technology. Thus, foreign technology was 
to be used to build up a domestic industrial infrastructure which would eventually be 
able to use local technology to produce goods tiiat would have otherwise been costly to 
import.14 By the early 1970s there were already indications that both approaches were 
being employed in the UAE, witii Kevin Fenelon remarking on the clear-cut division 
between three different categories of manufacturing industries: the first being those of
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the EOI group, the second being the traditional manufacturing activities, and the third 
clearly being those of die ISI group:
“One [group] consists of large-scale, highly capitalised industries 
employing the most modern technology, export-oriented and based on oil or 
natural gas. The other group is composed of small, traditional and labour­
intensive handicrafts working for a local market. In between there is a 
small though growing intermediate group, based like the first group on 
imported technology and machinery, but less highly capitalised and of more 
moderate size. For the most part, these industries serve local markets and 
are engaged in servicing, repair, and maintenance, or manufacture such 
articles as soft drinks or cement blocks, which if imported would involve 
high transport costs in relation to their value. ”7J
Furthennore, as Fatima al-Shamsi demonstrates in her study of 
industrialisation in the Gulf, there are now clear signs diat each of these strategies 
continued to be implemented in the UAE well into the 1980s and 1990s.16 With 
reference to EOI in the UAE, a particularly strong example would be the combination of 
natural gas, cheap energy and large-scale plants, especially in the resource-rich Abu 
Dhabi. Before the 1970s, the UAE’s considerable reserves of natural gas were under­
utilised widi the only gas produced being a side product of oil drilling, over 90% of 
which was simply flared off However, one of die earliest EOI strategies was to reverse 
this trend and to begin harnessing this potentially valuable resource. Early success 
came with die establishment of tiiree major gas plants, one on Abu Dhabi’s Das Island, 
a second in Al-Ruways, and a third in Dubai, each of which were producing nearly four 
million tonnes per annum by the mid-1970s.17 More recently, and as part of the UAE’s 
continuing commitment to upstream gas developments, proposals for the Dolphin Gas 
Project were signed in the late 1990s, establishing Qatar as a major co-supplier, and 
committing Abu Dhabi to the large-scale transportation and marketing of Qatari and 
Emirati natural gas.18 Alongside the main national gas companies of ADGAS and 
Atheer, other heavy export-oriented industries such as DUBAL (Dubai Aluminium)
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have also met with considerable success. Indeed, as the Economist Intelligence Unit 
estimated in 2000, aluminium exports have risen to account for nearly 60% of Dubai’s 
non-oil exports, thereby placing DUBAL at the very heart of the emirate’s industrial 
sector.19 Crucially, in addition to aluminium many other non-hydrocarbon based heavy 
industries, including the UAE’s various steel and plastics companies, have also grown 
in number and in capacity over the years, and in several cases have become regionally 
and internationally competitive. Moreover, as Soheir el-Saba explains, tlie future may 
be even more promising for EOI as the rising use of solar energy in Saudi Arabia and 
Kuwait extends to the UAE, thereby allowing for the development of new industries 
powered by a renewable energy source which, significantly for die diversification 
process, is entirely independent of the oil industry.20
Although, perhaps unsurprisingly, ISI-led growth has been less impressive given 
its concentration in smaller industries less able to benefit from the comparative 
advantages of the UAE’s low-cost energy, there have nevertheless been appreciable 
results and important signs of technology substitution and diversification. Indeed 
during the 1970s a number of uncomplicated small and medium-scale manufacturing 
firms were successfully established, each supplying a number of locally produced goods 
to the domestic market.21 Most notably, construction goods such as piping and cement 
could be sold at competitive prices given the high cost of importing such bulky freight 
into the UAE. Certainly die resulting reduction in such imports was reflected during 
tiiis period, even during the massive construction boom, with the UAE’s percentage of 
foreign trade to GDP gradually falling from 113% to 106%,22 and, in the case of Dubai, 
with die cost of imports being held in check at around 20 billion Dirhams (at fixed 
prices) until the late 1980s.23 Although the importation of such goods has risen in more 
recent years, and, as will be discussed later in this chapter, continues to pose a serious 
structural problem for the Emirati economy, diis does not necessarily indicate die failure 
of ISI. Indeed, there continues to be a significant rise in the number of new ISI projects, 
especially in die packaging and botding industries, many of which initially licensed 
foreign technology but have now made successful substitutions.24 As such, the 
perceived slowdown in ISI in the 1990s may have simply been due to the unsustainable
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growth of the early ‘easy stage’: ISI was originally applied to relatively straightforward 
industries requiring only minor technology injections and minimal planning, but recent 
attempts to apply ISI to more technologically advanced industries may take more time 
and greater investment.
Overall, by applying a combination of these strategies, the UAE’s non-oil 
manufacturing sector has grown steadily over the years from a practically negligible 
starting point in 1971, and now accounts for around 19% of the non-oil GDP, and more 
significantly for around 14% of the UAE’s total GDP,25 therefore indicating the 
increasingly important contribution of non-oil industries to the diversification effort. 
Moreover, although the sector’s rate of growth may have slowed in recent years,26 Al- 
Sharhan consultants do, however, present a slightly more positive picture. Using data 
from the last few years and calculating projections for 2002 and 2003, they demonstrate 
that by streamlining and improving efficiency, domestic industries are now rapidly 
increasing the value added to their manufactured goods. Indeed, arguing that the 
sector’s growth in manufacturing value added is as equally important as the 
manufacturing sector’s growth in contribution to the UAE’s total GDP, it is illustrated 
how, over the course of just five years, the sector’s value added will more than double:
Dubai's manufacturing sector: value added to domestic 
manufactures (2000 prices)
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With value added or ‘net output’ being the difference between the total revenue of a 
firm and tlie cost of bought-in raw materials, services and components, diese figures 
would indicate that Emirati firms are beginning to add more and more value to their 
bought-in materials and components by improving their processes of production.28 If 
tliis trend is able to continue dien die manufacturing sector’s contribution to GDP will 
begin to grow more rapidly, thus renewing the sector’s crucial diversification role.
3.2.7 - Fostering technology linkages with foreign firms
Furdier related to industrialisation and diversification, it is also important to note 
how the UAE’s planners have attempted to generate meaningful technology linkages 
between infant Emirati firms and the many foreign firms which operate in the UAE. In 
particular, diere has been a clear attempt to prevent the emergence of foreign enclaves 
and a ‘dual economy’; an asymmetrical economy in which little or no technology 
transfer takes place between foreign and local firms.29 Certainly, by the late 1970s it 
was becoming increasingly clear that the oil sector, given its distinct role and its high 
degree of specialisation, would never generate such linkages on its own, and that any 
‘natural filter’ of technology was unlikely to occur widiout more active government 
assistance.30 As such, a number of high-tech foreign industries were targeted with 
schemes aiming to encourage, and in some cases enforce, the transfer of tiieir 
technology and expertise to die UAE’s diversifying domestic industries.
Indeed, by 1984 die UAE’s Federation of Chambers of Commerce and 
Industry was already proposing that profitable foreign companies should be compelled 
to reinvest a significant portion of their revenue back into local enterprises. 
Furthermore, there were also calls for taxation and other restrictions to be imposed on 
these companies, and, as will be discussed in the following chapter, although such 
measures were not implemented dieir proposal nevertheless indicated die growing 
realisation of the potential role that foreign companies could be made to play in the 
UAE’s diversification process.31 Aldiough direct government intervention did not begin 
until the early 1990s, it nonetheless represented a veiy important step given that it took
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tlie form of a comprehensive arrangement requiring certain foreign firms, especially 
those having signed defence contracts with the UAE, to invest and assist in a number of 
commercial ventures witii local partners. Thus, administered by the newly foimed 
‘UAE Offsets Group’, these domestic recipients of foreign technology transfers were 
seen to be offsetting the enclaves being created by tlie high-tech foreign arms 
manufacturers, many of which only required limited local manpower, and most of 
which were thought unlikely to provide any genuine linkages witii tlie domestic 
economy under normal circumstances. As such, the UAE’s Offsets project can be seen 
as a clear attempt to take advantage of tlie world arms market and to promote vested 
interests in the UAE’s stability and security,32 while simultaneously escaping tlie ‘guns 
versus butter’ quandary which has plagued many other developing economies.33
Specifically, the group’s rules stipulate that such local ‘offsetting’ ventures 
should yield accumulated profits of 60% of the arms procurement contract value over a 
period of seven years. In other words, by entering into profitable and sustainable joint 
ventures with members of the local private sector, the supplier would have to bring back 
to tlie UAE economy some sort of ‘value addition’ worth 60% of the original contract. 
Furthermore, all projects have to be completed within seven years, and if the obligations 
are not met by the target dates, then the foreign company is penalised 8.5% of tlie 
unfulfilled portion of the obligation.34 Although there have been some instances of 
offsets failure and ineffective technology linkages, most notably concerning Giat’s 
missed targets,35 there have nevertheless been a large number of highly successful joint 
ventures. Among others, these have included:
• A local shipbuilding company
• An enzyme manufacturer in partnership witii McDonnell Douglas
• A healthcare centre with Lockheed Martin
• An agricultural exporter
• A solar energy panel manufacturer with GEC-Marconi
• A seafood company with Dassault
• Assistance with die aforementioned Dolphin Gas Project36
137
Indeed, to date, the Offsets group has co-ordinated over 20 such projects which, 
combined, are now valued at over $1 billion,37 Urns representing an important 
contribution to the UAE’s productive base and, given their autonomy from the oil 
sector, also representing an important contribution to tlie diversification of the UAE’s 
manufacturing sector.
3.3 - Diversification through agriculture
Another major component of die UAE’s diversification strategy has been the 
development of the agricultural sector. Although never likely to provide the same 
levels of growth and contributions to non-oil GDP as manufacturing and other sectors of 
die economy, die agricultural sector’s improvement was nevertheless seen as necessary 
for reducing the UAE’s dependency on imported foodstuffs and diereby achieving 
greater food security. In addition, the sector’s development was also seen as a means of 
expanding die domestic market and complementing die growth of other local non-oil 
related industries, especially die many dairy and poultry ISI industries which rely 
heavily on agricultural products.38 Thirdly, it is important to note that the sustained 
growth of the agricultural sector, which employs a higher percentage of UAE nationals 
tiian any odier sector (85% of all farm workers and 75% of all fishermen),39 has 
assumed great socio-economic significance in a country which, as will be described 
later in tiiis chapter, has become increasingly overwhelmed by expatriate workers.40
In 1976, the directive documents of the UAE’s Ministry of Planning emphasised 
the need to increase agriculture’s contribution to die GDP, eitiier by improving die 
productivity of the land itself (vertical expansion) or by increasing the total cultivatable 
area (horizontal expansion).41 With regard to die former, there has been substantial 
government investment in the form of considerable subsidies which have been used to 
slow the migration of farmers to the cities, and to provide for superior equipment, 
irrigation, and water wells. Moreover, in practice, the subsidies have often extended far 
beyond these initial objectives and, as interviewees revealed, in the rural areas of Abu 
Dhabi and Dubai it is now possible for new fanners to walk into almost ready-made
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farms complete with housing, fencing, roads, and of course all the necessary farming 
equipment.42 Also, as described in tlie appendices, there has been considerable 
investment in the development of new crop strains, with a number of agricultural trials 
stations now producing hardier crops better suited to the harsh desert conditions.43 With 
regard to increasing the cultivatable area, die primary strategy has been to concentrate 
on afforestation. Although when asked by curious university students as to why the 
government was spending so much on planting trees in die desert, Shaykh Zayid 
famously claimed it was ‘so people could see what they looked like’, the principal aim, 
however, has been to plant sufficient trees in order to reduce soil erosion and to help 
crops be better protected from die wind and sand. Furthermore, it has also been 
theorised that afforestation can stimulate increased rainfall which would in turn lead to 
greater vegetation in previously desert regions.44 See appendix (i).
With reference to the first of these strategies, productivity gains have led to a 
massive increase in agricultural output in recent years. Indeed, using Dubai as an 
example, vegetable production more than tripled from less than two tiiousand tonnes in 
1990 to over six thousand tonnes in 1999.45 Similarly successful has been the emirate’s 
fruit production, which rose from just over a tiiousand tonnes in 1990 to nearly 17 
tiiousand tonnes in 2000.46 Most impressive, however, has been Dubai’s dairy 
production, which rose from just tiiree hundred tonnes in 1981 to nearly 32 tiiousand 
tonnes in 2000, representing a hundred-fold increase in less tiian 20 years.47 Equally 
promising, though undoubtedly far from cost-effective given tlie region’s unforgiving 
climate, have been tlie results of the land cultivation strategy. Certainly, with figures 
made available by tlie Ministry of Agriculture, it can be demonstrated that there has 
been a substantial 82% increase of arable land since the mid-1980s:
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Total area under agriculture in Dubai
[Source: UAE Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries]48
Further related to the growth of the agricultural sector has been the modest increase in 
Emirati fishing. As demonstrated earlier in this thesis, fishing has always been one of 
the region’s main economic activities49 and, although cautious of over-fishing and 
unable to benefit from increasing land under cultivation, the industry has nevertheless 
also benefited from productivity gains and government subsidies in recent years. 
Indeed, over the past decade the catches for Dubai and the other northern emirates have 
risen from 12.5 thousand tonnes to 21.3 thousand tonnes, thus representing a 70% 
increase in their annual fish production.50
Although the sector’s growth is unlikely to lead to complete self-sufficiency 
given the many challenges of the desert and, as will be discussed later in this thesis, due 
to it’s reliance on subsidies from the allocative state,51 these overall improvements have 
nevertheless considerably boosted the UAE’s food security and, of course, have also 
directly and indirectly contributed to the diversification effort, especially by 
consolidating the UAE’s many food related ISI industries. Indeed, speaking at a recent 
Gulf food security conference, Sa‘id al-Raqabani, the UAE’s Minister of Agriculture 
and Fisheries underscored this considerable progress by claiming that the UAE had now 
managed to reach 83% sufficiency in vegetables, 80% sufficiency in dairy products, 
32% in eggs, 25% in meat, and 21% in poultry.52 Furthermore, it is also worth noting 
that, with the exception of Saudi Arabia, the UAE now possesses a higher per capita 
agricultural product than any of the other GCC states and, in addition to the impressive
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increases in production and arable land, the number of workers employed in the sector 
has more than tripled since die first development plans of die 1970s.53
3.4 - Diversification through commerce and tourism
Alongside the industrialisation of tlie domestic manufacturing sector and tlie 
development of the agricultural sector, in the mid-1970s the UAE’s planners believed 
that the expansion of the commercial and tourist sectors would also play an important 
role in the growth of the UAE’s diversified economy. Indeed, although on one level 
such activities may actually increase the UAE’s dependence on external economies, the 
sectors were nevertheless seen as a direct and effective means of building up non-oil 
related activities which would not necessarily be reliant on foreign technology or 
foreign labour. Furthennore, as Ali Abdulsalam, a former dir ector of the UAE Planning 
Department explains, it was hoped that the development of these sectors would also 
contribute to the promotion of many of the region’s traditional industries, the 
encouragement of various cultural and social activities, and most crucially would assist 
in developing the UAE’s internal trading sector.54
As such, by the early 1980s, with chambers of commerce in each emirate, an 
umbrella federation of chambers of commerce, and, in the case of Dubai, a World Trade 
Centre, tlie UAE began to position and promote itself as a world-class commercial and 
tourist hub.55 Moreover, in 1989 the government of Dubai underscored its commitment 
to the development of this sector by establishing a Department of Tourism and 
Commerce Marketing, the first of its kind in die UAE. Essentially tlie department 
sought to implement and support many of the original diversification plans within a 
more co-ordinated and effective framework by:
1. “Contributing to economic diversification by promoting non-oil 
development; and creating new opportunities for the Dubai business 
community by attracting trade, investment and tourism.
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2, Supervising tourist and archaeological sites, to lay down and 
implement plans and programmes that aim at encouraging tourism 
in the Emirate, to implement comprehensive media campaigns, to 
study projects related to tourism, to stage seminars and. exhibitions 
inside and outside the Emirate, to regulate the services of tourist 
guides and others in the tourist sector, to license hotels and 
furnished apartments, to supervise restaurants, and to develop 
commercial relations between the Emirate and other countries. ”56
As these ambitious objectives indicate, the department was keen to transform the 
emirate of Dubai into the Gulfs leading commercial zone and premier tourist 
destination. While the results of tiiis emirate-level strategy will be discussed in greater 
depth in the later analysis of dual development plans, it is nevertheless important to note 
some of tlie considerable successes which have been achieved over a short period of 
time, and the increasing evidence of similar strategies beginning to be employed in the 
other emirates. Perhaps the greatest success so far has been the ‘Dubai Shopping 
Festival’ (DSF) which was set up in 1996 widi die aim of transforming Dubai into an 
international shopping centre, attracting much higher numbers of tourists, and boosting 
expenditure in all sectors and on all types of goods and services.57 The DSF runs for 
approximately one mondi every year and claims to offer massive discounts in all 
participating stores and hotels,58 and, although in practice prices actually rise during the 
festival, the event’s popularity and reputation nevertheless continues to increase.59 
More recently, the DSF’s success has been complemented by die ‘Dubai Summer 
Surprises’ festival held during the out of season summer months, and the ‘Dubai die city 
that cares’ festival held during the month of Ramadan.60 Crucially, over the last few 
years a number of other commercial events and festivals have also begun to be staged 
by die other emirates and their new tourism and commerce departments, most notably 
Sharjah’s Ramadan festival and ‘Ajman’s ‘Fantasia’ festival. In die same way as die 
Dubai events, these have also appreciably boosted the local economies, with an 
increasing number of shoppers and tourists now being attracted to die smaller 
emirates.61
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With reference to the actual growth of the UAE’s commercial sector, 
perhaps the clearest indicator of expansion has been the sheer increase in the value and 
volume of international non-oil related trade, especially in Dubai. Indeed, quite 
remarkably the emirate’s total non-oil foreign trade rose from a modest eight billion 
Dirhams in 1975 to nearly 112 billion Dirhams in 2001 (measured at fixed 1995 prices), 
representing over 15 million tonnes of traded goods:62
Dubai's non-oil foreign trade - value (1995 prices)
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 -2001
[Source: Dubai Department of Ports and Customs]63
However, in addition to this fifteen-fold rise in the total value of non-oil foreign trade 
and a 140% rise in the total volume of foreign trade since 1980,04 the emirate’s 
substantial increase in re-exporting activity over the past 25 years must also be taken 
into consideration. Certainly, given the UAE’s historically high levels of imports, a 
problem which will be discussed later in this chapter,65 the value and quantity of re­
exports together with their relative contribution to total trade may provide an even more 
accurate indicator of the recent commercial expansion:
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Dubai re-exports - value (1995 prices)
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 -2001
Dubai re-exports (as a percentage of the value of total trade at 
1995 prices)
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 -2001
[Source: Dubai Department of Ports and Customs]66
Thus, with a massive increase in the value of re-exported goods between 1975 and 2001 
(and with the volume of re-exported goods more than doubling between 1980 and 2001 
from 0.9 million to 2.5 million tonnes67) and, as the above trend line indicates, with re­
exports accounting for a much higher proportion of total trade, it is evident that the 
emirate is indeed generating considerable non-oil related commercial activity. 
Moreover, when compared to the value of foreign trade and re-exports for the other 
GCC States,68 these figures clearly confirm Dubai’s position as one of the main trading 
hubs of the Persian Gulf and the greater Middle East. See appendix (iv).
With reference to the actual growth of the UAE’s tourist sector, the figures are 
similarly impressive, especially with regard to the dramatic increase in the number of
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hotels, resorts and other tourist-related establishments, and of course with tlie rising 
number of tourists and businesspeople now choosing to visit the UAE. Once again, 
Dubai has been at the forefront of such development, with its rapidly constructed tourist 
industry boasting nearly 300 hotels and now attracting nearly three millions visitors per 
annum,69 compared witii just 40 hotels and 0.4 million visitors in 1985:70
Dubai Hotels
Dubai Tourists (per annum)
[Source: UAE Ministry of Planning (for 1985-1994), Dubai Department of Economic Development 
(1985-1998), and Dubai Department of Tourism and Commerce Marketing (1999+)]71
Furthermore, given the major hotel developments which have taken place since 2000, 
including the Dubai Fairmont, Dusit Dubai, and tlie Grand Hyatt, and given the only 
temporary decline in UAE tourism following the September 2001 attacks, these positive 
trends seem set to continue. Crucially, it is also important to break down this sector and 
to show how the most rapid growth has been in the luxury tourist market, thus
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underscoring Dubai’s objective of transforming itself into an important winter sun resort 
for affluent European holidaymakers, thereby boosting die emirate’s supply of foreign 
exchange and further consolidating diversification.72 Indeed, of the 265 hotels 
operating in 2000, 78 were either ‘deluxe’ or ‘first-class’ rated,73 with many of the most 
prestigious Asian and international chains having chosen Dubai as the location for their 
flagship hotels.74 Also, given that these deluxe hotels are far larger than most of the 
other hotels, they actually provide the bulk of tourist accommodation in the emirate. In 
fact, these 78 hotels account for nearly 20,000 of the total of 31,000 hotel beds in Dubai 
and, more importantly, have enjoyed much higher occupancy rates than the other hotels, 
averaging nearly 70%, compared witii less than 36% for some of the lower class 
hotels.75 These occupancy rates have therefore translated into a high and growing 
number of luxury tourists staying in Dubai: 1.8 of the 2.5 million visitors in 1999,76 
representing nearly 72% of the sector total and almost double the size of die emirate’s 
normal population.
In much the same way as the commercial sector, the other emirates have also 
been able to follow Dubai’s lead in developing a successful international tourist 
industry. Indeed, Abu Dhabi now attracts around 18% of the UAE’s tourists while 
Sharjah quite remarkably manages to attract nearly 13%,77 despite the aforementioned 
decency laws and the emirate’s ban on alcohol.78 Furthermore, the UAE’s many natural 
beauty spots in die mountains, its rock pools, and its relatively untouched Indian Ocean 
coastline are now also being developed, with the aim of providing additional 
destinations for those tourists hoping to travel a littie further afield. Examples of such 
projects would include the recent recreation of a traditional village in the mountainous 
town of Hatta, the redevelopment of Dibba al-Fujairah, the construction of hotels on die 
coastal strip between Rol Dibba and Al-FaqTt, and the construction of an aqua leisure 
park in the tiny emirate of Umm al-Qawain.79 Significantly, where natural beauty does 
not exist, artificial beaches and breakwaters are also being created and, in die case of 
‘Ajman, an entirely new comiche and seafront is currently being constructed with 
federal funds.80
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Finally, in addition to then previously described role in the Emirati polity’s 
legitimacy formula, die increasing number of cultural and sporting activities can also be 
seen as assisting and consolidating the growth of these important sectors. Certainly, the 
many museums, local art galleries, reconstructed forts, and ‘heritage villages’ provide 
educational and charming distractions for the numerous tourists. Most notably the 
pearling village, the Bedu village and the Shaykh Sai’d art gallery, all of which line the 
creek side in Shindigha, provide Dubai’s tourists widi a pleasant open-air network of 
live entertainment, sights and sounds. Moreover, the growing number of sporting 
events, many of which have achieved world circuit status, have undoubtedly boosted the 
UAE’s commercial and tourist sectors by attracting wide audiences and greatly 
enhancing the UAE’s international reputation. Key examples would include die 
European golf tour’s Dubai Desert Classic, the UAE’s annual ATP and WTA tennis 
tournaments, Sharjah’s international cricket tournaments, and most significandy the 
Dubai World Cup - the world’s most lucrative horserace.
3.5 - The physical infrastructure for diversification
Without a new infrastructure, the UAE’s plans for industrialisation and the 
development of die agricultural, commercial and tourist sectors would have remained 
unattainable. While die UAE’s evolving legal and financial infrastructures will be 
discussed in greater detail hi die following chapter,81 it is essential to underline at this 
stage how die massive investments needed to create and maintain die physical 
infrastructure must be regarded as another key building block of the diversification 
strategy. Certainly, as Al-Sharhan consultants have described:
"[The UAE government] has continuously given high priority to the 
development of the country’s infrastructure and has invested over 25% of its 
GDP annually in recent years to build the present modern system of 
seaports, roads and telecommunication services. This in turn has paid back 
handsomely enabling the once oil dependent state to now actively promote
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its non-oil sectors and draw in income from a myriad of sources thereby 
enabling the country to further reduce its dependence on oil reserves”.
Remarkably, of course, it must be remembered that most of these impressive 
infrastructural improvements took place over just a few decades, with the Trucial States 
having previously been one of the most backward and undeveloped regions of die 
Middle East. Indeed, even as late as 1965, Fenelon observed on his visit that
”... there was not a single yard of surfaced public road in the whole of Abu
Dhabi; the only bit of made road was a short stretch within the compound of 
the Political Agency between the Agent's house and his office. The airport 
runway was a strip of levelled sand, the office a tiny shed, and the customs 
and immigration offices a Land-Rover. ”83
By the early 1970s, however, die situation had already begun to improve. Although 
Abu Dhabi and Dubai were still separated by over 100 miles of desert,84 diere were 
nevertheless many miles of brand new first-class roads, dual carriageways, and even a 
four-lane highway connecting Abu Dhabi and Al-4Ayn. As such, journeys between die 
outlying emirates which had previously taken nearly a week had been reduced to just 
two hours, and lorries were able to transport goods all over the region widiin a day. 
Moreover, in the space of just a few years, the airstrips were also changed beyond 
recognition as new international airports capable of handling the largest aircraft were 
being constructed in Dubai and Abu Dhabi.85 Ten years later, in the mid-1980s, the 
infrastructural developments were even more manifest, especially in die cities, widi 
Peck describing the enormous transformation he had observed in the centres of Abu 
Dhabi, Dubai and Sharjah:
“The virtual absence of any physical structure more than ten years or 
fifteen years old in Abu Dhabi reflects the extraordinary pace of change; 
only a few old buildings survive in Dubai and Sharjah. Glass, steel and 
concrete towers give the UAE's cities the appearance of transplanted
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Houstons rising above the flat sands of the Gulf. Almost overnight the 
greater part of the population has been displaced from traditional rural 
(and/or maritime) modes of existence to a setting of artificially sustained 
vegetation, broad boulevards, luxury hotels, and replicated Wimpys, Seven- 
Elevens, and Burger Kings, where only a scattering of barasti huts might 
have been found a generation ago ”.86
This fast-paced development was sustained throughout the 1990s and in many 
cases has continued unabated to the present day. Notable among the many 
achievements has been the completion of the Shaykli Zayid Highway linking Abu 
Dhabi with Dubai: with 24 hour lighting along its entire 210km stretch it is one of the 
longest roads in the Middle East.87 Similarly impressive has been die continuing 
expansion of Dubai’s international airport. Now hosting an award winning passenger 
airline, the airport has grown under the auspices of Dnata88 and the Dubai Cargo Village 
to become one of the world’s major cargo-handling hubs,89 with over 40 loading quays 
and with sufficient apron space to handle simultaneously four jumbo jets.90 Moreover, 
widi new terminals under construction and a modem underground rail network to link 
air passengers to the city centre and the emirate’s commercial and industrial districts, 
the airport looks set for further development in the near future.91 With regard to 
seaports, there have also been considerable accomplishments in recent years, with the 
total tonnage handled by Port Rashid and Jebel Ali having risen by over 75% in just five 
years, and with more than 100 shipping lines now calling at the UAE.92 These 
important maritime infrastructural developments have consolidated and facilitated the 
growth of Dubai as a major trade transit hub, while also allowing the UAE to compete 
witii other regional container ports in Aden and Salalah, both of which are situated 
much nearer to international shipping lanes.93
With specific regard to the physical infrastructure required by the UAE’s 
industrialisation, there has been similarly rapid progress. Most notable have been the 
fully equipped ‘export-processing zones’ (EPZs) which now exist in most of the 
emirates. In much the same way as the ‘ready-made’ government farms in die rural
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areas, the aim of these EPZs has been to create an environment conducive to tlie 
development and rapid growtii of manufacturing industries in die UAE. Lease office 
buildings (LOBs),94 cheap energy, road links, transport depots and administrative staff 
are all in place in an effort to provide new firms instantly with their entire required 
infrastructure. Aldiough these zones and dieir implications for long-tenn development 
will be examined in the fodowing chapter, it is nevertheless worthwhile to emphasise 
the massive growth that they have experienced over a relatively short period. Perhaps 
die best example of the EPZs has been the Jebel Ali Free Zone west of Dubai. 
Established in 1985 by die Dubai Department for Industry, the Jebel Ali Free Zone 
Authority began operating with the objectives of supplying all of die necessary 
administration, engineering and utility services required by their clients.95 Tlie zone 
expanded from a modest 298 companies in 1990 to over 2000 by 2001, is now home to 
nearly 37,000 workers, and has attracted somewhere in die region of $4 billion in 
investments.96 For high-tech and media companies, other more specialist zones also 
exist, including the Dubai Internet City and the Dubai Media City. Having opened in 
late 2000, dieir aims were to provide Internet and media free zones witii the entire 
necessaiy communications infrastructure in place for prospective computer-oriented 
firms.97 A number of multinationals have been already attracted by the high standards 
and impressive facilities, and the list of tenants now includes Microsoft, Compaq, IBM 
and Hewlett-Packard.
3.6- Social growth
Also necessaiy for the successful diversification of die economy and of course 
an essential component of the described rentier package of distributed wealth and the 
political ‘ruling bargain’, the UAE has made social growth another of its major 
priorities. In particular, education has been regarded as a key socio-economic building 
block; one which will allow the country’s youth to contribute in a better way to the 
national economy, and, as will be shown, one which will create a workforce more 
capable of reducing the UAE’s chronic dependency on expatriate labour than the 
present generation. Similarly, improved healthcare and a comprehensive welfare
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system have been seen as the necessary foundations for the creation of a healthy and 
happy society in which every individual can vigorously contribute to the UAE’s future 
development.
Many of these aims were formally recognised in the early 1970s with the oil- 
financed actualisation of social welfare and the provision of acquired rights being 
among the basic objectives of the UAE’s first development plans:
“These [social development objectives] were to be attained through a 
continuous improvement in the standard of living... This was to be carried, 
out on an equitable basis and in a manner which would emphasise and 
preserve the welfare benefits for the generations to come. ”9S
In tlie 1990s, after more than 20 years of sustained social development, tlie objectives 
remained much the same and, complemented by various other initiatives including the 
increased provision of facilities for women and expatriates," continue to form part of an 
ongoing strategy to maintain and improve social growth for the UAE’s expanding 
population. Indeed, in 1995 Sa‘id Ghubash, the Minister of Economy and Commerce, 
re-affirmed the government’s commitment to these plans and re-emphasised the 
importance of such development for the future of the UAE:
“The government of the UAE strongly believes in human development as a 
process of expanding and augmenting its people's choices. The most 
critical in the long list of these choices are to have a comfortable command 
of goods and services, to live a long and healthy life, to be educated, to feel 
safe and secure, and to have access to resources needed for an adequate 
standard of living. The choices people make are their own concern. 
However, the process of development must create a conducive environment 
that allows them to generate their full potentials. "Io°
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Given the relative simplicity of these goals and their clearly positive relationship 
witii oil wealth and economic growdi, most areas of social development enjoyed 
considerable success from a very early stage. Indeed, the provision and rapid 
implementation of educational and welfare services were already considered by the 
planners to have been, “one of most remarkable achievements of the UAE during the 
period 1975 to 198O.”101 The continuing successes throughout the 1980s and 1990s 
were also highly regarded, and more recendy with the UNDP’s positive report in 2000 
on the UAE’s first national human development statistics, the trend seems set to 
continue:
“The UAE has recently released its first national human development 
report... It is the outcome of the nationally executed programme of 
'Sustainable Human Development Profile and Strategy for the UAE ’ begun 
in 1994. It shows how the UAE has risen from a global rank of 77 to 42 in 
just 8 years, and praises Shaykh Zayid's often cited vision that “true 
development is not measured by cement and steel buildings, but by 
developing the human being. ”102
Certainly, with specific regard to education, the number of primary and secondary 
schools, teachers, and students have multiplied, providing the UAE with one of the most 
developed systems in the Middle East, and one comparable to tiiose of many western 
states. Again, perhaps die most significant feature has been the speed of diis progress, 
especially when one considers the region’s rather modest background and its relatively 
recent urbanisation. Among die most remarkable results have been the rise in die 
literacy rate of the UAE’s youth, which is now estimated at 90%,103 the gradual rise of 
primary and secondary school enrolment ratios, which now stand at 87% and 67% 
respectively,104 and the doubling of Emirati secondary school graduates over the past 
ten years:
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UAE secondary school graduates (per annum)
1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001
[Source: UAE Ministry of Education and Youth]’05
In addition to this massive increase in the number of graduates, another important 
indication of improvement in the UAE’s schooling system has been the steady decline 
in the student/teacher ratio. As the number of enrolled pupils has risen, the UAE has 
more than matched its population’s needs, and tlie number of teachers has risen at an 
even higher rate, allowing the UAE’s schools to provide an extremely conducive 
environment for both teaching and learning. Moreover, with ratios of around 15:1 in 
primary schools, and just 10:1 in secondary schools, it is worth noting that the UAE’s 
state sector ratios have been consistently lower than the private sector for much of the 
last 15 years.106 See appendix (v).
Similarly in the UAE’s tertiary sector, there has been rapid expansion with the 
number of universities and students increasing almost every year (with the enrolment 
ratio having risen from practically zero in 1971 to around 12% in 1999107). Sharjah 
provides a particularly strong example of recent development with its ‘University City’ 
which now houses two large universities, a technical college, and various other training 
academies. Other, more recent examples would include the expansion of the dual 
campus Zayid University, the opening of the new Abu Dhabi University, and the 
forthcoming launch of the British University of Dubai. However, the success of the 
UAE’s first university, situated in Al-‘Ayn, probably provides the best measure of the 
UAE’s tertiary education boom given that it was established in 1978 and continues to 
enjoy consistently high growth:
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Enrolled students and graduates of the UAE University in AI-'Ayn 
(per annum)
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students
□ Total 
graduates
[Source: UAE University in Al-‘Ayn]108
Evidently, the total number of students enrolled per annum has climbed from around 
500 to over 16 thousand, representing a thirty-fold increase in just 22 years. Thus, as a 
result, the number of university graduates has now risen to nearly three thousand per 
annum. Moreover, the UAE University in Al-‘Ayn is not only an excellent example 
because of its considerable growth, but also because it provides a clear indicator of the 
increasing importance attached to the educational development of UAE women:
Graduates of the UAE University in AI-*Ayn - by gender
□ Male 
graduates
□ Female 
graduates
[Source: UAE University in AI-'Ayn]109
Clearly, female students have outnumbered males in every year group from 1983 
onwards, and now account for over three-quarters of all graduates and currently enrolled 
students. Given that the university specialises in the humanities and social sciences, 
these statistics would probably not be replicated in more technical and science-based 
colleges which one may expect to be traditionally more male-dominated. Also, given
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that there has been a greater tendency for Emirati males to study abroad, these figures 
are perhaps unsurprising, but nevertheless the increasing number of female students and 
graduates does indicate an appreciable increase in female education at the highest levels 
and the continuing expansion of an important literary and skilled segment of the UAE’s 
population.
With regard to healthcare, the UAE’s attempts to create and maintain a welfare 
state have experienced similarly impressive results, especially given the region’s rapidly 
increasing population.110 Certainly, to illustrate the scale of this challenge it is worth 
noting that in 1975 approximately 28,000 patients were being admitted to health centres 
in the UAE, yet by 1995 this figure had reached nearly 100,000 per annum.111 In most 
areas, this challenge has been met, and in many cases the level of care continues to 
improve. Almost all health-related problems can now be dealt with locally in first-rate 
hospitals, and the number of overseas consultations has fallen as the number of 
specialists resident in the UAE has risen. Indeed, focusing on Dubai, the following 
figures serve to highlight some of the more tangible results in healthcare development:
Healthcare improvements in Dubai
□ Hospitals 
and medical 
centres
□ Medical 
doctors
□ Hospital 
beds
Evidently, the provision of hospitals, health centres and hospitals beds has risen 
appreciably in just ten years, but even more impressive has been the considerable 
increase in healthcare professionals. Between 1990 and 2000, the number of medical 
doctors practising in Dubai more than doubled, with the number of pharmacists, nurses
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and odier medical related staff having risen by 66%.113 As such, die population/doctor 
ratio continues to improve, having fallen from around 600:1 to just over 400:1,114 thus 
placing the emirate close to the USA, and ahead of the United Kingdom and many other 
European welfare states.115 Furthermore, the number of hospital beds per thousand of 
population has remained stable between two and diree, despite the expanding 
population.116 Finally, odier important indicators of diese successful healdicare 
developments must include the UAE’s average life expectancy at birth which is now 
close to 76 years, and the falling infant mortality rate, which now stands at around 13 
per 1000, both placing the UAE comfortably within the world’s top 50 healdicare
117systems.
3.7 - Emiratisation
As demonstrated in the historical background, expatriate labour has long been an 
important socio-economic characteristic of die lower Gulf, widi the pearling industry 
and its associated activities having always attracted large numbers of Indians, Iranians 
and other nationalities to the main coastal towns.118 However, by the early 1970s, the 
UAE’s massive labour requirements for its oil financed development projects soon led 
to far greater numbers of foreign workers, bodi skilled and unskilled, entering the 
workforce and assuming semi-permanent residence. Indeed, this influx continued more 
or less unabated riglit up to the 1990s, leaving die indigenous ‘locals’ a minority in their 
own country and, as most would agree, rendering them totally reliant on the millions of 
foreigners who have built and continue to build die UAE. In much the same way as the 
need for diversification of the oil dependent economy, the UAE’s planners therefore 
recognised the need to reduce their population’s persistent dependency on foreign 
labour and skills, not only to help achieve a more desirable level of labour self 
sufficiency in both the private and public sectors, but also to control in a better way die 
many other socio-economic problems that could result from the continuing presence of 
a large number of expatriate workers (both Arab and non-Arab). As such, die need for 
greater ‘emiratisation’ of the workforce has not only been viewed within the context of 
labour nationalisation, but is also increasingly regarded as a necessary safeguard against
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the negative implications for the UAE’s money supply growtii resulting from salaries 
and other payments being transferred out of the country, as a check on the unhealthy 
gender imbalances arising from a predominantly male immigrant workforce, and as a 
curb on the perceived erosion of cultural and religious identities.
To give an idea of the scale of this foreign presence it is worth noting that in 
1968, three years before the creation of the UAE, a sizeable, but perhaps containable 
38% of the region’s workforce were expatriates.”9 By the year 2000, however, with a 
population of somewhere between three and four million, recent surveys in the big cities 
have indicated that less than 17% of households may be UAE national, and that over 
70% of the municipal populations now comprise of either Asian households or Asian 
labour collectives:120
Breakdown of Dubai households -1998
Asian labourers 
29%
42%
[Source: Dubai Municipality, Administrate Affairs Department, Statistics Centre121]
Indeed, it is now privately estimated that over 90% of workers may be expatriates, with 
the head of the Abu Dhabi Planning Department’s statistics unit having recently 
admitted that UAE nationals now account for less than 7.5% of the private sector 
workforce.122 As Rawhi Abeidoh describes, tliis has of course been an enormous 
change over a relatively short period of time, a change which has led to increasing 
socio-economic concerns for the UAE’s future, even at the highest levels of Emirati 
politics:
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“United Arab Emirates citizens are rapidly becoming a shrinking minority 
in their own country. UAE officials and businessmen say they are alarmed 
by what they see as a growing reliance on foreign workers who now form 
more than 90 per cent of the country's three million worltforce. This is by 
far the highest percentage in the Gulf Arab states, their economies 
transformed by vast oil and gas riches. The UAE’s rapid transformation 
from small tribal societies into a modern state with eight-lane highways and 
gleaming skyscrapers came at a heavy cost in a country where citizens have 
traditionally shied away from menial jobs. Foreigners now virtually 
dominate the private sector andform around 60 per cent of the public sector 
worltforce, delegates said. According to the latest official census in 1997, 
the UAE population stood at 2.7 million, more than 75 per cent of it foreign. 
UAE officials privately say the figure was now around four million, 85 per 
cent of them foreigners, mainly from India, Pakistan and other Asian 
countries. The expatriates-to-locals ratio is higher in the worltforce as UAE 
immigration laws ban low-paid labourers from bringing in their families. 
In 1968, three years before the country's independence from Britain, UAE 
nationals represented 62 per cent of the worltforce, said Matar Juma'a, 
head of the statistics unit at the Abu Dhabi government-planning 
department. 'We are now less than 7.5per cent', Juma'a added. The UAE 
does not issue a detailed breakdown of its population. ‘We are facing a 
grave issue that demands a swift solution. We are shackled and I want a 
solution now before I become a mere one per cent’, said Muhammad 
Mazroui, secretary-general of the Federal National Council, the UAE’s 
appointed parliament. Mazroui said a lack of laws setting limits on the 
country's need for foreign labour was also to blame for the situation. A 
study of the worltforce in the private sector released last month found that 
construction and services employed the majority of the UAE’s 1.4 million 
overseas workers, two-thirds of whom do not have a secondary education. 
Delegates said the flood of the foreign labour was wiping out the Arab
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character of the country where some areas now resembled parts of India or 
Pakistan. ”123
Certainly, up until very recently expatriates have dominated virtually all segments of the 
private sector and, as Abeidoh describes, even the public sector is now comprised of 
60% foreigners. Perhaps most worrying of all though has been the increasing 
domination of expatriates in the middle and lower ranks of the government 
administration, areas one may have expected to remain the preserve of nationals, witii 
official studies having estimated that more than four-fifths of Abu Dhabi government 
employees may be foreigners, and the majority of these non-Arabs:124
Breakdown of Abu Dhabi government employees by nationality - 
1995
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[Source: Crown Prince Court. Department of Research and Studies, Abu Dhabi]125
Thus, with non-Emirati Arabs accounting for 35%, and with a staggering 47% being 
non-Arab foreigners,126 the size of the expatriate workforce also has serious 
implications for the functioning of the government itself. Not only reliant on foreigners 
for the continuing success of its economy, the UAE has also become dependent on 
foreigners for the functioning of its bureaucracies and much of the day-to-day public 
administration of the country.
It is worth noting that even in the 1970s tlie government had recognised the 
potential problem of such ‘shackling’,127 witii the Abu Dhabi Planning Department 
recommending in 1977 that there needed to be state-sponsored encouragement for far 
greater nationalisation, or ‘emiratisation’ of the workforce.128 Essentially, in economic
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terms, it was felt that a continuing reliance on foreign labour would lead to persistently 
high development costs, and that the growing expatriate population would also 
adversely affect the UAE’s money supply.129 Indeed, even today a considerable portion 
of the money supply growth fails to find its way back into the UAE’s banking system, 
and this is primarily due to the estimated $3.3 billion that is being repatriated overseas 
annually by foreign workers sending remittances back to their country of origin.130 
Furthermore, by the mid-1980s there was also a growing consensus that without such an 
emiratisation drive, the UAE’s employment structure would become even more 
distorted witii fewer nationals capable or willing to undertake jobs normally associated 
with expatriate labour. Certainly, as Peck observed:
“...as in the other wealthy oil states of the Arabian Peninsula, there is little 
evident connection in UAE society between wealth and work. As one 
analyst remarks, 'the message is clear; without effort or self-denial one can 
simply accept a world made by others. ’ As a residt, there are incipient 
signs of the kind of social malaise already evident in Kuwait with its long 
history of very high per capita wealth and advanced welfarism. Some young 
men with large amoun ts of money and leisure at their disposal are tempted 
to spend them on such things as expensive cars and mistresses and to avoid 
meaningful employment. ”131
Greater emiratisation has also been seen as an essential measure in lessening the 
growing gender imbalance in the UAE. Given that the vast majority of expatriate 
labourers are Pathan bachelors or married Keralite men unable to bring their spouses 
and families to the UAE (a minimum salary is required before a worker is eligible to 
invite family members to accompany them), this has inevitability led to a skewed 
demographic structure and a rather unpleasant atmosphere, witii adult males vastly 
outnumbering adult females. Indeed, the results of the UAE’s population censuses 
illustrate the scale of diis imbalance over die years:
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UAE population breakdown - by gender
□ Females
□ Males
[Source: UAE Ministry' of Planning]’ "2
As such, even though there were slight improvements in the 1990s, it is evident that of 
the three million or so registered in the census of 2000; more than two-thirds are still 
male, thus making the UAE’s population one of the most imbalanced in the world. 
Moreover, the proportion of males is probably even higher than this official figure given 
that many short-term contract workers are not included in census data. Also, given that 
the vast majority of the expatriates are based inside or close to the major cities, it is 
important to note that the gender imbalance may be even higher in these areas. Indeed, 
if the census statistics for the individual emirates are analysed then it becomes clear that 
the problem is most marked in the turban areas of Abu Dhabi, Sharjah, and especially 
Dubai where the percentage of males has been consistently higher than the UAE 
average, and now stands at around 71%.133 Conversely, those emirates with less 
developed economies, smaller conurbations and fewer labour intensive activities such as 
‘Ajman, Umm al-Qawain, and Ra’s al-Khaimah have much lower male to female ratios, 
but with males still accounting for around 59% of their populations,134 gender 
imbalance is nevertheless still a nationwide problem. If more UAE nationals, both men 
and women, can be brought into the workplace and eventually be used to fill positions 
previously requiring expatriates, then it is hoped that this disparity and its negative 
social implications can be somewhat reduced. See appendix (v).
With regard to the socio-cultural impact of such a large population of foreign 
workers residing in tlie UAE, it is worth noting that in Findlow’s recent investigation
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into emiratisation, she was informed that such factors were not important, and that the 
initiative was an entirely pragmatic policy designed to lessen the serious economic and 
demograpliic imbalances:
"When pressed during my interviews, people either told me that culture was 
not an issue in this project, or they were non-committal. The impression 
was given that the action agenda is firmly a pragmatic one and that 
religious considerations and the nation's religious identity were not linked 
to this issue.1,135
However, although not an official aim of the emiratisation process, there is little doubt 
that it has also been seen as an increasingly necessary preventative check on the 
perceived cultural and religious erosion resulting from the massive influx of expatriates. 
Indeed, while such erosion will be discussed in greater depth in the discussion of 
globalising forces later in this thesis,136 it is important to emphasise how many UAE 
nationals not only voice their misgivings over their minority status in the workforce and 
their reliance on foreign labour, but also voice veiy deep concerns over their increasing 
cultural marginalisation in a country dominated by non-Arabs and, in many areas, by 
non-Muslims.137 Moreover, given tire earlier discussion of cultural legitimacy resources 
and the crucial role of identity in the traditional polity, there is little doubt that 
emiratisation is also considered a multidimensional strategy by the ruling elite, many of 
whom are keen to foster and preserve a distinct, loyal, and culturally rich Emirati Arab 
patrimonial class.
Finally, although of less direct interest to the UAE government and the planners, 
it is perhaps also worth considering that the emiratisation strategy and indeed 
‘Saudification’ and tlie various other labour nationalisation initiatives in the Gulf States 
are being increasingly viewed by both indigenous and Asian scholars as necessary 
measures for correcting what have developed into serious two-way population 
problems. Certainly, it has been argued that massive labour migrations on the scale 
such as that between the Gulf and the subcontinent have caused marked gender
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imbalances and other socio-economic problems for the supplier countries as well as the 
host. Indeed, as Peck noted in the early 1980s, severe strains were already beginning to 
emerge in these South Asian supplier countries with the cause often being dubbed ‘the 
Dubai syndrome’:
‘'...social strains are generated not only in the host societies by the 
presence of foreign workers, but in the latter's societies as well. Although 
many of the Asian labourers live in physically and psychologically difficult 
situations in the UAE and in its neighbour states, their wives left at home 
fall victim to frustration and attendant disorders dubbed ‘Dubai syndrome ’
(as coined by a Pakistani psychiatrist). The prolonged absences of heads of 
families cause a breakdown of social controls in some Asian settings, and 
the remittances that are sent back often, create resentments and divisions in 
the workers ’ home communities. ”138
Moreover, twenty years later, these psychosocial problems are still very much in 
evidence, with recent Sharjah-based studies concluding that the majority of the millions 
of Asian expatriate workers not only suffer from some sort of psychological depression 
themselves, but also, due to their long periods of absence, are beginning to cause 
significant socio-economic problems in their home country.139 If therefore, as part of a 
broader labour nationalisation policy, there can be time limits or other restrictions 
placed on foreign workers, especially those unable to bring their families to the UAE, it 
is theorised that these pathologies can be somewhat reduced before conditions further 
deteriorate.
3.7.1 - Emiratisation strategies
Witii regard to the strategies themselves, the encouragement of locals to 
participate in the workforce actually has a long histoiy in the region and, as such, the 
present-day emiratisation initiative can be viewed as an extension of existing ideas and 
practices, albeit on a much more comprehensive scale. Indeed, with die beginning of
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‘Al-khawiya’ (tlie oil exploration by foreign firms in the early 1930s) the rulers had 
already begun to insist that as part of their concession agreements, tlie firms would be 
obliged to recruit and train up some of the local population, rather than simply 
importing all of tiieir labour.140 Moreover, by the late 1930s, the ruler of Dubai had 
taken tliis agreement one stage further by insisting diat Petroleum Development Trucial 
Coast Ltd. (PDTC) employ only Dubai subjects.141 Following the decline of the 
pearling industry, and faced with die prospect of unemployment, it was reasoned that 
Dubai locals needed far more stable jobs, and with the training provided by the foreign 
oil companies diis early emiratisation was seen as a suitable long-term solution.142 
Certainly, writing in die 1960s, Fenelon remarked upon the apparent successes of diese 
early initiatives, including those in Abu Dhabi, and described how die oil firms had 
been responsible for training a modest number of locals in skilled professions:
"... the contributions made by the oil companies in Abu Dhabi by providing 
training facilities for craftsmen and technicians have been of the greatest 
importance in producing a nucleus of skilled workers. A sizeable number of 
ex-trainees are now engaged in skilled jobs both inside and outside the oil 
industry”.143
Indeed, Abu Dhabi Marine Areas Ltd. (ADMA), one of the largest of the concession 
holders, had opened a number of such training centres widi the twin aims of providing 
Abu Dhabi locals with greater responsibility within the organisation and training them 
to such a level that they could eventually replace expatriate employees in technical and 
administrative departments. Similarly, the Abu Dhabi Petroleum Company (ADPC), 
the principal land-based concession holder, began to provide training facilities almost as 
soon as oil production began. Although many of the locals trained by the ADPC 
subsequentiy left the company, they soon began to contribute towards odier activities in 
the emirate, thereby continuing to fulfil the company’s responsibility to the local 
population.144
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By the late 1970s and 1980s the emiratisation strategy became far more 
extensive, witii the official economic and social development plans outlining a 
comprehensive programme aiming to rehabilitate as many UAE nationals as possible by 
educating them, training diem, and by giving them added incentives to participate and 
become an active part of the workforce.145 Indeed, as has been shown, die development 
of the UAE’s education system was already a key priority, and, with specific regard to 
emiratisation, a special emphasis was placed on courses and subjects relating to 
business practices and the professional skills demanded by odier areas of the UAE’s 
development. This commitment to investment in education was to be matched in the 
workplace by a number of government-sponsored schemes to encourage greater work 
experience and full-time employment. Prominent examples in recent years have 
included the Al-Futtaim Trading Group’s summer courses offered to young UAE 
nationals, widi the group claiming it intends to “pioneer the training of national 
personnel”;146 the work of the UAE Women’s Federation which aims to bring more 
young Emirati women into the workplace;147 and the various Emirati-specific training 
programmes offered by the major banks. Indeed, Speaking about Mashriq Bank’s role 
in the emiratisation process, Abdul Al-Ghurair, Chief Executive Officer of Mashriq, 
explained why the bank was die first to launch such a programme:
"In our continuous quest for excellence, Mashriq Bank has never neglected 
to play the role of the responsible corporate, forever striving to create 
practical and innovative solutions in response to the direct needs of the 
UAE market. The contributions of Mashriq Bank in the process of 
emiratisation has been quite significant as we go ahead with our plans to 
increase the presence of UAE nationals in our bank. ”
Moreover, Mohammed al-Sayari, chairman of the bank’s human resources department, 
explained how such a programme would actually contribute to the emiratisation 
process:
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"Our aim is to train 60 UAE nationals every year by running four courses 
throughout the year. The first 15 passed out in March and completed the 
programme successfully. Some are now working in Mashriq and some have 
started careers in other banks. The course concentrates on improving 
practical skills through on-the-job training rather than theory work. The 
course runs for five full working days to give the young nationals a feeling 
of the work place. They learn how to write a professional CV, how to 
behave in an interview and where to go if they have a problem. The training 
is definitely more practical than theoretical. "148
In addition to these educational programmes, there have also been more direct 
strategies, many of which have focused on the granting of specific privileges to UAE 
nationals with the aim of assisting their introduction into the workplace and reducing 
competition from expatriates. Certainly, as Abdullah Sultan Abdullah, the secretary 
general of the Federation of the UAE Chambers of Commerce and Industry has 
explained, although the UAE’s chambers do place great emphasis on training and 
qualifying nationals, this can only go so far, and in certain cases the government has had 
to intervene in order to provide additional incentives and encouragement.149 Most 
recently this strategy has been reinforced by a new labour law aimed at regulating the 
employment of UAE nationals in the private sector. As part of the new law, UAE 
nationals will benefit from special pension funds and better guarantees of their rights as 
employees in the private sector.150 Alongside these initiatives there have, of course, 
been more restrictive schemes, including die longstanding ‘'kqfil' sponsorship system in 
which all non-Emirati entrepreneurs require a local partner, thereby ensuring that UAE 
nationals, even as parasites, have at least some involvement in die management and 
profits of the domestic economy. In addition, there have also been specific 
emiratisation quotas introduced, requiring certain companies to increase their 
percentage of Emirati employees over a set period. Once again, die banking sector 
provides a strong example, where up until recently locals accounted for just 12% of the 
workforce. To redress diis situation, the government chose to impose quotas, requiring 
all banks to increase tiieir percentage of locals to 40% over die next ten years.151 As
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such, Mashriq Bank and many of the other banking houses have publicly stated their 
intention to have an ‘emiratisation growth rate’ of over 4% per year in an effort to meet 
these targets.152 Moreover, it is worthwhile noting that in certain circumstances there 
have also been more extreme measures including, for example, highly contentious 
directives such as the Ministry of Agriculture and Fishing’s decree that UAE nationals 
must captain all fishing boats. Explained by the Mmister as being a necessaiy step in 
order to “help check over-fishing and eliminate illegal practices resorted to by expatriate 
fishermen at sea”, in practice it is simply a part of the government’s overall drive for 
emiratisation in the agricultural sector.153
Thirdly, and also deserving mention, are those emiratisation strategies concerned 
not so much with the encouragement of UAE nationals, but rather the discouragement 
of expatriates, or more specifically, the discouragement of employers intent on hiring 
foreigners. Indeed, an important recent example would be the draft law released by tlie 
Ministry of Labour which will require companies to pay a fee for eveiy foreigner they 
hire, thus making UAE nationals a more attractive alternative.154 In addition, other 
more severe laws have aimed at stemming tlie flow of immigrant labour and actually 
reducing the size of the current expatriate population. Examples would include the 
restrictions placed on new visas requested by unskilled workers from India and 
Pakistan,155 and the introduction of lengthy immigration amnesties which have allowed 
all foreign workers without valid visas to leave the UAE with only minimal penalties. 
Indeed, it has been estimated that during the 1996 amnesty as many as 200,000 workers 
unexpectedly took advantage of die favourable terms and left before its deadline, 
thereby creating massive labour shortages.156
Given the enormity and complexity of the challenge, the results of these 
various emiratisation strategies have, however, been far less impressive than most 
would have expected (although it remains important to note that many serious observers 
had always remained sceptical157). Certainly, tlie original objectives of tlie early 1980s, 
which proposed that national management and labour in all sectors should reach at least 
25% of the UAE’s total within five years,158 have clearly not been met. Thus, unlike the
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comparatively straightfonvard diversification and welfare objectives, the nationalisation 
of the UAE’s workforce has not been solved witii financial packages and massive 
investment. Indeed, the experiences of the 1990s point to the opposite, given that the 
improved incentives, higher salaries, and pension schemes encouraged by the 
emiratisation initiative may have actually priced UAE graduates out of tlie market. 
Certainly, many employers baulked at paying the $26,000 average salary for a local 
graduate in addition to die obligatory 12.5% pension contribution,159 and much 
preferred to hire well-qualified and experienced South Asians at a fraction of die cost.160 
Nevertheless, aldiough few of the official targets may have been reached, there has 
undoubtedly been a rise in the number of UAE nationals participating in very diverse 
areas of the workforce and, as demonstrated in the previous section, with the rapidly 
increasing number of young Emiratis entering higher education, it is likely that 
emiratisation, especially in managerial positions, will mushroom in die near future. 
Thus, although lacking the immediacy of the incentives, quotas, and sponsorship 
systems, die various emiratisation education programmes and the UAE’s considerable 
investment in higher education may lead to important long-term results, especiady in 
the nationalisation of professional occupations which is, after all, a far more realistic 
objective tiian nationalising 25% of the total workforce. Indeed, tiiere are already 
important glimmers of hope, as in just the past year or so the proportion of UAE 
nationals gaining such positions, in bodi the private and public sectors, has appreciably 
increased. Again referring to die banking sector, the emiratisation process has really 
taken hold since 2000, with UAE nationals now accounting for around 20% of the 
workforce, thus representing a rise of nearly 8%. Moreover, some banks have been 
particularly successful and, in the case of EIBFS, the general manager confidentiy 
expected their proportion of UAE nationals to rise to 23% by the end of 2002 as a direct 
result of fresh Emirati graduates.161 Using a veiy different example, emiratisation has 
also been extremely successful in the UAE’s judiciaiy, a key area of the public sector. 
Although most judges are still foreign nationals, primarily from other Arab countries, 
die number of UAE nationals serving as public prosecutors and judges has nevertheless 
continued to grow,162 and, as the Minister of Justice, Muhammad al-Dhahiri, has
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claimed, nationals now account for 32% of the workforce, a proportion likely to double 
within the next few years.163
3.8 - Sub-strategies: Abu Dhabi and Dubai, a comparative analysis
Given that Abu Dhabi and Dubai are by far the largest, wealthiest, and most 
populous members of the federation, there is little doubt that the developments which 
have taken place in these two principal emirates have most directly contributed to 
UAE’s overall diversification, social growth, and emiratisation objectives. It is, 
therefore, essential to consider the important differences and sub strategies which have 
emerged in these emirates and, although inter-emirate politics and the viability of the 
federation will be discussed in greater detail in the following chapter,164 it is 
nevertheless crucial at this stage to understand the relative flexibility of Emirati socio­
economic planning and to appreciate how, at least in some respects, this has led to 
mutually reinforcing and beneficial dual approaches.
Indeed, as the above analyses have shown, especially witii regard to 
industrialisation, commerce, and tourism, vety often Abu Dhabi and Dubai have chosen 
to emphasise and pursue different elements of what remain very broad strategies. The 
immediate explanation for such divergent sub-strategies would of course be the relative 
differences in oil resources, with Abu Dhabi possessing some of the world’s largest 
reserves, and with little secret being made of the more finite supplies in Dubai.165 
Certainly, as the Middle East Economic Digest noted in the mid-1990s:
“The contrast between Abu Dhabi and Dubai, less than two hours apart by 
desert road, is striking. The capital city [Abu Dhabi] has risen as a 
glittering showcase for the modern Middle East, exuding an air of leisure 
and luxury. Dubai presents an altogether different aspect of the UAE with a 
sprawling townscape that hums to the rhythm of business... Dubai has 
staked everything on trade, its traditional lifeblood... Dubai’s oil 
production is sustained by a huge re-injection programme and costly
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recovery techniques. Some analysts predict that Dubai may soon have to 
become a net oil and gas importer. Thus, for the long-term prospects, 
nothing less than massive development will do. ”166
Thus, as one might expect, Dubai has been pressed into more wholesale diversification, 
needing to promote tlie growth of ISI industries and rapidly expand its non-oil related 
commercial and tourist sectors, while Abu Dhabi has instead been able to diversify at a 
slower pace and rely on its comparative advantage of cheap energy by concentrating on 
heavier, oil-related and EOI industries. Furthermore, although unrelated to 
diversification, Abu Dhabi’s massive oil wealth has also allowed the emirate to rely 
more heavily on oil-financed investments overseas. Indeed, although the government of 
Dubai is reported to hold approximately $35 billion overseas, the undisclosed foreign 
assets held by the Abu Dhabi investment authority, the Abu Dhabi ruling family, and 
many private Abu Dhabi citizens are nevertheless believed to dwarf this figure.167
A full explanation of how these different development paths have helped to 
shape the contemporary UAE cannot, however, rest solely on the relative oil wealth of 
die two emirates. Instead it must also be appreciated just how varied tlie pace of 
development had been for these two emirates during the first half of the twentieth 
century. It is often assumed that these emirates began the 1970s in much the same 
situation as they had both been Trucial shaykhdoms and, as explained in die historical 
background, they possessed similar traditional social and political structures. However, 
while Abu Dhabi still remained something of a backwater even by the 1950s, Dubai had 
long since grown into the largest town of die lower Gulf. Indeed, when fonner British 
political agent Donald Hawley visited Abu Dhabi during this period, he felt obliged to 
remark on its comparative visible backwardness:
"... the approach to the town, which is on an island, was appalling. High 
winds drove in the sea over miles of salt fats and only one narrow track, 
glistening with thick white cakes of salt, was passable. A square fort 
guarded a causeway (replaced only in 1968 with a bridge) and even the
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causeway was only built in the 1950s. Earlier, visitors had to drive through 
the shallows of the sea to reach Abu Dhabi. The town itself was a place of 
palm-frond houses, barastis, built on white sand among palm trees. A small 
market with tiny shops stood in higgledy-piggledy fashion between simple 
houses, and the streets were narrow and roofed with palm-fronds. Little 
was to be bought. The white palace of the ruler, turreted and crenellated 
like a Beau Geste fort, stood, among the palms, dominating the place, with 
the red and white flag of Abu Dhabi fluttering over it. ”168
By the late 1950s, and in complete contrast to the ‘small dilapidated town’ of Abu 
Dhabi,169 Dubai was already beginning to display noticeable signs of prosperity and 
development. Certainly, as die early aerial photographs of the emirate illustrate, the 
town was already rapidly expanding with an extensive commercial district in Deira and 
widi many large merchant houses along die creek side.170 Moreover, even following the 
oil boom and with Abu Dhabi developing into a modem city with much greenery, Dubai 
has always maintained a highly visible edge, and now of course boasts one of the most 
celebrated skylines in die Middle East.171
This manifestly differing pace of development can be best accounted for by 
the many underlying differences between die two emirates during the critical pre-oil 
period. Unlike Dubai, where prominent merchant families had been established for 
generations, Abu Dhabi’s business community was really more of a post-oil boom 
phenomenon and, as Peck has noted, “therefore lacked the roots, scope and energy of its 
Dubai counterpart”. Prominent Abu Dhabi families did of cour se succeed in launching 
tiiemselves in business, but veiy often they lacked the necessary experience and had to 
rely on expatriate managers to carry out the daily affairs of their enterprises, whereas 
the stronger business traditions in Dubai allowed many prominent families to assume a 
more hands-on role.172 In most cases these early structural differences were the result of 
Dubai’s long history of relative attractiveness over Abu Dhabi. Indeed, widi regard to 
commerce and other coastal activities, Dubai had always possessed a geographical 
advantage over the other Trucial shaykhdoms given its sheltered creek which extends
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much further inland than any of the other inlets along the lower Gulf. Moreover, this 
considerable natural asset was further complemented by Dubai’s relatively low tariff 
structure and the ruler’s active encouragement of foreign trade (an encouragement 
which remains very much in evidence even today, with the entrepreneurial spirit of the 
ruling Al-Maktum dynasty seen as being inextricably linked to the emirate’s ongoing 
commercial success), especially compared to Abu Dhabi, where, as Miriam Joyce 
describes, the overly cautious rulers continued to restrict entry for foreign merchants 
and even other merchants from the Trucial States.173
* Most significantly, when the major ports on the Persian coast were forced to 
impose new customs regulations in the early 1900s, the towns of the Trucial coast 
suddenly became far more appealing prospects, and Dubai was best placed to 
accommodate the new influx of merchants.174 Indeed, as DK Chaudhry, the general 
manager of the Persian Sharaf Shipping Agency explains, much of the early success of 
the emirate’s dhow trade and its commercial sectors can be attributed to the increasing 
tariffs in Iran175 and the almost simultaneous abolition of the existing 5% customs duty 
in Dubai.176 Certainly, the Shah’s expanding control over southern parts of Iran had 
disrupted the relative freedom in the busy harbours of Lingah and Bushire, and 
consequently Iran’s coastal business community began to shift its operations to 
Dubai.177 As such, when the Swiss traveller Burckhardt visited the area in 1904 he 
remarked that Dubai had been declared a ‘free port’ and was therefore unsurprised to 
find an abundance of British and German merchandise in the port, and a large number 
of immigrants fresh from Lingah.178 Thus, Dubai soon emerged as die main distribution 
centre for imported goods along the coast from Qatar to Ra’s al-Jibal (East of Ra’s al- 
Khaimah), and even became the favoured stop-off point for the British Indian Steam 
Navigation Company.179
Many states have been bom from trading modes of production,180 and as the 
century progressed and its commercial success continued to grow, Dubai became one of 
these. By the 1920s it was becoming clear that the restrictions which had been 
strangling die economy of soudiem Iran were unlikely to lift. Thus, many of the Persian
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merchants who had taken up temporaiy residence in Dubai earlier in the century soon 
realised that they were unlikely to return to Lingah and decided to take up the ruler of 
Dubai’s offer to settle permanently in the emirate.181 These merchants had made great 
contributions towards Dubai’s prosperity, and by deciding to remain they cemented 
Dubai’s commercial pre-eminence. As such, business skills, entrepreneurship, and 
trading links with Asia and Africa were effectively transferred from Iran to Dubai. 
Indeed, these Persians even introduced die concept of wind towers to die region, and 
examples of this early form of air-conditioning can still be seen in the Bastakiyah 
quarter of Bur Dubai where the ruler had originally donated land to the merchants. By 
the 1960s, the emirate received anodier boost, diis time from the British, when it was 
decided that Dubai, rather than Abu Dhabi or Sharjali, should host the headquarters of 
the Trucial States Council and the Development Office. As explained in the historical 
background, tiiis office administered considerable fruids provided by the British 
Ministry of Overseas Development and brought a nmnber of agricultural, medical, and 
technical experts to die emirate.182 Thus, as Frauke Heard-Bey contends, its presence in 
Dubai gave the emirate a more cosmopolitan air than die other shaykhdoms, and more 
importantly allowed Dubai’s rulers to discuss projects informally with the foreign 
advisers and witness die office’s achievements first-hand.183 Finally, with regard to 
Dubai’s continuing commercial advantages it is worth noting diat in the 1970s the 
emirate was still benefiting from its free ports, especially following the Iranian 
government’s renewed attempts to raise the tariff wall. Indeed, as a direct result of 
diese new tariffs, often touching 40%, a fresh wave of Persian merchants began to 
transfer their businesses to Dubai. As before, these merchants recognised that it was far 
preferable to import goods tiirough Dubai and then distribute diem in die Arab world 
than it was to suffer the heavy infrastructural liabilities of trading through Iran. 
Furthennore, as Chaudhiy also notes, by tliis stage the advanced development of 
Dubai’s Port Rashid and its Port Jebel Ah mega-project had led many Iranian merchants 
to assume that Dubai would soon become the one convenient stopping point for long­
distance shipping and dierefore die most sensible location for any long-term commercial 
base in die Gulf.184
173
Thus, in light of these different historical circumstances, it is apparent why 
Dubai’s strong commercial traditions coupled with its comparatively modest oil wealth 
have facilitated and spurred a more rapid and wholesale diversification of the economy, 
especially in the non-oil related trade sector. Conversely, Abu Dhabi’s non-commercial 
foundations and its massive oil wealth have engendered a more oil-focused 
development strategy, using cheap energy to encourage the growth of heavy EOI 
industries and using oil revenues to finance large-scale overseas investments. Indeed, 
evidence of these differing diversification sub-strategies has become clearer as the UAE 
has matured, especially given the relatively small size of Abu Dhabi’s non-oil sector 
and the increasingly large non-oil sector contributions being made to Dubai’s economy:
Comparison of oil and non-oil sector contributions to Dubai's GDP
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
[Source: UAE Ministry of Planning. Dubai’s GDP at factor cost calculated on fixed 1995 prices!185
Thus, by the mid-1990s Dubai’s non-oil economic sectors were already contributing 
82% of the emirate’s GDP, and perhaps most remarkably, over a period of just five 
years, Dubai’s non-oil economic sectors have continued to grow and now account for 
around 94% of the emirate’s total GDP. Moreover, while Dubai’s total GDP accounted 
for around 24% to 25% of the UAE’s total in 2000, its share of the UAE’s non-oil GDP 
had risen to 34%,186 demonstrating the emirate’s far greater commitment to non-oil 
related development than Abu Dhabi.
Secondly, with regard to attracting foreign direct investment, another key 
indicator of successful diversification and relative economic attractiveness, Dubai has
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been similarly successful and clearly ranks first among the emirates, attracting 54% of 
all FDI in the UAE’s manufacturing sector. This compares with Sharjah’s share of 21% 
and ‘ Ajman’s share of 10%. Accounting for just 9%, Abu Dhabi ranks only fourth,187 
indicating the emirate’s different outlook on FDI and its preference for state-sponsored 
heavy industries.188
Distribution of foreign direct investment in the UAE
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[Source: UAE Ministry of Finance and Industry]189
Indeed, Abu Dhabi’s commitment to heavy industries can be further confirmed by the 
fact that although the emirate hosts only 224 industrial establishments, a mere 10% of 
the total number of plants in the UAE, these plants account for more than half of the 
UAE’s total manufacturing output. In comparison, Dubai has 817 plants, Sharjah has 
716, and ‘Ajman 316. This clearly indicates the preference for lighter, smaller-scale ISI 
industries in Dubai and the northern emirates:190
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[Source: Al-Sharhan International Consultancy, Dubai]191
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Thirdly, and also with regard to the comparative success of Dubai’s non-oil 
development, it is important to note the appreciable improvements in the emirate’s 
labour productivity scores, especially in its diversifying sectors. Using data from 2000, 
the labour productivity scores for the various economic sectors in Dubai can be 
calculated and compared with the UAE averages:
Labour productivity scores - Dubai compared with the UAE average
Manufacturing Commerce/services Tourism/leisure Agriculture
□ Labour 
productivity 
score - Dubai
□ Labour 
productivity 
score - UAE 
average
[Source: UAE Ministry of Planning. Calculated from Dubai's total GDP of 54741 million Dirhams in 
2000 using sectors’ shares of total employment and total GDP]192 
Thus, if compared to the labour productivity statistics for the entire UAE, it is evident 
that in the tiiree main non-oil sectors Dubai has enjoyed significantly higher 
productivity than the other emirates, particularly in the commercial sector where the 
emirate has now achieved internationally competitive labour productivity rates 
(indicated by a score substantially higher than 1.0). Only in the agricultural sector does 
Dubai fall short of the UAE average, indicating the emirate’s historical preference for
coastal and trading activities, and Abu Dhabi’s greater development of its hinterland.
Despite these marked differences between Abu Dhabi and Dubai, there is, 
however, a growing consensus that such diversity will bring added strength to the 
federation and will eventually provide the UAE with ‘the best of both worlds’. Indeed, 
as Business Monitor International has claimed, the differing macro-economic strategies 
of Abu Dhabi and Dubai can be regarded as complementary rather than divisive and are
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likely to ensure that the UAE’s overall economy remains resilient and prosperous even 
in times of low oil prices.193 Abu Dhabi can draw upon massive financial reserves if the 
oil industry falters whereas Dubai can provide greater diversification and more diverse 
employment opportunities for the emiratisation process. Moreover, Jamal al-Suwaidi of 
the Emirates Centre for Strategic Studies and Research (ECSSR) has also emphasised 
these positive aspects of the relationship, explaining how Abu Dhabi needs to support 
Dubai’s rapid development, as “keeping Dubai strong is important for the federation 
and important for the future of the federation.” Thus, even though Dubai’s contribution 
to the federal budget is low, he recognises that Dubai’s expanding non-oil sectors are 
more likely to solve die employment / emiratisation problem than Abu Dhabi.194 
Similarly, as Muhammad Al-Faliim has acknowledged, it is increasingly believed that 
Abu Dhabi will be unable to achieve many of the UAE’s long term goals on its own as 
“its economy is built on selling oil to build infrastructure whereas Dubai’s more 
diversified and imaginative development projects offer a means whereby job creation 
can be encouraged”.195
As a result, there has been growing evidence of greater financial and physical 
links between the two emirates. One such link may be the widely rumoured decision by 
Abu Dhabi to donate 100,000 barrels of oil a day to support Dubai’s development 
projects. At current prices, this ‘gift’ represents more than $650 million a year.196 
Physical links have included the recent opening of the Maqta-Jebel Ali natural gas 
pipeline which, by 2005, will feed 700cf per day from Abu Dhabi into Dubai’s 
industrial zones as part of tlie aforementioned Dolphin Project.197 Indeed, as die 
Economist Intelligence Unit reports, this UAE-Qatar landmark gas deal provides die 
clearest indicator to date of closer economic ties between Abu Dhabi and Dubai.198 As 
such, much of the UAE’s recent economic development can be seen to have taken place 
widiin a context of increasing coexistence between two different but mutually 
supportive economies. As the discussion of die creation of die federation in die 
historical background emphasised, the UAE survived the initial dangers of the early 
years due to its ability to balance and include the different demands and concerns of the 
individual emirates. Similarly, die federation’s socio-economic development planning
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Figure (vii) “Abu Dhabi and Dubai, a comparative analysis
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has not led to uniformity and adherence to one rigid strategy, but has instead embraced a 
number of sub-strategies which, at least in diis case, have complemented and reinforced 
the UAE’s overall development. Moreover, there is eveiy indication that this 
coexistence and flexibility will continue for the foreseeable future: Abu Dhabi will 
continue to pursue its long-term strategies of ‘economic nationalism’199 by developing 
government sponsored heavy industries and downstream operations such as oil 
refineries, gas processing, and polyediylene plants; while in contrast it is predicted diat 
Dubai’s macro-economic strategy will remain more neo-liberal and oriented towards 
private sector activity, with die government providing the infrastructure and focusing on 
the international promotion of the emirate.200 See figure (vii).
3.9- Development Problems
Despite the visible success of most areas of diversification, infrastructure 
building, and social development, and despite die existence of mutually beneficial dual 
development strategies in the two principal emirates, the UAE has nevertheless been 
faced with certain other development problems, many of which have remained 
unresolved. Broadly speaking, these are die problems which have resulted from internal 
pathologies, and problems which, in much the same way as the inexorable over-reliance 
on foreign labour, cannot be easily overcome with oil wealth. Indeed, in some cases the 
difficulties have actually been caused by surplus wealth and over-budgeting, linked of 
course to the actual kind of subsidy-based development which has taken place in the 
rentier / allocative state and, as will be described in the following chapter, the nature of 
many of die prevailing domestic structures.201 Most notably these persisting problems 
have included chronic over-consumption and a continual trade imbalance despite the 
modest expansion of the UAE’s productive sectors; the expensive and wasteful 
duplication of investments; and finally the problem of substantial disequilibrium 
between die constituent emirates. By assessing these difficulties, this section will 
therefore attempt to highlight some of the UAE’s more serious development limitations, 
and also some of the more serious underlying problems which continue to exist.
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Firstly, with regard to excessive consumption, tiiere has long been a concern 
that oil wealth and strong purchasing powers will lead to worryingly high levels of 
consumer imports, which will in turn present serious long-term problems for the growth 
of domestic manufacturing, and of course for the UAE’s balance of payments.202 
Indeed, many of these pessimistic predictions were soon realised as the UAE’s current 
surplus of balance of payments began to fall from highs of nearly 39 billion Dirhams in 
1980 to less than two billion Dirhams in the mid-1990s 203 Similarly, the UAE’s trade 
balance fell from over 50 billion Dirhams to less tiian 15 billion Dirhams over the same 
period, leaving the UAE with the lowest trade balance of all GCC states by some 
considerable margin.204 Moreover, in the specific case of Dubai, the most commercially 
developed of the emirates, imports rose from around 7 billion Dirhams in 1975 to a 
staggering 83 billion Dirhams in 2001 and although as shown there has been an 
appreciable increase in re-exporting activity, these imports still represent around 74% of 
total non-oil trade (and with approximately half of these being accounted for by 
consumer durables).205
Dubai non-oil foreign trade -1975
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[Source: based on data from the Dubai Department of Ports and Customs]206
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Thus, despite a number of plans to set both governmental and private consumption 
limits,207 over the past 25 years relatively little has been achieved. Certainly, witii 
accelerating imports and an increasingly dominant consumption structure, the issue 
would seem to retain much of its original urgency, especially as the UAE’s attempts to 
reduce reliance on oil by boosting the non-productive commercial sector can be seen as 
having actually compounded the problem. Indeed, as al-Shamsi notes of tliis 
conundrum:
“Great emphasis has been put into encouraging the non-oil sector, and that 
share of the GDP has increased. However, such development has its 
shortcomings... a prevalence of high income and consumption sustained 
without recourse to local production and the existence of high levels of 
conspicuous investment. ”208
Similarly, despite the potential effectiveness of Abu Dhabi and Dubai’s dual 
development paths, the UAE’s spectacularly costly duplication of investments and a 
lack of region-wide co-operation, especially between the larger and smaller emirates, 
has also persisted and continues to undermine the overall diversification strategy.209 
Particularly strong and much discussed examples would include the UAE’s 
disorganised development of its airports and factories, and the apparent absence of any 
meaningful co-ordination between these projects.210 Indeed, even in the mid-1970s 
Sa‘id ’Ahmad Ghubash, tlie UAE’s Minister of Planning, was already complaining of 
tliis problem:
“Economic necessity will require the eventual cessation of the costly 
duplications of projects that have occurred throughout the UAE since it was 
established. UAE officials recognised that this duplication of projects only 
wastes time and money that could be used more effectively elsewhere. The 
intense rivalry between the various emirates and the important status issue 
dictated that if one emirate acquired an airport or factory then a similar one 
had. to be built in the other emirates. ”211
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Writing in the mid-1980s, Peck also emphasised this lack of co-ordination and the 
resulting unnecessary duplications:
“Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah and Ra’s al-Khaimah all have airports that 
service both international and domestic flights. This overbuilding, 
prompted by inter-emirate rivalry, has left the latter two facilities under­
utilised. Abu Dhabi, on the one hand, recently opened a new, large civilian 
airport to handle its traffic. Dubai, with the busiest airport in the Gulf, is 
upgrading its facilities... ”212
Clearly, this under-utilisation of major airports was a direct result of so many facilities 
having been built in a relatively small country. Of course, the problem is still very 
much in evidence today, with a new international airport in Al-‘Ayn and with foreign 
airlines cutting back their flights to Sharjah airport as a result of the continuing 
expansion of Dubai International only a few miles away.213 In fact, Dubai airport is 
now closer and far more accessible to most parts of Sharjah than the Sharjah airport. 
Similarly, with regard to the UAE’s airlines, there has been much the same problem. 
Although jointly owned between Abu Dhabi, Bahrain, Qatar, and Oman; Gulf Air was 
nevertheless originally intended to be the UAE’s principal carrier, but has experienced 
difficulties in recent years and has always faced stiff competition from its award­
winning Dubai-based rival, Emirates Airline. Certainly, few other countries of a similar 
population and geographic size as the UAE have successfully supported more than one 
major airline.214
The problem would therefore appear to remain the lack of any high-level 
organisation of development projects between the emirates. Thus, although inter­
emirate political relations will be considered more closely in the following chapter, it is 
important to note that persisting rivalries, overlapping local government departments, 
and the continuing lack of certain federal ministries (most significantly die absence of a 
UAE Ministry of Tourism), have clearly clouded any overall vision and in many cases 
have led to underused facilities, aborted projects, and expensive mistakes. Indeed, it
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later emerged that one of the causal factors behind the 1987 coup attempt in Sharjah 
was Shaykli Abdul-Aziz al-Qasinh’s opposition to die ruler’s sanctioning of expensive 
and unnecessary ‘prestige projects’ including the airport, an unfinished television 
station and several empty museums.215 Thus, the initial lack of co-ordination and 
necessary period of transition predicted by the planners of the early 1970s still remains 
a significant issue.216 Certainly, in many ways it has become even more of a concern 
dian before given diat die shock absorbing effects of oil wealdi may have allowed the 
UAE to survive the duplication and disorganisation of the 1980s and 1990s,217 but in a 
future of potentially greater scarcity, and in a future requiring greater diversification, 
such haphazardness may prevent more long-term sustainable growdi.
Perhaps die most considerable problem has, however, been die lack of 
equilibrium between the various emirates. Indeed, the need for a reduction in regional 
disparity, in much the same way as the reduction in die UAE’s reliance on oil, foreign 
technology, and foreign labour, has long been a key concern of the development 
planners, many of whom believed that if the different emirates could better pool and 
balance their resources dien socio-economic growdi would be more achievable for the 
entire country. Moreover, and clearly addressing another major feature of dependency 
theory, it was understood that greater equilibrium would also serve to prevent any 
‘super-exploitation’ of die UAE’s less well-developed areas by either indigenous or 
foreign forces.218 As such, in 1975 the development planners clearly stated their 
objective of “finding the optimum allocation of projects according to the relative 
importance of each emirate”.219 Specifically, die strategy was to ensure that die smaller 
non-oil producing emirates were to be targeted for appropriate federal-funded 
developments based on their individual characteristics, while all major development 
projects were to be better supervised to ensure more balanced investments and the best 
possible utility for the country.
A major and immediate obstacle to diis strategy was Article 23 of the UAE’s 
provisional constitution which stated that the “natural wealth and resources of each 
emirate should remain the public property of that individual emirate.” Although, as
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demonstrated in tlie discussion of the early federal negotiations, such articles allowed 
for greater flexibility and guarded against fragmentation,220 they nevertheless also set 
the rich apart from the poor, thus hindering full economic integration at an early 
stage.221 To a limited extent some of the UAE’s regional imbalances were unproved 
during tlie 1970s as the federal government, at that stage funded almost entirely by Abu 
Dhabi, began to intervene and assist outlying regions which would have otherwise 
remained underdeveloped and would have fallen into further decline. Indeed, as a by­
product of the UAE’s expanding physical infrastructure, many previously remote 
regions became better connected and more assimilated with the national economy than 
ever before. In particular, certain coastal and desert regions which had recently been 
linked by new roads and telecommunications, but which still remained reliant on 
traditional economic activities such as fishing and date farming, were targeted to receive 
additional development grants in an effort to prevent worsening disparity. A strong 
example of this regeneration programme would be the island of Dalma, which, as 
described in tlie historical background, had long been one of the lower Gulfs’ most 
prosperous pearling centres. Unlike tlie nearby island of Das which had been 
transformed into an offshore oil terminal for ADMA, Dalma possessed no oil, and 
following tlie collapse of the pearling industry became entirely reliant on fishing. 
Consequently, tlie population of the once bustling island fell to less than a hundred by 
die late 1970s,222 and seemed set to fall even further as the result of increasing migration 
to the cities. Yet, as Heard-Bey explains, the community’s decline was successfully 
held in check as Dalma, along with the remote interior towns surrounding the Lrwa 
oases, began to receive substantial government aid:
“The increase in oil company activities eventually diverted most of the 
manpower away from the pearling industry, which was already at a low ebb 
in the 1950s. With this the importance of Dalma also declined. In the later 
1970s the small community of tribal fishermen was given new incentives to 
stay there by the establishment of government-financed houses, schools, new 
mosques, a market complex, and a small hospital; free transport to and 
from the island by helicopter was organised by the army; several
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construction projects are proposed for the island. Thus, Dalma, like the 
Llwd and Bida 'Zayid and the Al-'Ayn area, entered the era of 
departmentalised administration, co-ordinated by government institutions in 
Abu Dhabi town.9,223
However, despite these hinterland aid packages, the sustained growdi of 
Sharjah’s manufacturing sector throughout the 1980s, and the expansion of Fujairah’s 
Indian Ocean ports in the 1990s, most of these regional developments have remained 
dwarfed by die growth of the two principal emirates. Indeed, as the Economist 
Intelligence Unit has noted, the vast bulk of the UAE’s development projects have been 
undertaken in Abu Dhabi and Dubai, while the smaller emirates still have veiy few 
commercially viable ventures apart from some small-scale tourism.224 Certainly, as die 
UAE’s indicators for the period 1975-1995 illustrate, the UAE’s regional disparities, at 
least in terms of economic development, have persisted, and the goal of greater 
equilibrium would seem as elusive as before. Although Abu Dhabi’s share of the 
UAE’s GDP fell from nearly 71% to 61%, this still represented by far the greatest 
contribution. Moreover, widi Dubai’s share of GDP rising from 20.5% to 24%, die two 
major emirates still accounted for over 85% of the UAE’s GDP in 1995, despite Dubai’s 
declining oil revenues. In contrast, the combined share of die four smaller emirates 
accounted for just 7% of GDP in 1995, and although this is nearly double the 1975 
share of 4%, this nevertheless represents a very small increase in total contributions 
over a considerable twenty-year period 225 and would therefore seem to indicate few 
major non-oil related developments in these outlying regions:
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Contributions to UAE GDP in 1995
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Abu Dhabi 
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[Source: Crown Prince Court, Department of Research and Studies, Abu Dhabi]226 
Finally, although the problem is unlikely to be resolved in tlie near future, and
regional disequilibrium will remain a feature of the UAE’s lopsided development for 
some time, it is nonetheless worth noting that a number of regeneration projects and 
developments are in the pipeline or on tlie horizon, and at the very least these 
underscore the planners’ continuing commitment to reducing regional disparity. Such 
examples include the Offsets Group’s proposed ventures in the northern emirates and in 
Al-‘Ayn,227 and the generous sponsorship of coastal revival projects and festivals in 
‘Ajman by the National Bank of Dubai and the UAE’s telecom company, Etisalat.228 
Similarly, the western desert region of Abu Dhabi has also been earmarked for future 
development with a multi-million Dirham project already underway in an effort to 
transform what is probably the UAE’s least developed area into a network of rural 
tourist attractions. Among others, these will include settlements close to LTwa and in 
Ghayathi, near to the Saudi border.229 Moreover, there have also been comprehensive 
plans drawn up by some of the smaller emirates in co-operation with the federal
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government and the UNDP, and given time these may also lead to greater regional 
development. In particular, Ra’s al-Khaimah recently launched its ‘UNDP-RAK 
Vision’; a plan aiming to achieve sustainable growth in the non-oil producing emirate 
by promoting Ra’s al-Khaimali-specific policies for the expansion and diversification of 
its economy. Indeed, as part of his official announcement, the ruler, Shaykh Saqr, 
stated his clear intentions to boost the emirate’s relatively small contribution to the 
UAE’s economy and to reduce the gap between Ra’s al-Khaimah and the three larger 
emirates.
3,10- Conclusion
By the mid-1970s the UAE’s economy was already heavily reliant on overseas 
demand for its oil exports, on foreign technology for die functioning of its industries, 
and on foreign labour for supplying both its skilled and unskilled workforces. Thus, in 
an effort to promote greater self-sufficiency and more sustained autonomous growtii, 
and of course to ensure die longevity of the crucial material components of dieir ruling 
bargain, the ‘modernising monarchs’ and their development planners initiated a number 
of strategies which aimed to reduce some of die most damaging features of their 
dependent development. In particular tiiere were calls for the greater diversification of 
die economy: specifically the promotion of the UAE’s non-oil related sectors and the 
encouragement of technology linkages and transfers between foreign and domestic 
enterprises; the creation of a first-class educational and welfare state to provide for a 
trained and healthy workforce; and the ‘emiratisation’ of labour, encouraging UAE 
nationals to assume positions previously requiring expatriates. See figure (viii).
With regard to diversification, over die past thirty years die UAE has 
experienced the modest growtii of its non-oil related industries and in some cases, 
particularly in die ISI manufacturing sector, has managed to encourage die transmission 
and domestic substitution of foreign technologies. Perhaps more significantly, the 
UAE’s commercial and tourist sectors have expanded considerably over diis period and, 
even though not reducing dependency as such, these sectors have nevertheless greatly
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reduced the economy’s reliance on oil. Furthermore, although with understandably less 
impressive results, the agricultural sector has also grown, providing an additional non­
oil related contribution to the UAE’s GDP, while of course providing greater food 
security. Finally, underpinning these developments has been the creation of a brand 
new physical infrastructure of roads, ports, industrial parks, and communications. 
Financed by the UAE’s remaining oil wealth, this infrastructure continues to expand, 
facilitating fresh diversification opportunities and better ensuring a stable and 
prosperous post-oil future. Thus, although the oil sector still remains tlie greatest 
contributor to the UAE’s GDP, accounting for somewhere between a quarter and a half 
of all exports,231 and although the various diversifying sectors have periodically 
suffered bouts of sluggish growtii,232 die non-oil sector has nevertheless become 
extremely significant, especially given the small timescale and the region’s comparative 
backwardness as late as die 1960s.
Social growth has been equally forthcoming, again of course aided by the 
UAE’s massive oil-financed investments. A large number of schools and universities 
staffed by qualified and experienced teachers and lecturers have provided the UAE’s 
youdi with the highest standards of education, with small class sizes, and with excellent 
facilities. Similarly the quantity of hospitals and medical centres has mushroomed over 
this short period, with the ever-increasing number of medical professionals ensuring 
low doctor-patient ratios and providing effective care for almost all conditions widiin 
the UAE. These accomplishments have therefore not only symbolised and consolidated 
the welfare state component of the rentier coalition, but have also demonstrated die 
planners’ clear commitment to human development in the UAE and the conception of 
an educated and strong Emirati population.
Although by comparison the emiratisation of the labour force has met with only 
limited success, and die UAE remains as reliant as ever on foreign labour, there have 
nevertheless been a niunber of promising signs, especially in recent years, which point 
to the much greater emiratisation of managerial, professional, and high-level public 
sector positions in the veiy near future. Moreover, given diat diis has been an area of
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strategy which has not directly benefited from oil wealth, and indeed may have been 
hampered by financial incentives which have priced UAE nationals out of the market, 
these results have been far harder to achieve. Indeed, it would appear that the planners 
have been forced to adopt a multidimensional approach, relying not only on wealth 
inducements for locals and restrictive practices such as quotas and visa limitations for 
expatriates, but also on greater educational and motivational opportunities for the 
increasing quantity of UAE graduates. Certainly, by providing and sponsoring 
vocational courses, internships, and other professional training programmes, the 
government has successfully begun to place for higher numbers of young UAE 
nationals than ever before into both public and private sector jobs, many of which 
previously required the expertise of expatriate workers.
In addition to these broad strategies, it must also be noted how the relative 
flexibility of the UAE’s federal system has allowed for the pursuit of differing sub­
strategies, especially in the two largest and wealthiest emirates of Abu Dhabi and 
Dubai. Quite simply, Abu Dhabi’s substantial oil wealth has engendered a more 
cautious diversification strategy based around heavy EOI industries which aim to 
maximise the emirate’s comparative advantages of cheap energy and abundant natural 
resources. On the other hand, Dubai’s rich history of commercial development and the 
entrepreneurial spirit of the ruling Al-Maktum dynasty, coupled with more modest and 
depleting oil reserves has instead promoted far more rapid and far truer diversification. 
Indeed, with an emphasis on smaller ISI industries largely unrelated to the oil sector and 
witii die massive expansion of its commercial and tourist sectors, Dubai’s non-oil sector 
has long since accounted for the vast bulk of the emirate’s GDP. Crucially, these 
differing strategies are now being regarded as complementary and mutually reinforcing, 
as Abu Dhabi’s considerable wealth and heavy industries can continue to provide the 
UAE’s financial backbone and support the other emirates, while Dubai’s more 
diversified economy and strong commercial links can better promote die UAE 
internationally and can better contribute to the emiratisation strategy by providing more 
varied and appropriate employment oppoitunities for UAE nationals. Thus, far from
188
conflicting, the UAE’s sub-strategies may become a vital factor in ensuring successful 
future socio-economic development.
Finally, however, it is also important to consider a number of critical 
development problems which have periodically surfaced and which, in some cases, have 
remained unresolved. Indeed, despite the planners’ best efforts, the UAE has remained 
heavily consumption rather than production oriented, with a resulting trade unbalance 
and a declining balance of payments. Furthermore, despite the evidence of increasing 
co-operation between Abu Dhabi and Dubai, there has also been the highly visible 
duplication of projects in the smaller emirates, with expensive and unnecessary 
developments often taking place in adjacent territories, many of which have remained 
under-utilised and empty. Thirdly, there has been the continuing problem of regional 
disequilibrium, with the wealth and development gap between the oil-producing 
emirates and the other emirates remaining ahnost as great as it was tliirty years ago. In 
much the same way as the plans for emiratisation, these have not been problems winch 
can easily be addressed by greater investment and oil-financed development projects. 
Instead, given the nature of the problems, it would appear that a number of internal 
pathologies must be responsible, namely the primarily allocative nature of the state, the 
persistent consumerist mentality of the rentier population, the lack of inter-emirate co­
ordination, the absence of effective inter-departmental co-operation, and presumably, on 
occasion, the mismanagement of resources and a lack of transparency. Thus, although 
the planners have clearly been able to reduce and overcome some of the weaknesses of 
the UAE’s dependent socio-economic structures, future attempts to modify other 
features of the development path may be undermined as the UAE continues to 
experience the more deeply entrenched disadvantages of its inherited and reinforced 
dependent circumstances, many of which, as the following chapter will demonstrate, 
can be viewed as the hidden costs of the UAE’s ruling bargain, its political stability, and 
the persistence of traditional forces.
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4. Domestic Pathologies and the Political Process
While the United Arab Emirates has enjoyed moderately successful socio­
economic development over the past thirty years, and while the planners have managed 
to reduce some of the most manifest weaknesses resulting from the UAE’s dependency 
on oil, foreign technology, and foreign labour, there have however been a number of 
significant under-the-surface pathologies which have continued to undermine the 
development path. Certainly, as the previous chapter demonstrated, a number of 
concerns including the massive duplication of investments and the UAE’s chronic 
regional disequilibrium would seem to indicate serious internal problems, perhaps 
stemming from die domestic political process, die lack of inter-emirate co-ordination, 
the lack of inter-departmental co-operation, the need for greater transparency, and the 
interaction of conflicting interest groups. Crucially, without contradicting the growing 
economic neo-liberal emphasis on internal factors shaping development,1 the aim of this 
chapter will be to demonstrate that such pathologies are in many ways by-products of 
the same reinvigorated traditional structures which allowed for the consolidation of the 
polity and the reinforcement of the dependent client elite in die first place. Indeed, it 
will be shown how many of these persistent development concerns can be seen as the 
hidden cost of the UAE’s political stability and dierefore the long-tenn price which 
must be paid in order to circumvent the Shaykh’s dilemma and escape the inevitability 
of the early modernisation dieories.
Firstly, explaining more clearly how such dependency-related internal 
structures may lead to a lag in development and inhibit any evolution towards Weberian 
legal-rational ideals, it will be shown how rentierism / allocation, neo-patrimonial 
networks, bureaucratic self interests, and complex client elite orientations can readily 
influence a state’s goals, its domestic political process, and the interactions of its key 
interest groups. Working within this framework, the chapter will then explore the 
UAE’s decision-making structure, outiining the key political institutions and, critically, 
their social compositions and comparative effectiveness. In addition, the all-important
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relationship between the key federal state-level structures and the many existing 
emirate-level institutions will also be discussed; a unique feature of UAE politics and 
essential to a greater understanding of regional co-ordination and co-operation. Thirdly, 
this chapter will consider die role of the UAE’s bureaucracies, parastatals and those 
other institutions responsible for policy implementation and regulation, with an 
assessment of their relative strengths and weaknesses, and of course their perceived 
level of opaqueness. Finally, die existence of significant elite interest groups widiin die 
Emirati political process will also be contemplated, especially the ongoing struggle 
between die well-established conservatives and the more technocratic reformers, bodi of 
whom seek to perpetuate rentier wealth, but whose different preferences and strategies 
have in many cases directly influenced and shaped die UAE’s development padi.
4.1 -Domestic pathologies
A number of theoretical models have been devised in an effort to explain the 
relative impact of domestic pathologies in developing states and, as tiiis chapter will 
demonstrate, elements of these can be readily applied to the UAE. Firstiy, in light of 
the various development problems discussed in the previous chapter, it is necessary to 
consider die inherent weaknesses of a political economy which is still by and large 
dominated by oil: diat is an allocative rentier state which is still able to rely primarily on 
hydrocarbon resources, and which therefore by definition lacks the same impetus to 
build up a productive sector as odier non-allocative developing states. Thus, although 
as shown diere have been concerted attempts to diversify in die UAE, Giacomo Luciani 
and other scholars have argued convincingly that such efforts may ultimately be limited 
as developing a domestic productive economy in many ways still represents sometiiing 
of a bonus rather than a necessity for these states:
“Growth in the domestic economy is one of the various luxuries that the 
state can buy with its oil income in one case, it is an essential precondition 
for its existence and survival in others. "2
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Crucially this feature (and in some ways attitude) of rentier states, may significantly 
hold back overall development and growtii as goals will invariably remain linked to die 
primary hydrocarbon sectors:
"...the strengthening of the domestic economic base may be included., but 
not necessarily so. Even if this happens to be one of the goals of the state... 
the strengthening of the domestic economy is not reflected in the income of 
the state, and is therefore not a precondition for the existence and expansion 
of the state. ”3
As shown, despite improvements in import-substitution industrialisation, hydrocarbon 
resources are still behind many of the UAE’s manufacturing activities, especially in 
Abu Dhabi, as many plants remain geared towards heavy export-oriented plants reliant 
on cheap energy4 Similarly, the agricultural sector continues to rely heavily on 
government subsidies (providing ready-made farms, equipment, irrigation, etc.),5 which 
are of course a luxury afforded by die oil-rich allocative state. Moreover, as also 
demonstrated in the previous chapter, allocated wealdi has indirectly hindered die 
emiratisation drive as UAE nationals have been priced out of die market and, in many 
cases, have been stripped of incentives to enter the workforce.6 Thus, while rentierism 
provides great wealth, allows for social growth, and engenders much needed stability, in 
certain key instances such a phenomenon may do little to curb long-term development 
problems which, in other economies more reliant on fostering strong productive sectors, 
could be more easily solved.
Building upon these implications, and of course given the earlier discussion 
of die survival of traditional monarchy and the polity’s increased reliance on 
patrimonial networks alongside seemingly modem institutional structures, anotiler 
important starting point would be the ‘neo-patrimonial’ model. As there is little doubt 
diat the ruling families continue to dominate the UAE’s political system, continue to 
control the highest offices of state and, significantly, administer die bulk of the state’s 
allocated wealth, it would seem reasonable to hypotiiesise that patrimonial elites direct
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policy formulation while the more modem bureaucracies simply act as augmentations of 
the patrimonial network and as tools for policy implementation. In this scenario
"... the bureaucracy is turned into an extension of a self-serving patrimonial 
elite which provides no coherent or dynamic administrative leadership. 
Particularistic distrust prevents the delegation of authority, stifles initiative, 
and frustrates teamwork and the co-ordination of functions. The chain of 
command is unreliable: legal prerogatives of office may give little real 
authority where power derives from personal connections and loyalties or 
legal commands are short-circuited by ‘personal fiefdoms ’... "7
Indeed, Ray Hinnebusch summarises how such a neo-patrimonial political process and 
the resulting pathologies can greatly affect development policy:
“Development policy is subverted by a patrimonial strategy of control in 
which economic rationality is subordinated to the creation of clienteles, co­
optation, and payoffs ofpotential opposition. In such an uninstitutionalised 
regime, instability and fragmentation paralyse or induce swings in policy, 
rendering it incoherent, and effective instruments of policy implementation 
are wholly lacking. In short, state policy, put in the service of narrow group 
interests, is ‘irrational 'from the point of view of the larger society. ”8
Thus, given this hybrid of traditional groups and new institutions, one would expect to 
find considerable competition between the various patrimonial elites and their clients 
over policymaking and the management of the state’s resources.9 Moreover, one would 
expect to uncover a system far removed from die Weberian ideals of legal-rational 
priorities, issues, and procedures, and therefore a political process likely to significantly 
impede and slow socio-economic development.
Furthermore, it is also important to note how the neo-patrimonial expansion 
of the UAE’s bureaucracies may also lead to the emergence of self-interested
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bureaucratic interest groups whose members may seek to secure themselves and their 
careers as well as consolidating die future of dieir particular institution widiin die hybrid 
political network. Certainly, as Fred Riggs has argued, such a behavioural pattern may 
lead to additional pathologies as bureaucracies and their staffs pursue irrational motives 
in an effort to further dieir own interests rather dian those of greater society or indeed 
even the patrimonial elites.10
Finally, while such models may be able to highlight the particularistic 
struggles diat can take place widiin neo-patrimonial structures, they do not however 
take into account the actual nature and complexity of the elite’s orientation at the apex 
of this system.11 Indeed, as Wallerstein noted in the 1970s, elites cannot always be 
viewed as homogeneous entities pursuing the narrow interests of patrimonial politics, as 
diey will very often have conflicting economic interests widi some favouring an ‘open’ 
economy while others favour some form of protection.12 Certainly, as this chapter will 
demonstrate, widi new generations of western educated and professional technocrats, 
many of whom control big businesses and are now beginning to gain positions of high 
office, the UAE’s patrimonial elite and, in Hisham Sharabi’s Marxist tenns, its 
dominant rentier class,13 is becoming distinctly heterogeneous, with a clear divide 
emerging between diose conservatives seeking to perpetuate oil-derived rentier wealth 
and those ‘new rentier’ reformers attempting to liberalise die economy in order to 
exploit fresh sources of economic rent. Thus, recognition of diese domestic elite 
interest groups and their differing development priorities and preferences must fonn 
another ciucial layer of understanding.
4.2 - The decision-making structure
At the federal level, the UAE’s decision-making structure comprises of a 
split executive, with a ‘President for life’ chairing a supreme council of die various 
hereditary rulers, and with a Prime Minister presiding over an appointed council of 
government ministers. Underneath this executive operates a unicameral legislative 
council comprising of selected representatives from die seven emirates. As one might
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expect, given the described neo-patrimonial model, the powerful executive is almost 
entirely dominated by members of the ruling families and representatives of other 
notable Emirati families, and most importantly, as this section will demonstrate, is 
largely unrestrained by the weak and ineffective legislature which has primarily served 
as an optional consultative body allowing for the limited co-optation of otiier privileged 
families.
At die apex of diis decision-making structure is the institution of the 
Presidency, with the President acting as the head of state, representing die UAE in 
foreign relations, performing bodi procedural and ceremonial functions, and serving as 
an important bridge between the two executive bodies:
“...[He] convenes meetings of the Supreme Council of Rulers. He also 
represents the UAE in foreign relations, supervises the implementation of 
federal laws and decrees. He appoints the Prime Minister with the approval 
of the Supreme Council of Rulers, and then selects the Council of Ministers 
with the approval of the Prime Minister. Perhaps most importantly, given 
his sole responsibility for calling joint meetings between the Supreme 
Council of Rulers and the Council of Ministers he plays a crucial role in 
linking the UAE’s two highest political bodies.”14
Certainly, as Khoury described in his study of die UAE’s political system, this linking 
role has often allowed die President to balance and regulate conflicts within the political 
system, thus satisfying his monarchical need to reinforce personal legitimacy and his 
position at the centre of patrimonial power.15 Indeed, the Presidency of the UAE is 
entirely synonymous widi die traditional rulership of Abu Dhabi, die largest and 
wealthiest of the constituent emirates, with Shaykh Zayid Al-Nuhayyan having been re­
elected to die position every five years by die six other rulers. Moreover, with Abu 
Dhabi being by far the largest contributor to bodi the federal budget and the UAE’s 
GDP, this historical association of the presidency with the ruler of Abu Dhabi has now 
been informally accepted by die other emirates,16 Thus, barring any major inter-emirate
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challenge, or as discussed in the study of dynastic monarchies, any internal power 
struggle amongst die Al-Nuhayyan family, it would seem likely drat Shaykh Zayid’s 
eldest son and crown prince, Shaykh Khalifa, will succeed as both ruler of Abu Dhabi 
and as President of the UAE. Accordingly, in much the same way that many of the 
republican Middle Eastern states have been described as ‘presidential monarchies’, the 
UAE can be seen as having evolved into a ‘monarchical presidency’, with a 
continuously re-elected royal president.
Comprising die seven hereditary rulers, the Supreme Council of Rulers (the 
SCR) is die UAE’s highest federal authority widi die powers to initiate policy, to review 
and reject laws passed by the ministerial government, to admit new members to die 
federation, and to appoint or dismiss any civil servant including the judges of the 
Federal Supreme Court, die Prime Minister, and even die President. Officially, die 
SCR’s annual sessions last for eight months of the year, during which time four formal 
meetings are supposed to take place,17 but given that no constitutional provision exists 
for enforcing such regular meetings, these have often been infrequent. Indeed, over the 
years the rulers have generally preferred the ease of informal gatherings, and as this 
chapter will reveal, diis essentially traditional process has often left major controversial 
issues in abeyance, sometimes even to the detriment of the national interest.18 
Moreover, while the SCR’s procedural issues are in tiieory decided by a simple 
majority, with each of the seven members having a single vote, in the case of more 
substantive matters both the rulers of Abu Dhabi and Dubai in addition to at least diree 
of the five smaller emirates must approve all decisions and ratifications. Thus, at this 
highest level, it is important to note tiiat die UAE’s formal political process serves to 
underscore the supremacy of Abu Dhabi and Dubai, the two wealthiest emirates.19 
Finally, with regard to social formation, die SCR naturally remains the most exclusive 
of the UAE’s political institutions, with its members having always been the seven 
respective emirs, all of whom are descendants of the ‘paramount shaykhs’ or tamima of 
the long-established tribal dynasties originally supported and favoured under die British 
Trucial system. Indeed, Abu Dhabi is represented by Shaykh Zayid, the head of the Al- 
Nuhayyan, with Dubai represented by Shaykh Maktum Al-Maktum, with Sharjah and
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Ra’s al-Khaimah being represented by Shaykh Sultan and Shaykh Saqr, their respective 
Qawasim rulers, with ‘Ajman represented by Shaykh Humayd of the Al-Na‘hn, with 
Umm al-Qawain represented by Shaykh Rashid of the Al-‘Ali (the Mu‘alla clan), and 
with Fuijarah being represented by Shaykli Hamad of the Sharqiym.20
The Council of Ministers (the COM) is effectively the UAE’s formal 
cabinet, with its ministers responsible for most of die day-to-day running of the 
federation. Aldiough clearly subordinate to the SCR, the COM is nevertheless 
responsible for formulating the bulk of die UAE’s policies, and can initiate its own 
legislation after receiving ratification from the SCR. hi addition, die COM approves the 
federal budget, oversees all public expenditure, and supervises all decrees, regulations, 
Supreme Court decisions, and international treaties.21 Currently, there are nearly 30 
members of this executive, including 17 government ministers and five ministers of 
state, along with the President, the Vice-President, the Prime Minister (currently also 
the vice-president), the Deputy Prime Minister, the governor of the Central Bank and, 
on occasion, die UAE’s permanent representative to the United Nations and the UAE’s 
ambassador to the USA 22 See appendix (vii).
Aldiough each of the seven emirates are represented by at least one minister, 
the COM is however, in a similar fashion to the SCR, also clearly structured in favour 
of Abu Dhabi and Dubai, with these larger emirates controlling the most significant 
portfolios. Originally, six of die ministries were allotted to Abu Dhabi (including 
foreign affairs, interior, and information), while die premiership in addition to tiiree 
other important ministries were given to Dubai (including defence and finance), three 
were also given to Sharjah, two each were given to Ra’s al-Khaimah and Fujairah, and 
one each was given to the smallest emirates of ‘Ajman and Umm al-Qawain.23 This 
composition of the cabinet was first negotiated in 1971 and was eventually formalised 
in 1996 when die constitution was finally made permanent. Thus, over the years, the 
allotments have remained relatively unchanged, with the main additions having instead 
come from newly created cabinet posts, including die previously discussed Minister of
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State for the Presidential Office, which has been assigned to another of Shaykh Zayid’s
sons.24
Distribution of ministerial portfolios in the UAE
-2
Umm al-Qawain 
1
'Ajman -1 
Fujairah - 2
Ra’s al-Khaimah
Sharjah - 3
Abu Dhabi - 6, 
including foreign 
affairs, interior, 
and information
Dubai - 3, 
including 
defence, 
finance, and 
economy / 
commerce
25[Source: Economist Intelligence Unit]
Conforming to the neo-patrimonial model, the COM’s social formation is 
perhaps best viewed as an extension of monarchical authority with many of the 
ministerial posts being occupied by either key members of the various ruling families 
(around 40% of posts26) or by representatives of other long-established and powerful 
tribal families. Most obviously, in much the same way as the President’s overlapping 
role, the UAE’s Prime Minister, Shaykh Maktum Al-Maktum (as the ruler of Dubai and 
also the Vice-President), serves on both the COM and the SCR. Shaykh Muhammad 
Al-Maktum, Dubai’s crown prince, is also represented in the cabinet, serving as the 
Minister for Defence, as is his older brother Shaykh Hamdan Al-Maktum, who serves as 
the Minister of Finance and Industry. In addition to Shaykh Zayid, Abu Dhabi’s ruling 
family is well represented by Shaykh Sultan Al-Nuhayyan, the Deputy Prime Minister, 
by Shaykh Nuhayyan Al-Nuhayyan serving as the Minister for Higher Education and 
Scientific Research, by Shaykh Abdullah Al-Nuhayyan as the Minister of Information 
and Culture, and by Shaykh Hamdan Al-Nuhayyan, the UAE’s Minister of State for 
Foreign Affairs. Other royals currently include Sharjah’s Shaykh Fahim al-QasimT who 
heads the Ministry of Economy and Commerce, and Umm al-Qawain’s Shaykh 
Humayd al-Mu’alla who serves as the UAE’s Minister of Planning.27 Examples of 
prominent non-royal families serving in the COM have included Abu Dhabi’s Dhaheris,
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the Suwaidis and the Otaibis.28 Indeed, Muhammad al-Dhahiri currently heads the 
Ministry of Justice and Islamic Affairs; Sultan al-Suwaidi serves as the governor of the 
Central Bank29, and in the past ’Ahmad Khalifa al-Suwaidi was the UAE’s first ever 
Minister for Foreign Affairs, with Mana Sa‘id al-Otaibi having presided over the UAE’s 
Ministry for Petroleum.30 Finally, however, as revealed in the earlier discussion of 
broader patrimonial networks and their contribution to the ruling bargain,31 it must be 
noted that in recent years a number of ministerial posts have also been granted to 
members of other Emirati families, often those possessing both professional experience 
and overseas postgraduate education. Certainly, the number of these ‘technocrats’ in 
the UAE’s cabinet is steadily increasing and their expanding role in federal politics will 
be detailed later in this chapter.
The UAE’s legislature consists of the unicameral 40-member Al-majlis al- 
watcmi lil-ittihad or Federal National Council (the FNC). hi 1971 it was quite naturally 
assumed that the relatively small local populations of the constituent emirates could be 
sufficiently represented by a few people chosen from among the leading merchant 
families and those tribal elders who had traditionally held the confidence of then 
people.32 Thus, by consolidating the principle of shura (consultation), it was intended 
that the FNC would function as a contemporary federal majlis, offering the people direct 
democracy via respected intermediaries. Indeed, as Kevin Fenelon remarked soon after 
its creation, die FNC was certainly structured in such a way that it could raise local 
issues and debate all matters of public interest before the responsible ministers. 
Furthermore, in theory the FNC was to be informed of all government decisions, was to 
be able to ratify all international treaties signed by the UAE, and, to ensure the 
independence of its views, its members were to be excluded from all other public posts 
and ministerial portfolios.33
However, unlike the parliamentary legislatures normally associated with 
democracies, the FNC, in much the same way as the COM, has remained entirely 
appointive, with the seven rulers (or their associates34) being required to select rather 
than elect the FNC representatives for their emirates.35 Moreover, again resembling the
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COM, this selection procedure is further controlled so as to favour the two wealthiest 
emirates. Thus, while eight members each are chosen from Abu Dhabi and Dubai, six 
members each are chosen from Sharjah and Ra’s al-Khaimah, and only four each are 
chosen from the smaller emirates of Fujairah, ‘Ajman, and Umm al-Qawain:36
Fujairah - 4
Distribution of FNC members
Umm al-Qawain - 
4
'Ajman -4-
Abu Dhabi - 8
Dubai - 8
Ra’s al-Khaimah - Sharjah - 6
6
[Source: Economist Intelligence Unit]37
With reference to the social formation of the FNC, the institution’s 
membership can again be interpreted as an attempt to incorporate representatives of 
prominent non-ruling families into the neo-patrimonial political process, even if they 
are granted little real authority. Certainly, as Fatma Al-Sayegh has shown in her study 
of merchants in the UAE, these FNC members, especially those from Dubai, often 
represent the new generations of the merchant elite families which previously 
dominated the Trucial States.38 Furthermore, in a similar fashion to the COM, there has 
also been an appreciable increase in the number of distinguished professionals from less 
well established families serving as FNC members, and, as will be shown later in this 
chapter, these technocrats are now even represented by the FNC’s speaker, Muhammad 
Al-Habtur.39 Other recent examples would include Dr. Juma Belhoul, Dr. Hussein Al- 
Mutawa, and Dr. Tariq Al-Tayer,40 along with a number of other prominent 
businessmen, well-known doctors, and experienced lawyers. Indeed, the Dubai-based 
lawyer Dr. Muhammad Al-Roken provides a typical example of the latter. Educated in 
the UK and having taught at the University of the UAE in Al-‘Ayn, Dr. Al-Roken is a 
published researcher and academic in addition to practising general commercial law in 
both local and federal courts.41 Indubitably, such well-established legal experts are seen
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as best placed for representing the individual emirates in a federal council which advises 
on pending draft legislation. See figure (ix).
Finally, however, also important to highlight the many weaknesses which 
are now increasingly associated with the FNC and the UAE’s legislature. Quite apart 
from its non-elected membership and its inappropriateness for die UAE’s ever 
expanding population, the original powers described by Fenelon have rarely been put 
into practice, often rendering the FNC a purely consultative body and a civilised 
‘talking shop’, with its members limited to discussing and reviewing only the legislation 
referred to it by the COM.42 Moreover, in the most part the FNC is seldom able to 
submit any of its reports directly to the President or the SCR; instead all queries and 
findings have to be referred to the relevant minister, thus locking it into a subordinate 
role underneath the COM43 Indeed, writing in the early 1980s, Malcolm Peck had 
already noted how
"... its real power is virtually nil because it does not initiate legislation but 
only offers recommendations on draft laws issued by the Council of 
Ministers, which is not, in turn, obliged to accept any of the FNC’s 
proposals. Although the FNC may prove to be a useful exercise in 
developing political expertise and leadership and might someday provide 
the basis for a real legislature, it is now only a consultative institution and 
debating forum, entirely dominated by the Council of Ministers. ”44
There are, of course, occasions when die system has worked, and, often supported by 
special committees,45 the FNC has managed to have its suggestions incorporated into 
government policy, but as the following recent case studies will suggest, the FNC’s 
powers have continued to remain limited, widi die council often unable to extract 
information on more substantive matters from the COM. Furthermore, when 
information is gathered and recommendations are made, often following serious delays, 
there appears to be little evidence of FNC proposals actually being implemented unless 
they reinforce existing government policy. Certainly at present there appears to be no
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official requirement or even precedent for the COM or the individual mmister in 
question to address die FNC’s concerns widiin a specific time frame, or indeed for diem 
to reply at all.
4.2.1 - The Federal National Council: a paralysed legislature
Firstly, it is worth noting diat the FNC’s standard procedure normally 
follows a pattern whereby a member or a group of members will submit a query or 
request to the rest of the council. Tliis will normally be concerned with a pressing 
matter that these members wish to debate. Following approval from a majority of other 
FNC members, the matter can then be referred to die COM, usually in the fonn of a 
recommendation to the relevant federal minister. In theory, the minister should then 
prompdy discuss the matter with the FNC or an appointed special committee of FNC 
members, and, if deemed necessary, the minister should then seek to initiate policy with 
the approval of liis colleagues in the COM. By drawing upon FNC minutes from a 
number of meetings tiiroughout the 1990s, diis section will highlight many of the issues 
that have been raised by FNC members, while also attempting to demonstrate the 
ineffectiveness of this procedure and the relative weakness of the legislature in 
influencing the UAE’s executive bodies.
The FNC meetings of July 1990 raised the matter of foreign ownership of 
real estate in the UAE. A request was submitted to discuss government policy on this 
issue, culminating in an FNC recommendation to “prevent foreigners from owning real 
estate without fixed restrictions in an effort to preserve the UAE’s resources in the 
interest of future generations.” Unsurprisingly, given that the content of this 
recommendation was already a long standing feature of government policy, the proposal 
was forwarded directly to the SCR46 Similarly, the FNC’s March 1994 
recommendation to uphold the UAE business statutes which require foreign ownership 
of businesses to be limited to 49% was entirely compatible with the aforementioned 
kafil sponsorship system,47 another well established policy. Predictably, die 
recommendation was met with a swift and detailed response, widi the relevant minister
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attending the FNC’s discussion, demonstrating exactly how the ministry was tackling 
the problem, and agreeing to refer the FNC’s concerns to tire COM.48 Also successful 
was the FNC’s May 1993 proposal for greater investment in youth anti-drug awareness. 
Closely related to the government’s ongoing development of the Supreme Council for 
Youth and Sports, tire proposal was forwarded to the SCR and tire necessarily policies 
were soon drawn up.49
However, with regard to more complicated matters requiring either the 
modification of existing legislation or the initiation of new policy, the FNC’s 
recommendations and criticisms have not been so well received. A strong example 
would be the long-running FNC debate over tire alarming size of tire expatriate 
workforce and the need for drastic new emiratisation measures. Indeed, in 1990 a 
request was submitted to discuss tire measures being taken by the Ministry of Labour 
and Social Affairs to address what was then believed to be a workforce comprising of 
just 15% nationals. This eventually took the form of a recommendation stating that the 
FNC’s members accepted tire continuing need for expatriate manpower, but that they 
were nevertheless alarmed by what appeared to be an ‘uncontrolled random increase’, 
and as such the COM needed to issue legislation forcing both public and private sector 
establishments to employ a portion of trained nationals as part of their workforce.50 
Delayed by the Kuwaiti crisis, tire debate was resumed in May 1991 with the FNC 
deciding to send several members to brief the Prime Minister on their renewed 
demands.51 Clearly, given the previously discussed emiratisation strategies, such strong 
demands were not completely in step with the government’s more cautious approach to 
solving this sensitive problem,52 resulting in tire matter being temporarily shelved and 
little further interaction taking place between the FNC and the COM on the subject. 
Indeed, it was not until May 1994 that the Minister of Labour and Social Affairs finally 
attended an FNC discussion on the nationalisation of labour, and it was not until 
January 1996, nearly six years after the original recommendation, that the FNC at last 
began to receive relevant draft legislation from the COM.53 Another similar example of 
slow and ineffectual procedure would be the FNC’s June 1993 request to discuss the 
performance of the Ministry of Information and Culture in improving the cultural
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content of mass media in the UAE. Although the minister attended the initial meeting 
and agreed to refer tlie matter to the COM, when in March 1994 the FNC remained 
dissatisfied with the ministry’s progress, especially with regard to the lack of TV 
programs relating to Emirati culture, the minister failed to attend the FNC’s scheduled 
debate. Moreover, when tlie minister finally did attend in April 1994, he promised to 
provide the FNC with a detailed letter outlining all of the ministry’s forthcoming TV 
and radio projects, but it was not until April 1996, two years later, that the FNC actually 
received such a letter.54
The worst instances of FNC paralysis have, however, been those occasions 
when formal recommendations and requests have failed to elicit any response from the 
minister in question. As one might expect, these have often been those issues connected 
with substantive and highly sensitive matters such as national security, political reform, 
and oil policy. While the FNC’s abortive attempts to press for limited political reform 
will be considered in greater depth in the following section, the recent oil-related 
requests provide another very clear insight into tlie FNC’s subordinate relationship with 
the COM. In January 1994 a query was submitted by FNC members with regard to tlie 
worrying escalation of petrol prices in the UAE. hi the normal manner, a request for 
information was presented to tlie Minister of Petroleum and Mineral Resources 
emphasising the FNC’s concern that petrol prices were much higher in the UAE than in 
any of the other GCC states. Moreover, the FNC requested that the ministry should 
fully explain its plans for reducing the prices and eliminating the hardships faced by 
local businesses reliant on petrol products. Unable to bring tlie minister to question and 
unable to extract any information from the COM, despite following the established 
procedure, tlie FNC was forced to postpone its petrol-related questions indefinitely.55
4.3 - The emirate-level decision-making structure
At the emirate level, the rulers’ courts, or dtwan, preside over local 
governments, most of which possess tiieir own civil services, economic affairs 
departments, public works departments, finance departments, and, as will be detailed
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below, in some cases even their own oil departments, civil aviation authorities, and 
internal security organisations. Moreover, Abu Dhabi operates its own Executive 
Council, a 16-member organisation chaired by the crown prince and made up of heads 
of Abu Dhabi local government departments, in addition to a National Consultative 
Council which acts as a scaled down emirate-level version of the FNC.56 Similarly, 
Sharjah also has an Executive Council comprising of 26 nominated members of the 
ruling family and the local elite which, as explained earlier, was fonned in 1987 by the 
reinstated ruler following die coup leader’s promise for greater political participation in 
the emirate.57 Likewise, following the recent February 2003 announcements, Dubai 
will soon be establishing an executive council to supervise its large number of local 
government institutions.58 Indeed, reflecting the emirate’s greater diversification and 
the development of its non-oil sectors, there are unsurprisingly a number of additional 
government departments and authorities at the local level in Dubai. Among others these 
include the aforementioned Department of Tourism and Commerce Marketing,59 the 
Department of Ports and Customs, die Dubai Ports Authority, the Jebel Ali Free Zone 
Authority, the World Trade Centre Association, and a Department for Economic 
Development.60
In addition to these formal emirate-level structures, the region’s majalis, although 
originally an integral part of the traditional tribal hukuma and now perhaps less able to 
cope with the demands of large urban populations, nevertheless continue to provide an 
important informal consultative channel between die citizen and the ruler.61 In fact, as 
the UAE’s Minister for Information and Culture explains, these majalis have, like die 
more modem institutions, tried to adapt to die country’s needs and in some cases still 
serve as useful forums for raising topics of debate more directly affecting the individual 
and their specific emirate:
“Just as the modern institutions have developed in response to public need 
and demand, however, so the traditional forms of tribal administration have 
adapted. With many relatively routine matters now being dealt with by the 
modern institutions, so the traditional ones, like the majalis, have been able
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to focus on more complex issues rather than on the routine matters with 
which they were once heavily involved... On matters more directly affecting 
the individual, such as the topic of unemployment among young UAE 
graduates, debates often tend to begin in the majalis, where discussion can 
be fast and furious, before a consensus approach is evolved that is 
subsequently reflected in changes in government policy. ”62
Indeed, even the United Nations Development Project in the UAE has reported on the 
continuing relevance of informal majalis in emirate-level politics. In particular, the 
frequent discussions over issues such as role of women, the management of the 
expatriate population, and youth employment prospects have led the majalis to be 
recognised by the UNDP as providing an important forum for local social and political 
development.63 Certainly the rulers and their courts are aware of this function, with 
Abu Dhabi having deliberately augmented its majalis to include not only established 
tribes but also the many urban families and other groups who had previously lacked 
such local participation.64 Similarly in Dubai, there are currently plans to allow for 
elected regional majalis in various parts of die emirate by mid 2003.65 Finally, it is also 
notable how a niunber of local businesses have sought to embrace such forums, with 
many now promoting open majalis between managers and employees in an effort to 
raise issues of concern and improve the workplace environment.66 See figure (ix).
4.3.1 - The relationship between federal and emirate level structures
Under die tenns of the UAE’s constitution the federal government is responsible 
for a wide range of matters including defence, foreign policy, immigration, nationality, 
communications, health, justice, and education. As such, while these local branches, 
offices, and institutions exist diroughout die emirates, die majority are in theory 
subordinate to the COM’s ministries based in the federal capital of Abu Dhabi. 
Furthermore, although the constitution does enable local-level powers to provide public 
services, to maintain law and order, to uphold standards, and to enforce local
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ordinances;67 at present the individual emirates are all obliged to contribute half of their 
revenue to die federation. Indeed, as Shaykh Abdullah Al-Nuhayyan describes:
"... all the emirates contribute to the federal budget and the federal budget 
funds projects in all of the emirates, including the three emirates that have 
no oil and. gas production. Thus, while Fujairah, for example, has no oil 
revenues, the federal government funds projects in Fujairah, that are, in 
turn, funded by the contributions to the federal budget made by oil 
producers like Abu Dhabi and Dubai. The oil revenues of the emirates that 
do have oil are used through the medium of the federal budget, to fund 
development in the emirates which do not have oil.,r68
Under diis redistributive system Abu Dhabi and Dubai, the two major oil producing 
emirates, have therefore been required to make larger contributions, and, as Shaykh 
Abdullah contends, federal spending is shared proportionately by the seven members 
depending on their domestic populations and their specific needs. Thus, it would appear 
that some aspects of the federal-emirate level relationship, especially with regard to 
financial contributions, are now becoming formalised or at least better accepted by the 
constituent emirates. However, this was not always the case, with the past thirty years 
providing a rich histoiy of federal-emirate struggles, and, even now (as Shaykh 
Abdullah admits) with the individual governments of the seven emirates still retaining 
certain autonomous powers and often maintaining duplicate and parallel local 
government departments, many of which overlap existing federal institutions.69
Thus, critical to a fuller understanding of the UAE’s decision-making structure 
is tlie relationship between its federal, centralised political institutions and the local, 
emirate level structures. Significantly, it will be shown tiiat in many respects die term 
'federation’ is something of a misnomer. Although the UAE is widely acknowledged to 
be one of the most successful examples of Arab unity and federation, it is really more of 
a confederation. True federations, such as the USA and Australia normally represent 
groups of regions or states which maintain then own local governments and laws, but
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are also united with a central government that is responsible for defence, foreign policy 
and other matters of national interest70 As tins study will reveal, there has so far been 
little real unity under the UAE’s surface, with many crucial policy areas having often 
remained outside of federal control. Indeed, although the federation is undoubtedly 
evolving, die UAE at present remains more of a loose confederation with its constituent 
emirates more closely resembling the Swiss Cantons than the federated American states 
or the six Australian regions.
The first signs of potential disunity were acts of violence when, after just one 
year of federation, a number of inter-emirate territorial disputes escalated into bloody 
tribal skirmishes. Most of these confrontations were die results of border disagreements 
within the complex patchwork of villages and settlements in the hinterland of the 
northern emirates - a particularly violent example being the 1972 dispute between 
tribesmen of Sharjah and Fujairah after which twenty were left dead and many more 
were wounded.71 As described in the historical background, many of die tribes and 
villagers claimed allegiance to specific rulers, sometimes even to tiiose in different and 
far-away shayklidoms, and were therefore reluctant to recognise any newer, more 
central forms of authority.72 A combination of Federal Defence Force coercion (which 
had replaced the Trucial Oman Scouts) and negotiations were eventually able to settle 
most of diese issues and reduce the frequency of the outbursts, but until the housing 
boom of the late 1970s and die increasing urbanisation of die Bedu during the 1980s, 
the prospect of tribal insurgence remained a serious tiireat to political stability and 
domestic security, especially in the rural areas. Indeed, speaking in 1977 Shaykh Zayid 
specifically referred to this ongoing problem, emphasising die need for greater co­
operation and a stronger union:
“...unification steps must be continued and deepened and legislation 
supporting the federation must be a prime importance and above boundary 
disputes and individual disputes. ”73
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By the mid-1970s there also began to emerge significant divisions over the 
direction of federal policymaking, and moreover, serious doubts over the future of the 
federation itself. While many of those high-up in the political system believed that the 
federation was little more than a transitional stage before a more coherent state could be 
established, there were many others, especially in Dubai, who continued to believe that 
the relative autonomy of each separate emirate was the federation’s greatest strength as 
it better preserved the region’s tribal democratic systems and all of the other emirate- 
specific characteristics which would be lost under a more centralised state.74 As such, 
these conflicting views led to political struggles over delicate matters such as oil and 
immigration. As these were policy areas which required the individual emirates to 
relinquish control over what were seen as their private resources and their means of 
livelihood, immediate consensus was understandably unforthcoming with the local 
rulers and their governments reluctant to concede existing powers. Indeed, this was 
especially the case with regard to oil as Dubai and Sharjah, the second and third 
wealthiest oil-producing emirates, preferred to retain full autonomy over tlieir oil 
policies and were disinclined to contribute a large share of their oil revenue to the 
federal budget and the Abu Dhabi-based federal ministries.75 This problem stemmed 
primarily from Article 23 of the provisional constitution; a clause which allowed the 
individual emirates to manage independently their own hydrocarbon industries.76 As 
demonstrated, such emirate-specific articles may have provided much needed 
accommodation during the early federal negotiations,77 but in this case, with no formal 
provisions for future regulations to ensure proportional contributions to the federal 
budget, the clause effectively inhibited any greater financial centralisation. Similarly, 
when the federal government called for a more uniform immigration policy to enforce 
passports, residence visas, and work permits, some of the local governments were 
hesitant to co-operate, preferring to retain control over the rate of immigration in their 
own particular emirate rather than hand over power to a distant ministry in Abu Dhabi.78
Eventually, this increasing lack of co-operation and unwillingness to integrate 
and contribute led to the first major crisis in UAE politics. When in 1976 the time came 
to draw up a new and more permanent constitution,79 a committee of 28 prominent
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citizens and legal experts was formed to consider the matter. Essentially this committee 
was divided between those who continued to regard tiiemselves as representatives of 
their native emirate and who sought to promote the preferences of their particular Emir, 
and those ‘independents’ who saw the creation of a new constitution as an ideal 
opportunity for updating many aspects of Emirati political life. Indeed, as Zaki 
Nusseibeh, Shaykh Zayid’s former press secretary explains, these independents, many 
of whom can be considered among the first generation of Emirati technocrats given 
their educational and professional backgrounds, sought greater centralisation at the 
expense of individual inter-emirate politics and intended to remove Article 23 in order 
to encourage more efficient wealth distribution.80 As a reflection of these differing 
views, the committee’s draft of Hie new constitution was something of a compromise: 
Article 23 would be abolished, but each emirate would still be able to retain 25% of its 
hydrocarbon income.81 However, when tlie draft was forwarded to die SCR later that 
year, the rulers of Dubai and some of the other emirates chose to reject the signing of 
such a constitution and insisted on retaining the original provisional constitution. This 
direct challenge to tlie federal vision prompted Shaykh Zayid to threaten liis resignation 
from the presidency. Given his level of personal commitment to the federation, and 
given Abu Dhabi’s single-handed financing of tlie federation during its early years, 
Zayid argued tiiat the other emirates should have been more appreciative and more 
enthusiastic in accepting moves towards a more permanent and centralised 
government.82 Furthermore, as Adnan Bajaje, Zayid’s personal political advisor 
explained, this threat of resignation was also coupled with an offer to move the capital 
from Abu Dhabi if it would bring about a more viable federation, such was Zayid’s 
dedication to the UAE’s future stability.83 Regardless of tlie motives, the bluff could 
not be called as the other rulers recognised the important mediating role of their 
illustrious and statesmanlike President, and of course liis control over the largest and 
most powerful of the emirates. Thus, Abu Dhabi managed to remain tlie centre of the 
federation, but only after a costly four month crisis just five years after the creation of 
tlie UAE.84
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Nevertheless, just two years later the tensions resurfaced, this time over the issue 
of die UAE’s armed forces. In 1978 Shaykh Zayid decided to appoint his son, Shaykh 
Sultan Al-Nuhayyan, as Commander in Chief of the Federal Defence Force.85 Given 
that Shaykh Muhammad Al-Maktum, the son of Dubai’s ruler, was die UAE’s Defence 
Minister, many in Dubai and the northern emirates interpreted diis move as a clear 
attempt by Abu Dhabi to assume even greater control over the federation. Indeed 
Shaykh Rashid even reportedly tiireatened to pull Dubai out of the UAE along with 
Ra’s al-Khaimah and Umm al-Qawain unless the decision was reversed.86 Thus, 
although the situation was eventually de-fused following a clearer definition of the two 
posts,87 the dispute nevertheless highlighted the continuing reluctance of die smaller 
emirates to fully integrate with Abu Dhabi. Indeed, in a similar fashion to the proposed 
centralisation of oil and immigration policies, the amalgamation of the emirate-level 
aimed forces started to become an increasingly unlikely prospect. Certainly, as Frauke 
Heard-Bey explains, the individual rulers continued to derive much power and prestige 
from dieir respective militaries, and many were reluctant to hand over such control to a 
more centralised command:
“...before the 1970s the various armed forces had always been the 
traditional manifestation of a ruler’s standing. Therefore, the political 
price to be paid for trying to enforce amalgamation and thereby alienating 
some rulers would have been disproportionate to the fighting strength which 
these forces woidd have added to the capability of the newly formedfederal 
forces. ”88
The most serious dispute did not, however, occur until the following year 
when a widely supported multipart memorandum for reform was submitted to the SCR. 
In 1979 the Islamic revolution in nearby Iran and die ensuing threat of Shf a insurgency 
in Sunni Muslim states led to the fear of a ‘fifth column’ of Islamic revolutionaries in 
the Gulf. Secondly, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and die anticipated American 
reaction left many expecting a superpower conflict close to the Gulf. Thirdly, this was 
also the time that Sadat, the Egyptian President, had attended the Camp David meetings
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and had set in motion the Egyptian-Israeli peace process; a controversial diplomatic 
move which divided the Arab world and clearly placed the conservative Islamic rulers 
of the Gulf states in an awkward position.89 Given this increasingly uncertain regional 
political climate many groups in the UAE called for a strengthened federation, a more 
unified leadership, and an end to the inter-emirate squabbles of die 1970s. Essentially, 
therefore, the ‘independents’ were reacting to regional instability by renewing their 
backing for Shaykh Zayid’s drive for greater centralisation. Crucially, die resulting 
memorandum was drawn up by members of both the COM and the FNC, and was also 
believed to represent the views and concerns being expressed in more informal 
assemblies such as the majalis. In particular, die memorandum called for an end to the 
autonomy of die individual emirates, stating diat they should unify in the national 
interest, and, quite significantly, it also called for the SCR, which had been meeting less 
and less frequently, to meet mondily to decide policy, and for it to devolve far more of 
its policymaking powers to the COM. Moreover, although evidently not the 
memorandum’s main emphasis, it was also requested that the FNC be given fidl 
legislative powers (thereby elevating the council from its limited consultative 
capacity),90 and an ‘expanded base’, perhaps paving the way for public elections.91
The result was a protracted five month long ‘constitutional crisis’; 
demonstrations were held across the UAE and Shaykh Zayid enjoyed much popular 
support from a number of diverse groups ranging from students to local businessmen, 
all of whom were calling for greater unification.92 Predictably, the opposition came 
from the rulers of Dubai and Ra’s al-Khaimah, the emirates which had earlier opposed 
the permanent constitution and blocked any proposed military amalgamation. The 
claim was that such a move towards a more centralised state as demanded by the 
memorandum was clearly unconstitutional given the loose nature of the federation 
outlined by the original constitution. Furthermore, Dubai argued that any unification of 
services was only justified if better results could be promised than the existing emirate- 
level services and, as a relatively prosperous oil-producing emirate with an independent 
revenue, it was clear that Dubai was still unwilling to contribute its wealth to the 
development of the smaller emirates via the medium of a federal budget.93 Indeed, as
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Valerie Yorke explained of Shaykh Rashid, Dubai’s ruler and the main challenge to 
Zayid’s leadership, “It was said that Shaykh Zayid was in the union for what he could 
put into it; Shaykh Rashid for what he could get out of it.”94 However, this issue of 
revenue contribution perhaps clouds the fundamental political differences between the 
emirates at tins time. In many ways what Dubai really preferred was not an end to 
unity, but simply that the UAE remained a much looser federation, or as described 
earlier, more of a confederation; a collection of states in which die central authority 
never exceeded the total of all the individual authorities. Undoubtedly Shaykh Zayid 
and die 1979 proposals were seen as exceeding this total.
The crisis was only resolved with the help of outside mediation from 
experienced Kuwaiti negotiators, and die compromise solution has remained in place 
ever since, albeit now with a new generation of rulers. A new cabinet was formed and 
Shaykh Rashid was appointed Prime Minister. Thus, in addition to serving as the 
federation’s Vice-President, the ruler of Dubai was to take on the extra fimction of 
presiding over the COM. Shaykh Zayid and his supporters hoped that this greater and 
more direct involvement from Dubai in federal matters would encourage Dubai to 
remain a part of the UAE and to take a more active interest in improving the services 
provided by the federal ministries. The agreement worked and Dubai soon began to 
contribute 50% of its oil revenue to the federal budget,95 with the two smaller oil- 
producing emirates of Sharjah and Ra’s al-Khaimah also beginning to contribute by the 
mid-1980s.96 Thus, although the other aspects of the memorandum regarding the 
increased powers of the COM and the expansion of die FNC were not implemented, tlie 
crisis can nevertheless still be viewed as something of a watershed in federal politics as 
its resolution not only averted the secession of Dubai and the eventual break-up of die 
UAE, but also demonstrated that, if necessary, political opposition to the hereditary 
SCR could be mobilised.
Alongside tiiis centralisation debate, another important aspect of federal politics 
and again a source of confusion and tension has been the persistence of relatively 
autonomous foreign relations maintained by the various emirates. Although in tlieoiy
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the constituent emirates were to be represented by the federal Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and the President, a number of disputes during die 1970s and 1980s served to 
undermine the UAE’s international standing, with different emirates pursuing different 
objectives based on dieir individual interests. Perhaps the most damaging of these early 
disagreements were those concerning OPEC, as the UAE’s provisional constitution 
permitted each emirate to either take up or withdraw from OPEC membership.97 While 
Abu Dhabi had decided to follow Saudi Arabia’s lead and had joined the international 
oil cartel in the 1960s,98 Dubai had instead opted to remain an independent producer. 
Thus, when the time came to create a federal oil ministry in the early 1970s, it soon 
became apparent that such an institution would have little control over oil and oil- 
related foreign policies outside of Abu Dhabi. Indeed, this lack of control became 
particularly problematic for Abu Dhabi from 1974 onwards when OPEC began to treat 
the UAE as a single entity rather than recognising Abu Dhabi’s individual membership. 
Consequently, when OPEC production quotas were first introduced in the early 1980s, 
Abu Dhabi was obliged to take the sole responsibility for ensuring that the UAE’s 
overall oil production met these requirements. With Dubai regularly refusing to accept 
any pro-rata share of the necessary cutbacks, Abu Dhabi was often forced to under­
produce in order to stay within the quota.99 Moreover, by the mid-1980s Dubai’s 
unrestrained production was not only leading to tense relations between Abu Dhabi and 
OPEC, but was also attracting die unwanted attention of Iraq. Embroiled in a costly and 
lengthy conflict with Iran, Iraq was threatening to punish all fellow OPEC members 
which persistently violated the designated quotas; this list of offenders not only 
included Iraq’s future victim, Kuwait, but also the UAE.100 Indeed, when Dr. Subroto 
of OPEC visited the capital in 1987, Shaykh Zayid assured him that the UAE was “at 
the forefront of preserving the unity and cohesion of OPEC”; however at the same time 
the UAE was strongly suspected by OPEC of actually being the worst offender by 
producing an estimated 20% above its assigned quota.101 In 1988 the supervision of 
Abu Dhabi’s embattled oil industry was finally reorganised under a Supreme Petroleum 
Council which effectively sidelined the powerless federal ministry, assumed sole 
responsibility for ADNOC (the main Abu Dhabi oil company),102 and unilaterally 
declared a higher oil output for Abu Dhabi, regardless of Dubai.103 Thus, in many
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ways, this new emirate-specific oil council can be seen as symbolising Abu Dhabi’s 
grudging acceptance of the limitations of federal control over not only oil policy, but 
also over the other emirates’ interactions with neighbouring states and foreign 
organisations. Today, despite its chequered history, Abu Dhabi does manage to adhere 
to OPEC’s quota for die UAE,104 but this task is perhaps only easier because of the 
declining oil reserves in Dubai and Sharjah.
Moreover, the 1970s and 1980s also saw divided opinion over superpower 
relations. The majority of the Emirates were naturally inclined to die Western powers 
given die region’s long association with Britain and then continuing reliance on 
Western advisers and skdls for dieir respective development programmes. Remarkably, 
however, Ra’s al-Khaimah, still the most reluctant member of the federation, attempted 
to seek support from the Soviet Union in an effort to create a new breakaway state 
which would have included Sharjah, and which would have involved seizing a part of 
Oman.105 Furthermore, in die 1980s during the height of the Iran-Iraq War, Ra’s al- 
Khaimah again sought to further its own interests by offering Iraq the opportunity to 
establish airbases in its territory in exchange for greater independent recognition in the 
Arab community.106 Significantly, the war also resulted in a split between the six other 
emirates, widi Abu Dhabi, ‘Ajman and Fujairah also supporting Iraq, but with Dubai, 
Sharjah and Umm al-Qawain choosing to support Iran, dieir primary trading partner and 
the home of many of dieir merchant expatriates.107 Thus, as Peck noted at the time:
“Dubai and Sharjah's pro-Iranian stance subjected the UAE’s federal 
government, which has the sole responsibility for conducting foreign 
political and diplomatic relations, to embarrassment and pressure from 
Saudi Arabia and other Gulf neighbours. ”}0S
Altiiough die UAE has presented a more unified front in recent years, divisions over 
foreign policy have still existed, with some of the Emirates having been reluctant to 
support die Desert Storm coalition in 1991, and with only mixed support for die US-led 
invasion of Afghanistan in 2001.109
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In summary, it is perhaps useful first to consider Fatma Al-Sayegh’s view that 
federal-emirate relations have evolved over three distinct phases: the early years, 1971­
1979 can be seen as having been the ‘creation of the federation’, during which federal 
institutions were being built and teething troubles were being resolved; 1980-1986 can 
be seen as ‘accepting the federation’, dining which the seven emirates conceded some 
of their former powers in the national interest; and thirdly, 1987 to the present can be 
viewed as tlie ‘maturity of the federation’, a period in which many of tlie former 
difficulties have been overcome and those that have remained unresolved have been 
effectively contained.110 Indeed, in recent years the federation has certainly 
strengthened as Hie threat of internal rivalry has subsided and as the federal institutions 
have become better established. Furthermore, the resolution of the majority of 
outstanding boundary disputes, the establishment of a Central Bank, and the increasing 
contributions to die federal budget from die odier emirates have all combined to create a 
more cohesive federation. Perhaps the most important development has, however, been 
die greater integration of Dubai. Agreeing to accept a permanent constitution and, also 
in 1996, finally agreeing to integrate its armed forces into the federal command were 
clear signs diat Dubai had chosen to concentrate on its ambitious economic 
development programme while accepting Abu Dhabi’s leading role as the financial 
backbone and protector of the federation. Indeed, in 1997 Dubai officials were even 
quoted as saying:
“...there is no obvious need to maintain an independent force in Dubai 
because the UAE armed forces GHQ provides a fully fledged and cost- 
effective defence capability".111
Thus, with declining oil revenues and with the need to pursue greater diversification, it 
would appear that Dubai has relinquished its claims to regional leadership and now 
prefers to assign otherwise costly services to federal control.
Nevertheless, as this section has revealed, it is also clear diat any ‘maturity of 
federation’ view remains decidedly over-optimistic. In many areas it is evident that the
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strained and loosely defined relationship between federal and emirate-level powers lias 
led to significant divisions which, on occasion, have led to policy disputes over key 
issues such as immigration, military integration and budget contributions. While some 
of these differences have certainly abated over the years, there are nevertheless certain 
grey areas which have persisted, and over time these may resurface and again play a 
determining role in the federation’s future. Indeed, in addition to the obvious 
differences over critical matters such as oil policy and foreign relations there are a 
number of other very recent internal inconsistencies which continue to undermine the 
federal framework. Each emirate, for example, still maintains its own independent 
police force. While all emirate level internal security organs are theoretically branches 
of one federal organisation, in practice they operate with considerable independence.112 
Furthermore, the UAE’s Shall* a courts, which are administered by each emirate and 
which are supposed to answer to the Federal Supreme Court, still do not always do so. 
In 1994 the President decreed that the Shan* a courts would have the authority to try 
almost all types of criminal cases, but this decree has not affected the emirates of Dubai 
and Ra’s al-Khaimah, which have lower courts independent of the federal system and 
special Shf a councils to act on matters pertaining to ShT*a law.113
Finally, with regard to development pathologies, it is also clear how the numerous 
inter-emirate disputes and other internal problems which have arisen as a result of 
opposition to federal policies may in many cases have directly affected the UAE’s 
socio-economic planning. The divisions in wealth distribution and the initial reluctance 
to commit to the federal budget certainly contributed to die uneven development and 
regional disequilibrium described in the previous chapter, and can therefore be seen as a 
causal factor behind many of the problems being addressed by the development 
planners today. Secondly, the lack of co-ordination and the distrust of federal control 
must also have exacerbated die described duplication of investments, with inter-emirate 
rivalry leading to inappropriate and often wasteful developments which may have been 
avoided under a more comprehensive federal development plan.314 Thirdly, die 
significant overlap between federal and emirate-level powers and the constant need for 
infonnal consultation between the various bodies must be seen as having slowed the
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overall formulation and implementation of development policies,115 especially, as will 
be shown later in this chapter, given that federal laws often require further enabling 
legislation in the individual emirates. Indeed, as Heard-Bey has explained:
"... this can be a cause for the tardiness of some legislation... and this 
opportunity for emirate level input does not necessarily improve the draft or 
make the law more universally enforceable... local legislation, which is 
passed by the individual emirates in most instances still retains the 
hallmarks of their rulers, who are used, to acting directly and. even 
autocratically, when they perceive the need, for their regulatory 
intervention. ”116
4.4- Other institutions, parastatals and bureaucracies
By examining a number of the UAE’s other major institutions, parastatals 
and bureaucracies, this section will explore the UAE’s policy implementation 
infrastructure while attempting to highlight some of the more serious pathologies which 
have arisen and which may, in the same way as the fragmented decision-making 
structure, have also contributed to development problems. Specifically, it will be shown 
how these seemingly modem legal-rational institutions are essentially hybrid extensions 
grafted onto a greater neo-patrimonial network, with rigid chains of command 
inextricably linked to the traditional rulers and dieir appointed representatives. 
Furthermore, it will also be shown how many of these institutions, even the major 
regulatory bodies, have enjoyed little real autonomy and, on occasion, have been forced 
to acquiesce in order to survive. Firstly, the structure and role of the various chambers 
of commerce and industry will be considered; key institutions in the promotion of the 
UAE’s diversified economy. Secondly, the powers of die UAE’s judiciaiy and other 
related institutions will be considered, with a special emphasis on the relative 
independence of these establishments. Thirdly, die UAE’s banking sector and die 
functioning of the Central Bank will be discussed, and, by tying together the sector’s 
regulatory performance with the questionable independence of die judiciary, this case
226
study will attempt to underscore the domestic foundations of the ultimate combination 
of neo-patrimonial and bureaucratic self-interest pathologies: Abu Dhabi’s BCCI 
scandal.117 Finally, by highlighting the many recent attempts to improve the UAE’s 
bureaucratic transparency, it will also be shown that while many accept the in-built and 
long-term nature of most of these problems, there has nonetheless been recognition 
from certain elements' of the polity that immediate improvements are needed if the 
UAE’s future growth and development are to be sustained.
4.4.1 - Chambers of commerce and industry
Established in 1976, the Federation of UAE Chambers of Commerce and 
Industry serves as both an umbrella organisation and as a general forum for members of 
all the emirate-level chambers of commerce.118 Broadly speaking, the organisation’s 
objectives have been to enhance co-operation between the commercial sector and the 
government, to promote better co-ordination between traders and manufacturers in 
different economic sectors, and to provide reconciliation and arbitration in instances of 
commercial and industrial dispute.119 To this end, the chamber collects and processes 
data, commercial statistics, and other pertinent information from its members before 
finally submitting its suggestions to a federal board of directors. Consisting of the 
directors of each of the seven individual chambers in addition to a second delegate from 
each emirate, this board annually elects a chairman on a rotation system to ensure 
greater regional representation and to improve the unity of the federal chamber.120 If 
the board deems the chamber’s recommendations appropriate, diese are then forwarded 
to the relevant minister or government department and, on occasion, may also be raised 
in specialist commercial and industrial committees hosted by die FNC.121 Indeed, 
recent examples of such involvement would include the chamber and the legislature’s 
joint reviews of draft ordinances on commercial transactions, trade licences, and the 
protection of Emirati industries.122
More significant than this umbrella organisation are, however, the constituent 
local chambers, as these deal with most of the UAE’s day-to-day commercial and
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industrial administration, and are of course responsible for appointing the directors and 
associates who then serve on the federal board. Unsurprisingly, given the described 
pace of commercial development in the emirate, the Dubai chamber was the first such 
institution, established by Emiri decrees in 1965 and 1975 to be an “autonomous and 
non-profit-making institution” responsible for regulating economic life in Dubai.123 
Essentially the chamber is responsible for reviewing all legislation and orders relating to 
commercial and industrial activities such as trade mark laws and the various free zone 
laws required by the new export-processing zones. To fulfil this task, the chamber hosts 
a research and studies department employing economic analysts and industrial experts 
to advise its director,124 and more recently has begun to host a number of business 
oriented conferences and symposia for the benefit of its members and other interested 
parties. These have been held on a wide variety of subjects including business 
contracting, human resources, arbitration of disputes, management of technology, and 
the implications of the UAE’s WTO membership.125 A good early example would be 
the 1988 conference on the subject of the usefulness of free zones for promoting 
investment in Dubai. Attended by representatives of the Ministry of Finance and 
Industry, the Islamic Development Bank, and the Islamic Bank of Dubai, it was hoped 
that a forum could be created for informed members to voice their opinions and 
concerns on what was to become a controversial and far-reaching development for 
Dubai. Indeed, much discussion was generated with several papers delivered on the 
subject of the Jebel Ali Free Zone, with reports made on the success of similar EPZs in 
other GCC states, and with an informative UNIDO report being presented on the 
international experience of free zones.126
Similarly, die Abu Dhabi Chamber of Commerce and Industry has also played a 
key role in local development and commercial affairs. In much the same way as the 
Dubai chamber, the ADCCI has hosted a number of seminars and conferences for die 
benefit of its members and, in addition, has hosted numerous exhibitions and has invited 
numerous trade missions to the emirate in an effort to increase foreign investment and 
to boost the diversification of the local economy.127 A strong example of the former 
would be the chamber’s 1993 symposium on industrial investment opportunities in Abu
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Dhabi.128 Attended by the ADCCI’s members in addition to a number of prominent 
UAE and Gulf-based institutions including die Gulf Investment Organisation, Emirates 
Industrial Bank, and Gulf Industrial Consultations, the event reportedly led to an 
‘enriched dialogue’ between the chamber and the government which eventually led to 
the drafting of policy recommendations based on the findings and agreements of die 
conference guests and representatives.129
However, despite these instances of successful and meaningful interaction, the 
UAE’s chambers have been routinely criticised for their inflexible hierarchical structure 
and their otherwise limited participatory opportunities. Indeed, the Dubai chamber not 
only excludes a number of categories of small businesses from membership,130 but also 
still lacks a formal assembly for Dubai businessmen, industrialists, and otiier members 
to meet and discuss their concerns with each other and with members of the board. 
Moreover, the Abu Dhabi chamber provides a particularly interesting example given 
that its organisational structure has changed considerably over the years. Indeed, as 
former member Salam Al-Saman describes, the board of directors was originally made 
up of elected members of Abu Dhabi’s business community, yet as the chamber grew in 
size and numbers, the board expanded to over 20 members, all of which became 
appointed positions, including members of influential Abu Dhabian families such as the 
aforementioned Dhahiris.131 Crucially, the chairmanship of the Abu Dhabi chamber 
also became a permanent, non-elected position, and is now held by Shaykh Sultan bin 
Khalifa Al-Nuhayyan, a member of the ruling family and also the chairman of the 
Crown Prince’s Court.132 Thus, many observers have contended that with this apparent 
reinvigoration of patrimonial client networks, the Abu Dhabi chamber’s organisation is 
no longer appropriate for a modem institution claiming to represent the emirate’s 
business community.133 Certainly, in addition to shouldering more responsibilities, 
providing greater chamber-sponsored advice for investors, introducing more 
comprehensive services aimed at meeting the needs of Abu Dhabi businessmen, and 
addressing many of the usual business community concerns, it has also been argued that 
the chamber should provide more direct channels of communication between the non- 
elected board and its members.134
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4.4.2 ~ The judiciary and related institutions
The judicial branch of the federal government is represented by a Federal 
Supreme Court and a number of Courts of First Instance. This Federal Supreme Court 
is made up of a president and five judges, all of whom are appointed by tlie UAE’s 
President and the COM.135 At the fonnal request of tlie individual emirates these judges 
can act as adjudicators between the different emirates or between an emirate and the 
federal government. Moreover, like the FNC, the Supreme Court also has a 
consultative role, deciding on the constitutionality and viability of die federal laws 
drafted by the COM (although as explained, in practice the status of these laws often 
depend on further enabling legislation in the individual emirates).136 The Courts of First 
Instance adjudicate administrative, commercial, and civil disputes between the federal 
government and individuals, leaving local matters to die emirate-level judicial bodies.137 
In theory, these emirate-level Shari‘a courts, which deal primarily with criminal cases, 
are also answerable to the Federal Supreme Court, but as demonstrated, these often 
maintain independence from the federal system, especially in Dubai.138 Supporting 
these institutions at all levels, the UAE’s judicial staff has mushroomed to satisfy the 
needs of the rapidly expanding population, and as the Minister of Justice, Muhammad 
al-Dhahiri, claims, is now comprised of a greater number of carefully monitored and 
well qualified professionals capable of ensuring independence and promoting greater 
transparency from within die system. Indeed, speaking recendy at tire Zayid Centre for 
Co-ordination and Follow-up, al-Dhahiri chose to re-emphasise his ministry’s 
continuing commitment to these key objectives:
“...we have an independent judicial system that does not accept interference
in its work from whatever quarters. The judiciary is closely watched by the
supreme authority in the country, the Supreme Council of Rulers, to ensure
that justice is administered efficiently and with fairness, and also to ensure
that nobody other than the Supreme Court of Appeal should interfere in 
/ 20
court cases. ”
230
However, as the US Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labour 
indicated in its comprehensive 2001 report, while die UAE’s judicial institutions are 
now generally independent, there is still considerable room for improvement and further 
development.140 The federal government remains opposed to any fonn of external 
monitoring of the UAE’s judicial system and its prisons, many of which are believed to 
be overcrowded and lacking in basic amenities such as air-conditioning. Furthermore, 
an archaic ‘blood money’ compensation system continues to be applied across the UAE, 
especially in the event of motoring accidents which can lead to financial interventions 
and indefinite incarceration for those unable to pay. Moreover, many of the courts 
(except those in Dubai) still impose harsh corporal punishments on both Muslim and 
non-Muslim offenders with sentences of between 40 to 200 lashes not uncommon for 
‘moral’ crimes such as adulteiy and prostitution141 (although mutilations have been 
phased out with such sentences now being overturned by die Supreme Court of 
Appeal).142 Perhaps the most severe weaknesses, however, have been the long 
bureaucratic delays which have often left prisoners languishing behind bars for several 
mondis beyond their court-mandated release dates.143 In die most part, these delays 
have been blamed on the restricted access to legal counsel. The accused is usually only 
permitted to seek counsel after the police have finished their investigation, thereby 
allowing the police to question suspects for long periods before they can be released.144 
Even more seriously, and implying an underlying lack of genuine autonomy, these 
delays have also been blamed on the frequent involvement of the aforementioned rulers’ 
courts, or dfwan, which still reserve the right to review sentences and to return cases to 
the courts. Occasionally, in cases of personal interest, there have also been alleged 
cases where rulers of other emirates have attempted to intervene in local cases.145
4.4.3 - The UAE's banking sector and the Central Bank
As late as 1960 tiiere were still only two banking houses represented in the 
Trucial States, and both of these were foreign: Eastern Bank and the British Bank of the 
Middle East (BBME). However, when Shaykh Rashid Al-Maktum chartered the 
National Bank of Dubai, other locally chartered banks soon followed suit and by the
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time of federation fifteen other foreign banks from Britain, Pakistan, Iran, and Jordan 
had joined diese. Understandably, the main weaknesses during diis early period were 
the lack of basic controls and accountability. Indeed, as Fenelon noted in the early 
1970s, apart from seeking permission to operate (which was granted by the ruler), the 
UAE’s banks had to follow very few other guidelines. Certainly, the currency boards, 
which had been established earlier by the British, were concerned primarily with the 
issue and redemption of coins and notes, and occasionally with the provision of a few 
statistics, rather dian with providing a regulatory framework for the UAE’s financial 
institutions.146 As such, by die mid-1970s the need for far greater control over die 
banking sector had become a major priority, especially given die UAE’s increasing need 
to provide a sound financial base in support of its industrial and commercial 
development.147
While some controls to prevent the over-extension of credit and the 
excessive expansion of foreign banks were implemented during the late 1970s,148 the 
establishment of the UAE Central Bank in 1980 was the first major step forward. 
Replacing the currency boards, the bank was set up to control credit policy while 
fostering more balanced economic growth and to advise the government on all monetary 
and financial matters.149 Indeed, along similar lines to odier state banks such as the 
Bank of England, the Central Bank is regularly represented at the meetings held by the 
Ministry of Finance and Industry and the Ministry of Planning and, on occasion, is 
required to submit reports to the IMF and other international agencies.150 In much die 
same way as the chambers of commerce, the bank is organised around an appointed 
board of directors,151 many of whom hold multiple high-level positions in die UAE’s 
business community, and are sometimes even prospective ministers.152 Along widi a 
treasury department and a department of current accounts, the board is advised by a 
banking supervision department, a research and statistics department, and an internal 
audit department, all of which can make recommendations for future resolutions.153 
Essentially, die supervision department ensures die financial soundness of all UAE- 
based financial institutions and, crucially, tiieir compliance with the provisions of 
federal law and monetary policy. Recent departmental recommendations have included
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the need for important measures such as the requirement for certified stockbrokers,154 
the upwards revision of the CRR (cash reserve requirement) for commercial banks in an 
effort to improve the sector’s stability,155 and the curbing of any bank’s excessive 
concentration of credit to a single borrower.156 The research and statistics department 
provides the board with annual and quarterly reports advising on the success or failure 
of current policies such as the UAE’s pegging of the Dirham to the US Dollar, the 
viability of off-shore banking projects in the UAE, and the possibility of liquidating the 
bank’s certificates of deposit.157 Similarly, in addition to checking the bank’s various 
transactions, the internal audit department is also given the task of supplying monthly 
reports to the board. Significantly, these reports not only concentrate on the external 
auditor’s findings and provide the bank’s management with suitable responses to the 
auditor’s questions, but also contain recommendations for improved perfoimance and 
better internal organisation. In recent years such recommendations have included the 
setting up of a department to advise on the automation of banking services, the need for 
a system to compensate those with damaged banknotes, and a scheme to reward those 
employees obtaining higher academic qualifications.158
Another important financial institution, especially given the UAE’s plans for 
greater industrialisation, has been the Emirates Industrial Bank. Created in 1982, its 
express aims were to promote economic growth and to assist the diversification process 
by encouraging the development of the industrial sector.159 Essentially the bank has 
acted as a parastatal: providing aid to the establishment of new, non-oil based industries, 
while consolidating the UAE’s existing industries. Moreover, given that the bank 
supposedly seeks to promote long-term diversification, it carefully monitors its loans to 
ensure that the most suitable industrial projects are given the necessary assistance. As 
such, its activities have often taken the form of comprehensive feasibility studies, 
financial and engineering analyses, marketing and legal consultations, and supplying 
UAE firms with essential industrial information.160
Also worthy of mention have been the more recent attempts, especially those in 
Dubai, to expand the UAE’s financial markets further by establishing regulated stock
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exchanges. The first such example came in early 2000 when the Dubai Financial 
Market opened for business. Although it suffered from a slow start it nevertheless 
showed much promise. Certainly, as the Economist Intelligence Unit noted:
“...trading volumes were low in the first few months, but moves to allow 
foreign investors to buy shares and. the imminent opening of a sister bourse 
in Abu Dhabi should boost liquidity. ”161
In early 2002 it was announced that this financial market would be supplemented by the 
opening of the Dubai International Financial Centre (the DIFC) which would, as the 
crown prince claimed, allow Dubai and the UAE to join die international financial 
markets of London, New York, and Tokyo. Indeed, as die chairman of die centre’s 
board elaborated:
“We want to be able to satisfy the regional needs of business and investors 
by building a hub in Dubai. We want to create a place for regional blue 
chips to find financial solutions and a place for international banks to seek 
regional investment opportunities. ”162
Similar projects are underway in Abu Dhabi widi the Emirates Global Capital 
Corporation having been launched with the express purpose of implementing Abu 
Dhabi’s ambitious $3.3 billion Sadiyat project, This was to be an island free zone 
bridging the time zones between Asia and Europe by housing a stock exchange, a 
commodities exchange, and an offshore banking centre.163 Although diis particular 
project has since changed direction and, as will be described later in this chapter, is now 
destined to become a real estate development,164 there is nevertheless every indication 
that such an Abu Dhabi-based bourse will soon be established.165
In summary, the UAE’s banks and financial institutions have undergone 
significant development over the past 25 years, a trend which is set to continue for die 
foreseeable future, diereby further strengthening and complementing die overall
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diversification effort. Impressively, by 2001 there were already well over 430 banks in 
the UAE, with no fewer than 324 of these being locally chartered, and with over 100 of 
these being based in Dubai alone.166 Indeed, when gauging the size and development of 
the banking and financial system relative to die domestic economy, the UAE fares 
particularly well, especially given its ratio of money to the GDP. Certainly, as Alan 
Richards explains:
“[the ratio of money to GDP] stands at about 54% in the UAE. That's
comparable to 59% in the USA and. 51% in Ireland. So we are dealing, at
this very simple macro indicator level, with a developed financial system. ”
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Furthermore, it had also been claimed tiiat the UAE has enjoyed relatively good 
macroeconomic policy consistency due to its Central Bank and, although the 
government does not formally guarantee deposits, the UAE is also believed to enjoy 
relatively low moral hazards given the government’s relative wealth and implicit 
guarantees.168 In addition, the UAE has also been seen as providing increasingly 
respectable regulatory oversight by requiring all commercial banks to adopt new 
administrative structures more representative of their shareholders,169 and by promoting 
simultaneous deregulation and re-regulation it is also hoped that the banking sector’s 
accountability and disclosure will be further enhanced. Indeed, as Richards again 
explains:
“One can only hope that in the next thirty years the UAE will continue to 
modernise its banking system by simultaneously deregulating (privatising 
certain key banks), and also re-regulating (making them conform to 
international standards of information disclosure). If they do this, I suspect 
that in 2030 the UAE banking system will be a fully developed component of 
the global financial system.1,170
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However, despite the many improvements, the UAE’s banking sector still 
exhibits a number of serious problems and continues to draw bodi domestic and 
international criticism.171 Most obviously, the sector veiy much conforms to an 
‘oligopoly with a competitive fringe model’ dominated by a few large banking houses 
preventing free competition, and more significantly, there is also still believed to be 
veiy poor transparency of information:
“In general it is believed that the UAE’s banking system suffers from a 
relatively low level of disclosure. Quoting a recent assertion made by 
Standard & Poors, ‘the disclosure falls short of international best practice 
and even compares unfavourably with some regional peers like Saudi 
Arabia. ’ Any analysis of the UAE’s banking system must thus take into 
account a rather high information risk. ”172
Moreover, in much the same way as the UAE’s other political institutions and 
bureaucracies, and most crucially for die sector’s regulatory future, die Central Bank’s 
real powers and autonomy have remained rather questionable, especially given the 
appointed board’s clear incorporation into the neo-patrimonial network, and die 
organisation’s historic inability to assert control over emirate-level authorities. Indeed, 
die Central Bank has only had as much or as little power as die individual emirates and 
their ruling families have been prepared to give it. It has tried widi only limited success 
to control unmonitored loans to directors and to demand disclosures of balance sheets in 
certain emirates. Furthermore, its powers of persuasion widi regard to mergers among 
the UAE’s numerous commercial banks have also been dwarfed by those of the emirate- 
level governments.173 Certainly, the mergers that took place in the mid-1980s in Abu 
Dhabi and Dubai were entirely the work of the two local governments, since it was they 
rather than the Central Bank that put up die necessary fluids. Similarly, in 1985, when 
the Ra’s al-Khaimah government failed to provide the necessary funds to rescue the 
Ra’s al-Khaimah National Bank, the Central Bank was also powerless in intervening.174 
By far the most notable example of such failure was, however, the BCCI scandal in Abu 
Dhabi in the early 1990s. Although a new Central Bank board of directors was
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appointed to try and assert more control and restore confidence in the UAE’s banking 
sector,175 the Central Bank was nevertheless relegated to a secondary bystander role as 
the local Abu Dhabi government and ruling family assumed complete responsibility for 
the restructuring and subsequent closure of the branches. Indeed, as the following case 
study will demonstrate, quite remarkably the Central Bank was to play only a minimal 
part in what was destined to be the region’s most serious and damaging financial 
disaster.
4.4.4- The BCCI scandal
Collapsing in 1990-1991 against a backdrop of scandal and corruption, the 
demise of the Bank of Credit Commerce International (the BCCI) was a major source of 
discomfort for the UAE, the home of many of the bank’s largest and most influential 
backers. The ensuing international investigation lifted the lid on a world of patrimonial 
politics, unethical dealings, and criminal practices, thereby exposing the weaknesses of 
the UAE’s banking sector, the lack of judicial independence, the high levels of 
bureaucratic self-interest, and the overall opaqueness of the state’s political process. 
This was especially true for Abu Dhabi given the bank’s close links to the emirate’s 
local government and its seemingly undefined relationship with representatives of 
members of the Al-Nuhayyan ruling family, some of whose personal fortunes had 
played a key role in the bank’s history since its establishment in 1972.
Originally, Abu Dhabi’s planners and advisors may have seen the bank as a 
means of building up a strong financial base capable of supporting die non-petroleum 
sector, thereby complementing the emirate’s early diversification efforts. Certainly, as 
the Washington Post reported in the aftermath of the scandal, Abu Dhabi’s later 
attempts to buy up the BCCI could in some ways be seen as the realisation of the 
emirate’s long-term ambition to transform itself into an offshore banking centre using 
die BCCI as a ‘flagship bank’.176 Ultimately, however, die crisis which unfolded in the 
early 1990s had severe consequences for the UAE’s international credibility, seriously 
delaying any such transformation. Indeed, as US senators John Kerry and Hank Brown
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reported in tlieir 1992 investigation, the BCCI was found to have hosted an almost 
criminal structure centred around an “elaborate corporate spider-web... which was both 
an essential component of its spectacular growth, and a guarantee of its eventual 
collapse”.177 Furthermore, their explanation of tlie bank's ability to evade regulation 
seems to have placed particular emphasis on the weaknesses arising from its multi­
layered, top-down and non legal-rational structure; not dissimilar to the pathologies 
normally associated with neo-patrimonialism:
“Unlike any ordinary bank, BCCI was from its earliest days made up of 
multiplying layers of entities, related to one another through an 
impenetrable series of holding companies, affiliates, subsidiaries, banks- 
within-banks, insider dealings and nominee relationships. By fracturing 
corporate structure, record keeping, regulatory review, and audits, the 
complex BCCI family of entities created by Abedi [Agha Abedi being the 
founder of the BCCI] was able to evade ordinary legal restrictions on the 
movement of capital and goods as a matter of daily practice and routine. In 
creating the BCCI as a vehicle fundamentally free of government control,
Abedi developed in the BCCI an ideal mechanism for facilitating illicit 
activity by others, including such activity by officials of many of the 
governments whose laws BCCI was breaking. ”178
Specifically, this impenetrable layering of the BCCI’s corporate structure was believed 
to have facilitated the operation of a niunber of illegal mechanisms ranging from shell 
corporations, secrecy havens, kickbacks for front men, and the use of falsified 
documentation. Moreover, as a result of its closed patrimonial structure, the bank was 
able to maintain a high level of opaqueness, easily avoiding existing controls in the 
UAE, and, as the investigation claims, allowing its administrators and their associates to 
engage in a wide range of international criminal activities including money laundering, 
gun running, the management of prostitution, the facilitation of income tax evasion, and 
perhaps most significantly the financing of terrorist organisations.179
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Given that Abu Dhabi represented the BCCI’s largest depositors, borrowers, 
and shareholders, it is of little surprise that many of the bank’s structural failings were 
seen as being inextricably linked to its long association with the emirate’s local 
government, especially as Abedi had long been granted the powers of attorney to act in 
tire name of Shaykh Zayid.180 Indeed, as the UK-based auditor Price Waterhouse 
informed the Bank of England, the relationship between the two entities was not only 
‘very close’, but was also “far beyond the ordinary relationship of a bank to either its 
shareholders or depositors.”181 Moreover, while Abu Dhabi persistently presented itself 
as a victim and claimed only a passive role in the affair, its lack of co-operation in 
providing key documents and witnesses left the international community less convinced 
and even more determined to unravel the layers of deceit.182 While many questions 
have been left unanswered, the investigators nevertheless exposed several of the less 
desirable features of the UAE’s political structures in die course of their study. Of 
these, perhaps the most pertinent to diis discussion were the findings regarding the lack 
of any clear division between the polity and die judiciary; the continuing ability of 
BCCI-connected individuals to arbitrarily manipulate the UAE’s judicial system; and of 
course the lack of disclosure surrounding die extent of involvement of representatives of 
members of die ruling family and other notables in the BCCI’s affairs.
Aldiougli members of the Al-Nuliayyan family held more than $750 million 
worth of the BCCI’s shares by die time of its collapse, tiieir total contribution to the 
bank’s capitalisation quite remarkably appears to have been only $0.5 million: die initial 
start-up contribution paid to the bank by Shaykh Zayid in the early 1970s. Indeed, as 
die investigation clahns, the majority of tiiese supposed shares were acquired as a result 
of fake ‘investments’ where the Shaykhs’ representatives (presumably without the 
knowledge of their employers) would make payments on a risk free, guaranteed return 
basis, thereby allowing die bank to project an illusion of substantial royal backing:183
“...Price Waterhouse specifically found that representatives of the riding 
family of Abu Dhabi acquired shares on the basis of guaranteed rates of
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return and buy-back arrangements, with the result that they were not at risk 
for their ostensible 'shareholdings' of the BCCI. ”184
Determining the level of actual participation from these ‘front men’ proved less 
straightforward due to a lack of information and numerous logistical obstacles. 
Nevertheless, as die investigation did uncover, there had undoubtedly been a long and 
familial' association between the BCCI and the ruling family for many years, with the 
bank and its advisors having, “handled almost every financial matter of consequence for 
the Shaykh and his family, as well planning, managing, and carrying out trips abroad, 
and a wide range of services limited only by the desires of the Al-Nuhayyan family
Central to this close relationship was the founder of the BCCI, Agha Abdei, 
who for over twenty years created and managed a network of foundations, corporations, 
and investment entities for Abu Dhabi's ruling family, of a complexity similar to the 
network he had created at the BCCI itself. Consequently the BCCI handled the 
financial arrangements for many of these entities, managed a variety of Abu Dhabi's 
portfolio accounts in US Dollars, and “provided members of the ruling family with 
personal services ranging from Shaykh Zayid's own modest needs to the more elaborate 
requirements of his sons and members of his retinue.”186 Certainly, given the 
previously described rise of the unitary state and the expansion and demands of the 
evolving dynastic monarchy it is quite conceivable that the BCCI's finances quickly 
became so intermingled with the finances of Abu Dhabi that it became difficult even for 
BCCI insiders to determine where one left off and die other began.187
Moreover, even more conclusive than the longstanding association with 
Abedi was the Abu Dhabi government’s strong links with two other prominent BCCI 
bankers: al-Mazrui and Iqbal. For more than fifteen year's, Ghanim al-Mazrui served 
Shaykh Zayid as a financial advisor and manager, and as such he was a central figure in 
the Al-Nuhayyan financial network. Furthermore, from 1981, al-Mazrui also served on 
the board of directors of BCCI itself, in his capacity as secretary general of the Abu
240
Dhabi Investments Authority (ADIA), an organisation which at that tune held around 10 
percent of the BCCI's shares, and which continues to handle the principal government 
investments of Abu Dhabi.188 As such, al-Mazrui represented a clear three-way 
connection between the employees of the ruling family, the BCCI, and an important 
local government institution; a link which effectively blurred the financial autonomy of 
one entity from another. However, although the auditors and investigators discovered 
that al-Mazrui had received substantial personal financial benefits from tire BCCI, had 
made bogus loans to members of the ruling family, and had lied about his earlier 
misdemeanours, when he finally confessed to Abu Dhabi authorities in 1990 he was not 
held in custody and was even permitted to remain in place as the head of Abu Dhabi's 
working group to deal with the BCCI. Clearly, given tiiat he was neither fired nor 
forced to resign from positions of trust he had clearly violated, his existence brought 
into question the accountability of the emirate’s regulatory and judicial processes, and 
again indicated the significant role which may have been played by ‘higher-ups’:
“... al-Mazrui's continued role in handling Abu Dhabi's response to the 
collapse of BCCI raises additional questions. One possible explanation is 
that Shaykh Zayid and the riding family are remarkably tolerant of 
incompetence, deception, fraud, and the personal enrichment of top 
advisors. Alternative explanations are that al-Mazrui's improprieties had 
previously been sanctioned by higher-ups, or were consistent with ordinary 
practices in the Emirate. ”189
Similarly, when the time came to appoint a new team to manage the Abu Dhabi-based 
rebuilding of the BCCI, Zafar Iqbal, the former head of the BCCE (the BCCI affiliated 
UAE-based bank) was selected. This was also seen as being highly controversial given 
Iqbal’s previously close ties with employees of the ruling family and his perceived lack 
of banking expertise. As the investigation claimed, based on reports by junior BCCI 
staff:
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'‘[Iqbal] had long had a close personal relationship with important 
employees of the ruling family of Abu Dhabi... Within the bank [the BCCE],
Iqbal was not considered to be an expert on much besides pleasing Abu 
Dhabi... ”190
With specific reference to the independence of the emirate’s judiciary during 
the affair, Al-Sayegh, Abu Dhabi’s chief witness and a BCCI employee, argued that one 
of the main difficulties in making available key documents to foreign investigators was 
that Abu Dhabi’s legal system forbade such interference as it was based on a separation 
of powers to ensure that the executive branch could never exercise any influence over 
the judicial process. As such, he contended that there were no short cuts that could be 
undertaken in order to supply more quickly the much-needed documents and witnesses. 
However, as the BCCI investigators uncovered, this was claim was highly inaccurate as 
the judicial system at this time was found to be far from autonomous, with many 
examples of external influence and manipulation, thus reinforcing the belief that 
important witnesses and information were being deliberately withheld.191 Indeed, one 
particularly weak area was believed to be the UAE’s detainment law which appeared to 
have been left completely open to outside interference:
“ ...Following his arrest, an accused may not be detained for more than 
forty-eight hours [unless there is an order by the prosecutor] to detain him 
provisionally pending interrogation for a period of seven days subject to 
renewal for further periods not exceeding fourteen days... [A judge may] 
extend the detention for a period not to exceed thirty days, subject to 
renewal... ”192
This law, especially regarding the possibility of ‘renewal’ was believed to be serving as 
a primary mechanism for keeping accused BCCI officials and other staff with 
connections to representatives of the ruling family away from international 
investigators:
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"... these final provisions were the basis for the ordering of the summary 
arrest of the BCCI officials suspected of being involved in the irregularities 
and fraudulent activities, and their detention since, as under the 
interpretation given the law, the phrase ‘subject to renewal’ allows the 
judge to continue to hold the accused from month to month so long as the 
prosecution wishes, without any limit whatsoever, for years, decades, or life, 
if matters remain under investigation. Indeed, Subcommittee staff have 
interviewed one knowledgeable Pakistani insider about BCCI and Abu 
Dhabi who spent years in prison in Abu Dhabi without trial, after being 
involved in a dispute with a representative of the ruling family. ” '
Moreover, the separation of powers was also called into question with regard to die 
federal civil court’s ‘protective custody’ of many of the BCCI’s records. In Al- 
Sayegli’s prepared testimony it was stated that the court restricted access to diese 
records to die majority shareholders and that the UAE prosecutor, appointed by Shaykli 
Zayid, “ordered that the documents... remain confidential” for reasons not explained.194 
Thus, given that the majority shareholders were members of the Abu Dhabi ruling 
family and their guardians, and given the apparent closeness of the judiciaiy to the 
ruling family, die senators’ radier damning report concluded diat:
"Given the fact that Shaykh Zayid, according to his own attorneys in 
submissions with the Federal Reserve, owns most of Abu Dhabi’s resources 
and land, and that the laws themselves are styled as decrees by Shaykh 
Zayid, in consultation with other bodies and officials who are appointed by 
Shaykh Zayid, not by popular vote at elections, the notion that the United 
Arab Emirates ’justice system is somehow completely independent from the 
interests of the rulingfamily of Abu Dhabi stretches credulity. ”195
Although clearly over-simplistic and with little appreciation of the intricacies of the 
complex Emirati political process, such a statement nevertheless indicates die potential 
damage tiiat can be caused by such neo-patrimonial pathologies not only to domestic
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development, but of course also to the UAE’s high standing in the international 
community.
4.4.5 - The drive for greater transparency
While the alleviation of the UAE’s more serious bureaucratic pathologies, 
especially those deriving from the persistence of informal neo-patrimonial networks and 
the lack of institutional independence, may be extremely difficult to overcome; 
attacking opaqueness and improving accountability have, however, become increasingly 
regarded as more realistic and immediate objectives. Indeed, the drive for greater 
transparency has attracted much support in recent years from a wide number of sources 
including, most notably, the Dubai government and ruling family whose veiy future, as 
demonstrated, rests on the creation of a successful diversified economy and the 
establishment of a sound international reputation in order to counter the emirate’s 
declining oil revenues.196 Broadly speaking this drive has, thus far, consisted of three 
identifiable sets of initiatives: the ruling families’ frequent personal attempts to expose 
opaque bureaucracies, the attempts to mobilise the UAE’s press as a greater organ of 
accountability, and most significantly the creation of new formal organisations and 
legislation capable of institutionalising and enforcing better answerability.
The crown prince of Dubai, in much the same way as the old Venetian Doges, 
has personally spearheaded his emirate’s drive to reduce corruption and incompetence. 
Indeed, over the last few years Shaykh Muhammad Al-Maktum has attempted to shake 
up Dubai’s civil service, sometimes even resorting to early morning raids on 
government offices and firing any officials not present at their desks.197 Furthermore, 
he has also publicly called upon the editors of all local newspapers to act as “watchdogs 
to ensure that governments and their bureaucracies correct their mistakes and take the 
right decisions in the interests of the people.” Along similar lines, the UAE’s Minister 
of Infonnation, Shaykh Abdullah Al-Nuhayyan, has openly encouraged all federal 
institutions and bureaucracies to become more sophisticated in their approach to press 
and public criticism and “not to regard it as disloyal, or even traitorous”. Moreover,
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Abdullah lias also called for information services such as the Internet to be embraced by 
both the press and public, and to be used as tools to encourage greater bureaucratic 
accountability.198 Although highly visible, these individual efforts and royal 
interventions are, however, by themselves unlikely to lead to any wholesale 
improvement. Certainly, while there have been cases where die press has criticised 
alleged inefficiencies in the provision of government services and in the judicial 
system,199 these are still extremely rare and the strengthening of the UAE’s press should 
be viewed as more of a long-term objective. Indeed, as the following chapter will 
explain, the UAE’s media remains in a considerably weakened state, caught between 
existing government controls and the continuing self-censorship exercised by die many 
cautious expatriate journalists.200
Instead, it would seem that significant improvements in transparency are, at 
least in terms of public relations, far more likely to result from the work of strong 
organisations granted the powers diey need to enforce better accountability in die 
UAE’s bureaucracies. A good example would be the work of the recently created 
‘Anti-Corruption Unit’ in Dubai, another of Shaykh Muhammad’s initiatives. In 
February 2001 the unit first came into effect and soon began investigating and arresting 
a large number of officials in die Dubai customs, ports and immigration services on 
charges of corruption. Six suspects were detained including the director-general of 
Dubai’s customs authorities, and these were soon joined by a further fourteen including 
the head of the immigration section of Dubai International Airport. All were accused of 
taking part in the embezzlement of millions of Dollars, thus leading to the first public 
acknowledgement of corruption by the Dubai autiiorities. Initially, the accusations and 
findings considerably shook the political and business environment in die city, but many 
have contended that by exposing die great extent of corruption in Dubai, the long-term 
benefits have been considerable. Indeed, with signs that the emirate is now beginning 
to ‘get its house in order’, it is believed that more foreign investors will be inclined to 
consider the UAE as a viable option.201
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Similarly, new anti-money laundering organisations and legislation have 
been seen to have encouraged greater formal accountability in the UAE’s financial 
sector. Certainly, under the 1987 federal law concerning the promulgation of the penal 
code, the UAE was one of the first countries to adopt specific anti-money laundering 
articles. In 1993 these articles were strengthened by the Central Bank’s requirement for 
comprehensive customer identification for the opening of all accounts, including those 
purportedly for charitable institutions. In 1999 an ‘Anti-Money Laundering and 
Suspicious Cases Unit’ was established and given access to all relevant authorities, and 
in 2000 this was followed by the formation of a national anti-money laundering 
committee responsible for all such policy in the UAE. In late 2001 an anti-money 
laundering law was passed by the COM and duly approved by the FNC, in an almost 
immediate response to the widespread accusations of Al-Qaeda funding following the 
September 2001 terrorist attacks.202 As such, by February 2002, at a meeting of die 
Financial Action Task Force (FATF) held in Hong Kong, the UAE was declared to have 
finally established a comprehensive anti-money laundering system, comprising of all 
the necessary laws, regulations and procedures, and was said to be now “in a very good 
position to co-operate in the internationally declared fight against money laundering.” 
Moreover, the team also declared that any deficiencies in the UAE’s previous anti­
money laundering systems had now been eliminated.203
In the near future, diese anti-corruption and anti-money laundering 
organisations and legislation will be augmented by other transparency initiatives. One 
important example will be the Central Bank’s forthcoming establishment of a customer 
credit worthiness database. This database will oversee all transactions and will aim to 
reduce the number of fraud-related incidents which have plagued the UAE’s financial 
sector. For the first time, a database will gather financial information on selective 
clients along witii details of their operations, the magnitude of dieir business, and the 
nature of dieir transactions.204 At a more grass-roots level will be the Dubai 
Government’s forthcoming ‘Excellence Programme’ which will play host to a number 
of projects including a ‘mysteiy shopper’ operation designed to call anonymously on
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government departments and directors and rate their performance. Indeed, as the 
programme’s sponsor explains:
“...some people think that closed doors can hide the facts and conceal the 
fact that this applies to some directors... who did not come up with a single 
idea or project during the whole year. What are they waiting for, while 
their colleagues have succeeded in transforming their departments into 
active cells. ”205
Similarly, it is also hoped that the aforementioned Dubai International Finance Centre 
can play a key role in promoting die UAE’s drive for transparency.206 Indeed, as 
emphasised by its chairman, Al-Jallaf, there will be a brand new regulatory and 
executive system set up in the DIFC with strong regulatory codes and rules based on 
respected international standards. Moreover, it is intended that the DIFC’s regulatory 
agency will be divided into a council and a commission to ensure the separation of 
oversight and execution. As such, Al-Jallaf argues that the DIFC will be
"... even more tightly regulated than the developed markets. We have to be 
more careful because of the scrutiny we will come under from the USA and 
the dangers of money laundering. ”207
As such, one of die DIFC’s main priorities will be to reach a high level of 
internationally recognised transparency. Indeed, as Al-Jallaf hopes, die DIFC will soon 
gain recommendation from the OECD, and all institutions based in the DIFC will be 
accredited entities with tiieir headquarters in either a member country of the FATF, or a 
country committed to the Wolfsberg principles and guidelines relating to money 
laundering.208
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4.5- Elite interest groups: old rentiers versus new rentiers
Far from homogenous, the UAE’s powerful client elite can increasingly be 
divided into two main socio-economic interest groups: the conservatives and the 
reformers. Although both are clearly components of a dominant class seeking to 
perpetuate rentier wealth and rent-channelling structures, this section will attempt to 
illustrate the important differences between those ‘old rentiers’ remaining reliant on oil- 
derived economic rent and aiming to maintain the status quo, and those ‘new rentiers’ 
seeking fresh and less finite sources of economic rent from non-oil related activities 
such as the leasing of real-estate and the ownership of business parks. To facilitate the 
development of these more diversified sources of rentier wealth, die new rentiers have 
been pressed to seek a number of liberalising reforms in an effort to remove existing 
restrictive practices, to attract greater foreign investment, and to boost die UAE’s 
international credibility. Crucially, on occasion, these proposed reforms have led to 
significant conflicts, sometimes at the highest levels, widi the more conservative 
elements of die Emirati elite keen to block any potentially destabilising initiatives or 
amendments to existing legislation. Moreover, although as shown, the differing sub­
strategies of cautious oil-related development in Abu Dhabi and more vigorous 
diversification in oil scarce Dubai are being increasingly seen as mutually beneficial, it 
is also worth noting that die UAE’s inter-elite conflict can in some ways be interpreted 
as a struggle between the two principle emirates.209
To explain more frilly die interaction of these interest groups and their 
relevance to Emirati development, this section will first consider the veiy different 
backgrounds of the conservatives and the reformers, witii a particular emphasis on die 
emergence of the new ‘technocratic’ elite. Secondly, a number of key issues which 
have sparked furious debate and which have on occasion led to serious quarrels between 
die two camps will be considered, before turning to three detailed case studies, each of 
which will highlight an aspect of desired reform which has provoked strong opposition 
from the conservatives. Specifically, die controversial question of foreign ownership of 
property in die UAE will be assessed in light of the new rentiers’ need to reform
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existing laws and practices in order to boost real estate rent, and the old rentiers’ 
conflicting desire to preserve the existing restrictions in an effort to safeguard the 
privileges and resources of the Emirati population. Similarly, the new rentiers’ need to 
promote innovative new legislation for the many proposed flee zones, and their 
subsequent need to allow greater foreign ownership of commercial ventures will also be 
studied. Finally, the more general issue of foreign direct investment and the clear 
contrast between the requirements of the new rentiers and the fears of the conservatives 
will demonstrate how the seemingly irreconcilable differences between these two main 
interest groups are likely to continue shaping the UAE’s socio-economic development 
for the foreseeable future.
For the most part, die UAE’s prominent conservatives, many of whom are 
believed to be supported by Shaykh Zayid and his crown prince, Shaykh Khalifa,210 are 
those members of leading families either closely related to the ruling families or 
associated with the UAE’s oil industry. Many have been understandably reluctant to 
permit sweeping changes lest their oil-related sources of revenue be jeopardised or their 
high-level positions be lost. Certainly, examples of such conservatives would include 
many of the members of the previously discussed Dhaheri family. Originally from 
Buraimi and now one of the most influential Abu Dhabian families, the Dhaheris 
presently hold more than 25 senior positions in the UAE’s hierarchy, including 
executive posts in the Abu Dhabi National Oil Company (ADNOC), the federal 
judiciary, and the Abu Dhabi Financial Department. Similarly, the Bin Yousefs, 
another prominent Abu Dhabian family, have for some time also been closely linked 
with tlie emirate’s oil industry. Although, as Business Monitor International reported, 
Yousef bin Yousef resigned as Minister for Petroleum and Resources in the early 
1990s,211 this was only because of die federal ministry’s impotence and liis subsequent 
lack of control over oil-related policies. Significantly he was soon appointed general 
manager of ADNOC and later became the secretary-general of the Supreme Petroleum 
Council which, as described 212 now formulates die bulk of Abu Dhabi’s oil policies and 
has therefore become one of the most powerful bodies in the UAE.213
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In contrast, the UAE’s most prominent reformers have tended to be those 
businessmen and families with closer links to the non-oil related sectors, and therefore 
those with a greater personal interest in successful diversification. Moreover, it is also 
important to note that many of these are believed to have a more technocratic 
background, with the majority having studied abroad, holding academic qualifications, 
and in some cases also having had professional and entrepreneurial experience. Prime 
examples of such technocrats would include the influential and well renowned Dubai 
businessmen Muhammad Al-Abbar, Majd Al-Futtaim, and Juma Al-Majid Abdullah. 
As director-general of Dubai’s Economic Development department, the North American 
educated Al-Abbar has been instrumental in formulating and implementing many of the 
emirate’s recent economic reform programmes and, as the Economist Intelligence Unit 
claims, deserves much of the credit for their apparent success. Indeed, he is believed to 
have championed a number of liberal economic strategies in an effort to boost local 
businesses, including his own highly successful Emar Properties which, as will be 
demonstrated, has now achieved considerable international status. Similarly, Al- 
Futtaim, another household name in Dubai, has also been a major driving force behind a 
number of thriving property developments and business ventures. Moreover, in much 
the same way as Al-Abbar, he has also been seen to have embraced free market 
economics, and is now drought to wield an enormous liberalising influence in Dubai’s 
rapidly developing financial sector.214 Al-Majid Abdullah, again from Dubai, can be 
regarded as another key member of this new technocratic elite. His business and 
educational interests are much in evidence in the emirate, with many successful local 
enterprises to Iris name, with his vice chairmanship of both Emirates Bank International 
and fire Central Bank, and with his establishment of a cultural foundation dedicated to 
local scholarship.215
Crucially, as a greater proportion of the UAE’s youdr begin to experience 
higher education and professional environments, and as the need for diversification and 
reform becomes even more pressing, it is believed that the size and relative political 
weight of this teclnrocratic group will continue to gr ow. Although, as described in the 
earlier outline of patrimonial sources of legitimacy, the traditional rulers have always
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carefully sought to accommodate and incorporate such ‘modern groups’ into their 
polities,216 in more recent years there have, however, been very visible signs that the 
technocrats are finally beginning to assume many more positions, sometimes even those 
previously occupied by powerful conservative families. Indeed, there has been much 
evidence that the technocrats may now even be gaining a foothold in the COM, which, 
as explained, is the most influential non-hereditary political institution in the UAE and 
is responsible for the bulk of day-to-day policy formulation.217 Either as a result of 
growing pressure or out of a genuine desire to achieve broader representation, in 1997 
Shaykh Zayid admitted to the COM a group of western-educated professionals with 
considerable experience in commerce, banking and other non-oil related activities. 
Furthermore, despite their youthfulness, these new appointees were not restricted to 
minor cabinet portfolios, with Dr. Muhammad Kharbash even being appointed Minister 
of Finance and Industry;218 one of the UAE’s key development related ministries.
Moreover, in 1998 the influence of the technocrats was further enhanced after 
another western-educated graduate, Muhammad Al-Habtur, won an election to become 
speaker of the FNC. Although, as described, the FNC only commands limited 
legislative powers, the position of speaker is nevertheless of great significance, not least 
because it is one of the few genuinely elected positions in the UAE’s political system. 
Indeed, whereas all previous speaker elections had been uncontested formalities, the 
1998 election was fiercely contested. Democracy was in action given that both the pro­
reform Al-Habtur and his more conservative opponent canvassed for support from 
individual FNC members.219 Most importantly, Al-Habtur’s victory was far from 
unanimous, with Al-Wasat newspaper reporting the result as being 24 to 15, with only 
one abstention.220 Furthermore, given that voting patterns did not necessarily reflect 
regional or family origin,221 the split would seem to confirm that politically opposed 
blocs and differing elite orientations do exist underneath the surface of UAE politics, 
and, as in most other states, the political elite is far from being a single homogenous 
unit.
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Thus, given this increasing strength of technocratic reformers alongside die 
continuing presence of powerful conservatives, it is of little surprise that a number of 
major ‘new rentier’ versus ‘old rentier’ development-related policy struggles have 
surfaced in recent years which, on occasion, have led to counter policies and attempts to 
slow and block controversial reforms. Certainly, some of the more notable examples 
would include:
Attempts to promote liberalising reforms
The liberalisation of property rights. Traditionally only UAE nationals have been 
allowed to own property, but these rules are now being relaxed and changed by those 
seeking to open up the UAE economy and attract greater foreign direct investment. In 
1999, Al-Abbar’s Emar Properties allowed GCC citizens and even wealthy non-GCC 
citizens to purchase 99-year leases at its exclusive Emirates Hills development. 
Similarly, in 2000, Union Properties, a subsidiary of the Al-Majid Abdullah-linked 
Emirates Bank International, announced it would offer 30-year leases to foreigners on 
selected developments. In much the same way, in the commercial sector, Dubai Internet 
City has allowed investors to purchase 50-year renewable leases from the year 2000 
onwards. Thus, as the case studies later in this section will reveal, although these 
developments have remained within the letter of the law, it is quite clear that by offering 
such long-term leases, the reformers clearly have attempted to bypass the existing 
restrictive legislation.
The liberalisation of business ownership laws. In 1997 the governor of the Central 
Bank recommended to the COM that some of these restrictions be relaxed and that non­
nationals should be allowed to invest in the public offerings of a future stock exchange 
with the intention of pushing the UAE’s capital market towards maturity and further 
expansion. Following approval, Al-Abbar’s Emar Properties once again led die way by 
being the first listed Emirati company to allow foreigners to buy shares: up to 20% of its 
equity at first, then eventually rising to 49%.222
The provision of investment work-arounds for non-UAE nationals. By providing non­
voting investment opportunities for foreigners, some of the UAE’s banks have 
attempted to create an investment alternative for those restricted by the current 
regulations. The first of such schemes, the Emirates Equity Fund, was sponsored by 
Emirates Bank International and offered more than 30 million Dirhams worth of open- 
ended units and, as BSP Management Consultants claim, other banks are soon expected 
to follow suit.223
Attempts to block liberalising reforms and augment existing restrictions
The introduction of ‘exclusive agency’ agreements in which certain UAE-based 
companies have been given the sole distribution rights for imported goods. These were 
intended to eliminate the threat of competition in certain areas, thereby safeguarding the 
interests of established UAE enterprises.224
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The introduction of a 4% customs duty, imposed by the federal government on most 
goods since 1994.225 Although a relatively low figure, as this thesis has shown Dubai’s 
merchants have relied upon a tax-free trading environment for much of the twentieth 
century.226 Indeed, as the Middle East Economic Digest notes, many of the UAE 
bankers have vigorously opposed this policy, cautioning that the duty may impede 
Dubai’s further growth as a trading centre if companies find more attractive alternatives 
such as Hong Kong or Singapore 227
The constant efforts to maintain the ban on foreign ownership of real estate in the UAE, 
as demonstrated in the earlier discussion of the FNC’s July 1990 recommendations.228
The efforts to reinforce the kafil sponsorship system and the minimum 51% ownership 
share by nationals in all UAE businesses, as noted in the earlier discussion of the FNC’s 
March 1994 recommendations.229
Calls from some members of the FNC for the government to impose a 5% corporation 
tax on non-UAE companies, thereby weakening the competition.230 While many 
domestic companies would surely thrive under free market conditions, it was feared that 
a number of companies, especially the many infant light manufacturing industries, 
would suffer without some form of protection.231
The opposition to Dubai Media City and the proposed plans to allow greater freedom 
for Dubai-based media companies. Indeed, as was reported in 2001, a number of FNC 
members recoiled at the prospect of potentially uncontrollable and culturally eroding 
media outlets,
“The FNC members generally expressed deep reservations about what kinds of content 
the media companies setting up in the trade free zones like the Media City would be 
producing. Some said that the content might erode the national culture and morals. 
Such nervousness is understandable, as the individual Emirates establish the free zones, 
and the federal government has no authority or control over their activities. ”232
4.5.1 - Foreign property ownership
As file first of three case studies highlighting these ‘new rentier’ reforms and 
their greater impact on socio-economic development, this section will consider the 
controversial issue of foreign property ownership, or rather foreign long-term leasing 
and the struggle to overcome the existing federal property laws. Attempting to establish 
new sources of economic rent, improve foreign investment, and of course boost the 
diversification of the economy, many have sought to challenge or circumvent the ban on 
non-national property ownership by either bending regulations or working around 
restrictions. Perhaps the first example of such an endeavour was the result of a strategic 
alliance formed between Dubai’s crown prince, Shaykh Muhammad Al-Maktum, and
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Al-Abbar’s Emar Properties. Significantly, for much of the early and mid-1990s, Emar 
Properties had confined its activities to the construction and letting of condominiums on 
the Shaykh’s donated land, and both parties had been content to restrict the sale of 
completed apartments to UAE nationals, thereby upholding the foreign ownership ban. 
However, by 1997 an important change had taken place. Emar announced the launch of 
‘Emirates Hills’; a 700 million Dirham golfing-cum-residential project which would 
overlook the Emirates Golf Club close to Dubai’s busiest commercial centre. Given the 
scale of the project, Shaykh Muhammad began to take a more active role by personally 
supervising its progress.233 Thus, with a powerful supporter and benefactor, Al-Abbar 
finally began to contradict publicly the existing laws by underscoring his commitment 
to foreign ownership:
“We have had strong response [for Emirates Hills] from citizens of Abu
Dhabi, Dubai, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait, and even from ex-patriates. We 
will also allow locally incorporated companies to purchase the villas. ”234
Thus, for the first time in the UAE’s histoiy, residential plots were not only being 
marketed to Emirati and GCC citizens, but also to “...those ‘others’ that can either buy 
fully built-up villas or plots”.235
Moreover, Emar’s much-publicised follow-up project, the Westside Marina, 
further consolidated the reformist Al-Abbar / Shaykh Muhammad position. Indeed, in 
much the same way as Emirates Hills, the project’s stated objective was not so much to 
meet the needs of the local population, but rather to increase the attractiveness of Dubai 
to foreign investors. Specifically, it was to comprise of:
“A marina complex with mixed usage low, medium and high-rise buildings 
along with comprehensive infrastructure features, complete with shopping 
centres, swimming pools and golf courses... which would accommodate the 
expected growth of Dubai for tourists, international expatriates, and UAE
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and GCC citizens. Properties within the community complex would also be 
available for UAE, GCC and other companies, he added. ”236
Thus, by condoning the long-term leasing of property to all interested parties, regardless 
of nationality, the marketing aims of these two projects have strictly speaking been 
outside of UAE law. However, given that both Emirates Hills and the Marina have 
been resounding successes for Dubai’s real estate sector, Emar appears to have set a 
precedent with many other developers having followed their lead.
By far’ die most ambitious and noteworthy of diese new property developments 
has been the creation of the vast Palm Island project which is being built on a man­
made atoll off the coast of Dubai. With its 120km of artificial sandy beaches, a 
monorail linking the palm’s various fronds, high rise hotels, and diree thousand luxuiy 
villas, Palm Island will join the Great Wall of China as one of the few man-made 
structures visible from space. The project has reportedly cost over 15 billion Dirhams 
and has been funded primarily by die government of Dubai along witii a number of 
local and international banks. Crucially, although not under the auspices of Emar 
Properties, this project is also being personally supervised by Shaykh Muhammad. 
Furthermore, in much die same manner as the groundbreaking Al-Abbar developments, 
die properties on Palm Island are being made available to overseas buyers on one 
hundred year leases.237 Accordingly, while this does not actually constitute foreign 
ownership, the semi-permanency of the proposed leases and the overall objectives of the 
project are best viewed as careful work-arounds of the law.
Significantly, it would appear that even the UAE’s federal ministries are now 
beginning to recognise the importance of these successful developments in Dubai, and 
as a recent communique from die Ministry of Information and Culture indicates, it 
would seem that the reformers’ strategies are gradually being accepted, even if not yet 
officially approved:
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"In general, expatriates are not allowed to buy properties in the UAE, 
however it is now possible to do so in some emirates, for example, Dubai.
The ambitious Palm Island Project - the world's largest man-made island 
shaped like palm trees, being developed by the Dubai Government, offers 
villas to be sold on a free-hold basis. ”238
In addition, the pioneering role of Dubai-based companies such as Emar Properties, and 
their use of long-term leases as legal loopholes are now also being acknowledged by tire 
ministry:
“Last year Dubai Lands and Properties Department has announced that 
expatriates, including non-resident foreigners, can now buy property in 
Dubai in the form of 99-year leases with properties managed by Emar 
Properties. Earlier, only GCC citizens were entitled to this privilege, now 
foreigners are entitled to the same rights as UAE citizens and Gulf nationals 
as far as buying, selling and. renting lands and property in Dubai is 
concerned. ”239
Finally, it is worth noting that in the last few years there have been indications 
that such developments are also beginning to take shape in other emirates, even in Abu 
Dhabi. A good example would be the Sadiyat Island project. As described earlier in 
this chapter, die development was originally intended to house an offshore financial 
market in Abu Dhabi.240 However, as the Economist Intelligence Unit reports, it now 
appears that the project has become a real estate development, offering 99-year leases 
and free zone status to prospective foreign companies241 Thus, in Abu Dhabi it would 
seem that there are also efforts being made to bypass the existing property restrictions 
by exploiting ambiguities such as long-term leases and offshore status. Sadiyat Island 
and a number of similar projects underway in the smaller emirates may therefore 
indicate that, in this case at least, Dubai’s example and die strength of the refonners are 
having a liberalising influence across the UAE’s previously restricted real estate sector.
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4.5.2 - Commercial ventures and free zones
Another important source of new rentier wealth has been the economic rent 
accruing from the leasing of free zone plots and industrial parks to productive tenants. 
Thus, in much the same way as the efforts to reform and circumvent real estate laws, 
there have also been clear attempts to relax and avoid the existing foreign business 
restrictions. Indeed, without such liberalisation it is undoubtedly feared that potential 
foreign investors will be put off by the 49% cap on foreign business ownership and the 
much maligned kafil sponsorship system requiring all foreign businesses to take on an 
Emirati partner. Once again, Dubai’s technocrats have been at the forefront of this 
mission, with the creation of the massive Jebel Ali Free Zone in the mid-1980s having 
already clearly confirmed their intentions. As demonstrated in the earlier discussion of 
physical infrastructure, the JAFZ was to serve as a major non-oil related industrial 
export-processing zone for both domestic and foreign firms, and as such there was a 
pressing need to remove all unpopular commercial restrictions.242 Thus, in 1985, a local 
Dubai law was passed with the express aim of providing the JAFZ authority with 
greater freedom and exemptions from existing UAE business regulations. Specifically, 
the law empowered JAFZ companies to be released from all export fees and turnover 
taxes, and most crucially allowed all of the zone’s foreign companies to be exempt from 
local partner conditions and to claim full repatriation of the invested capital.243
In recent years a number of innovative development projects have attempted to 
follow this pattern, with many of die new free zones and parks also claiming to permit 
100% foreign ownership. Indeed, if die Dubai-based Emar Properties can be viewed as 
die pioneer of residential real estate development in die UAE, then Dubai Investments 
Park Development Co. (DIPD) can be regarded as its commercial equivalent. In 1998 
the firm was seeking approval to allow foreigners to hold a majority stake in ventures in 
its business park situated close to the JAFZ. Certainly, although general manager 
Khalid Kalban accepted that the park was likely to remain distinct from Jebel Ali and its 
free zone status, he nevertheless stated his “hope for 100% foreign ownership in the 
business park.”244 Since dien, DIPD intensified its marketing campaign to attract
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foreign investors and businesses by offering them first-rate infrastructure with complete 
freedom from any restrictions,245 and, backed by a new Dubai decree in 2000 to 
promote such freedom in commercial developments, these promises were soon realised. 
Although the “Dubai Technology, Electronic Commerce and Media Free Zone Law 
No.l” was not a federal law, it was nonetheless the first of its kind in the UAE, again 
underscoring the emirate’s strong commitment to the liberalisation of the UAE’s 
economy. Indeed, by expanding upon die earlier JAFZ enabling legislation, this new 
local ordinance responded to the needs of the business community by allowing for a 
number of significant amendments and relaxations of the existing restrictions:
• Article 9, “Entry into leases of plots and buildings may extend to 
periods of up to 50 years, witii any establishment in the free zone, to 
enable it to cany on its activity according to tenns and conditions 
agreed upon.”
• Article 15, “Free zone establishments shall be exempt from all taxes, 
including income tax, witii regard to their operations in the free 
zone. They shall also be excluded from any restrictions on 
repatriation and transfer of capital, profits and wages in any currency 
to any place outside the free zone for a period of 50 years... ”
• Article 16, “Assets or activities of the free zone establishments shall 
not be subject to nationalisation or any measures restricting private 
ownership throughout the period of their activities in the free zone.”
• Article 17, “Free zone establishments may employ or hire 
whomsoever they choose in their operations in the free zone, 
provided that such employees are not subject to any countries 
politically or economically boycotted by the UAE.”
• Article 18, “The operations of free zone establishments or 
employees, within the free zone, shall not be subject to tire laws and 
regulations of Dubai Municipality, the Department of Economic 
Development of the Government of Dubai, or the powers and 
authority falling within their jurisdiction.246
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Essentially, therefore, these articles formalised the practice of granting long-term leases 
to foreign firms while guaranteeing them exemption from any possible nationalisation 
of industry and from any future implementation of taxation, such as the proposed 5% 
corporation tax.247 Furthermore, they also granted all free zone companies exemption 
from municipal laws thereby effectively placing them outside of federal law.
Benefiting from this custom-made legislation, a flurry of new ventures have 
sought to maximise these new advantages. One such example would be the Dubai 
Airport Free Zone which became operational in late 2000. Close to the city centre, the 
zone began to offer prospective high-tech companies a number of incentives, many of 
which relied heavily upon the recent relaxations. Indeed, in much die same way as the 
JAFZ, but widiout needing a specific Emiri decree, the zone was able to promise tax 
exemptions, 100% foreign ownership, and 100% repatriation of capital and profits.248 
An even stronger example of such a development has of course been the Dubai Internet 
City, another of Shaykh Muhammad’s personally supervised projects. Certainly, the 
DIC seems intent to capitalise on all of the benefits granted by the new law, as its 
marketing brochure reads:
”100% foreign ownership, 0% problems! To attract IT and internet-focused 
companies, Dubai Internet City will offer an extremely attractive set of 
benefits. In addition to 100% foreign ownership, companies will also get 
land on renewable leases of up to 50 years. They can move into ready-to- 
operate-from offices or build their own offices. The aim is to facilitate 
immediate commencement of business operations. Towards this end there 
will be a 'single-window ’ for all government clearances, including those 
pertaining to trade licences and work permits. ”249
Thus, given the many similarities between these objectives and the described articles, 
developments such as the DIC can be regarded as direct products of diis new legislation. 
Moreover, it is also worth noting that as these new free zones grow in size and number, 
they may catalyse further amendments to existing UAE regulations. Indeed, it is
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believed that the DIC’s requirements for more comprehensive Internet access may soon 
even lead to a relaxation in the UAE’s telecommunications restrictions. For a long time 
the topic of Internet access has been a delicate issue in the UAE, with freedom of use 
currently being sacrificed for state control. However, with a clear reference to the DIC, 
a spokesman for the federal government recently raised this very issue of censorship by 
stating that
"... the current regulations enforced in the UAE may need to be examined 
and even dropped altogether as a concession to the fact that electronic 
information knows no borders and it is virtually impossible to stop its flow 
in and out of the UAE... businesses located in the Dubai Internet City would 
soon be able to by-pass the Etisalat proxy server [the imposed intermediate 
server and information filter] for the purposes of sending and receiving 
electronic information. ”250
Lately there have also been indications of similar efforts to reform and liberalise 
the UAE’s financial zones. Indeed, it has been reported that the aforementioned Dubai 
International Finance Centre will attempt to defy current UAE laws in much the same 
way as the commercial and industrial parks. Moreover, this challenge will be especially 
significant for the reformers given that the DIFC, lacking any official free zone status, 
will not be able to rely upon the Dubai 2000 legislation and, as is widely believed, has 
not yet received support from the Central Bank. Certainly, as Sultan al-Suwaidi the 
governor of the Central Bank has stated, the DIFC remains “entirely a Dubai initiative, 
with no connection to either the Central Bank or any other UAE institution”.251 
However, despite its ambiguous status, the chairman of the DIFC, Al-Jallaf, has 
confidently stated that the centre’s offices and banks, “... will not be operating under the 
laws and regulations of the UAE”, and that, “100% foreign ownership will definitely be 
permitted.”252 Unsurprisingly, Al-Jallaf s bold statement soon received support from 
Shaykh Muliammad who reiterated that the DIFC would parallel international laws and 
conventions similar to those in the USA and the UK, rather titan local UAE laws.253 It 
would therefore seem likely that the DIFC, in a similar fashion to Emar Properties and
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DIPD, will at first be operating outside of UAE law, perhaps until fresh legislation is 
introduced in order to disable the existing restrictions.
Lastly, it is also noteworthy that in the same way as the other emirates have 
slowly begun to follow Dubai’s lead in liberalising property markets, there are now also 
signs of greater commercial freedom emerging in other parts of the UAE. Indeed, in 
what has been described as an unprecedented move, the Sharjah Economic Department 
has drawn up a framework which will allow 100% foreign ownership in certain Sharjah 
businesses. Moreover, although this Sharjah Service Agent Law is still in the draft 
stages and has yet to be approved, it is thought unlikely that any opposition will be able 
to block such development, especially given the spate of legislation and exemptions in 
neighbouring Dubai. Similarly in Fujairah, it has been reported that the emirate’s local 
government has drawn up plans to boost its local industries by allowing for 100% 
foreign ownership. With the only major port on the UAE’s Indian Ocean coastline, the 
emirate intends to become the region’s main distribution point for die Indian and East 
African markets, and by sharing the same views as Dubai’s reformers, there has been an 
increasing realisation that such objectives can only be met if existing federal regulations 
are removed.254
4.5.3 - The foreign investment debate
As both of these case studies have demonstrated, many of the reformers’ 
attempts to amend and circumvent existing restrictions have been directly related to the 
issue of foreign direct investment (FDI), whether regarding foreign ownership of 
residential real estate, foreign ownership of commercial and industrial plots, or even 
foreign ownership of financial centres. The reformers clearly hope that by liberalising 
the UAE’s laws, a more competitive commercial environment will develop and greater 
foreign investment can be attracted to the region, thereby bringing new technologies to 
the country and reducing the UAE’s reliance on oil, while also providing a fresh source 
of rentier wealth. Conversely, more conservative groups have contended that such 
developments and attempts to relax regulations may have dangerous consequences for
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the future of the UAE’s economic structures. Indeed, as explained in the previous 
chapter, it is thought that the transfer of technology and skills between foreign and 
domestic enterprises may prove unattainable unless unaccompanied by emiratisation, 
joint ventures, or other government-sponsored initiatives 255 Moreover, it is 
undoubtedly feared that any greater liberalisation may further encourage technology 
enclaves and dual economies, especially if the free zones remain distinct from the 
domestic productive base. Finally, these conservatives have also argued that by creathig 
the free zones, the reformers are actually being short sighted given that such zones are 
essentially onshore tax havens, and that their autonomous existence may make it 
difficult for the UAE to implement corporation tax or any other form of control in future 
years.
In a recent study on this debate by the Dubai Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry, results indicated that there are indeed such identifiable groups for and against 
greater FDI in the UAE, in addition to a sizeable third group stressing the need for a 
more moderate path. Firstly, with regard to the conservatives, it was noted that there are 
a considerable number of officials and observers in the UAE who continue to stress the 
need to proceed with caution when ‘opening the door to FDI’. These conservatives 
have pointed out a number of die negative implications which may result from an overly 
liberal approach to investment in the UAE, and have voiced their intention to oppose 
such policies as and when they are brought to discussion. A good example being 
Muhammad al-Khuri, the president of the International Central Circle Group, who 
emphasises not only the tax-related drawbacks associated with unrestrained FDI, but 
also its worsening effects on the UAE’s already imbalanced population structure and the 
considerable risks posed to local UAE markets if a high value of FDI were to be 
suddenly withdrawn. As such, al-Khuri argues that:
“What is important is not to go for more foreign investments, but to lay 
down the basis and controls that govern existing investments and find out 
the best methods of benefiting from them and avoiding negative effects 
which may arise as a result of their expansion." 56
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In contrast, the study also highlighted the opinions of certain pro-reform 
officials who contend that FDI plays a crucial role in all developed countries and that, 
with a veiled reference to the oil-dependent Abu Dhabian economy, a financial surplus 
in the hands of citizens cannot be considered a valid reason for conservatism and the 
restriction of FDI. Moreover, this group also argues that the risks of greater FDI are far 
outweighed by its important benefits; the most important of which are seen to be 
technology linkages, the provision of jobs and training for nationals, and the 
diversification of the productive base. These officials also claim that low FDI and 
economic isolation will ultimately lead to higher costs and reduced competitiveness, 
reminding tiieir opposition that other developing states such as Singapore, Malaysia, 
and Korea have all succeeded in embracing FDI while having seemingly overcome the 
associated problems and dangers. Advocates of greater FDI have included FNC 
member Musallam bin Hum, who maintains that if such investments do not duplicate 
local projects, then they are wholly advantageous to the UAE and that 100% foreign 
ownership in die free zones is entirely acceptable.257 Similarly, Muhammad Yasin, the 
director general of Emirates Commercial Centre, has joined these supporters of greater 
FDI by claiming that:
"... more FDI would support the local economy and lead to equilibrium in 
the trade balance, diverting the UAE from being an importer of products 
and exporter of investments to a recipient of investments. ”258
Moreover, Jasim al-Shamsi, the director of the Budget Department of the Ministry of 
Finance and Industry, shares this structural view, arguing that greater FDI in the 
manufacturing sector will eventually improve the UAE’s integration with international 
production systems, and that instead of fearing the creation of foreign enclaves, local 
UAE companies should instead embrace FDI, as foreign investors are likely to allow 
them to improve penetration of export markets by providing them with important 
contacts and information such as the location of the best distribution outlets.259 Also, in 
much the same way, Dr. Muliammad Sliihab, an economics expert in the federal 
Planning Department, believes that greater FDI is entirely beneficial to the UAE and
263
that die fears of multinational dominance and loss of national identity have been greatly 
exaggerated. Indeed, in an interview with the chamber he stated that:
“The UAE, being a mono-resource economy country, -where oil dominates 
the local resources, should strive to develop its local investments and attract 
FDI to lessen dependence on the oil revenue in its development process.
The importance of FDI in the UAE is not restricted to being a means of 
economic development, but should be considered as a factor which helps in 
increasing the country’s economic integration in the international economic 
system as well. ”260
The third group identified by the chamber’s study were those moderates who 
stress die need for a balance between reforms and conservatism. Essentially, the 
moderates maintain that by introducing appropriate laws and regulations, the benefits of 
FDI can be maximised while at the same time preserving national heritage and avoiding 
the dangers of unbridled foreign investment. Such foreign investment laws would 
prevent economic dumping and other harmful consequences of FDI, while also 
directing FDI into the most beneficial sectors.261 To this end, these moderates have 
called for an institution capable of both promotion and restraint, citing the successful 
examples of moderate strategies in Taiwan and Japan where FDI has been both 
encouraged and limited, and where foreign companies have transferred much of their 
technology within a comprehensive package of industrial policies.262 Indeed, Dr. 
Muhammad al-Assouri, the director of research in Emirates Industrial Bank, sums up 
this group’s preference for such a dual strategy:
“We [the UAE] should act as an open market allowing free and fair 
competition, but at the same time, we should prepare our public and private 
institutions and companies for the inevitable forthcoming competition. This 
way the UAE will have an effective role in the new global economic 
relations. ” 263
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4.6- Conclusion
In addition to reiterating the potentially negative implications of rentierism / 
allocation, tliis chapter focused heavily on the role of internal structures and their 
associated pathologies in an effort to explain some of the more persistent development 
problems facing the UAE’s modernising monarchies, especially those which have 
seemingly stemmed from a lack of co-operation, mismanagement, opaqueness, and 
other primarily domestic concerns. Indeed, by underscoring the impact of reinvigorated 
neo-patrimonial networks, bureaucratic self-interests, and differing client elite 
orientations on the UAE’s policymaking and policy implementation processes, it was 
shown how in many cases the same strengthened traditional and dependent structures 
which have allowed for monarchical survival and political stability are now so deeply 
entrenched that they actively shape, and often undermine, socio-economic development 
objectives and the planners’ attempts to modify the UAE’s circumstances. Specifically, 
this investigation required an examination of the UAE’s decision-making structure at 
both federal and emirate levels, an analysis of the organisation and performance of the 
many other institutions and bureaucracies which make up the UAE’s rapidly expanding 
administration, and finally a consideration of the existence and interaction of key 
interest groups within die UAE’s apparently heterogeneous elite.
Essentially, it was shown how the UAE’s decision-making structure at the 
federal level is still dominated by hereditary rulers and their appointees in what would 
appear a hybrid neo-patrimonial government of seemingly modem institutions grafted 
onto powerful traditional authorities. Moreover, although a legislature does exist, the 
unicameral non-elected chamber of appointed representatives has remained in a 
paralysed state, often unable to exercise its constitutional rights and frequently 
incapable of questioning or restraining the executive. Furthermore, at the emirate level, 
local governments and departments continue to exist, some of which are subordinate but 
many of which run parallel to and overlap their federal counterparts. Certainly, there 
have been numerous occasions when the fabric of the union has been stretched to 
breaking point, often over vital issues of national interest such as oil policy, foreign
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affairs and defence. Thus, while the federation has certainly strengthened in recent 
years with the greater incorporation of Dubai, it is nevertheless still more accurate to 
consider the UAE as something of a loose confederation with its relatively autonomous 
and at times uncoordinated emirate-level powers continuing to shape the state’s 
development.
Also capable of influencing Emirati development have been the various other 
institutions, parastatals, and bureaucracies tasked with policy implementation and 
advisory roles. Case studies of the various chambers of commerce, judicial institutions, 
and financial institutions have provided examples of how these are also very much part 
of a rigid neo-patrimonial network of non-elected appointments and close links to the 
traditional polity. Furthermore, it was shown how in certain circumstances these 
institutions have suffered from a number of other pathologies including bureaucratic 
self-interest, opaqueness, and a lack of genuine independence. Indeed, the BCCI 
scandal of the early 1990s can be seen as a prime example of die devastating effect of 
such a combination of pathologies; with die management and fortunes of one of die 
UAE’s most prominent development-related institutions having been inextricably linked 
to the traditional polity, with the offending bureaucracies having prevented disclosure in 
die interests of self-preservation, with die major regulatory bodies being powerless to 
intervene, and widi the host emirate’s local government and legal system left vulnerable 
to external interference and corruption.
Finally, in an attempt to highlight the non-homogenous nature of the UAE’s 
client elite, the third section of this chapter revealed the increasing struggle over the 
future of Emirati development between the reformers and conservatives. Although bodi 
orientations are of course components of the same dominant rentier class deriving 
income from economic rent, the reformers can be seen as ‘new rentiers’ while the 
conservatives can be seen as ‘old rentiers’. Essentially the new rentiers have sought 
fresh sources of economic rent fr om non-oil related activities such as the letting of real 
estate and commercial free zones, while the old rentiers have sought to perpetuate the
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steady flow of oil revenues. As demonstrated, a number of controversial issues such as 
foreign property ownership, foreign business ownership, and foreign direct investment 
have led to protracted disputes between those attempting to liberalise the economy and 
foster the growth of these non-oil related activities, and those attempting to preserve the 
status quo and safeguard what they believe to be the UAE’s national interests. Thus, 
with conflicting legislation, work-arounds, pioneering projects, and attempts to 
circumvent existing regulations, the interactions of these opposing elite interest groups 
must be regarded as another major domestic influence on the UAE’s socio-economic 
development.
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5. Globalisation and the prospects for 
Civil Society
With Hie described reforms of die UAE’s ‘new rentiers’ clearly encouraging die 
much touted forces of ‘globalisation’ and the ‘new economy’, it is the aim of this final 
chapter to assess die seemingly ambiguous impact of such increasing external 
influences on the UAE’s dependent development and the future of its domestic 
structures. In particular, it will be suggested on the one hand how globalising forces, as 
extensions of die same international forces which created die dependent structures in the 
first place, may continue to reinforce die UAE’s dependency-related domestic 
pathologies; while on the other hand something of a second wave of globalisation may 
be capable of surmounting such obstacles and engendering genuinely liberalising 
reforms. More specifically, following an overview of the main academic debate and a 
brief histoiy of globalising forces in the region, the effects of globalisation on domestic 
businesses will be discussed, alongside die controversial ‘globalisation versus 
regionalisation’ issue, and the growing influence of international non-governmental 
organisations on Emirati economic structures. Secondly, die socio-cultural impact of 
globalisation will be measured, with particular emphases placed on the perceived 
erosion of Emirati heritage, the role of die Arabic language, and the influence of global 
mass media. Thirdly, this chapter will also outline what are believed to be die main 
preconditions for the development of civil society, before assessing the current state of 
rentier-dependency weakened associational life in the UAE, and the potential role of 
globalising forces in overcoming such impediments and fostering meaningful political 
development.
5.7 - The globalisation dilemma
Internationalised economies with widespread inter-state activities have 
existed for centuries, but in most cases individual national economies remained distinct 
and predominant. In more recent years, however, tiiere has been a growing trend 
towards a more globalised economy in which such individual economies have been
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“subsumed and re-articulated into a system by international processes and 
transactions”.1 This ‘globalisation’ can, therefore, be viewed as both an evolution and 
as a qualitative shift from internationalisation as it supplies functional integration to the 
previously dispersed economic activities of separate national economies.2 Furthermore, 
although globalisation has been regarded by political scientists as being primarily a 
characteristic of economic activity, it is, however, also a multidimensional force with 
the power of not only subsuming national economies but also of re-shaping national 
identities. Indeed, as many planners in the developing world have realised, while 
globalisation may on the one hand offer an escape route avoiding future economic 
marginalisation, at the same time it may also have serious implications for then 
indigenous political systems, societies, and cultures.
If the slogan of the annual Dubai Shopping Festival, "One World, One 
Family, One Festival" is to be taken literally,3 it would seem that the UAE, or at least 
Dubai, is prepared to embrace wholeheartedly the forces of globalisation. Certainly, as 
demonstrated earlier in tins thesis, it would appear that the government of Dubai and its 
business community are both welcoming and actively encouraging foreign investment, 
international communications, and many of the other developments commonly 
associated with globalisation. Indeed, in citing a recent speech by Dubai’s energetic 
and reforming crown prince, David Hirst illustrates this point well:
"Early last year His Highness General Shaykh Muhammad bin Maktum 
announced at a press conference that the Internet revolution and the ‘new 
global economy' were coming to Dubai. It was an incongruous spectacle: 
so traditional a figure, in distinctive black dishdasha, delivering a pep talk 
like some wired and. with-it corporate executive. As ‘synergy", ‘internet- 
enabled solutions’, ‘cycle-time reduction' and suchlike flashed across a 
screen behind him, he swore he would have his globalised 
‘government@Dubai 'fully in place within 18 months or else... ”4
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Moreover, in the near future globalisation in Dubai is predicted to reach even higher 
levels following the much publicised ‘Dubai 2003’; a massive event which will host 
members of the World Bank, the IMF, and other international organisations. This 
gathering is seen as confinning Dubai’s position at the crossroads of die new global 
economy and, as the event’s co-ordinator, Ibrahim Belselah, has described, “it will offer 
the opportunity for Dubai to reach out to global investors and decision-makers while 
affinning the emirate’s credibility and stability.”5 But has this same pro-globalisation 
attitude been shared by die odier emirates and interest groups? As die earlier case 
studies regarding foreign property ownership and foreign business ownership have 
indicated, there has clearly been little consensus with many of die more conservative 
‘old rentiers’ remaining firmly opposed to such reforms and wary of the perceived 
dangers of greater global integration. Certainly, by building upon the previous 
chapter’s discussion of the role of foreign direct investment,6 it would appear tiiat there 
is now also something of a national debate between those seeking to maximise the 
benefits of ‘benign globalisation’, and in contrast those wishing to maintain and 
augment the existing restrictions and regulations in an effort to preserve not only the 
UAE’s national economy but also its distinct national society and culture.
To complicate die matter further, it would seem tiiat neither camp has been 
able to present a definitive argument in their favour, given the paucity of real-world 
examples from other developing states experiencing similar conditions. Furthermore, 
on a more conceptual level, the abundance of both convincing pro and anti-globalisation 
literature has only served to fuel die debate, especially as botii schools of thought would 
appear to be directly applicable to the UAE’s development. Predictably, the anti­
globalisation writings of Samir Amin7 and others reinforce dependency theory by tying 
in globalising forces with the capitalist interests of the core economies and the notion of 
unequal ‘underdevelopment’. As such, globalisation is seen as a collection of 
‘predatoiy’ socio-economic forces which will eventually incorporate and undermine 
peripheral nation states in order to allow for the greater expansion of capitalist markets. 
Therefore, witiiin such a framework, globalisation is seen as leading to the loss of 
control over domestic economies and resources, generating disequilibrium and
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fragmentation within developing states,8 and of course also threatening national identity 
and eroding social cohesion. Thus, mindfiil of these dangers, the solutions suggested by 
the anti-globalisation theorists and many of die UAE’s conservatives have centred 
around a more activist nation state capable of regulating potentially harmful forces and 
offering greater protection. In contrast, much of the recent pro-globalisation literature 
has provided support and solutions for tiiose reformers seeking to liberalise die UAE’s 
economy and welcome the forces of globalisation.9 Indeed, arguing that greater global 
integration, labour migration, improved communications, and otiier manifestations of 
‘convergence’ will not only bring economic improvements but will also provide long­
term social and political benefits,10 the pro-globalisation theorists suggest that 
developing states should not resist such changes, but should instead remove all 
obstacles in order to facilitate diis inevitable transformation.
5.2 - The historical antecedents of globalisation
As Frauke Heard-Bey notes in her study of the Trucial Coast, for a long 
period die shared waters of die Persian Gulf not only served as conduits between die 
various shaykhdoms, but also as an economic lifeline to the rest of the world.11 Indeed, 
this ‘lifeline’ became especially evident at die turn of the century when a common 
regional interest in the profitable pearling industry began to encourage far greater 
contact and co-operation between the various towns and ports. Although certainly 
stunted by the described British exclusivity agreements and the region’s subsequent 
incorporation into the British-Indian economic network; international trade, overseas 
markets, and labour migration nevertheless all became key features of the lower Gulfs 
economic life during diis early period.
More recendy, following the creation of the federation in die early 1970s, 
there began a fresh wave of greater regional and international economic integration. As 
demonstrated, at this time the UAE’s planners were concentrating heavily on a broad 
strategy of diversification, requiring the UAE’s non-oil related sectors to expand in an 
effort to reduce the economy’s reliance on its single primary product export. Such a
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strategy, especially with regard to the UAE’s domestic export-based industries and 
commercial activities, therefore called for a far superior framework of co-operation not 
only between the UAE and the other Gulf States, but also between the UAE and 
potential international markets.12 Thus, from the 1970s and onwards, die attempts to 
establish greater trade links led to a plediora of mutually beneficial industrial, 
commercial, and tourist agreements linking the UAE widi many other states, 
predominantly those in South Asia and Africa, but also with some as far afield as 
Singapore and Brunei.13 Indeed, thirty years later many of these bilateral agreements 
are still in place, and can therefore be regarded as important antecedents of the region’s 
more recent global economic integration.
Similarly, witii regard to die socio-cultural globalisation of die region, it is 
also important to note that by the late nineteenth century the lower Gulf was already 
beginning to experience greater cultural influences from other parts of die Middle East 
and North Africa. Certainly, as Abdullah explains, this was especially evident 
following the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869:
“Steam navigation routes reconnected the lower Gulf with Egypt after a 
rupture of about three hundred years. These new lines of communication 
also brought to the Gulf as well as international mail, Cairo daily 
newspapers and literary magazines, thus helping to foster more of a 
political awareness within the educated groups. This was especially 
significant given the fact that before the First World War the Gulf did not 
even possess an Arabic printing press. ”14
Moreover, during this period the region’s previously narrow economic links with the 
Indian subcontinent also began to expand to include much greater cultural stimulation. 
Indeed, as die pearling industry reached its zenidi, die international trading hub of 
Bombay had already grown rapidly in size and diversity, widi the city widely regard as 
being a cosmopolitan cultural centre and as a symbol of ‘British-western civilisation’.15 
Given Bombay’s close links with die Trucial Coast, particularly with Dubai, there is
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little doubt that much of this foreign influence also began to filter through to the lower 
Gulf. Bombay, like Cairo, possessed many printing presses, and a mixture of Indian 
and Egyptian-published volumes duly found their way into private libraries along the 
Trucial Coast.16 Furthermore, as Fatrna Al-Sayegh describes, the increasingly frequent 
contact witii Indian and other Arab merchants in Bombay was already leading to a much 
greater awareness of world developments and stimulated much greater political thinking 
among those in the lower Gulf.17
Of course by the tune of the oil booms, the massive influx of foreign 
workers together with the vast consumption of imported goods, the improved 
communications, and the Emiratis’ newfound ability to travel overseas, all considerably 
accelerated the region’s socio-cultural global integration. Indeed, even in 1973, just two 
years after the creation of the federation, Kevin Fenelon remarked how
"... the presence of a large number of expatriates, drawn from many nations, 
cannot but have a great influence in breaking down conservatism, old 
habits, and prejudices against other ways of life, such as might have been 
felt in more isolated, communities”.18
Moreover, Fenelon also foresaw the influence of mass media and foreign travel on 
Emirati society and culture:
"... television and radio have done much to widen horizons, as these media 
penetrate into the home and thus reach all members of the family, including 
the women's quarters. The almost universal possession of transistor radios 
has brought the happenings of the outside world into relatively remote 
regions. In the towns, modern cinemas that show films in Arabic, English 
and Indian languages are very popular, again providing links with the 
outside world. Merchants are well travelled, and it is not unusual for them 
to travel abroad several times a year. Many now are bringing their families 
on visits to Beirut, Cairo and Europe. In Oxford Street, London, ladies from
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the Gulf can be seen not infrequently in the summer doing their shopping, 
masked and veiled as they would be at home - a striking combination of the 
ultra-traditional with the most modern. ”19
Writing ten years later, Malcohn Peck made similar observations, especially 
with regaid to die increasing number of foreigners in the UAE’s schools and 
universities. Certainly, by focusing on the example of the University of the UAE in Al- 
‘Ayn, he demonstrated how in die late 1970s and early 1980s local UAE students were 
beginning to come into much greater contact than ever before with foreign students and 
staff. In particular, he highlighted the Palestinian contingent of students, which at that 
time comprised the largest non-local student body in the UAE. The assumption was 
diat increasing interaction widi such groups would soon widen die socio-cultural 
horizons of Emirati students, and at the very least make them more receptive towards 
ideas such as Arab nationalism than previous generations.20 Aldiougli, as diis thesis has 
shown, Arab nationalism has never really taken a firm hold in the UAE,21 there is 
nevertheless little doubt that Peck’s broader socio-cultural predictions are being realised 
as expanding expatriate contingents continue to exchange ideas and experiences with 
the local youth.
5.3- The impact ofglobalising forces on the contemporary economy
In more recent years, one of the most debated features of increasing 
economic integration and globalisation has been the seemingly inevitable increase in 
international competition, and of course the extent to which diis will affect die UAE’s 
domestic businesses. Unsurprisingly, in much the same way as the foreign investment 
question, the UAE’s refonners and conservatives have remained at odds over the way in 
which the government and local Emirati enteiprises should best adapt to tiiese changes. 
On the one hand, many local Dubai businessmen appeal’ positive and seem ready to 
accept a more liberal and global trading environment. Certainly, as ’Ahmad Al-Shaykh 
argues, Dubai family-based businesses will always have a place, and although they may 
have suffered initially due to international competition, they are nevertheless going to
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be well suited to change as their small size will allow for more streamlined decision­
making and less bureaucracy:
“As such, their growth should be fast, and as long as laws are introduced to 
improve the transparency of family businesses, they can hope to reap the 
benefits of international markets, e-commerce, and improved global 
communications. ”22
On the other hand, however, Muhammad Al-Meshrikh, a member of the Sharjah 
Chamber of Commerce and Industry, offers a more cautious perspective. Claiming that 
family-owned businesses cannot possibly hope to compete “in an open market with 
multinationals that own expert houses and huge capitals”, he contends that globalising 
forces will soon require the UAE’s family firms to either merge or to go public simply 
in order to survive.23 Although, as of yet, there are perhaps too few examples to 
accurately assess the impact of these forces on domestic businesses, it would seem that 
the pro-globalisation thinkers can nevertheless draw much comfort from the many small 
family enterprises, especially those in Dubai and Abu Dhabi, which have clearly seized 
the opportunities of globalisation and which have definitely begun to prosper in a 
greater international market Among others, these have ranged from Arabian sword 
vendors and tailors to cake shops and luxury soap manufacturers, all of which not only 
offer value for money and efficient service, but have also adopted the concepts of e­
commerce and Internet marketing in order to expand their customer bases.24
An equally complex issue has been the debate over globalisation versus 
regionalisation, with many UAE nationals arguing that another major economic impact 
of greater globalisation has been the stagnation and sidelining of the UAE’s regional 
economic integration with the other Gulf States and the rest of the Arab world. Indeed, 
claiming that die UAE is now pursuing globalisation without first promoting 
regionalisation, many have asserted that individual national economies also need to be 
part of a strong regional economy which can be used as a safety net in times of crisis 
and instability as, in the event of an economic downswing, it is thought likely that the
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multinationals and other foreign companies will be the first to withdraw their 
investments from the UAE. Thus, it is argued that greater regionalisation should be 
seen as a necessary first step in order to consolidate the national economy and to 
provide a more effective launch pad from which to enter the global economy.25 
Although in much the same way as the implications for domestic businesses, it is 
perhaps again too early to judge the long-term effects of globalisation over 
regionalisation, there are nevertheless already clear indications of such imbalanced 
economic integration. Certainly, as the following statistics highlight, there is now little 
doubt that the UAE’s key trading partners have become almost exclusively non­
regional, non-Arab economies:
Dubai: Major non-oil trading partners - imports
[Source: Dubai Department of Ports and Customs]26
Clearly, in the case of Dubai, the central hub of the UAE’s trading activities, almost all 
of the emirate’s imports currently originate from Western or Asian trading partners, 
with Iran, traditionally the UAE’s highest placed regional partner, now ranking just 
twentieth.
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Dubai: Major non-oil trade partners - exports
[Source: Dubai Deparlment of Ports and CustomsJ27
Similarly, if Dubai’s re-exporting activity is excluded,28 it would appear that, in addition 
to the aforementioned consumption / import bias and the resulting trade imbalance,2 9 
almost all of the major trading partners for the UAE’s exports are either Western or Far 
Eastern, with formerly significant regional partners such as Bahrain, Kuwait, and the 
Yemen now placed well outside of the top ten.
Moreover, with regard to investments, there is also believed to have been a 
discernable shift away from regional investment towards more global investment. 
Indeed, writing in the early 1990s, JE Jreisat had already highlighted the fact that 
although total Arab foreign investment was around $65 billion (almost of all of which 
was held by the governments, banks, and ruling families of the Gulf), only 5% of all 
surplus funds accumulated by these oil rich states was actually invested back into the 
region.30 Similarly, with regard to foreign direct investment, it has been shown by Sari 
Hanafi in his recent study of the ‘paradoxical effects of the UAE’s political economy’ 
how the UAE has become increasingly reliant on FDI from multinationals, with 
relatively little input from the Arab region. Specifically, the Jebel Ali Free Zone and 
the UAE’s other export processing zones are seen as being particularly strong examples 
of this trend, and have been accused of being geared entirely towards globalisation 
while doing little to support and promote regional integration. Indeed, by 2000, the
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Jebel Ali Free Zone comprised of over 1000 registered companies, of which about 32% 
were Asian, 30% were European, 14% were North American, and less than a quarter 
were Arab or Middle Eastern:31
Jebel Ali Free Zone Companies 2000: regional 
distribution
[Source: Jebel Ali Free Zone Authority 2000) ' ’
Thus, Hanafi convincingly argues that Arab investors have shied away from investing in 
such zones, claiming they feel less integrated with the structures than their European 
and North American counterparts. Moreover, it is also widely believed that many Arab 
investors are now reluctant to invest in the UAE and the other Gulf States given the 
long history of restrictive business practices and ownership regulations, such as the 
aforementioned kafil sponsorship system. Indeed, citing the experiences of many 
Palestinian businessmen and investors in the UAE, Hanafi claims that even though 
some of these restrictions are now being relaxed, the old memories are taking time to 
fade, and many prefer to invest elsewhere believing that the UAE is specifically 
targeting western investors and multinationals.33
Another significant aspect of globalising forces on the UAE’s national 
economy has been the increasing presence and involvement of supranational economic 
organisations, most notably the Word Trade Organisation (WTO), the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). 
Although again it is perhaps rather premature to ascertain the relative positive or 
negative impact of such globalising influences on the UAE, it is nonetheless important 
to note that in some cases the ink has already dried on agreements signed between these
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organisations and the UAE, and in the very near future a number of these will come into 
effect, thereby permanently altering domestic economic structures. Moreover, as witii 
all other globalisation-related issues in the UAE, it is also important to recognise the 
deep divide which has emerged between the supporters and opponents of such 
involvement. While the most controversial of these future changes are likely to result 
from the region’s increasing co-operation with the IMF, which is already believed to be 
urging the GCC states, including the UAE, to strengthen their extraction capabilities 
and maybe even to levy some form of income tax,34 the UAE’s contentious membership 
of the WTO remains, however, the most visible example at present.
Regarded as institutionalising the national economy’s integration into the 
global economic system, many local observers contend that WTO membership can only 
have long-term benefits for the economies of the Gulf States.35 Most notably, it is 
believed that the technical and organisational assistance now being provided to the Arab 
Monetary Fund by the WTO will soon enhance multilateral trading in the Arab region, 
thereby dispelling any of the above mentioned concerns over globalisation without 
regionalisation.36 Furthermore, many UAE businessmen and industrialists argue that 
WTO membership will soon lead to very tangible benefits resulting from the improved 
copyright controls and international patent law outlined by the WTO’s TRIPS (Trade 
Related aspects of International Property Rights) agreement.37 Certainly it would seem 
that the UAE’s infant industries require much greater protection from copying and 
infringement by third parties, which remains a very real problem given the slew of 
copyright-breaking products which flow into tire region from South Asia and tire Far 
East. Indeed, as Muhammad Al-Jabrl, a prominent Dubai banker, has explained, in 
recent years many of tire UAE’s new computer programming and media companies 
have a faced a serious threat from computer pirates operating throughout the country. 
Following the TRIPS agreement, however, Al-Jabil claims that pirated software have 
already begun to disappear' from the UAE’s computer stores, allowing copyrighted 
products to claim a greater market share.38 Other clear examples of beneficial patent 
control would include tire rapid growth of the UAE’s indigenous pharmaceutical 
industry. For some time, the UAE’s pharmaceutical companies (most notably Julphar,
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Globalpharma, and Gulf Inject39) have struggled to establish their products alongside 
the plethora of low-cost, non-patented imports which have filled the shelves of most 
pharmacies, but following TRIPS, tiieir position appears to have been greatly 
strengthened40
In addition, other perceived advantages of WTO membership have included 
the proposed loosening of existing monopolies in the Gulf. Although such openings 
have not yet taken place, die UAE’s WTO monopoly exemptions will expire in 2003, 
and die government may soon be required to promote frill competition in previously 
monopolised sectors. A prime example will be the telecommunications sector where 
Etisalat’s monopoly position will be reduced by 2005 as a direct result of the UAE’s 
WTO agreements. Many locals argue that diis will lead to lower prices and improved 
Internet products, especially as new independent service providers (ISPs) will be able to 
offer competitive alternatives.41 Also, excepting these potentially harmful monopolies, 
given that membership of the WTO still allows for a wide array of special customs and 
trade practices specific to particular members, many argue that the UAE and die other 
Gulf States need not fear any real loss of control over tiieir national economies. Indeed, 
as the UAE’s Minister of Economy and Commerce, Shaykh Fahim al-Qasiml, has 
explained, although the UAE committed itself to the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT) when it joined the WTO in 1996, the country nevertheless still maintains 
the right to impose special duties on imports in order to protect indigenous infant 
industries from harmful competition, and to prevent other undesirable aspects of greater 
openness such as economic dumping.42 Furthermore, as al-Tamimi consultants note, 
many of the existing restrictions on foreign firms based in the UAE will be unaffected 
by WTO membership. For example, the aforementioned 49% cap on foreign capital 
participation will remain unchanged, at least by the WTO, given that tliis specific 
Emirati business requirement applies equally to all WTO members operating inside the 
UAE, and therefore does not violate die organisation’s principles of fair trade.43 
Similarly, the UAE’s continuing requirement that all registered commercial agents be 
100% nationals of tiieir respective country does not violate die General Agreement on 
Trade in Services (GATS). Thus, although fellow WTO member Bahrain has already
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voluntarily removed such a requirement, and the USA has lobbied heavily for such 
change elsewhere in the Gulf, the UAE remains well within its rights to retain these 
restrictions until it feels more comfortable to incorporate them into its own WTO 
‘Schedule of Commitments’.44 See appendix (viii).
In contrast, the opponents of WTO membership and the UAE’s agreements 
with other international organisations have argued that such affiliations and 
commitments will soon lead to costly changes to the economic structures of the Gulf 
States 45 Indeed, presenting the flipside to the question of monopolies and the example 
of Etisalat, these opponents contend that it may be unwise to open up certain key 
components of die UAE’s teclinological infrastructure to foreign and non-state 
controlled competition during what remains a relatively early stage of the UAE’s 
development. Moreover, it also feared that despite the current WTO permitted UAE- 
specific restrictions, other future WTO agreements may still seek to remove the 
necessary layers of protection currently enjoyed by many of the UAE’s infant 
industries. Without these layers, it is argued that some of the more recently established 
industries, including the UAE’s booming textile and ready-made clothes firms, are 
likely to falter as they will face stiff competition from Asian and African imports.46
Furthermore, it has also been argued that at present there are insufficient 
long-term economic incentives to balance the losses likely to result from such a removal 
of protection. Indeed, as Ali Merza of the UNDP has demonstrated, membership of the 
WTO does not even provide any real assistance in the restructuring of economic 
systems for developing states, and as the UAE and the other Gulf States already have 
clear development strategies in place, they are believed to be already capable of 
implementing their own changes when deemed necessary47 hi addition, the UAE and 
its oil producing neighbours are seen to be especially disadvantaged by such 
membership given that they continue to rely on oil and gas products which, as of yet, 
remain outside of the WTO’s list of reciprocal concessions. Thus, until hydrocarbons 
are explicitly included by the WTO, die Gulf States have few major financial incentives 
to join. Moreover, although the opponents accept that membership of the WTO does
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not interfere with a country’s right to employ its own citizens first, it is nevertheless 
feared that such WTO affiliation may still affect the UAE’s future labour nationalisation 
strategies, with ‘emirati sation’ legislation becoming harder to adopt as the UAE 
becomes increasingly expected to conform to international norms.48 Finally, it has also 
been noted that WTO membership may lead to certain unwanted political complications 
for the UAE and other Arab states. Indeed, as ’Ahmad Jiyad explains, although the 
UAE currently only grants ‘most favoured nation’ status to other GCC states,49 and still 
tends to rely on its long-established bilateral ‘double taxation’ treaties with other 
friendly countries,50 the terms of WTO agreements may, however, eventually require 
the UAE to grant die same favourable trade conditions to all other WTO member states, 
including boycotted states such as Israel.51
5.4 - The impact ofglobalising forces on contemporary society and culture
Alongside economic considerations, die impact of globalisation on a 
developing state’s society and culture has also been recognised as a key motor of 
change,52 and the UAE has been no exception, with accelerating and often highly 
intrusive socio-cultural globalising forces having caused local divisions between diose 
fearing and diose ready to embrace such changes. Firsdy, with regard to the opponents, 
perhaps die greatest concern has been over the perceived ‘cultural contamination’ of the 
UAE. Indeed, although the UAE’s ALESCO (Arab League for Educational, Scientific, 
and Cultural Organisation) representatives now no longer publicly speak of a cultural 
invasion,53 and have instead begun to express their desire to promote ‘fairness among 
odier equally worthy cultures’,54 there is, however, little doubt that a significant number 
of UAE nationals continue to blame globalising forces for the near-destruction of their 
country’s heritage {turath}55 Certainly as Sulayman Klialaf explains in his case study 
of Emirati culture, much of the lower Gulfs heritage was lost over the past diirty 
years,56 especially during the oil booms of the 1970s and 1980s when many of the 
region’s traditional buildings were rapidly replaced with tenements and skyscrapers, and 
when many began to exchange their traditional ways of life for seemingly more western 
and urban lifestyles. See appendix (ix).
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As such, many in the UAE and the other GCC states have reacted to the 
eroding effects of globalisation by initiating something of a modem-day cultural 
revival. Indeed, as Khalaf notes:
"... cultural revival is growing so fast as to reach levels of national industry 
in the Arabian Gulf societies... with... heritage revival appearing at this 
time juncture as an expanding national cultural industry. ”57
Indeed, museums were simply not necessary in the region in earlier times as traditional 
activities remained a pail of eveiyday life, but as Khalaf argues, there is now seen to be 
an increasing need for ‘living museums’ and ‘imagined communities’ such as the Dubai 
Heritage Village, the Pearling Village, and die recently constructed Hatta Heritage 
Village, all of which have been created and promoted by the emirate-level tourism 
departments. Of course, tliis speedy reaction to potentially damaging globalising forces 
is of particular significance, especially given the government’s in-built need to preserve 
and create ‘living memories’ to remind the population of their culture and heritage.58 
Certainly, as tliis diesis has demonstrated, these museums and heritage centres are not 
only seen to be performing an increasingly necessary role in the UAE’s economic 
diversification dirough tourism strategy, but have also served to reinforce an integral 
component of the traditional polity’s legitimacy formula.
Related to diis cultural erosion, the impact of globalising forces on the 
UAE’s national language, Arabic, has also roused considerable opposition and has 
prompted strong reactions, often from die highest levels. Indeed, long considered a 
symbol of advanced civilisation and a source of great pride in the Arab world, the 
Arabic language is now becoming increasingly marginalised in the UAE. Widi massive 
and diverse non-Arab expatriate populations from die subcontinent and East Asia, in 
addition to significant British and European minorities, English has quickly become the 
lingua franca for almost all private sector gatherings ranging from board meetings to 
secretarial functions. Indeed, English is now die primary language in even some of the 
major semi-governmental organisations such as Dubai’s Emirates Airlines. Similarly,
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Hindi is universally understood and frequently used by the less educated sections of the 
population engaged in retailing, transport, construction, and other blue-collar activities. 
In fact, even many of the young UAE nationals are now well acquainted with Hindi, 
having been brought by up Asian childcarers. Moreover, while other globalising forces 
such as English language television (including Arab-run English TV stations),59 films, 
DVDs, radio stations, and pop music are of course also contributing towards this 
marginalisation of the Arabic language, perhaps the most important factor, at least for 
the UAE’s youth, will be the increasing use of English in their secondary and tertiary 
education. Certainly, for those schooled in the private sector, English will have been 
their primary medium of instruction from an early age.60 Indeed, in her recent study of 
the UAE’s national identity, Sally Findlow supports this view by demonstrating the 
changing attitudes of Emirati students towards the use and necessity of Arabic. In a 
1999 survey, she investigated student preferences for English and Arabic in UAE 
colleges, finding that nearly half of respondents were in favour of solely English 
instruction, 30% wanted to have mixed English and Arabic instruction, and only 23% 
preferred to be taught in Arabic, simply claiming that it was ‘their language’:
UAE students* language preferences 1999
English I
Arabic
(mixed)
30%
Arabic
23% \ English
\ / 47%
[Source: Findlow / ECSSR 2000]61
Understandably, groups such as the Arabic Language Protection Association 
have attempted to limit this erosion of the national language by unwanted globalising
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forces. As Abdullah Al-Madfa, the association’s chairman explains, tlie main aim has 
been to:
“...preserve the Arabic language from an awkward mix of foreign 
vocabularies and dialects, and to limit the negative influences of the 
multicultural environment on the UAE's official language. A quick 
observation of the language used at present indicates a looming 
catastrophe. The new generations are becoming more and more distant 
from their native tongue, favouring other languages such as English. This 
has given rise to a new form of broken Arabic that combines various accents 
emerging on ihe surface. ',62
Among its activities have been plans to correct miss-spelt Arabic shop signs and street 
names, plans to introduce new and more interesting Arabic language lessons in schools, 
and plans to increase the number of Arabic language tutors for expatriate workers. 
Significantly, these initiatives have found much support from government organisations, 
especially in Sharjah, where hi an effort to check the spread of English and broken 
Arabic, the ruler decreed in late 2002 that all public departments shall in future use only 
Arabic in their correspondence and meetings63
Although by no means universally supported, perhaps the most popular 
feature of greater socio-cultural globalisation in the UAE has been the improvement in 
global communications, especially given its perceived positive effects on improving 
government accountability and transparency. Indeed, as Mai Yamani notes with 
reference to the Gulf States, transnational media including satellite television stations 
and Internet sites have considerably loosened tlie state’s grip over information and 
therefore reduced the relevance of state-controlled media. In particular, Yamani 
highlights tlie Kuwaiti Crisis as being a major turning point for public perception, 
arguing that the credibility of state television in the Gulf was irreversibly damaged as a 
result of its delayed and sanitised broadcasts regarding die Iraqi invasion and tlie cross 
border forays into Saudi territory.64 Gulf citizens could simply no longer rely on their
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own television stations for reliable information and instead switched their loyalties to 
global satellite channels such as CNN and the BBC. Moreover, although more closely 
related to regionalisation, these global-scale events were also seen as improving Arab 
media, by leading to greater demands for more probing and comprehensive Gulf news 
services capable of providing accurate information and reducing government 
opaqueness. Perhaps the strongest example of such development has been the creation 
of the Qatari-based Al-Jazira satellite station which, as Gerd Nonneman explains:
"...has broken through these traditions [of submissiveness, narrowness and 
dogmatism], and as a consequence has become one of the favourite sources 
of information in the Arab World (even if avoiding criticism of Qatar's own 
ruler), however much regional regimes at times fulminate against it. ”65
Indeed, in 1994 the BBC World Service assisted in training Al-Jazira’s Arab production 
crew and, as part of their training, the staff were encouraged to be more critical and 
questioning of government officials, a trend which appears to have been followed by 
most of the other Gulf satellite television stations in recent years. Certainly, as Yamani 
asserts, Al-Jazira and these other stations have led to something of a cultural 
competition between Gulf television stations as each attempts to produce the most 
sensationalist programming.66 Thus, although as the latter part of tliis chapter will 
demonstrate, the UAE’s television stations have remained more cautious than their 
Qatari and Bahraini counterparts, it nevertheless remains possible that die snowball 
effect taking place elsewhere in the Gulf may eventually lead to changes in the UAE’s 
media, diereby complementing die existing transparency initiatives.
5,5 - Civil society and globalisation
In his revealing study of neopatriarchal society and political change, Hisham 
Shaiabi contends that many of the existing power structures in the Arab world cannot be 
overcome simply by revolution, modernisation or development. Instead, it is argued 
diat the state-society relationship needs to fundamentally change from one of
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authoritarianism to one capable of humanising social relations and liberating political 
life.67 Thus, for long-term political development and a shift in the existing order, 
Sharabi and many others believe that there first needs to be greater and more genuine 
civil society in the Arab world. Indeed, with regard to the UAE, this would seem a 
particularly sound hypothesis given the confirmed stability of its political structures and 
the resistance of its neo-patrimonial networks to rapid socio-economic development and 
the forces of modernisation. As such, this section will concentrate on the emergence of 
such civil society in the UAE, the problems faced, and tire prospects for the future. In 
particular, following a suitable definition of the concept within the context of the UAE 
and a theoretical framework outlining the commonly regarded preconditions for 
successful indigenous growth, die contemporary state of Emirati civil society will be 
assessed and, specifically, it will be shown how high levels of financial and 
organisational co-option and die absence of any real cultural milieu (problems which 
can be seen as the rentier-dependency products of persisting patrimonial networks and a 
continuing reliance on vast quantities of expatriate labour) have repressed and stunted 
associational life in the UAE. Finally, however, it will also be shown how certain new 
globalising forces including improved communications and the increasing presence of 
international NGOs may, unlike the earlier dependency-related external forces, be 
capable of reshaping these domestic civil society structures and catalysing the growdi of 
stronger associations.
5.5.1 - Preconditions for the emergence of civil society
What exactly is meant by ‘civil society’, and how should die term be best 
applied to the UAE? In her survey of civil society in southern Arabia, Sheila Carapico 
explored the strength of associational life and the proliferation of voluntary 
associations.68 Working witiiin a similar framework to de Toqueville’s earlier study of 
civil society,69 she demonstrated that hi die Yemen there existed a network of 
institutions and associations which “operated in a pluralistic, continuously contested 
public space or public civic realm, a zone between the state and private sectors”. 
Moreover, she contended that the existence of such a zone in the emerging Arab states
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could serve as a “layer or buffer between government and households... representing a 
third, non-governmental, non-profit making, voluntary sector of modem society.”70 
Crucially, it was also suggested that such a layer might also include many seemingly 
traditional and tribal groups: a key factor with regard to die study of Emirati 
associational life given the previously described tribal nature of society in the lower 
Gulf.71 Writing with a more general reference to the developing world, Melnan 
Kamrava has largely concurred with Carapico’s view, while also higlilighting the 
potential political power of civil society and, on a more individual level, also 
emphasising die existence of the many important social actors that often constitute civil 
society:
"Civil society gives rise to a very specific type of organisation, one that is 
social in its genesis and composition but can be political in its agendas and 
initiatives. It is an organisation that is formed out of the independent, 
autonomous initiatives of politically concerned individuals. These social 
actors are united by a common concern, often rallying around a specific 
issue (e.g. greater political space, less literary censorship, etc.). But 
irrespective of their specifics, if their demands on the state were met, they 
would either directly or indirectly result in a greater opening up of the 
political process. ”72
Thus, in light of these definitions, examples of such civil society 
organisations could be seen to include a wide variety of voluntary and socially 
orientated associations ranging from women’s organisations, charities, and expatriate 
community centres, to diose widi potentially greater political motivations such as 
human rights organisations, religious groups, media societies, and workers’ 
associations. Secondly, as Carapico asserts, any evidence of independent intellectual 
production, including newsletters, poetry readings, and literaiy journals must also be 
considered, as these all form part of what Europeanists would define as being the ‘civic 
realm’. Thirdly, any voluntarily organised, non-governmental, and non-commercial 
events such as academic seminars, conventions, demonstrations, and celebrations can
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also be considered a part of civil society, not least because they also provide an
7’Aimportant outlet for the dissemination of ideas and die creation of public opinion. 
Finally, complementing these organisations, certain social actors can also be identified 
in most emerging civil societies, and, as Kamrava has shown, these can include a wide 
range of motivated persons including politicians, intellectuals, and journalists.74
Despite visibly possessing many examples of these associations and actors, 
civil society in die UAE has, however, remained weak, at least on one level, due to the 
absence of certain key prerequisites. Firstiy, there is clearly a severe lack of ‘civic 
space’. Indeed, in dieir highly relevant study of resurgent associational life in Eastern 
Europe following the demise of the USSR, Weigle and Butterfield emphasised the 
necessity of autonomous civic space above all else. In particular, it was argued diat 
without an institutional base capable of defining such space, a country’s associations 
and actors would be rendered incapable of participation and voluntary organisation.75 
As Carapico notes, in most states this civic space can usually be determined by an 
interrelated set of four factors:
1. The level of suppression or liberalisation as determined by the regime
2. The existence of a legal framework and constitutional framework that 
either excludes, tolerates or fosters civil society organisations
3. The level of public infrastructure necessary for the growdi of civil 
society organisations, e.g. communications, buildings, etc.
4. The availability of economic resources for public, private, and voluntary 
sector investment
Together these factors effectively set the parameters within which associations and 
actors can press for greater tolerance, expanded services, and clearer separation of 
private from public wealdi76 Thus, on first inspection the UAE would appear to meet 
many of these preconditions, as both the regime and constitutional framework seem 
relatively tolerant of associational life, and die level of public infrastructure and die 
availability of economic resources are undoubtedly far higher than in most other
296
developing states. However, as will be revealed, the UAE’s civic space has actually 
remained extremely limited with a number of under-the-surface circumstances 
combining to prevent and discourage the emergence of genuinely independent 
associations. Certainly, as Carapico described of the nearby Yemen, “civil society is 
rarely a binomial event, either there or not, but instead a variable that assumes different 
forms under different circumstances.”77
Moreover, alongside these four factors regarding civic space, another 
important precondition for the emergence of civil society must also be considered, 
especially given the UAE’s demonstrated reliance on large numbers of resident 
expatriates.78 Specifically, it has been argued that for successful growth there must 
exist a homogenous national culture, rather than smaller cultural sub-groups which are 
likely to retain their own specific norms, rituals, and status. A vibrant civil society may 
therefore require a nationally uniform cultural milieu where there is seen to be a 
“standardisation of idiom” and where people are bound “not by segmentaiy, exclusivist 
institutions that differentiate, but rather by associations that are unsanctified, 
instrumental, revocable and yet effective.”79 The many disparate groups of expatriates 
working and living in the UAE, many with little common middle ground, can therefore 
be seen as blocking this necessary precondition. Indeed, as former US Ambassador to 
the UAE, William Rugh, claims:
"... the UAE is not a 'meltingpot ’. Many separate and distinct social and 
ethnic groups reside in the UAE side by side, each maintaining its own 
cultural identity and tolerating the other in a 'live and let live' environment.
The largest groups - Indians, Pakistanis, Bangladeshis, and Filipinos as 
well as the smaller ones such as the British, all have their own schools, their 
own clubs, and their own places of worship, and they tend to spend their 
leisure time with their own people. The foreigners learn just enough Arabic 
to get by. Many spend, a minimal amount of their earnings, sending most of 
the money home to relatives. ”80
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Although there are of course countries such as India where large sub-groups do exist 
and civil society does thrive, the sub-groups in the UAE are often temporary workers 
unwilling to involve themselves in what is perceived to be an alien society. As Rugh 
noted, this has led to an overall lack of engagement and a general sense of apathy in 
most of the expatriate groups. Moreover, by citing a rare example of street protests by 
Pathans in the UAE, he showed how tlie wealth and employment security offered by the 
rentier state was easily sufficient to quell any sustained civil society activism by 
expatriates:
“In December 1992 when a mob of Hindus in the Indian city of Ayodhya 
destroyed the Bahri Masjid Mosque, and Muslims protested in many places, 
Muslims in the UAE (mainly Pakistani) also took to the streets... These 
demonstrations lasted only about two days, however, as the government 
promptly rounded up several hundred suspects and deported them. The 
protests suddenly stopped. Jobs were more important. ”8i
Indeed, given their cautious acceptance of their employers’ sponsorship and their 
strictly temporary view of life in the Gulf, which is often regarded as a stepping stone to 
other countries and as a quick means of making money,82 tlie majority of die UAE’s 
resident expatriates are extremely weak civil society actors lacking any strong cultural
♦ 83and institutional ties widi the constituencies they serve or claim to represent.
5.5.2 - The co-option and patronage of civil society
By further investigating the underlying problems which appear to be 
restricting Emirati civic space, and by combining these with the fragmented cultural 
milieu and the wealth-driven objectives of most of the population, diis section will 
attempt to highlight some of the main weaknesses of contemporary civil society in the 
UAE. In particular, it will be shown how very few civil society associations are able to 
gain any genuine autonomy, with almost all being organisationally and financially tied 
to government ministries and ruling families, and with many of the more independent
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expatriate societies now facing increasing restrictions and regulations. Thus, as 
demonstrated in the discussion of the UAE’s niling bargain, even though there has of 
yet been little pressure for the polity to pursue a repressive maintenance strategy,84 there 
are nevertheless subtle indications of greater control being exercised over the UAE’s 
many civil society organisations.
Certainly, in her study of the history of Emirati civil society, Fatma Al- 
Sayegh has emphasised diis trend, arguing (albeit indirectly) that although there exists a 
long tradition of civil society in the region, in recent years almost all organisations have 
suffered from increasing government co-option:
“Civil society started before independence; in 1967 the first female society 
was established, in Ra’s al-Khaimah. Arab communities also were 
established before independence, and. in 1978 there were 17 of them. 
During the 1980s many other civil society organisations appeared, all of 
which were dependent on government support... their development has been 
dependent largely on the development of the legal and executive bodies of 
the society itself. ”85
Indeed, while the Federal Social Welfare Societies Law of 1974 did allow for the 
establishment of community societies, it is important to note that most public 
assemblies and associations in the UAE now require government approval, and, 
crucially, all private associations must now be licensed by local authorities. This 
follows an amendment in 1981 which effectively suspended die issuing of licences to 
such associations, reasoning that their existence posed a “significant threat to internal 
security”.86 Moreover, even though by the end of 1999 there were still estimated to be 
more dian 100 associations operating without such licences, a forthcoming amendment 
will ensure that all of these ‘illegal’ associations are soon brought under the government 
umbrella. In fact, this amendment will require all societies to legalise their status widiin 
six montiis of die new law, otherwise they will be automatically dissolved. 
Furthermore, as a senior official from the Ministry of Labour and Social affairs
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explained in late 2001, the law will give the ministries full “legal authority to oversee 
their activities” by allowing for the supervision of all their programmes, projects, and 
financial performances.87
By measuring, or at least indicating the extent of this co-option and 
dependence on government support, the following case studies will demonstrate some 
of the problems faced by the wide variety of UAE-based organisations. Specifically, 
the UAE’s cultural, educational, and environmental groups, and their close ties to the 
government and the ruling families will be discussed. In addition, the many 
recreational, welfare, and women’s groups will be investigated and, perhaps most 
significantly, the functioning of the UAE’s religious groups, the freedom of its media 
associations, and the capabilities of its workers and professional associations will be 
considered. Finally, the restricted role of the many expatriate societies, which account 
for the vast majority of civil society organisations in the UAE, will also be assessed.
Cultural Z Educational / 
Environmental
National / Emirate specific Description
Emirates Internet
Association
National Chaired by Shaykh Maktum Al-MaktQm, 
ruler of Dubai and the UAE’s Prime 
Minister. Membership restricted to UAE 
Nationals88
Emirates Association for 
Revival of Folk Arts
National Receives funding from the Ministry of 
Finance and Industry89
Arabic Language Protection 
Association
National An association which aims to preserve the 
use of Arabic in UAE society90
Abu Dhabi Science Club Abu Dhabi
Emirates Heritage Club, Abu 
Dhabi
Abu Dhabi Chaired by Shaykh Sultan Al-Nuhayyan, 
deputy Prime Minister of the UAE91
Amateur Astronomers Group Abu Dhabi Under the umbrella of the Emirates
Heritage Club
Writers’ Club Abu Dhabi
Dubai Art Lovers’
Association
Dubai
Emirates Art Centre, Sharjah Sharjah Close links to the Sharjah government
Sharjah Arts and Theatre 
Association
Sharjah Close links to the Sharjah government
Sharjah National Theatre 
Group
Sharjah Close links to the Sharjah government
Marine Club for Arts and 
Tourism
Sharjah Close links to the Sharjah government
Kalba Folklore Association Kalba, Sharjah Close links to the Sharjah government92
Filipino Association for 
Computer Excellence
National Ethnic (Far-east Asian) educational 
association
Filipino Computer Club,
Dubai
Dubai Ethnic (Far-east Asian) educational 
association
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Filipino Culture and Sports 
Club, Abu Dhabi
Abu Dhabi Ethnic (Far-east Asian) educational 
association
Environmental Friends
Society
National
Emirates Environmental
Group
National93
As one of the longest running cultural organisations in the UAE, the Emirates 
Association for the Revival of Folk Aits provides a good example of the increasing co­
option of civil society. Formed in the 1980s as a voluntary organisation aiming to 
revive traditional folk ails and protect Arab traditions from tlie influence of modern 
trends, tlie association issued 20,000 shares to its members and those interested in its 
activities in order to raise funds. However, before long the association was granted 
‘federal status’, and although its activities remained seemingly autonomous, its budget 
began to be administered and allocated by die Ministry of Finance and Industry.94 In 
much the same way, the UAE’s environmentalist groups also provide very clear 
examples of financial support from federal ministries. Normally associated with 
political activism in campaigning for animal rights and anti-pollution measures in most 
countries, the UAE’s groups such as the Environment Friends Society and the Emirates 
Environmental Group have remained more restrained, concentrating on more limited 
goals regarding die UAE’s nature reserves. These more sanitised objectives are 
undoubtedly due to die high level of co-option by the state, as these groups now receive 
generous annual budgets from the Ministiy of Labour and Social Affairs.95 Similarly, at 
the individual emirate-level the picture is much the same, with obvious examples of co­
option including the Abu Dhabi-based Emirates Heritage Club. Established by Emiri 
decree in 1997 and chaired by Shaykli Sultan Al-Nuhayyan, die UAE’s deputy prime 
minister and a key member of die Abu Dhabian ruling family, the club effectively 
functions as an authority belonging to the Abu Dhabi government. Moreover, the club 
also acts as an umbrella organisation for a number of other Abu Dhabi clubs and 
societies including the Amateur Astronomers’ Group, Marine Races, and the Emirates 
Sailing Academy.96 Indeed, this ‘umbrella system’ appears to have been replicated 
throughout civil society in the UAE, with many smaller organisations falling under the 
direct or indirect control of larger organisations which are eidier government controlled, 
or receiving patronage from members of the various ruling families. Significantiy, in
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recent years some of these umbrella systems have even expanded to include formerly 
independent clubs and societies. Examples would include die many youdi and youth- 
related recreation clubs for UAE nationals, which although originally voluntary 
associations with autonomous budgeting, are now all linked under a federal umbrella 
organisation represented by the Supreme Council for Youth.97
Perhaps die strongest examples of the co-option of cultural and educational 
organisations are, however, to be found in die emirate of Sharjah which, as explained, 
has long prided itself as being die cultural and intellectual capital of the UAE. Indeed, 
as the Press Affairs Directorate of the Sharjah Emiri Court describes, by the end of the 
1980s there were 26 such organisations based in the emirate. These included eight 
cultural societies, six art associations such as the Sharjah Arts and Theatre Association, 
the Shaijah National Theatre Group, the Marine Club for Ails and Tourism, and five 
significant ‘public interest’ associations ranging from literary societies to folklore 
associations. Between the mid-1970s and the late 1980s these associations received 
more than 100 million Dirhams in financial contributions from the Shaijah government 
and, as described by die Directorate, also received significant “financial and / or moral 
support from the ruler, HH Shaykh Dr. Sultan bin Muliammad al-Qasiml”.98 As this 
royal patronage and liigb level of government sponsorship appears to have continued 
unabated in Sharjah throughout die 1990s, ranging from financial backing for theatrical 
gatherings to organisational support for anti-smoking rallies,99 it would seem that the 
smaller cultural and educational civil society organisations at the emirate level have 
lacked autonomous civic space in much the same way as their federal counterparts, even 
if this may have been unintentionally caused by their ruler’s great benevolence and 
genuine patronage of die arts.
Finally, widi regard to educational associations, the role of academics must also 
be discussed. As described in die study of social growth, there has been a rapid increase 
in the number of academics and other university-related staff in the UAE given the 
massive expansion of the higher education sector in recent years,100 and, as many civil 
society dieorists claim, such intellectual social actors can play a major part in
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associational life. To a limited extent, this has taken place in the UAE as, following the 
Gulf War, it was observed that:
“In 1991, after Desert Storm, there was some informal discussion among a 
small group of educated nationals about the possibility of increased 
democratic participation in governance, and this was reported in the press 
at the time. Although it did not result in a significant movement in the UAE 
working for democratic reform, students and intellectuals still occasionally 
discuss the subject privately. ”101
However, for die most part there exists an unwritten but generally recognised ban on 
criticism of the government from such circles. In practise, this unwritten ban is 
normally enough to enforce self-censorship among academics, especially given that 
many are expatriates and are therefore cautious of jeopardising their employment in 
their host country, although on some occasions, as will be detailed later in this section, 
the ban can become veiy real. Furthermore, given that the government now tightly 
restricts the freedom of peaceful assembly and that all public gatherings require a 
permit, there would appear to be considerable disincentives for those academics 
attempting to organise seminars and conferences on sensitive subjects.102
Recreational National/Emirate specific Description
UAE Football Association National
UAE Equestrian and Racing 
Federation
National Federation of all Emirati horseracing 
organisations
UAE Golf Association National Chaired by Muhammad Al-Abbar,
Director General of Dubai’s Economic 
Development Department, chairman of 
Dubai Aluminium and chairman of Emar 
Properties103
Emirates Cricket Club National
Emirates Gentlemen’s Golf 
Society
National
Abu Dhabi International 
Marine Sports Club
Abu Dhabi
Marine Races, Abu Dhabi Abu Dhabi Under the umbrella of the Emirates
Heritage Club
Emirates Sailing Academy, 
Abu Dhabi
Abu Dhabi Under the umbrella of the Emirates
Heritage Club
Al-‘Ayn Cricket Association Al-‘Ayn, Abu Dhabi
Dubai Football Club Dubai The president and main organiser of the 
club is Shaykh Rashid bin Muhammad Al-
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Maktum, the son of tire Crown Prince104
Dubai R/C Pilots Club Dubai Club for radio-controlled aircraft 
enthusiasts
Filipino Chess Players Club National Ethnic (Far-east Asian) club for Filipino 
members
Indian Sports Club Dubai Dubai Ethnic (sub-continent) club for Indians
Filipino Dance Club, Dubai Dubai Ethnic (Far-east Asian) club for Filipino 
members
Light form Filipino 
Photographers Guild, Dubai
Dubai Ethnic (Far-east Asian) club for Filipino 
members
Filipino Dance Club, Sharjah Sharjah Ethnic (Far-east Asian) club for Filipino 
members
The recreational and sports clubs which exist in the UAE also paint a picture of 
government co-option and royal patronage. Although, unlike some of die cultural and 
educational organisations, their membership is not always restricted to UAE nationals, 
they nevertheless clearly cater for a divided heterogeneous society, with certain clubs 
aimed at Emiratis, with some targeting western expatriates, and with separate and 
specific ethnic-based groups existing for the various other expatriate communities. As 
demonstrated, a number of the smaller recreational clubs such as the Emirates Sailing 
Academy and Marine Races are operated by emirate-level semi-governmental 
authorities such as the Emirates Heritage Club, while in much the same way many of 
die larger associations responsible for die more popular sports such as horseracing, golf, 
cricket, and football, are controlled by federal umbrellas organised and chaired by 
government ministers, members of the ruling families, or other notables. The UAE 
Golf Association provides such an example given diat its chairman is Muhammad Al- 
Abbar who, as described in the previous chapter, is not only a key associate of Shaykh 
Muhammad Al-Maktum but also serves as the Director General of the Dubai 
Department of Economic Development and as the chairman of Emar Properties.105 
Similarly, the Dubai Football Club also has very close links with die ruling family given 
that its president and main organiser is Shaykli Rashid bin Muhammad Al-Maktum, one 
of Shaykli Muhammad’s sons. Indeed, in a recent Ramadan football tournament 
organised by the club, it was clear just how far die chib’s royal patronage extended with 
many of the participating teams being captained by young Shaykhs and with die prize 
money and ‘inspiration’ for die event having been provided by Shaykli Muhammad 
himself.106
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Welfare National / Emirate specific Description
Handicapped Guardians’ 
Association
National This association restricts membership to 
UAE nationals and is presided over by 
Shaykh Sullan al-Qasiml, ruler of
Sharjah107
Juveniles Association National
Emirates Volunteers 
Association
Sharjah An organisation aiming to encourage 
volunteer workers in the field of 
healthcare, care for the elderly, etc. Has a 
close relationship with Shaykh Sultan al- 
Qasiml, the ruler of Sharjah, and is 
chaired by Humaid al-Qutami, the general 
manager of the government-funded
Emirates Institute for Banking and
Financial Studies108
Emirates Volunteers 
Association
Khor Fakkan, Shaijah Under the umbrella of the Sharjah 
Association
Emirates Volunteers 
Association
Ra’s al-Khaimah
Voluntary organisations and associations attempting to provide care for the 
handicapped and elderly also exhibit clear signs of government co-option. They are 
required to hold licences from the Ministiy of Labour and Social Affairs and most, like 
many of the UAE’s cultural associations, restrict their membership to UAE nationals. 
The Handicapped Guardian’s Association is one such example. Established in 1996 in 
accordance with the directions of Shaykh Sultan al-Qasiml, the ruler of Sharjah, the 
organisation is now also headed by Shaykh Sultan in addition to being funded by the 
government.109 The Emirates Volunteers Association is broader in scope than many of 
the UAE’s other welfare organisations given that it accepts both UAE national and 
expatriate members in its attempt to create a large body of volunteer workers in the 
fields of healthcare, helping the elderly, and protecting the environment. However, the 
association also displays clear signs of co-option and patronage, maintaining close links 
with the Sharjah ruling family and other local elites. Indeed, it receives generous 
awards and prizes from Shaykh Sultan and is chaired by Humaid al-Qutami, die general 
manager of a key government funded institute110 (the Emirates Institute for Banking and 
Financial Studies111). Also, given that subordinate branches of die association are now 
opening in Khor Fakkan and Ra’s al-Khaimah, it would appear that the civil society 
umbrella system is again being reproduced widi the newer associations operating under 
the auspices of the original Sharjah-based authority.
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Women’s groups National / Emirate specific Description
UAE Women’s Federation National The honorary president is Shaykha Fatima 
Al-Nuhayyan
General Women’s Union National The president is Shaykha Fatima Al- 
Nuhayyan
Women’s Committee of the 
Red Crescent Society
National Sub-committee of the Red Crescent
Society charity organisation. The 
president is Shaykha Fatima Al-Nuhayyan
Abu Dhabi Women’s
Society
Abu Dhabi The president is Shaykha Fatima Al- 
Nuhayyan
Association for the
Awakening of Abu Dhabian 
Women
Abu Dhabi The president is Shaykha Fatima Al- 
Nuhayyan
Women’s Business Council 
Abu Dhabi
Abu Dhabi The president is Shaykha Fatima Al- 
Nuhayyan112
Dubai Women’s Association Dubai
Sharjah Women’s Club Sharjah Established by Shaykh Sultan al-Qasimi, 
ruler of Sharjah, and chaired by his wife, 
Shaykha Jawehr
Young Ladies’ Club Sharjah Under the umbrella of the Sharjah
Women’s Club
Emirates Women Writers’ 
Association
Sharjah Under the umbrella of the Sharjah
Women’s Club
Umm al-Mominln Women’s 
Association
‘Ajrnan Recipient of ‘Rashid Award’ funding from 
die ‘Ajrnan ruling family113
Tamil Ladies Association National Ethnic (sub-continent) women’s 
association for Tamilian Indians
Indian Ladies Association, 
Abu Dhabi
Abu Dhabi Ethnic (sub-continent) women’s 
association for Indian expatriates
Kerala Emirates Ladies 
Association, Abu Dhabi
Abu Dhabi Ethnic (sub-continent) women’s 
association for Keralites from the South of 
India
Many of the national and Abu Dhabi-based women’s organisations are 
government funded and are indirectly connected to the Abu Dhabi ruling family by 
either their chairperson or president, often Shaykha Fatima Al-Nuhayyan, the wife of 
Shaykh Zayid and therefore the UAE’s ‘first lady’. A recent example of such co-option 
would be the establishment of the Women’s Business Council in 2001 by a number of 
female entrepreneurs in Abu Dhabi. The Council’s main aim has been to provide a 
forum for female nationals to
"... meet and discuss the issues of their common interest and exchange views 
on their expectations and aspirations in the world of business andfinance... 
and to provide a connecting link between government and semi-government 
authorities on the one hand, and businesswomen on the other hand, to 
overcome obstacles and problems. These would include marriage and
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family responsibilities, and society’s perception of a businesswoman and its 
doubts about her ability to succeed. ”114
Recent actions have included applying pressure on the government to grant greater 
maternity leave at full pay and to provide superior childcare facilities in the 
workplace.115 However, while apparently a voluntaiy association organised by like­
minded businesswomen, the Council does not have true autonomy over its organisation. 
In addition to requiring approval for its actions flora tlie Federation of Chambers of 
Commerce and Industry, the association is also closely linked to Shaykha Fatima, who 
also serves as tlie chairperson of the UAE Women’s Federation, the Abu Dhabi 
Women’s Society, the Women’s General Union, the Association of the Awakening of 
Abu Dhabian Women, and the Women’s Committee of the Red Crescent Society.116 As 
such, the genuine independence of the Council’s views and activities from those of the 
state and the Al-Nuhayyan would seem questionable.
Similarly in Sharjah, most women’s groups are linked to the establishment 
through Shaykha Jawaher al-Qashnl, the wife of Shaykli Sultan. Specifically, the 
Sharjah Women’s Club, which was set up in 1982 and financed by the ruler’s office, has 
since been chaired by Shaykha Jawaher and has now branched out to include clubs in 
other parts of Sharjah and Klior Fakkan. Predictably, many of tlie other women’s 
associations in the emirate, such as the Emirates Women Writers Association and tlie 
Young Ladies Club, fall under die club’s administrative and financial umbrella. In 
other emirates, including ‘Ajman, the pattern is much the same with organisations such 
as the Umm al-Mominm Women’s Association receiving ‘Rashid Award’ {ending from 
the ‘Ajman ruling family and support from the local government.117
Islamic / Charity 
organisations
National / Emirate specific Description
Al-Muntada al-Islami Shaqah A society dedicated to promulgating and 
popularising Islamic principles among all 
sectors and classes of the local 
population.118
Indian Islahi Centre, Sharjah Sharjah Ethnic (sub-continent) Islamic centre
Indian Isialii Centre, Ra’s al- 
Khaimah
Ra’s al-Khaimah Ethnic (sub-continent) Islamic centre
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Indian Islamic Centre, Dubai Dubai Ethnic (sub-continent) Islamic centre
Indian Islamic Centre, Abu 
Dhabi
Abu Dhabi Ethnic (sub-continent) Islamic centre
Indian Islamic Centre, Ra’s 
al-Khaimah
Ra’s al-Khaimah Ethnic (sub-continent) Islamic centre
Red Crescent Society UAE National Umbrella Islamic charity organisation. 
Receives funding from local governments 
and the ruling families and often 
distributes funding to other Islamic 
charities in the UAE. Shaykh Hamdan 
Al-Nuhayyan, the Minister of State for 
Foreign Affairs is the president, and
Khalifa al-Suwaidi is the chairman119
Women’s Committee of the 
Red Crescent Society
National Sub-committee of the Red Crescent
Society charity organisation. Tire 
president is Shaykha Fatima Al- 
Nuhayyan, the wife of Shaykh Zayid and 
the ‘first lady’ of the UAE120
Al-Islah wal-Tawjih 
Association
National Charitable association which has most 
recently concentrated on raising funds for 
the Iraqi people121
Shaykh Muhammad Al- 
Maktum Humanitarian and 
Charitable Foundation
Dubai Unifies the relief efforts of other Dubai 
charities. Presided over by Shaykh 
Muhammad Al-Maktum, Crown Prince of 
Dubai, and chaired by Ibrahim Bu Melha, 
Dubai’s equivalent of an Attorney
General12?
Shaykha Latifa Charity for 
Children’s Creativity
Dubai Chaired by Shaykh Muhammad’s 
daughter and operates under die auspices 
of the Shaykh Muhammad Humanitarian 
and Charitable Foundation
Sharjah Charity Association Sharjah
International Islamic Relief 
Organisation of Sharjah
Sharjah
Fujairah Charity Association Fujairah Most recently, the association has been 
concentrating on fund raising for
Palestinian relief123
Zakat Committee of Ra’s al- 
Khaimah
Ra’s al-Khaimah Most recently die committee has co­
operated with die Shaykh Muhammad 
Humanitarian and Charitable foundation 
in raising funds for the Iraqi people124
Indian Relief Committee Ra’s al-Khaimah Ethnic (sub-continent) charitable group 
patronised by Indian expatriates
Marriage Fund Associations Local, informal A plethora of informal associations exist 
with the aim of raising funds for UAE 
national men to marry UAE national 
women125
As explained earlier in this thesis, religious resources continue to play a key 
unifying role in the polity’s legitimacy formula.126 As such, almost all mosques, 
ulama \ and Islamic related organisations are carefully controlled by the government in 
its efforts to prevent any potentially harmful radicalism or religious-political opposition. 
Indeed, 95% of Sunni mosques in the UAE are state-owned, with the remaining 5% 
receiving large government subsidies. The only exceptions being the small number of
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privately funded Shfa mosques, but even these, in Dubai at least, are now being 
brought under local government control. In addition to this financial co-option, die 
federal Ministry of Justice and Islamic Affairs (together with local emirate-specific 
departments) employs all Sunni Imams and distributes weekly guidance to Sunni 
clergymen regarding their religious sermons, thereby ensuring adherence to ministry- 
approved topics.127 Indeed the Minister of Justice and Islamic Affairs, Muhammad al- 
Dhahiri, has been quite clear on this point, having admitted in a recent interview that his 
departments do exercise considerable ‘quality control’ over religious preaching and the 
UAE’s mosques:
"The Islamic world is teeming with people who claim knowledge about 
Islam, but experience has shown that many of the people who applied to the 
Awqaf department for the posts of Imams in the mosques were far below the 
required standards. ...It was therefore necessary to set regulations and 
criteria for regulating religious teachings... The ministry also provides 
written Friday sermons (Khutba) to be read out to the faithfi.il. Those 
Imams who have proven themselves to be qualified and skilful are allowed 
to choose topics on their own free will provided that they inform the 
ministry about these topics. ”12S
Moreover, in much the same way as the mosques, most of the UAE’s other 
Islamic associations and charities have also been co-opted by the government. 
Certainly, while some Islamic societies which aim to popularise Islam are permitted, 
tiiese are either government funded, or are carefully screened. Examples would include 
Al-Muntada al-Islami in Sharjah with its primarily Emirati membership,129 and the 
various expatriate Islamic societies serving the many Pakistani and Indian Muslims 
working in the UAE. With regard to Islamic charities, the most obvious example of co­
option has of course been die UAE Red Crescent Society which receives considerable 
financial and organisational support from die various ruling families and, predictably, 
serves as an umbrella organisation for other smaller charities. Shaykh Hamdan Al- 
Nuhayyan, the UAE’s Minister of State for Foreign Affairs and a key member of the
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Abu Dhabi ruling family serves as the Red Crescent’s president, with Khalifa al- 
Suwaidi (a member of another prominent Abu Dhabian family) chairing the 
organisation. Moreover, many of the society’s projects to promote activities for 
disabled citizens have been assisted and supervised by both the Ministry of Education 
and Youth and the Ministiy of Labour and Social Affairs, and a rnunber of other recent 
activities such as competitions for the disabled and fust-aid training courses have been 
organised under the patronage of Shaykha Fatima who naturally serves as the president 
of tlie society’s Women’s Committee.130 Significantly, the Red Crescent also 
distributes its considerable funds to other Islamic charity organisations in the UAE, a 
recent example being Shaykli Zayid’s donation of 12 million Dirhams via die society to 
the Shaykha Fatima Charity Award in order to improve die lives of orphans in die 
UAE.133 Correspondingly, if the Red Crescent Society can be seen as an Abu Dhabi 
dominated umbrella organisation, then Shaykli Muhammad’s Humanitarian and Charity 
Foundation in Dubai can be seen as a smaller, and more northern emirate-specific 
counterpart. Presided over by Dubai’s crown prince and chaired by Ibrahim Bu Melha, 
Dubai’s equivalent of an attorney general, the foundation effectively unifies die relief 
efforts of other Dubai-based Islamic charities widiin the framework of a controlled and 
co-opted organisation. Indeed, most recently the foundation co-ordinated and supported 
the efforts of a number of charitable associations in die northern Emirates aiming to 
raise funds for the Iraqi people. These included die Fujairah Charity Association, the 
Sharjah Charity Association, Al-Islah wal-Tawjih, the Zakat Committee of Ra’s al- 
Khaimah, and Shaykh Muhammad’s daughter’s ‘Shaykha Latifa Charity for Children’s 
Creativity’.132
Media / Press related National /Emirate specific Description
Three English language 
newspapers
National AH are privately owned, but all receive 
government subsidies
Six Arabic language 
newspapers
National Three are government owned, and the 
other three are privately owned but receive 
government subsidies
UAE Journalists’
Association
National
UAE Writers’ Association National
Dubai Press Club Dubai Forum for Dubai-based journalists and 
media professionals
Gulf Voice ‘Ajman
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With regard to the press and press-related organisations, the UAE’s 
newspapers have, like the UAE’s other associations, also become more limited, despite 
having their freedom guaranteed by article 30 of the UAE’s constitution.133 Certainly, 
as of yet they do not constitute the ‘independent intellectual production’ described by 
Carapico,134 and although they may be tolerated, they are ultimately controlled. 
However, as Peck explains, tliis was not always the case, with many associations, 
especially workers’ organisations, having found much support from the UAE’s press in 
the late 1970s and early 1980s, especially from the Arabic newspaper Al-Azima al- 
Arabiyya. In particular, tliis newspaper played a key role in helping strikers, including 
many who worked in agencies of federal ministries, to gain tiieir demands. Moreover, 
Al-Azima also kept addressing more general socio-economic and political issues which 
other papers had previously shied away from, such as the human cost of the UAE’s 
massive infrastructural development taking place at that time.135 Another example, 
again from the early 1980s, would be the role of the press in successfully opposing 
government education policy. When, in 1981, the under-secretary of education issued 
an edict permitting coiporal punishment in schools, the press vehemently objected and 
subsequently the policy was revoked.136 Nevertheless, by the mid-1980s the press was 
obliged to become more cautious over such matters following increasing government 
disapproval. Moreover, after the forced closure of Al-Azima due to its anticipated 
opposition to a further extension of die UAE’s provisional constitution,137 the UAE’s 
press associations were seen to be as restricted and ineffectual as most of the UAE’s 
other civil society organisations.
Indeed, the reality, as understood and practised by bodi editors and journalists, 
became one of staying within the boundaries and respecting certain limits. After all, as 
described, the majority of the UAE’s journalists are Arab and South Asian expatriates 
and are tiierefore reluctant to step out of line in tiieir wealthy host nation.138 
Furthermore, this control over the media was formalised in 1988 by a new federal law 
which clearly stipulated that all publications, including both books and periodicals, had 
to be licensed for approval by the Ministry of Infonnation and Culture.139 Crucially of 
course, the law also governed the content of these licensed publications, thus effectively
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requiring journalists to exercise self-censorship when reporting on potentially sensitive 
issues such as national security, political development, and the ruling families.140 In 
addition, the Ministry also became empowered to review all imported publications and 
ban any materials deemed to be derogatory of Islam, supportive of Israel, or critical of 
the establishment.141 In more recent years, this censorship has of course been extended 
to the Internet and all Emirati web sites, given that, as explained in the previous chapter, 
the Ministry co-operates with the UAE’s telecommunications monopoly (Etisalat) by 
running a proxy server which aims to block undesirable web content. Not only are sites 
relating to gambling, pornography, and alcohol banned, as one might expect, but also 
restricted are links relating to civil society, democratisation, and political development 
in general.
Interestingly, however, at a formal gathering to mark die launch of the Dubai 
Media City in Januaiy 2001, Shaykh Muhammad Al-Maktum proclaimed his formal 
agreement to allow freedom for the press and media in Dubai. Although clearly made 
in the context of die aforementioned transparency initiatives and the attempts to boost 
the attractiveness of the new free zones for foreign investors, the agreement was 
nevertheless seen by some, in Dubai at least, as being the beginning of a new awakening 
for die UAE’s press. Indeed, as was reported at die time:
“Having such freedom suddenly guaranteed was remarkable, as before this, 
open and uninhibited debate in the media on any issue was not sanctioned 
by any of the local governments making up the UAE... This bold precedent 
heralded a new beginning in the Arabian Gulf. Following the 
announcement in Dubai, an oasis has appeared for the mass media. ”J42
Of course, not all were convinced, and many continued to believe that the press would 
still need to avoid any direct criticism of die government and would therefore need to 
proceed widi caution:143
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“While Arabic-language publishers and media professionals are called here 
from far and near to quench their decades-long thirst for freedom, caution 
is still the order of the day, lest it turn out to be just another mirage on the 
edge of the blistering sands... Although guaranteed, in the Constitution, the 
UAE Criminal Code in its current form still does not allow the press to 
comment on certain issues. It remains to be seen whether or not, once media 
companies in the new free zone start to take off, the freedom promised to 
them by the Crown Prince will have any effect on the host country that 
nurtures them.” 44
Within only months of this announcement many of these suspicions were 
confirmed, as a number of press-related incidents seemed to indicate that little had 
changed, at least when it came to the need for self-censorship. In March 2001 the 
Ministry of Information and Culture filed a lawsuit against the Dubai-based newspaper 
Gulf News in response to a series of sharply satirical columns published by a Qatari 
journalist, Abdul-Wahid al-Mawlawi, which allegedly featured self-deprecatory humour 
regarding stereotypical Gulf Arabs. The government considered the articles to be 
offensive to Gulf citizens in general and to the country's citizens in particular; More 
worryingly, according to a US government human rights report, in addition to the 
lawsuit, al-Mawlawi was also arrested shortly after the publication of the last of his 
columns. He was purportedly subjected to sleep deprivation and physical abuse during 
a two-week detention, before finally being expelled to Qatar.145 Eventually the lawsuit 
against the offending newspaper was withdrawn, but only after the editor agreed to 
publish a front-page apology for the offensive material. Moreover, later that year a 
similar dispute arose between the Ministiy and the media, culminating in ten prominent 
writers, including four university professors, being banned from publishing opinion 
pieces in both the Arabic and English newspapers. Apparently the ban was imposed 
following the writers’ support of over 100 employees who had been made redundant by 
the government financed Emirates Media Corporation. As with the al-Mawlawi 
dispute, no official justification was given for the ban, although it was eventually lifted 
after tlie dust had settled.146
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In addition to this self-censorship and often heavy-handed enforcement, another 
important characteristic of the UAE’s press and press-related associations has been their 
increasing financial dependence on the government and semi-governmental 
organisations. Indeed, three of tlie country’s six Arabic language newspapers are now 
state owned with tlie other three receiving substantial government subsidies.147 Hie 
case is much the same for the three English language newspapers which, although 
privately owned, all receive generous subsidies.148 Similarly, most of the UAE’s 
television stations and other broadcast media organisations are also veiy closely linked 
to the government and as such tend to present only government views,149 and strictly 
conform to official reporting guidelines.150 The only exception had been ‘Ajman’s 
popular satellite television station, but hi July 1999 even diis was purchased by 
Emirates Media, a corporation which already owns Abu Dhabi’s television and radio 
stations, publishes the Arabic Al-Ittihad newspaper, and has recently forbidden all of its 
employees, including its journalists, from speaking with unapproved foreigners and
• 151representatives.
Workers / Professional National / Emirate specific Description
UAE Journalists Association National Limited to making recommendations on 
behalf of its members
UAE Lawyers Association National Limited to making recommendations on 
behalf of its members
UAE Writers Association National Limited to making recommendations on 
behalf of its members
UAE Teachers Association National Limited to making recommendations on 
behalf of its members152
Emirates Medical
Association
National Chaired by Shaykh Mansur Al-Nuhayyan 
of the Abu Dhabi ruling family153
Emirates Bankers
Association
National154
Emirates National Student 
Association
National
Medical Students’
Association
National
Jurists Society National
Society for Petroleum 
Engineers
National More of a social and educational forum 
than a workers’ association geared to 
protecting engineers’ rights, etc.155
Women’s Business Council 
Abu Dhabi
Abu Dhabi The president is Shaykha Fatima Al- 
Nuhayyan156
Air Passengers Welfare 
Association
Abu Dhabi
Spare Parts Employees 
Welfare Association
Dubai
American Business Council 
of Dubai and the Northern
Dubai Maintains extremely close and deferential 
ties with the UAE’s political elite,
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Emirates manifested by its award scheme157
Indian Pharmaceutical
Forum
National Ethnic (sub-continent) professional 
organisation for Indian members
Overseas Filipino Civil 
Engineers’ Association
National Ethnic (Far-East Asian) professional 
organisation for Filipino members
Filipino Institute of Certified 
Public Accountants
National Ethnic (Far-East Asian) professional 
organisation for Filipino members
Indian Business /
Professional Group
Abu Dhabi Ethnic (sub-continent) professional 
organisation for Indian members
NRI Business Council,
Dubai
Dubai Ethnic (sub-continent) professional 
organisation for Indian members, NRI 
being Non-Resident Indians
NRI Investors’ Forum,
Dubai
Dubai Ethnic (sub-continent) professional 
organisation for Indian members
Indian Engineers’ Forum, 
Dubai
Dubai Ethnic (sub-continent) professional 
organisation for Indian members
All employees in the UAE, both white and blue collar, have the right to lodge 
grievances with officials from the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, who are then 
obliged to investigate all complaints. Moreover, in theory all workers are also able to 
appeal against the Ministry’s rulings and, if necessary, can take the matter' to the courts. 
However, as has been reported, many workers simply choose not to protest for fear of 
reprisals or deportation, and for those who do, their complaints and compensation 
claims are often severely backlogged due to understaffing and under budgeting in the 
Ministry.158 Indeed, the press often carries reports of employers punishing or abusing 
those employees, especially domestic servants, who lodge official complaints.159 With 
regaid to workers’ groups and associations, although UAE law does not yet permit 
employees to engage in collective bargaining, many associations are granted some 
degree of freedom to collectively raise work-related issues, to lobby for redress, and, on 
occasion, to file protests with the government.160 Thus, while these groups are 
essentially limited to making recommendations on behalf of then members and 
therefore possess few of the characteristics of fully functioning labour unions, they 
nevertheless offer the only real opportunity for employees to group together in order to 
voice their concerns.
In some cases these groups, especially the professional associations, have 
achieved relative autonomy in recent years and have been able to lobby the government 
successfully over certain work-related problems. A good example would be the
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Emirates Bankers’ Association. Established in 1982 as a non-profit making 
organisation enabling employees of both local and national banks to subscribe to its 
membership, the association aimed to exchange opinions and knowledge between its 
members and to provide assistance and services to its members and all of those working 
in the banking profession.161 In 1991, during a period of increasing automation in die 
banking sector, the association was capable of independently representing its members’ 
concerns to the UAE Central Bank. As such, the association was able to provide 
something of a mouthpiece for the banking workforce and was able to extract 
concessions and reassurance for those fearing unemployment and transitional 
problems.162
However, in much the same way as the UAE’s press and media associations, it 
would appear that when more serious employment matters arise, the illusion of freedom 
and autonomy is swiftly dispelled as government ministries retain the right to supervise, 
inspect, and disband all such organisations.163 The UAE Teachers Association, one of 
the largest of the UAE’s professional bodies, provides such a case study given its 
repeated failures in confronting government ministries over recent years. One such 
example would be a teachers’ dispute in 2002 which resulted in the Ministry of 
Education and Youth summarily suspending an instructor for liis alleged beating of a 
pupil. Duly, the Teachers Association attempted to defend the teacher’s rights and 
began to sue the Ministiy. Within days, however, tlie association soon found itself 
fighting a losing battle and unable to uphold the interests of its members. Indeed, as a 
source from the Ministiy indicated with regard to the incident, such associations are 
effectively powerless in these disputes:
“...the Ministry has the right to take any legal action yvhich it deems 
necessary against those violating rules, noting that beating students was 
prohibited in schools. The association does not have the legal power to sue 
the Ministry on behalf of its members. Its resolutions are just 
recommendations which do not have any legal value."
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Moreover, the source also inferred that the recent stand taken by the association may 
well result in it being dissolved, observing that
"... the association should have advised the teachers to settle the dispute in 
a peaceful manner without letting the issue reach the court. ”164
In addition, while some associations have found themselves unable to mount 
legal challenges against government ministries, others have of course been weakened by 
high levels of patronage from either the government or the ruling families. With formal 
and informal ties to the neo-patrimonial network they are thought unlikely to ever 
evolve into autonomous labour organisations and are tiierefore believed to be incapable 
of independently representing their members’ interests. While some of these 
associations, such as the Emirates Medical Association and tlie Women’s Business 
Council, chaired respectively by Shaykh Mansur Al-Nuhayyan and Shaykha Fatima Al- 
Nuhayyan, are clearly linked to the ruling families,165 others, especially those catering 
for expatriates, are often more subtly linked. Indeed, even the American Business 
Council of Dubai and tlie Northern Emirates, which has elected officers and an 
exclusively American membership, is remarkably keen to maintain close and deferential 
ties with the various ruling families. In fact, in a form of reverse patronage, the 
recipients of the Council’s prestigious annual business award have included no less than 
four of the UAE’s shaykhs since 1995: Shaykh Muhammad Al-Maktum and his brother 
Shaykh ’Ahmad, Shaykh Sultan al-Qasiml the ruler of Sharjah, and Shaykh Hamad al- 
SharqT the ruler of Fujairah.166 Similarly, other predominantly expatriate organisations 
such as the Society of Petroleum Engineers and the many Indian and Filipino 
associations also observe polite respect, with most tending to keep a low profile by 
focusing more on providing social and educational forums than seeking to protect their 
members’ legal rights.167
Expatriate communities National / Emirate specific Description
Indian Association Dubai, Sharjah, Ra’s al- 
Khaimah, Umm al-Qawain
Indian community associations, serving as 
umbrellas for other sub-organisations
Goan Cultural Society Dubai Community association for Goanese
Indians. Operating under tlie umbrella of
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the Indian Association, Dubai168
Indian Cultural Association Dubai
Indian Social Centre Abu Dhabi, Al-4 Ayn
Kerala Social Centre Abu Dhabi Social centre for Keralites from Southern 
India
UAE Kerala Muslim
Cultural Centre
Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah Social centre for Muslim Keralites from 
Southern India
UAE Gulf Malayalee 
Coordinalion Committee
Dubai Organisation for Malayalee expatriates 
from Southern India
Overseas Malayalee
Residing Association
Abu Dhabi Organisation for Malayalee expatriates 
from Southern India
World Malayalee Council 
(WMC)
Dubai Organisation for Malayalee expatriates 
from Southern India
Malayalee Muslim Welfare 
Association
Dubai Organisation for Muslim Malayalee 
expatriates from Southern India
Priyadarshini Cultural 
Association
Dubai Association for Priyadarshini expatriates 
from Bombay
Overseas Friends Meet Abu Dhabi Organisation for Indian expatriates
Panchayat Expatriate 
Association
Dubai Association for expatriate Indians from 
self-governed provinces (the Panchayat 
villages)
Assam Society of the UAE National Association for Assam expatriates from 
India
Filipino Association for 
Computer Excellence
National
Filipino Computer Club,
Dubai
Dubai
Filipino Culture and Sports 
Club, Abu Dhabi
Abu Dhabi
Singles for Christ Dubai Organisation for Filipino Catholics
Bicol Anom Dubai Association for Bicol speaking Filipinos
Pangasinense Aligwas Club Abu Dhabi Welfare and charitable organisation for 
expatriates from the Northern
Phillipines169
Kenya Friendship Society National African expatriate society170
A survey of civil society organisations in the UAE would be incomplete without 
also considering tire many expatriate welfare organisations and associations which exist 
in the major cities. Indeed, given the size of these foreign communities, many of which 
dwarf the local Emirati populations, it is little surprise that these are high in membership 
and probably constitute die bulk of civil society activity in the country. Among others, 
there are clubs for Europeans, North Americans, Indians, Filipinos, Africans, and 
indeed for almost all of the diverse nationalities which make up the UAE’s vast 
expatriate labour force. Many of diese societies concentrate on social events and on 
building up a sense of community and familiarity for diose far from their homelands, 
while others offer compatriots the opportunity to network with each other and learn how 
best to do business in the UAE and the Gulf. Some of these societies are even region- 
specific, with many offering social services and support to immigrants from particular
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areas of India, the Philippines and the other main labour providing nations. Examples 
would include the Goan societies which operate under the umbrella of the Indian 
Association,171 the various Keralite and Malayalee associations for South Indians, the 
Bicol Anom organisation for Bicol speaking Filipinos, and the Pangasinense Aligwas 
Club for expatriates from Luzon and the northern Philippines.172
As one might expect, given the cautious nature of expatriate workers and their 
presence in a comparatively conservative state, these organisations are, like many of the 
UAE’s other associations, self-censoring and self-limiting. All are careful to emphasise 
their goals of providing solely welfare and cultural activities, with some even going so 
far as to state explicitly their non-political agenda. One such example would be the 
Kenya Friendship Society, which is a non-profit making and volunteer-based 
organisation designed to help and support the large Kenyan community in the UAE. 
Among its aims are tlie provision of welfare services for members and their families, the 
encouragement of cultural and recreational activities, and the encouragement of 
‘intellectual association’ between like-minded Kenyans. On this last point, however, 
tlie society’s chairman, Jalal Balala, felt it necessary to assert hi a recent speech tiiat, 
“this society will involve strictly social, cultural, educational and humanitarian 
activities. Absolutely non-political. All Kenyans will benefit”.173 Similarly keen to 
stress its apolitical nature has been the Goan Cultural Society. Established in 1988 to 
provide a social community for non-resident Indians in Dubai from the Catholic 
province of Goa, tlie society’s mission statement has always been to the effect that, 
“...the society is purely a social and cultural organisation without any political 
affiliations and its membership is open to all Goans residing in the United Arab 
Emirates”.174
Of all the civil society organisations hi the UAE, these expatriate welfare 
organisations appear to have been the least co-opted. Almost all have constitutions, 
committees elected from their membership, and, given their foreign and often non­
Muslim constituencies; they have few if any ties to tlie ruling families or government- 
funded bodies. However, it is perhaps because of this relative autonomy that these are
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the organisations which are now facing the strictest regulations and government control. 
Indeed, another important aspect of the recent amendment to tlie Federal Social Welfare 
Societies Law is that the creation of any new social welfare societies, whether they be 
“religious, professional, cultural, humanitarian, theatre-related or concerning women,” 
will be restricted to UAE nationals alone. As a senior official explained:
“We do realise the importance of allowing communities of various 
nationalities to have a forum where they can get together and practise their 
cultural and social activities. But at the same time, we believe that the 
number of the community bodies should be restricted...1,175
Presumably tliis will allow for greater control over future civil society associations 
while limiting the growth of the less easy to co-opt expatriate forums. Moreover, if any 
expatriate societies avoid or defy these restrictions, or indeed if they refuse to allow the 
ministries to inspect their books, records and activities, then Article 43 of the 
amendment will provide the Ministiy of Labour and Social Affairs with the right to 
immediately dissolve tlie association.176
5.5.3 - Globalising forces and external motivation
Clearly, regardless of whether such civic corporatism and control is part of an 
uninstitutioiialised strategy to reduce tlie potential constituencies of an emerging civil 
society thereby consolidating the state’s position, or in Michael Hudson’s terms, is 
merely the product of non-participatory patrimonial structures;177 what is apparent is 
diat under such conditions any significant indigenous growth of autonomous civil 
society in the UAE will remain a distant prospect. More optimistically, however, there 
is a growing recognition that such a deactivated and demobilised civil society can be 
significantly boosted by certain globalising forces, in particular by tlie increasing 
number of international organisations now operating in the UAE which are believed to 
be capable of promoting more stable and democratic structures in domestic civil society 
organisations; by the increasing penetration of international communications which, as
320
shown, may not only increase transparency and accountability in Emirati society, but 
may also provide indigenous associations with a ‘demonstration effect’ of successful 
examples of civil society elsewhere; and also by the civil society-related influences and 
requirements of those global organisations attempting to implement and uphold 
international standards.
Indeed, on one level it may be that domestic civil society organisations can 
become stronger and more internally democratic if they are operating alongside and co­
operating with UAE-based branches of international NGOs. Certainly, as Carapico 
noted in her study of the Yemen, an increasing number of international NGOs were seen 
to be fostering greater liberalism and civil society institution building from below, 
thereby significantly boosting domestic associational life.178 Thus, as more of these 
NGOs and development assistance agencies establish themselves in the UAE, their 
influence may continue to grow as more of the local population become directly and 
indirectly involved with their activities. By employing local staff and providing training 
and greater expectations, these international NGOs may provide an insight into 
democratic practices and methods, and may supply blueprints for future local 
organisations. Examples of such UAE-based branches already include the United 
Nations Development Project in Abu Dhabi (employing several dozen UAE nationals), 
the World Health Organisation, and the Medecin sans Frontiers relief organisation. 
Furthermore, when a critical mass of these democratically organised NGOs, employees, 
and volunteers exists, there may also develop an atmosphere of collective security in 
which indigenous civil society organisations can develop with greater confidence.179 
Thus, with greater internal democracy and moral support it is thought likely that the 
UAE’s associations will better resist the weakening effects of corporatism and control.
Secondly, in addition to their profound socio-cultural impact, mass 
communications may also provide a boost for die emergence of domestic civil society. 
Indeed, as Samuel Huntington noted in 1991 following the demise of the Soviet Union, 
such technological advances were already seen as providing a ‘demonstration effect’ 
where people in one society were able to leam quickly how people in another society
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had either pressed for greater liberalisation or had even brought down an authoritarian 
government. Furthermore, die ability to exchange ideas and views also allowed people 
to learn how these objectives could be achieved.180 As such, with increasing access to 
the Internet, satellite television and many other global information sources capable of 
bypassing state-imposed restrictions, Emirati civil society organisations may be able to 
forge greater links with similar organisations in other countries, thereby providing 
mutual support and a greater opportunity to share experiences. Indeed, there are already 
a number of such examples widi some of die described associations, especially those 
providing recreational activities, having established Internet links widi dieir overseas 
counterparts.181 Although these are of course relatively apolitical, they nevertheless 
provide an early indication of the potential role of global communications for other 
existing and future Emirati associations.
Perhaps most significantly, in much the same way that global organisations such 
as the WTO and the World Bank have recently begun to influence the UAE’s economic 
structures, so too may international NGOs begin to shape domestic associational life, 
especially in die workplace. A strong example would be the recommendations drawn 
up at the International Labour Organisation’s 2002 symposium in Dubai on the 
‘Declaration on Fundamental Rights and Principles at Work’. Essentially, die 
proposal’s aims were to create new associations and enhance existing groups so as to
"... look after the interests of workers, including any private or government 
employee of any nationality, to defend their rights, to seek to improve their 
social and. econom ic status, and to represen t them in all matters of concern 
to them. ”183
Furthermore, and most crucially, it was also hoped that the new legislation would 
redress die balance of power between employers and employees by allowing diese 
organisations to file lawsuits against the government.183 Thus, given the previously 
discussed case studies of ineffective workers’ associations in the UAE, if, as it is 
predicted, the Ministiy of Labour and Social Affairs approves such ILO-inspired
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legislation, this will represent a significant departure from the past. Indeed, as Mattar 
Al-Tayer explains, the ILO’s recent promotion of labour standards has certainly had a 
major impact on the UAE, requiring his ministry to “adapt to foreign influences and the 
tremendous development of the world economy” by better supporting professional and 
workers’ groups:
"... the economic situation in the country [the UAE] and the structure of its 
labour market will have to adapt to foreign influences and the tremendous 
development of world economy. International conventions and. 
commitments require the development of legislation in the UAE in order to 
ensure continuation of economic development without neglecting the ILO's 
Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights of Workers. In the light 
of economic changes, a review of the country's laws has become a pressing 
issue. We have professional associations and we do not object to the 
formation of workers' bodies. In this context., the UAE has signed six ILO 
conventions despite being a young and developing country. These 
conventions are not binding, but being a member of the ILO, we feel that we 
should sign the conventions which benefit us and which reflect the civilised 
image of the UAE as a country committed to basic labour standards and 
rights which our constitution guarantees. "184
Similarly, in the near future, motivation from international organisations may 
extend beyond reforms for labour associations to include support for other areas of civil 
society, including types of organisations which do not presently exist in the UAE. One 
such example would be human rights groups, which have thus far been unable to 
perform meaningful investigations in the UAE due to the described restrictions on the 
press and the freedom of public participation. Although a small section now exists 
within Dubai’s police force to monitor allegations of human rights abuses, genuinely 
independent domestic groups have yet to emerge. However, with increasing criticism 
from foreign sources, including influential bodies such as tlie US Bureau of Democracy 
and Human Rights,185 this may change as the UAE government is pressured and
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embarrassed into implementing reforms more consistent with those of its global 
partners.186
5.6- Conclusion
As this final chapter has demonstrated, with the seemingly inevitable 
acceleration of global integration, in part due to the liberalising reforms of the ‘new 
rentiers’ seeking to boost foreign investment and promote fresh sources of economic 
rent, certain new external forces, perceived as both benign and malignant, are now also 
beginning to shape and influence indigenous structures, and must therefore be included 
alongside domestic factors in a comprehensive assessment of Emirati development. 
Firstly, with regard to die UAE’s economic structures, it has been indicated how 
globalisation has led to both increased international competition and greater marketing 
opportunities for Emirati firms. Secondly, and equally controversially, it has been 
suggested that increasing global economic integration may have led to a neglect of 
regional integration, widely believed to serve as an important safety net for most 
developing economies. Thirdly, the impact of international organisations such as die 
WTO and the IMF on the domestic economy has also been shown to be both far- 
reaching and ambiguous, widi clear divisions having emerged over the UAE’s 
acceptance of any international agreements thought likely to alter existing structures 
permanently. On the one hand, certain groups have championed the prospects of the 
WTO-led removal of monopolies and the implementation of copyright controls, while 
on the odier hand conservatives have cautioned against the opening up of key industries 
and the political complications which may result from the UAE’s commitments.
In the second part of this chapter, the equally contentious impact of socio­
cultural external forces was considered, with particular regard to globalisation’s role in 
the perceived erosion of Emirati culture and heritage, with reference to the rapid 
marginalisation of the Arabic language and, more positively, with regard to 
international communications and increased accountability. Indeed, it has been 
demonstrated how globalising forces have been blamed for the increasing ‘cultural
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contamination’ which appears to have all but destroyed the traditional Emirati way of 
life, and how in turn this socio-cultural attack has provided an additional impetus for die 
government’s multipurpose cultural revival. Similarly, it has been shown how the 
increasing presence of non-Arabs, foreign media, and foreign-language education have 
all combined to marginalise die Arabic language, again prompting a reaction to what is 
widely believed to be the consequence of mtrusive globalisation. However, with regal’d 
to the improvements in global communications and their accessibility in the UAE, it is 
evident diat such developments have been better received, widi many agreeing that such 
supra-national sources of information have already begun to increase the accountability 
and transparency of neighbouring Gulf communications networks, a trend which may 
soon reach the UAE.
In addition to diese significant influences on domestic socio-economic 
development, some of which have helped to reinforce existing pathologies while others 
have helped to overcome such obstacles, this chapter has also explained how globalising 
forces may begin to play an important role in reshaping civil society and associational 
life in the UAE. Specifically, following a demonstration of how the UAE’s current civil 
society remains hi a weakened state due to a combination of rentier-dependency related 
structures (namely cultural heterogeneity resulting from die massive foreign labour 
force, increasing levels of government co-option, royal patronage, and in some 
circumstances greater control and repression), it was suggested tiiat a fresh wave of 
external forces may neverdieless offer a means of reactivating and supporting 
demobilised associations in the near future. In particular, the transfer of ideas and 
methods from the increasing niunber of UAE-based branches of international 
organisations may lead to stronger internal structures for indigenous associations and a 
greater network of collective security and mutual support. Secondly, the improvements 
in global communications may also provide a demonstration effect for the UAE’s civil 
society organisations as tiiey become better connected and more able to share 
experiences with their counterparts in other parts of the world. Finally, and perhaps 
most significantly, it was also shown how certain external bodies may be capable of 
motivating the UAE government to free up civic space from above, with domestic
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labour groups and human rights associations already likely to benefit from 
recommendations and proposals made to the relevant ministries by prominent global 
NGOs and major international partners.
1 HIRST, P (1995), “Globalisation in Question” in “Occasional Paper Number 11”, Political Economy 
Research Centre, University of Sheffield, pp.3
2 DICKEN, P (1992), “Global Shift and die Internationalisation of Economic Activity”, London, pp.l
3 See http://www.mydsf.com/
4 HIRST, David (2001), “The Emirs in the Internet era”, in LE MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE, February 
2001
5 EMIRATES CORPORATE COMMUNICATIONS (2002), “Countdown to Dubai 2003”, press 
release issued by Emirates Airlines Media Relations Department, 23rd October 2002
6 See section 4.5.3
7 See AMIN, Samir (1997), “Capitalism in the age of globalisation: the management of contemporary 
society”, London; and AMIN, Samir (1982) “The Arab Economy Today”, New York, for a discussion of 
anti-globalisation theory
8 As Herb states with reference to the Gulf monarchies, the fragmentary effects of globalising forces are 
often readily blamed for many of tlie serious internal antagonisms in tlie more unstable developing states, 
resulting in hardship and suffering for much of the population. See HERB, Michael (1999), “All in the 
Family”, New York
9 Held, who although warning of tlie dangers of predatory globalisation, concludes that globalisation is 
not beyond regulation and can be harnessed as a civilising and democratising force, see HELD, David, 
MCGREW, Anthony, GLODBLATT, David, and PERRATON, Jonathan (1999), “Global 
transformations: politics, economics and culture”, Oxford, Polity Press, pp.444-452
10 PRATT, N (2001), “Conceptualising Globalisation: some Political Implications for the Arab World”, 
excerpt from a presentation given at tlie “Globalisation and the Gulf’ conference at the University of 
Exeter, July 2001
11 HEARD-BEY, Frauke (1982), “From Trucial States to United Arab Emirates”, London, Longman, 
pp.ll
12 GCC DEVLOPMENT PLANS - UNITED ARAB EMIRATES (1982), “Economic and Social 
Development Plans for the UAE, 1975-1980”, Abu Dhabi, pp.10 and pp.l8-19
13 Personal interview, Dubai Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Research and Studies Department, 
December 2001
14 ABDULLAH, Muhammad Morsy (1978), “Tlie United Arab Emirates: A Modem History”, London, 
Croom Helm, pp. 106-107
15 AL-SAYEGH, Fatma (1998), “Merchants’ role in a changing society: the case of Dubai, 1900-1990”, 
in MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES, Volume 34 Number 1, January 1998, pp.92
16 ABDULLAH (1978), pp.106-107
17 AL-SAYEGH (1998), pp.92
18 FENELON, Kevin (1973), “Tlie United Arab Emirates: An Economic and Social Survey”, London, 
Longman, pp. 18-19
19 Ibid, pp.18-19
20 PECK, Malcolm C (1986), “The United Arab Emirates: A Venture in Unity”, Boulder Colorado, 
Westview Press, pp.76
21 See section 2.2.4
22 BUSINESS IN DUBAI (2002), “Family companies the day after: how would local family owned 
businesses survive in globalisation?”, Dubai Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Volume 2 Issue 15, 
March 2002, pp.18 - 19
23 Ibid, pp.18- 19
24 Personal Interviews, Abu Dhabi, March 2002
25 Personal Interviews, Dubai, December 2001, March 2002, and September 2002
26 DUBAI DEPARTMENT OF PORTS AND CUSTOMS (2001), “Dubai: major (non-oil) trade 
partners - imports”, in DUBAI DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (2001), 
“Development Statistics”, Government of Dubai, pp.l 29
27 DUBAI DEPARTMENT OF PORTS AND CUSTOMS (2001), “Dubai: major (non-oil) trade 
partners - exports”, in DUBAI DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (2001), 
“Development Statistics”, Government of Dubai, pp.l 30
326
28 DUBAI DEPARTMENT OF PORTS AND CUSTOMS (2001), “Dubai: major (non-oil) trade 
partners - re-exports”, in DUBAI DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (2001), 
“Development Statistics”, Government of Dubai, pp.131
29 See section 3.9
30 JREISAT, JE (1992), “Managing national development in the Arab states”, in ARAB STUDIES 
QUARTERLY, Volume 14 Numbers 2 and 3, Spring I Summer 1992, pp.1-2
31 HANAFI, Sari (2001), “Globalisation without Regionalisation; the Paradoxical Effects of the Political 
Economy of the United Arab Emirates”, excerpt and statistics from a presentation given at the 
“Globalisation and the Gulf’ conference at the University of Exeter, July 2001, Sari Hanafi is director of 
the Palestinian Diaspora and Refugees Centre in Ramallah
32 Ibid; and JEBEL ALI FREE ZONE AUTHORITY (2000), Jebel Ali, Dubai, for investment statistics
33 See HANAFI (2001)
34 KAWACH, Nadim (2001), “IMF urges GCC to levy income tax," in GULF NEWS, 16th October 2001
35 Personal Interviews, Dubai Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Research and Studies Department, 
December 2001
36 WORLD TRADE ORGANISATION NEWS (2002), “Press Releases, Press/293”, 3rd May 2002
37 TRIPS being the ‘Trade Related aspects of International Property Rights’
38 AL-JABIL, Muhammad (2002), “GCC: the emerging common market”, in AFRICA BUSINESS 
GUIDE, Cairo, December 2002
39 See BUSINESS MONITOR INTERNATIONAL (2003), “The United Arab Emirates”, second
quarter report
40 Personal Interviews, Shaijah, October 2002
41 ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT (2000), “United Arab Emirates”, pp.17
42 TAMIMI LAW UPDATE (2001), “Law update: UAE committed to implementing WTO agreements”, 
Tamimi Consultants, Dubai, January 2001
43 ASHOUR, MF (2001), “The GCC and the WTO”, in AL-TAMIMI, January 2001
44 Ibid.
45 STAUFFER, Thomas (2001), “Global Oil Markets and their Implications for Revenue Instability in 
the Gulf’, excerpt from a presentation given at the “Globalisation and the Gulf’ conference at the 
University of Exeter, July 2001
46 TAMIMI LAW UPDATE (2001), Shaykh Fahim al-Qasimi, the Minister of Economy and Commerce, 
said the UAE would free up the textile and ready-made clothes industry through three stages which would 
end by 2005
47 MERZA, Ali (2001), “Economic Reforms in the Major Oil-Producing Countries”, excerpt from a 
paper given at the “Globalisation and the Gulf’ conference at the University of Exeter, July 2001, p.16,
Ali Merza represents the UNDP project in Libya
48 BIBBO, Barbara (2002), “New contract rule to benefit nationals”, in GULF NEWS, 14th December 
2002, as explained by Dr. Khazraji, undersecretary of the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs. For a 
discussion of US pressure for the UAE to reform, see MALLETT, Robert L (2001), “Symposium on 
Shaykh Zayid”, in MIDDLE EAST POLICY, Volume 6 Number 4, June 1999, pp.13, quoting Robert 
Mallett, Deputy Secretary of Commerce, US Department of Commerce, speaking at the 20th April 1999 
conference convened by the Middle East Policy Council
49 See TAMIMI LAW UPDATE (2001)
50 Double taxation treaties (DTTs) are bilateral agreements ensuring the mutual reduction or elimination 
of import/export duties
51 JIYAD, ’Ahmad (2001), “The Role of Foreign Direct Investment in the Globalisation of the Gulf’, 
excerpt from a presentation given at the “Globalisation and the Gulf’ conference at the University of 
Exeter, July 2001
52 ROBERTSON, R (1992), “Globalisation: social theory and global culture”, London, Sage, cited by 
RANDALL, V and THEOBALD, R (1998), “Political change and underdevelopment”, London, 
Macmillan, pp.248
53 ALESCO being the ‘Arab League for Educational, Cultural and Scientific Organisation’
54 FINDLOW, Sally (2000), “The UAE: Nationalism and Arab-Islamic Identity”, Abu Dhabi, Emirates 
Centre for Strategic Studies and Research, ECSSR OCCASIONAL PAPER, Number 39, pp.36, citing 
the contrasting examples of ALESCO conferences in 1977 and 1998. See appendix (vii).
53 Personal interviews, Abu Dhabi; March 2001; Dubai December 2001; and Shaijah, October 2002 
56 KHALAF, Suleyman (2001), “Globalisation and Heritage Revival in the Gulf; an Anthropological 
Look at the Dubai Heritage Village”, excerpt from a presentation given at the “Globalisation and the 
Gulf’ conference at the University of Exeter, July 2001
37 KHALAF, Suleyman (1999), “Camel Racing in the Gulf: notes on the evolution of a traditional 
cultural sport”, ANTHROPOS 1999, pp.85-106; also see KHALAF, Sulayman (2000), “Poetics and
327
politics of newly invented traditions in the Gulf: camel racing in the United Arab Emirates”, in 
ETHNOLOGY, Volume 39 Number 3, Summer 2000, pp.243-261
58 See KHALAF (2001); and section 2.2.3
59 Personal interviews, Abu Dhabi, September 2002. There are plans to establish a major UAE-based 
English language satellite television station, this is hoped to offer an alternative to Al-JazTra and to 
provide western journalists with a more accessible source of Arab opinion; also see KAWACH, Nadim 
(2003), “Call for Arab TV in English”, in GULF NEWS, 20th January 2003
60 Interview with English-language library staff, Shaijah Public Library, September 2002
61 FINDLOW, Sally (2000), pp.33
62 ZEITOUN, Doa (2002), “Direct Quote: safeguarding purity of Arabic”, in GULF NEWS, 22nd 
December 2002
63 Ibid.
64 YAMANI, Mai (2001), “Challenged by Example; Globalisation and the New Arab Awakening”, 
excerpt from a presentation given at the “Globalisation and the Gulf’ conference at the University of 
Exeter, July 2001. Mai Yamani is a member of die Royal Institute of International Affairs, London
65 NONNEMAN, Gerd (2001), “Rentiers and autocrats, monarchs and democrats, state and society: the 
Middle East between globalisation, human ‘agency’, and Europe”, in INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, 
Volume 77 Number 1, January 2001, pp.150
66 Ibid.
67 SHARABI, Hisham (1988), “Neopatriarchy: A Theory' of Distorted Change in Arab Society”, New 
York, Oxford University press, pp.l 50-152
68 CARAPICO, Sheila (1998), “Civil society in Yemen: the political economy of activism in modern 
Arabia”, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, pp.2
69 DE TOQUEVILLE, A (1981), “Democracy in America”, New York, McGraw-Hill, cited by 
RANDALL and THEOBALD (1998), pp.202
70 CARAPICO (1998), pp.2
71 See CARAPICO (1998), and see sections 1.2 and 1.3 with regard to tribal society
72 KAMRAVA, Mehran (2000), “Politics and society in the developing world”, London, Routledge, 
pp.l 92
73 CARAPICO (1998), pp.12
74 KAMRAVA (2000), pp.202-203
75 WEIGLE, MA and BUTTERFIELD, J (1992), “Civil society in reforming Communist regimes: the 
logic of emergence”, in COMPARATIVE POLITICS, Volume 25 Number 1, October 1992, pp.l-22, 
cited by RANDALL and THEOBALD (1998), pp.203-204
76 CARAPICO (1998), pp. l 5
77 Ibid, pp.l2
78 See section 3.7
79 KAMRAVA (2000), pp.l95
80 RUGH, WA (1997), “The United Arab Emirates: What are the sources of its stability?” in MIDDLE 
EAST POLICY, Volume 5 Number 3, September 1997, pp.l6, quoting William Rugh, US Ambassador 
to the UAE between 1992 and 1995
81 Ibid, pp.l6
82 Most middle class NRIs (non-resident Indians) working in the Gulf will claim they are simply there to 
earn sufficient money so as to emigrate to Canada, Australia, New Zealand, etc. within the next few 
years,
83 For a similar discussion see KAMRAVA (2000), pp.202-203
84 See section 2.1.3
85 AL-SAYEGH, Fatima (1999), “Symposium on Shaykh Zayid”, in MIDDLE EAST POLICY, 
Volume 6 Number 4, June 1999, pp. 13-16, quoting Fatima Al-Sayegh, University of the UAE, Al-‘Ayn, 
speaking at the 20th April 1999 conference convened by the Middle East Policy Council
86 see UNDP-POGAR (2002), “Programme on Governance in the Arab region - UAE”
87 MAD AD, Sana (2001), “Welfare societies will need a federal licence”, in KHALEEJ TIMES, 27th 
September 2001
88 see http://www. emiratesit. org/
89 “Folk art forum to be given federal status” in KHALEEJ TIMES, Dubai, 10th October 1987
90 See ZEITUN, Doa (2002), “Direct Quote: safeguarding purity of Arabic”, in GULF NEWS, 22nd 
December 2002
91 See EMIRATES HERITAGE CLUB (2000), as its mission statement explains, “In June 1997 
Emirates Heritage Club is considered as an independent authority belonging to Abu Dhabi Government 
headed by His Highness Shaykh Sultan Bin Zayid Al-Nuhayyan, Deputy Prime Minister, chairman of the 
Emirates Heritage Club according to the Emiri Decree number 14/1997”
328
92 PRESS AFFAIRS DIRECTORATE OF SHARJAH EMIRI COURT, (1988), “Sharjah in Fifteen 
Years Time: 1974-1988”, Shaijah, Al-Bayan Press, pp.l83-185
93 CALLAN, L and ROBISON, G (2000), “Oman and the United Arab Emirates”, Hawthorn, Australia, 
Lonely Planet Publications, pp.l87, see heading under ‘environmental organisations’
94 KHALEEJ TIMES 1987), “Folk art forum to be given federal status”, 10th October 1987
95 CALLAN and ROBISON (2000), pp.187, see heading under ‘environmental organisations’
96 See EMIRATES HERITAGE CLUB (2000)
97 Personal interviews, Dubai, December 2001
98 PRESS AFFAIRS DIRECTORATE OF SHARJAH EMIRI COURT, (1988), pp 183-185
99 Recent examples include Sharjah’s hosting of‘Theatrical Gatherings’ sponsored by both the Sharjah 
Department of Culture and Information and by the ruler, Shaykh Sultan al-Qasiml, see ZEITCN, Doa 
(2002), “Theatre artistes to gather in Sharjah”, in GULF NEWS, 13,h October 2002; examples of rallies 
and public demonstrations would include the recent anti-smoking campaign supported by Shaykh 
Muhammad bin Saqr al-Qasiml, Director of the Shaijah Medical District, see, KHALEEJ TIMES 
(2002), “Anti-smoking rally in Shaijah”, 10,h October 2002
100 See section 3.6
,(” RUGH(1997), pp.l8
102 UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE (2001), “United Arab Emirates: Country Reports 
on Human Rights”, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labour, 23rd February, 2001, section 2(b)
103 See http://www.ugagolf.com
104 ALI, Sayed (2002), “Ramadan Tournament gets big cash boost”, in GULF NEWS, 3rd December
2002
105 See http://www.ugagolf.com; also see section 4.5
106 See ALI (2002); and personal observations
107 See http://ww.hga-uae.org.ae. Membership is restricted to UAE nationals, as per condition 1 of the 
association’s working membership requirements
108 ’AHMAD, Ashfaq (2002), “Volunteers play key role in society”, in GULF NEWS, 29th November
2002
109 See http://ww.hga-uae.org.ae
110 See ’AHMAD (2002)
111 The Emirates Institute for Banking and Financial Studies is a government funded institute for 
upgrading the knowledge and skills of UAE bankers, see http://www.eibfs.com
112 ABU DHABI ECONOMY (2001), “A big boost for businesswomen”, Abu Dhabi Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry, Publications and press relations Department, May 2001, pp.5-7
113 see http://www.moumineen.org.ae/
1,4 ABU DHABI ECONOMY (2001), pp.5-7
115 See UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE (2001)
116 ABU DHABI ECONOMY (2001), pp.5-7
’17 see http://www. moumineen. org. ae/
118 see http ://www. muntada. org. ae
119 KI BOOKS (1999), “Monthly News”, see http://members.tripod.com/kibooks/news/ian99.htm; and 
MUSSALLAM, NS (2002), “RCS projects to help disabled”, in KHALEEJ TIMES, lsi December 2002
120 See MUSSALLAM (2002)
121 MADAD, Sana (2003), “Dubai charity telethon to support Iraqi people”, in KHALEEJ TIMES, 23rd
March 2003
122 Ibid.
123 KHALEEJ TIMES (2002), “National Panel set up for Palestinian Relief, 6tb April 2002
124 MADAD (2003)
125 FLEIHAN, Tarek (2002), “Informal association to raise marriage funds for nationals”, in KHALEEJ 
TIMES, 19th October 2002
126 See section 2.2.3
127 UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE (2001), section 2
128 KHALEEJ TIMES (2001), “Country’s judiciary is independent: Dhahiri”, 6th December 2001
129 see http://www, muntada. org, ae
130 See MUSSALLAM (2002)
131 KI BOOKS (1999)
132 MADAD, Sana (2003)
133 UAE MINISTRY OF INFORMATION AND CULTURE (2002), free press is guaranteed in the 
UAE as per the Constitution under Article 30 which states that, "Freedom of opinion expressing it 
verbally, in writing or by other means of expression shall be guaranteed within the limits of the law".
134 CARAPICO (1998), pp.l2
135 PECK (1986), pp.78-80
329
136 Ibid, pp.80
137 Ibid, pp.80
138 See section 4.4.5
139 UAE MINISTRY OF INFORMATION AND CULTURE (2002), regarding Federal Law No. (15) 
of 1988
140 UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE (2001), section 2(a)
141 Ibid.
142 SALDAMANDO, Martin (2001), “Big news for a dogged freedom”, in STAR MAGAZINE, 11th
November 2001
143 UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE (2001), section 1
144 SALDAMANDO (2001)
145 UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE (2001), section 1(c) and section 1(d)
146 Ibid, section 2(a)
147 Ibid.
148
149
SALDAMANDO (2001) 
Ibid.
150
151
152
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE (2001), section 2(a)
Ibid.
MADAD, Sana and FLEIHAN, Tarek (2002), “Issue of teacher beating student may go to court”, in
KHALEEJ TIMES, 29,h May 2002
153 EMIRATES MEDICAL ASSOCIATION (2002), “Annual Report”, Abu Dhabi, Shaykh Dr. Mansur 
Al-Nuhayyan is son of Shaykh Zayid, ruler of Abu Dhabi and president of the UAE
154 EMIRATES BANKERS ASSOCIATION (1997), “Financial position of commercial banks of the 
UAE, 1996-1997”, Dubai, pp.4-6
153 see http://www.spedubai.org/
156 ABU DHABI ECONOMY (2001), pp.5-7
157 see http;//www. abcdubai, com
158 UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE (2001), section 6(e)
159 Ibid. Workers are often reluctant Ip lodge complaints for fear of reprisal, “...the press periodically 
carries reports of abuses suffered by domestic servants, particularly women, at the hands of some 
employers. Allegations have included excessive work hours, non-payment of wages, and verbal and 
physical abuse”
160 Ibid, section 6(b)
161 EMIRATES BANKERS ASSOCIATION (1997), pp.4-6
162 See UAE CENTRAL BANK (1991), “Annual Report 1991”, Abu Dhabi
163 MADAD, Sana (2002), “Ministry details proposal for workers’ associations”, in KHALEEJ TIMES, 
15lh January 2002
164 MADAD, Sana and FLEIHAN, Tarek (2002), “Issue of teacher beating student may go to court”, in 
KHALEEJ TIMES, 29th May 2002
165 See EMIRATES MEDICAL ASSOCIATION (2002); and see ABU DHABI ECONOMY (2001),
pp.5-7
66 See http://www.abcdubai.com
167 See http://www.spedubai.org/
168 See http://www.goanculturaldubai.com/
169 See http ://www. pinovuae. com/clubs pang,htm
170 See http://www. kfs-uae. org
171 See http://w ww. goanculturaldubai. com/
172 See http://www.pinovuae. com/clubs pang.htm
173 See http://www.kfs-uae,org, this speech was made in Abu Dhabi, 1999 by Jalal Balala, the Kenya 
Friendship Society’s chairman
174 See http://www. goanculturaldubai.com/
175 MADAD, Sana (2001), “Welfare societies will need a federal licence”, in KHALEEJ TIMES, 27th 
September 2001
176 Tbid.
177 HUDSON, Michael C (1977), “Arab Politics: the Search for Legitimacy”, New Haven, Yale 
University Press, pp.85-88
178 CARAPICO (1998), pp.4-5
179 KAMRAVA (2000), pp.195
180 HUNTINGTON, Samuel P (1991), “The Third Wave: Democratisation in the Late Twentieth 
Century”, Norman, University of Oklahoma Press, cited by RANDALL and THEOBALD (1998),
p.242
1 Personal interviews, Dubai, March 2002 and September 2002
330
182 MADAD, Sana (2002), “Ministry details proposal for workers’ associations”, in KHALEEJ TIMES, 
15th January 2002
183 Ibid.
184 KHALEEJ TIMES (2002), “UAE seeks ILO help on labour reforms”, 16th January 2002, citing die 
UAE Minister for Labour and Social Affairs speaking at the Dubai Chamber of Commerce and Industry
185 UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE (2001), section 4
186 Personal Interviews, Dubai, December 2001
331
Summary of Conclusions
As the first chapter of this thesis described, in many ways the lower Gulf was 
doomed to a future of peripheralisation given tlie region’s scant geographical resources 
and the local economy’s early reliance on both foreign labour and die export of a single 
primaiy product. Nevertheless, despite these conditions there were important signs of 
indigenous socio-economic development. Indeed, with the pearling booms there began 
to evolve something of a capitalist mode of production and, significantly, a domestic 
merchant / entrepreneurial class began to emerge from the wealthier strata of the old 
desert hierarchy. Capable of funding local development projects and even checking the 
power of their rulers, these merchants were powerflil players in lucrative economic 
networks stretching from South Asia to East Africa. Moreover, alongside these 
formations diere also existed remarkably flexible and relatively de-centralised political 
structures which allowed for direct channels of access to the rulers and highly effective 
systems of mobile and consultative democracy. Crucially these traditional polities were 
also comparatively strong given that they possessed efficient extractive institutions 
which were capable of both collecting taxes and financing a range of rudimentary 
government services.
Working widiin a dependency framework, the chapter demonstrated how this 
inherited situation was fundamentally altered as the lower Gulfs increasing contact 
widi tlie core economy and Imperial power of Britain led to the elimination of certain 
traditional structures and the reinforcement of others. In particular, it was shown how 
Britain’s initial conflict with the Qawasim traders of Ra’s al-Khaimah not only secured 
tlie British East India Company’s trade routes but also displaced a major indigenous 
economic network and, through a system of maritime treaties, effectively transformed 
tlie remaining local rulers into a British client elite. Indeed, by guaranteeing lasting 
peace in exchange for recognition of their sovereignty, these externally strengthened 
Trucial rulers, many of whom would have otherwise held only precarious control over 
their rivals, effectively formalised their dependence on British support and thereby
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brought to an end the fluidity of the traditional tribal political structure. Moreover, as 
the region’s strategic worth and the value of its resources increased, tiiese clients were 
gradually persuaded by a combination of economic benefits and the implicit threat of 
renewed conflict to allow ahnost total British control over their foreign affairs and their 
local industries. Thus, by excluding all forms of outside intervention, Britain had for all 
intents and purposes turned the Gulf into a ‘British lake’ isolated from other economic 
and political powers. Certainly, without such control and the detachment of the lower 
Gulf from tlie wider region it is highly likely that the Trucial States would have either 
fallen under French influence, or would have been absorbed into a Persian, Ottoman, or 
other indigenous economic bloc.
By the 1920s the dependency and responsiveness of these clients to then core 
patron was further reinforced as the rulers began to receive substantial and often 
personal incomes from British air companies and British oil exploration firms. 
Although die lower Gulf has experienced a long histoiy of rent-gathering, these new 
sources of unearned rentier wealth were on a much greater scale and can be seen to have 
laid the foundations for many of the region’s contemporary structures long before the 
first oil exports. Indeed, with access to such revenues the rulers were not only able to 
discontinue most of the existing extractive institutions and instead distribute wealth to 
their populations, but were also able to shift the traditional ruler-merchant balance of 
power. Certainly, with tlie rulers no longer reliant on their merchants for taxation, they 
were able to assume a new degree of autonomy over their people and, although there 
were attempts to reinvigorate indigenous development and share the rentier wealth 
(most notably the Dubai reform movement), these were easily suppressed by the 
British-backed clients.
Furthermore, even as the Empire began to withdraw in the late 1960s, the British 
went to great lengths to ensure die survival of their former clients and dieir future oil 
suppliers by helping to build up region-wide institutions such as the Trucial States 
Council and the Trucial States Development Office. Indeed, by encouraging greater 
unity and a federal framework it was hoped that the newly independent state could be
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guaranteed at least some measure of security from nearby powers and the threat of 
internal fragmentation. Significantly, many of the region’s existing local systems and 
preferences, such as the emphasis on consultation and the direct channels of 
communication, were incorporated alongside these seemingly central institutions, and as 
such the new state was able to ensure a relatively smooth transition without any 
significant break with the past. Thus, through careful negotiation and compromise the 
federation was able to steer its way through the initial complications, and in its early 
years, against the expectations of many, became one of the most stable and successful 
examples of Arab political union.
The second chapter provided an overview of how the UAE’s polity and its 
traditional monarchies have managed to circumvent the ‘Shaykh’s Dilemma’ of 
assimilating new groups alongside old by carefully combining traditional sources of 
legitimacy with structural and material resources in an effort to create a stable and 
resilient ‘ruling bargain’. Specifically, it was demonstrated how the polity has 
continued to draw upon personal legitimacy resources and, by fostering a patrimonial- 
clientalist system of privileges, loyalties, and vertical linkages; how personal authority 
has remained a key component of the UAE’s legitimacy formula even during an era of 
rapid population growth and urbanisation. Moreover, by reviving and in some cases re­
inventing cultural, religious, and ideological resources, the polity has further augmented 
its position by unifying most segments of the population behind shared memories, 
common causes, and a greater sense of identity. Thirdly, through astute constitutional 
engineering and the development of new bureaucracies and institutions it is also clear 
how the polity has been able to provide some degree of structural legitimacy while at 
the same time retaining its carefully managed patrimonial, or rather ‘neo-patrimonial’ 
network of relations.
At all levels, the region’s substantial oil wealth has strengthened the UAE’s 
legitimacy fonnula by providing enormous material resources and by facilitating the 
development of a distributive economy which, in turn, has allowed for a powerful 
‘rentier pact’. Essentially, by providing the bulk of the population with a package of
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distributed wealth and a comprehensive welfare state, the rulers have been able to 
purchase political acquiescence and considerable popular support from both locals and 
expatriates. Moreover, it is also important to note how this rentier pact has been 
particularly strong in the UAE given die relative weakness of the region’s merchant 
elites at the beginning of die oil era. Unlike many of die other Gulf States, whose 
merchants were comparatively powerful when oil exports began; in the lower Gulf the 
merchants had suffered numerous setbacks and years of economic depression, dius 
making it easier to absorb them into a new rentier coalition and less likely for diem to 
press for political reform. Further relating to die UAE’s material resources, there is also 
little doubt that die region’s favourable international relations widi its powerful oil­
purchasing allies have provided an important security umbrella. Indeed, widiout such 
protection and perceived support it would seem likely that the UAE and its monarchies 
would have eventually succumbed to the threat of more powerful expansionary states in 
an increasingly volatile region.
Moreover, by evolving into large-scale dynasties complete with their own 
internal self-regulating mechanisms, the UAE’s traditional monarchies have been able 
to warrant even better stability and far greater longevity. By careflilly sharing positions 
of power in die new and more unitary rentier state, by safeguarding and guaranteeing 
the succession process, and by promoting greater collective action and bandwagoning 
against harmful factions, the ruling families have managed to avoid both internal 
divisiveness and damaging external influences. Essentially, die family itself has 
become an institution and has formed a layer of structural legitimacy in its own right. 
Indeed, as surrogate political parties, dynastic monarchies can be seen to have 
developed then own internal dynamic; a dynamic capable of making their members act 
positively for the group as a whole, and ultimately capable of reinforcing the existing 
neo-patrimonial and materially-based legitimacy formulae.
As the third chapter described, by the mid-1970s the UAE’s economy was 
already heavily reliant on overseas demand for its oil exports, on foreign technology for 
the functioning of its industries, and on foreign labour for supplying both its skilled and
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unskilled workforces. Thus, in an effort to promote greater self-sufficiency and more 
sustained autonomous growth, and of course to ensure the longevity of tlie crucial 
material components of their ruling bargain, the ‘modernising monarchs* and their 
development planners initiated a number of strategies which aimed to reduce some of 
the most damaging features of tiieir dependent development. In particular there were 
calls for the greater diversification of tlie economy: specifically the promotion of the 
UAE’s non-oil related sectors and the encouragement of technology linkages and 
transfers between foreign and domestic enterprises; the creation of a first-class 
educational and welfare state to provide for a trained and healthy workforce; and the 
‘emiratisation’ of labour, encouraging UAE nationals to assume positions previously 
requiring expatriates.
Widi regard to diversification, over the past thirty years die UAE has 
experienced the modest growth of its non-oil related industries and in some cases, 
particularly in the ISI manufacturing sector, has managed to encourage die transmission 
and domestic substitution of foreign technologies. Perhaps more significantly, the 
UAE’s commercial and tourist sectors have expanded considerably over this period and, 
even though not reducing dependency as such, diese sectors have nevertheless greatly 
reduced the economy’s reliance on oil. Furthermore, although with understandably less 
impressive results, die agricultural sector has also grown, providing an additional non­
oil related contribution to the UAE’s GDP, while of course providing greater food 
security. Finally, underpinning diese developments has been the creation of a brand 
new physical infrastructure of roads, ports, industrial parks, and communications. 
Financed by die UAE’s remaining oil wealth, this infrastructure continues to expand, 
facilitating fresh diversification opportunities and better ensuring a stable and 
prosperous post-oil future. Thus, although the oil sector still remains the greatest 
contributor to the UAE’s GDP, accounting for somewhere between a quarter and a half 
of all exports, and although the various diversifying sectors have periodically suffered 
bouts of sluggish growdi, the non-oil sector has nevertheless become extremely 
significant, especially given the small timescale and die region’s comparative 
backwardness as late as the 1960s.
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Social growth has been equally forthcoming, again of course aided by the 
UAE’s massive oil-financed investments. A large number of schools and universities 
staffed by qualified and experienced teachers and lecturers have provided the UAE’s 
youth with the highest standards of education, with small class sizes, and widi excellent 
facilities. Similarly the quantity of hospitals and medical centres has mushroomed over 
this short period, with the ever-increasing number of medical professionals ensuring 
low doctor-patient ratios and providing effective care for almost all conditions within 
the UAE. These accomplishments have therefore not only symbolised and consolidated 
die welfare state component of the rentier coalition, but have also demonstrated the 
planners’ clear commitment to human development in die UAE and the conception of 
an educated and strong Emirati population.
Although by comparison the emiratisation of the labour force has met with only 
limited success, and the UAE remains as reliant as ever on foreign labour, diere have 
nevertheless been a number of promising signs, especially in recent years, which point 
to the much greater emiratisation of managerial, professional, and high-level public 
sector positions in the very near future. Moreover, given that this has been an area of 
strategy which has not directly benefited from oil wealth, and indeed may have been 
hampered by financial incentives which have priced UAE nationals out of the market, 
these results have been far harder to achieve. Indeed, it would appear that the planners 
have been forced to adopt a multidimensional approach, relying not only on wealth 
inducements for locals and restrictive practices such as quotas and visa limitations for 
expatriates, but also on greater educational and motivational opportunities for tire 
increasing quantity of UAE graduates. Certainly, by providing and sponsoring 
vocational courses, internships, and other professional training programmes, the 
government has successfully begun to place far higher numbers of young UAE 
nationals than ever before into both public and private sector jobs, many of which 
previously required the expertise of expatriate workers.
In addition to these broad strategies, it must also be noted how the relative 
flexibility of the UAE’s federal system has allowed for the pursuit of differing sub­
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strategies, especially in the two largest and wealthiest emirates of Abu Dhabi and 
Dubai. Quite simply, Abu Dhabi’s substantial oil wealth has engendered a more 
cautious diversification strategy based around heavy export-oriented industries which 
aim to maximise the emirate’s comparative advantages of cheap energy and abundant 
natural resources. On the other hand, Dubai’s rich history of commercial development 
and the entrepreneurial spirit of the ruling Al-Maktum dynasty, coupled with more 
modest and depleting oil reserves has instead promoted far more rapid and far truer 
diversification. Indeed, with an emphasis on smaller import-substitution industries 
largely unrelated to the oil sector and with the massive expansion of its commercial and 
tourist sectors, Dubai’s non-oil sector has long since accounted for the vast bulk of die 
emirate’s GDP. Crucially, diese differing strategies are now being regarded as 
complementary and mutually reinforcing, as Abu Dhabi’s considerable wealth and 
heavy industries can continue to provide the UAE’s financial backbone and support die 
other emirates, while Dubai’s more diversified economy and strong commercial links 
can better promote the UAE internationally and can better contribute to the 
emiratisation strategy by providing more varied and appropriate employment 
opportunities for UAE nationals. Thus, far from conflicting, the UAE’s sub-strategies 
may become a vital factor in ensuring successful future socio-economic development.
However, as the third chapter also demonstrated, it is important to consider a 
number of critical development problems which have periodically surfaced and which, 
in some cases, have remained unresolved. Indeed, despite the planners’ best efforts, the 
UAE has remained heavily consumption rather than production oriented, with a 
resulting trade imbalance and a declining balance of payments. Furthermore, despite 
the evidence of increasing co-operation between Abu Dhabi and Dubai, there has also 
been the highly visible duplication of projects in the smaller emirates, with expensive 
and unnecessary developments often taking place in adjacent territories, many of which 
have remained under-utilised and empty. Thirdly, there has been the continuing 
problem of regional disequilibrium, witii the wealth and development gap between tlie 
oil-producing emirates and the other emirates remaining almost as great as it was thirty 
years ago. In much the same way as the plans for emiratisation, these have not been
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problems which can easily be addressed by greater investment and oil-financed 
development projects. Instead, given tlie nature of the problems, it would appear that a 
number of internal pathologies must be responsible, namely tlie primarily allocative 
nature of the state, the persistent consumerist mentality of tlie rentier population, the 
lack of inter-emirate co-ordination, die absence of effective inter-departmental co­
operation, and presumably, on occasion, the mismanagement of resources and a lack of 
transparency.
Thus, in an effort to explain more fully some of these ongoing development 
problems, the fourth chapter focused heavily on the role of domestic structures and tiieir 
associated weaknesses. Indeed, by reiterating the potentially negative implications of 
rentierism / allocation, and by underscoring die impact of reinvigorated neo-patrimonial 
networks, bureaucratic self-interests, and differing client elite orientations on die UAE’s 
policymaking and policy implementation processes, it was shown how in many cases 
the same strengthened traditional and dependent structures which have allowed for 
monarchical survival and political stability are now so deeply entrenched that diey 
actively shape, and often undermine, socio-economic development objectives and the 
planners’ attempts to modify the UAE’s circumstances. Certainly, in many ways diese 
problems can be viewed as the hidden costs of the UAE’s ruling bargain, its political 
stability, and die persistence of traditional forces; and therefore the price which must be 
paid in order to permanently circumvent the Shaykh’s dilemma and die inevitability of 
the early modernisation theories.
Essentially, it was shown how the UAE’s decision-making structure at die 
federal level is still dominated by hereditary rulers and their appointees in a hybrid neo­
patrimonial government of seemingly modem institutions grafted onto powerful 
traditional authorities. Moreover, although a legislature does exist, the unicameral non- 
elected chamber of appointed representatives has remained in a paralysed state, often 
unable to exercise its constitutional rights and frequently incapable of questioning or 
restraining the executive. Furthermore, at the emirate level, local governments and 
departments continue to exist, some of which are subordinate but many of which run
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parallel to and overlap their federal counterparts. Certainly, there have been numerous 
occasions when die fabric of the union has been stretched to breaking point, often over 
vital issues of national interest such as oil policy, foreign affairs and defence. Thus, 
while die federation has certainly strengthened in recent years with die greater 
incorporation of Dubai, it is nevertheless still more accurate to consider the UAE as 
something of a loose confederation with its relatively autonomous and at times 
uncoordinated emirate-level powers continuing to shape the state’s development.
Also capable of influencing Emirati development have been the various other 
institutions, parastatals, and bureaucracies tasked with policy implementation and 
advisory roles. Case studies of the various chambers of commerce, judicial institutions, 
and financial institutions provided examples of how these are also very much part of a 
rigid neo-patrimonial network of non-elected appointments and close links to die 
traditional polity. Furthermore, it was shown how in certain circumstances these 
institutions have suffered from a number of odier pathologies including bureaucratic 
self-interest, opaqueness, and a lack of genuine independence. Indeed, the BCCI 
scandal of the early 1990s can be seen as a prime example of the devastating effect of 
such a combination of patiiologies; with the management and fortunes of one of the 
UAE’s most prominent development-related institutions having been inextricably linked 
to the traditional polity, widi the offending bureaucracies having prevented disclosure in 
the interests of self-preservation, with the major regulatory bodies being powerless to 
intervene, and with the host emirate’s local government and legal system left vulnerable 
to external interference and corruption.
Furthermore, in an attempt to highlight die non-homogenous nature of the 
UAE’s client elite, the fourth chapter also revealed die increasing struggle over the 
future of Emirati development between the reformers and conservatives. Altiiough both 
orientations are of course components of the same dominant rentier class deriving 
income from economic rent, the reformers can be seen as ‘new rentiers’ while the 
conservatives can be seen as ‘old rentiers’. Essentially the new rentiers have sought 
fresh sources of economic rent from non-oil related activities such as the letting of real
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estate and commercial free zones, while die old rentiers have sought to perpetuate the 
steady flow of oil revenues. Significantly, a number of controversial issues such as 
foreign property ownership, foreign business ownership, and foreign direct investment 
have led to protracted disputes between those attempting to liberalise the economy and 
foster the growth of these non-oil related activities, and diose attempting to preserve the 
status quo and safeguard what they believe to be the UAE’s national interests. Thus, 
widi conflicting legislation, work-arounds, pioneering projects, and attempts to 
circumvent existing regulations, the interactions of diese opposing elite interest groups 
must be regarded as another major domestic influence on the UAE’s socio-economic 
development.
As the fifth chapter demonstrated, with the seemingly inevitable acceleration of 
global integration, in part due to the liberalising reforms of diese non-oil rent seekers, 
certain new external forces, perceived as both benign and malignant, are now also 
beginning to shape and influence indigenous structures, and must therefore be included 
alongside domestic factors in a comprehensive assessment of Emirati development. 
Firstly, with regard to the UAE’s economic structures, it was indicated that 
globalisation has led to bodi increased international competition and greater marketing 
opportunities for Emirati firms. Secondly, and equally controversially, it was suggested 
how increasing global economic integration may have led to a neglect of regional 
integration, widely believed to serve as an important safety net for most developing 
economies. Thirdly, the impact of international organisations such as the WTO and the 
IMF on the domestic economy was also shown to be both far-reaching and ambiguous, 
witii clear divisions having emerged over the UAE’s acceptance of any international 
agreements thought likely to alter existing structures permanently. On the one hand, 
certain groups have championed the prospects of the WTO-led removal of monopolies 
and the implementation of copyright controls, while on the other hand conservatives 
have cautioned against the opening up of key industries and the political complications 
which may result from the UAE’s commitments.
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In the second part of the chapter, tlie equally contentious impact of socio­
cultural external forces was considered, with particular regard to globalisation’s role in 
the perceived erosion of Emirati culture and heritage, with reference to the rapid 
marginalisation of the Arabic language and, more positively, with regard to 
international communications and increased accountability. Indeed, it was 
demonstrated how globalising forces have been blamed for the increasing ‘cultural 
contamination’ which appears to have all but destroyed die traditional Emirati way of 
life, and how in turn diis socio-cultural attack has provided an additional impetus for die 
government’s multipurpose cultural revival. Similarly, it was shown how the increasing 
presence of non-Arabs, foreign media, and foreign-language education have all 
combined to marginalise the Arabic language, again prompting a reaction to what is 
widely believed to be the consequence of intrusive globalisation. However, with regard 
to die improvements in global communications and dieir accessibility in the UAE, it is 
evident that such developments have been better received, with many agreeing that such 
supra-national sources of information have already begun to increase die accountability 
and transparency of neighbouring Gulf communications networks, a trend which may 
soon reach the UAE.
Finally, in addition to these significant influences on domestic socio-economic 
development, some of which have helped to reinforce existing pathologies while others 
have helped to overcome such obstacles, the chapter also explained how globalising 
forces may begin to play an important role in reshaping civil society and associational 
life in the UAE. Specifically, following a demonstration of how the UAE’s current civd 
society remains in a weakened state due to a combination of rentier-dependency related 
structures (namely cultural heterogeneity resulting from the massive foreign labour 
force, increasing levels of government co-option, royal patronage, and, in some 
circumstances, greater control and repression), it was suggested diat a fresh wave of 
external forces may nevertheless offer a means of reactivating and supporting 
demobilised associations in die near future. In particular, die transfer of ideas and 
methods from the increasing number of UAE-based branches of international 
organisations may lead to stronger internal structures for indigenous associations and a
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greater network of collective security and mutual support. Secondly, the improvements 
in global communications may also provide a demonstration effect for the UAE’s civil 
society organisations as they become better connected and more able to share 
experiences with tlieir counterparts in other parts of the world. Lastly, and perhaps 
most significantly, it was also shown how certain external bodies may be capable of 
motivating the UAE government to free up civic space from above, with domestic 
labour groups and human rights associations already likely to benefit from 
recommendations and proposals made to the relevant ministries by prominent global 
NGOs and major international partners.
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Appendices
Appendix (i) - Early agricultural development
The LTwa chain of oases in southern Abu Dhabi offered some support for 
fanning even in the heart of the desert, but it was only in the oases and towns close to 
the Hajar Mountains in the North and East of the region tiiat agriculture was really able 
to flourish.1 Hatta, Dhayd, and the twin oases of Buraimi and Al-‘Ayn were surrounded 
by a green landscape of well-irrigated farms and a forest of palm trees. They hosted a 
number of important markets and emerged as major trading posts for travellers from all 
over southern Arabia and Oman. The key to their success was in their use of an ancient 
but effective system of irrigation and water transportation. This ‘falaj ’ system (pi. aflaf) 
comprised of subterranean stone tunnels which were designed to bring water down to 
the level of the towns from the high water tables of tlie nearby mountains. When the 
tunnels reached the agricultural gardens they would become surface channels allowing 
the water to be regulated and re-directed to wherever it was most needed.2 It is 
uncertain when the first of these tunnels were constructed, as although it is widely 
believed that they were originally introduced to the area by the Persians,3 more recent 
studies have claimed they were the work of indigenous Omani people.4 Nevertheless, 
regardless of their origin, the majority were probably built during pre-Islamic times with 
many having been restored in more recent years. Indeed, working examples can still be 
seen today in the mountainous village of Hatta in Dubai emirate, and more extensively 
in tlie date gardens of Al-‘Ayn where a network of aflaj help to maintain a huge number 
of palms close to the city centre.
The introduction of more modem technology and methods allowed for some 
modest development in the agricultural sector, but this took time, and it was only in tlie 
1950s tiiat tangible improvements were seen. The first real progress was in Ra’s al- 
Khaimah following the establishment of an Agricultural Trials Station at Diqdaqa. 
Agriculture had always been more developed and diversified in Ra’s al-Khaimah given
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the northern emirate’s slightly cooler climate and its proximity to the mountains. 
Indeed, there has always been a higher than average proportion of die labour force 
engaged in agricultural activity in this emirate, and after the station began operating in 
1955 die proportion began to grow. In 1967 a Department of Agriculture was set up 
widi the assistance of die Trucial States Development Office5 and this further expanded 
the operation in Ra’s al-Khaimah by adding an agricultural school, a veterinary clinic 
and a new network of aflaj to help support die recent growth.6 The department had its 
headquarters in the main agricultural centre close to Al-‘Ayn in the Abu Dhabi emirate, 
and continued to introduce more experimental farms with the dual aims of testing 
varieties of plants for dieir suitability in die desert climate, and also of helping to 
demonstrate modem agricultural techniques to local farmers, many of whose families 
still farm the land today.7
Appendix (ii) - The Sharjah Decency Laws
“The Emirate of Sharjah has promulgated a set of rules aimed at promoting public 
decency and proper conduct. The rules include a dress code for both men and women; 
rules regarding bathing suits; rules on places where only women are allowed; a 
prohibition on men and women who are not married or related from being alone; a 
prohibition on antisocial behaviour; and a prohibition on wearing certain clothing in 
mosques. The rules were promulgated as Local Instructions No 1 of 2001 and Executive 
Council Resolution No 12 of 2001. A multi-lingual booklet has been published to direct 
the attention of the public to the new mles. The dress code prohibits men from wearing 
shorts in public or commercial places and in public offices. It also prohibits men from 
appearing in public sbirtless or wearing only an ezar (a type of local undergarment). 
Women may not wear clothing that exposes their backs or abdomens, shorts or skirts 
that are cut above the knee, or other clothes that are tight or transparent. The mles 
require all swimmers to wear conservative swimwear that is acceptable to the culture of 
Sharjah. They prohibit wearing bathing suits in the streets or other public places. The 
rules provide that men may not enter specified private areas to be used only by women, 
except in emergency circumstances. An unmarried man and woman may not be alone in
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a public place or in suspicious circumstances. The rules prohibit disturbing the peace 
with acts of vulgarity or loud noise and also prohibit acts of harassment that violate 
public decency. People may not enter a mosque wearing pyjamas or clothing that has 
images or improper slogans. The Sharjah police, security officers and building guards 
are charged with ensuring adherence to the rules, and they may issue warnings or refuse 
to provide public services to persons who violate the rules.”
[Source: Sharjah Law, Local Instructions No 1 of 2001 and Executive Council Resolution No 12 of 2001, 
supplied by Afridi and Angell, Dubai]8
Appendix (Hi) - Emirati identity surveys
Sally Findlow’s identity survey was conducted in 1999 at the University of the 
UAE in Al-‘Ayn. 500 university students were asked to answer the question, “Where 
are you from?"
Student’s home emirate ‘UAE I Emirati’ response Other response
Abu Dhabi (including Al- 
‘Ayn)
50% 50%
Dubai 15 85
Ra’s al-Khaimah 15 85
Overall 30 70
[Source: Sally Findlow, “The UAE: Nationalism and Arab-Islamic Identity’7]9
Other 
response - 
70%
Findlow identity survey response (1999)
'UAE/
Emirati'
[Source: Sally Findlow, “The UAE: Nationalism and Arab-Islamic Identity”]10 
The author’s identity survey was conducted in April 2002 in five locations across the 
UAE. 250 male UAE citizens of varying age groups were asked, “Which of the 
following best describes your identity?", and were provided with three choices: ‘UAE /
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Emirati', an emirate-specific response (e.g. Abu Dhabi for those surveyed in Abu 
Dhabi), and a more general 'Arab ’ response.
Location ‘UAE / Emirati’ 
response
Emirate-specific
response
‘Arab’ response
Abu Dhabi 86% 8% 6%
Dubai 36 60 4
Sharjah 76 16 8
‘Ajman 98 0 2
Al-‘Ayn 100 0 0
Overall 79% 77% 4%
[Source: Davidson identity survey, 2002]
Davidson identity survey response (2002)
'Arab'
Emirate- response
specific - 4%
response ■ |«Ll
17%
'UAE 1 
Emirati' 
response
79%
[Source: Davidson identity survey, 2002]
Appendix (iv) - Volume of non-oil trade and re-exports in Dubai
Dubai's non-oil foreign trade - quantity
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 -2001
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Dubai re-exports - quantity
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 -2001
[Source: Dubai Department of Ports and Customs]11
Appendix (v) - Net enrolment ratios and Student/teacher ratios
Educational Sector Year Net enrolment ratio
Primary 2000/2001 86.6
Secondary 2000/2001 67.4
Tertiary 1998/1999 12.1
[Source. UNESCO]12
Student/teacher ratios in Dubai schools
1985 -2000
□ Private sector - 
primary and 
secondary
□ Primary 
schools
□ Secondary 
schools
[Source: UAE Ministry of Education and Youth]13
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Appendix (vi) - Gender imbalances in the overall UAE population and in Dubai
UAE population breakdown - by gender
□ Females
□ Males
[Source: UAE Ministry of Planning]14
Dubai population breakdown - by gender
□ Females
□ Males
[Source: Dubai Municipality]15
Appendix (vii) - The UAE Council of Ministers, 2002
President
Vice President / Prime Minister 
Deputy Prime Minister
Agriculture and Fisheries
Communications
Defence
Economy and Commerce 
Education and Youth 
Electricity and Water 
Finance and Industry
Shaykh Zayid Al-Nuhayyan 
Shaykh Maktum Al-Maktum 
Shaykh Sultan Al-Nuhayyan
Sa‘id al-Raqabani
’Ahmad Al-Tayir
Shaykh Muhammad Al-Maktum 
Shaykh Fahim al-Qasiml 
Dr. Ali Al-Sharhan 
Humayd Al-Uways 
Shaykh Hamdan Al-Maktum
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Foreign Affairs
Health
Higher Education and Research
Information and Culture
Interior
Justice and Islamic Affairs
Labour and Social Affairs
Petroleum and Mineral Resources
Planning
Public Works and Housing
Rashid al-Na‘imi
Hamad Al-Madfa
Shaykh Nuliayyan Al-Nuhayyan 
Shaykh Abdullah Al-Nuhayyan 
Lt. General al-Badi
Muhammad al-Dhahiri
Matar Al-Tayir
Ubayd al-Nasiri
Shaykh Humayd al-Mu‘alla 
Raqad Al-Raqad
Minister of State for Cabinet Affairs
Minister of State for Finance and Industiy 
Minister of State for Foreign Affairs
Minister of State for Supreme Council Affairs 
Minister of State for Presidential Office (1998)
Sa‘id Al-Ghaytli
Dr. Muhammad Kliarbash 
Shaykh Hamdan Al-Nuhayyan 
Majid al-Na‘imi
Shaykh Mansur Al-Nuhayyan
Governor of the UAE Central Bank
Ambassador to the USA
Permanent Representative to the United Nations
Sultan al-Suwaidi
Muhammad al-Shali
Muhammad Samhan
[Source: Business Monitor International, tlie Middle East Research Institute of Japan, and Polsci.com]16
Appendix (viii) - US pressure for economic reform in ihe UAE
As one of the UAE’s most important trading partners and a major source of 
the UAE’s foreign investment, the USA has recently lobbied for economic reform in the 
UAE. Indeed, the USA has openly criticised the UAE’s current business environment 
and has indicated that if changes are forthcoming then die UAE can expect greater 
American investment. In tlie words of Robert Mallet, tlie US Deputy Secretaiy of 
Commerce, speaking in 1999:
“Are there areas -where we could be moving more quickly? There certainly 
are. We believe that the UAE has the potential to become a role model for 
the rest of the Middle East. We think that the UAE can set new standards 
for good business practices, including more privatisation, increased 
transparency and more respect for intellectual property rights - including 
the enactment of copyright patent laws consistent with World Trade 
Organisation practices. We hear from American firms that they are eager 
to participate in additional privatisation projects. They are eager to invest
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in the pharmaceutical domain, for instance, if their rights are fully 
respected and protected. American companies would like greater flexibility 
regarding commercial agents, majority ownership and more vigorous 
contract-dispute resolution methodologies. ”17
Appendix (ix) - Contrasting ALESCO recommendations regarding globalisation and 
Emirati culture
In 1977, the UAE’s representatives at the ALESCO (Arab League for 
Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organisation) conference stated tlieir country’s 
need to safeguard against globalising forces:
“...while stating its [the League’s] belief in the value of keeping pace with 
modern science and technology, it resolved first to explore in depth the 
foundations of Arab Islamic authenticity in order to safeguard it against the 
ideological influences contaminating it from so many sources”.
However, in 1998, on the same subject, the indication was one of greater acceptance of 
globalisation and the need for increased cultural coexistence rather than resistance:
”... the approach is that particular cultures and value systems should not 
dominate over others. It is no longer an issue of dealing with cultural 
invasion, but of ensuring fairness among other equally worthy cultures.
Thus, every effort should be made to profess and promote the strengths of 
the Arab and Islamic culture as part of the major intellectual cultures of the 
world. ”18
1 LORIMER, JG (1915), “Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf, Oman and Central Arabia” Volume 1 Historical 
Part II, Calcutta. Superintendent Government Printing [republished 1970 by Gregg International 
Publishers], pp.2296
2 HEARD-BEY, Frauke (1982), “From Trucial States to United Arab Emirates”, London, Longman, 
pp.177-180
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3 British historians such as Hawley claim the aflaj date from the Sassanid occupation of Oman between 
the third and seventh centuries, see HAWLEY, Donald (1970), “The Trucial States”, London, George 
Allen & Unwin, pp.203
4 Recent UAE-based archaeological studies contend that the indigenous Omanis were the original creators 
of the aflaj, not the Persians. Moreover, it is believed that the word falaj ’ is a derivate of the Arabic verb 
‘felj’ which means ‘to divide something into two parts’, especially with regard to water or money. See (in 
Arabic) AL-TIKRITI, Walid (2003), “Aflaj”, Department of Antiquities and Tourism, Al-‘Ayn
5 See references to the British funded Trucial States Development OfBce, section 1.4.4
6 FENELON, Kevin (1973), “The United Arab Emirates: An Economic and Social Survey”, London, 
Longman, pp.49-50
7 Ibid, pp.46-47
8 SHARJAH LAW (2001), “Local Instructions No 1 of 2001 and Executive Council Resolution No 12 of 
2001”, supplied by AFRIDI & ANGELL, Dubai
9 FINDLOW, Sally (2000), “The UAE: Nationalism and Arab-Islamic Identity”, Abu Dhabi, Emirates 
Centre for Strategic Studies and Research, ECSSR OCCASIONAL PAPER, Number 39, pp.29-30
10 Ibid.
11 DUBAI DEPARTMENT OF PORTS AND CUSTOMS (2002), “Dubai: non-oil foreign trade - 
total”, in DUBAI DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (2002), “Development 
Statistics”, Government of Dubai, pp.109
12 UNESCO (1998/1999/2000/2001), the net enrolment ratio being the percentage of children attending 
from the relevant age group
13 UAE MINISTRY OF EDUCATION AND YOUTH (2001), “Dubai: government schools - 
student/teacher ratio”, “Dubai: private schools - teachers by sex”, and “Dubai: private schools - 
enrolment by sex”, all in DUBAI DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (2001), 
“Development Statistics”, Government of Dubai, figures for government sector schools taken from ratios 
published on pp.199, ratios for private sector schools calculated from teacher and student totals listed on 
pp. 208-209
M UNITED ARAB EMIRATES MINISTRY OF PLANNING and DUBAI MUNCIPALITY (2001), 
“UAE and Dubai: population”, in DUBAI DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
(2001), “Development Statistics”, Government of Dubai, pp. 25
15 Ibid. *
16 See BUSINESS MONITOR INTERNATIONAL (1998), “The United Arab Emirates”; and 
MIDDLE EAST RESEARCH INSTITUTE OF JAPAN (2002) statistics relating to UAE cabinet 
compositions; and POLSCI.COM (2001), “Political reference Almanac - UAE Political System”, New 
York, Keynote Publishing; and personal interviews, Abu Dhabi, September 2002
17 MALLETT, Robert L (2001), “Symposium on Shaykh Zayid”, in MIDDLE EAST POLICY, volume 
6 number 4, June 1999, pp.l 3 quoting Robert Mallett, Deputy Secretary of Commerce, US Department 
of Commerce, speaking at the 20th April 1999 conference convened by the Middle East Policy Council
18 FINDLOW (2000), pp.36 citing the contrasting examples of ALESCO conferences in 1977 and 1998
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Glossary of Terms, Abbreviations and Acronyms
'Amir
Arif
Askars
Azima
Abaya 
Abu Musa
Ardha
Ashira
Atheer
Baggala
Banian 
Bani Yas 
Baraka 
Bastakiyah
Bay'a 
Bedu
Buraimi
Bushire
Dalma
Dar al-harb
Das
Dhayd
Dibba al-Fujairah
Dirham
Diqdaqa
Dira
Diwan
a person involved in an almost capitalist system of 
pearling in which boats would be fitted out by an 
entrepreneur who would then claim a share of all profits 
the ruler’s local representative, especially on the Abu 
Dhabian island of Dalma
an official responsible for the maintenance of falaj 
irrigation channels in agricultural towns such as Hatta and 
Al-‘Ayn
aimed tribesmen paid a salary to enforce tlie ruler’s 
authority in outlying regions
a voluntary contribution paid by pearling merchants to 
provide for feasts in honour of visiting dignitaries, 
especially on tlie Abu Dhabian island of Dalma 
a form of traditional dress
strategic island in the lower Gulf, formerly belonging to
Sharjah, but currently occupied by Iran
a show or display, e.g. camel races in Bedu society
a narrowly defined familial organisation or tribe
a major Abu Dhabian gas company
a type of fishing / trading vessel commonly used in the
Gulf
a British Indian subject
a powerful Abu Dhabi-based tribal federation 
charisma
an old quarter of Bur Dubai once donated by the ruler to 
Persian merchants, some of the Bastakiyah houses still 
have their original wind towers
collective recognition of another person’s authority 
nomadic people (the double plural "bedouin' is not 
commonly used in the lower Gulf)
a conurbation of Omani villages surrounding a large oasis 
close to AT-Ayn and tire UAE border 
an important Iranian harbour town 
a small Abu Dhabian island, formerly a thriving centre of 
the pearling industry
die non-Muslim world, referring to die Wahdbbi attempts 
to conquer non-Wahabbi lands 
an Abu Dhabian island transformed into an offshore oil 
terminal
an agricultural town due east of Sharjah
a small town on the UAE’s Indian Ocean coastline, 
currently being redeveloped into a tourist resort 
the UAE’s currency
an agricultural town south of Ra’s al-Khaimah, the site of 
die first agricultural trials station in the Trucial States 
the elastic concept of an area in which a tribe exercised 
sway
die Rider’s court
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Dishdasha
Dnata
Duris
Etisalat 
Falaj (pi. aflaj)
Al-FaqTl
Al-Ghanima
Ghasd
Ghayathi
Ghazu
Hadhr
Hajar Mountains
Haras
Hdsila
Hatta
Hukiima
Ikhluwi
Imam
Jalbut
Julfar
Jumeirah
Kafll
Kalba
Al-Khawiya 
Khojah 
Khor Fakkdn
Khutba
Lakh
Lingah
Lrwa Oases
Majlis (pi. majalis)
Majlis al-tujjar
a form of traditional dress
a Dubai Government-owned supplier of cargo air services 
armed guards in the oasis towns and outlying regions 
responsible for protecting camels and other livestock from 
raiders
the UAE’s telecommunications monopoly
subterranean stone tunnels designed to bring water down 
from the mountains and provide irrigation in agricultural 
areas
a small town on the UAE’s Indian Ocean coastline, 
currently being redeveloped into a tourist resort 
the booty collected by desert raiders, of which four-fifths 
would be divided amongst the tribesmen and one-fifth 
retained by the leader
the ‘pearling proletariat’ of crewmen which emerged as a 
result of the 'dmil system
an Abu Dhabian settlement close to the Saudi border 
desert raiding 
settled people
a range of mountains running down from the Musandam
Peninsula into the UAE’s hinterland
armed guards at the ruler’s fort in the main town
a pearling tax requiring all pearling boats to contribute a
share equal to income of one crewmember
a town in the Hajar Mountains, an enclave of Dubai
emirate and an increasingly popular tourist destination
the traditional tribal administration
a communal system of pearling in which the crew would
jointly own a boat and share all profits
a communal prayer leader
a type of fishing I trading vessel commonly used in the 
Gulf
the former name for Ra’s al-Khaimah
a western district of Dubai, now dominated by European 
expatriates
a sponsor - all foreign businesses operating in die UAE
require at least one local partner
a small town on the Indian Ocean coastline, it was briefly
granted independence from Shaijah in order to facilitate
British negotiations over air landing rights
the period of oil exploration by foreign firms in the 1930s
a Punjabi region of present-day Pakistan
a container port on the UAE’s Indian Ocean coastline,
part of Shaijah emirate
Friday sermons
a denomination of British-Indian currency
an important Iranian harbour town
a string of oases deep inside the Abu Dhabian hinterland 
a meeting place I council
the council convened by Shaykh Sa’id Al-Maktum in the 
1940s to rejuvenate many of the projects originally 
proposed during the Dubai refonn movement of 1938
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Al-Majlis al-watam lil-ittihadihe Federal National Council of appointed representatives
Masha a tax collected by the ‘arifs to help maintain the falaj
Al-Mashriq
Al-Mithaq
irrigation channels in agricultural towns
the eastern Arab world
the pact between rulers and other groups, also the name of 
the Bahraini Emir’s new national charter
Mutarizaya
Muzakki
Na’ib
Nanb
the ruler’s anned retainers
an official responsible for tax collection
the ruler’s local representative, especially in Al-‘Ayn 
a pearling tax levied on all pearl merchants proportionate 
to the size of their business
Al-Nisab
Qadi
the tax threshold quantity of dates
a judge responsible for dispensing justice according to 
Islamic law
Qalta
Qawasim (adj. Qdsimi)
a pair of pearling crewmen, normally a diver and a hauler 
a tribal federation that grew prosperous from maritime 
trade in tlie early nineteenth century and whose 
descendents continue to rule Sharjah and Ra’s al-Khaimah
Qishm a large island close to the Straits of Hormuz and the
Ra ’iyy / Ra 'aiyya
Rams
RolDibba
present day Iranian port of Bandar ‘Abbas 
a shepherd / his flock
a small coastal town north of Ra’s al-Khaimah 
a small town on the UAE’s Indian Ocean coastline,
Rub ‘ al-Khdli
currently being redeveloped into a tourist resort 
the ‘Empty Quarter’, a desert which stretches across the
Sadiyat
Najd Peninsula into Oman and the UAE
an Abu Dhabian island currently being redeveloped as a 
real estate investment park
Saib a pearling boat crewman, normally a hauler or rope-puller 
for divers
Salalah
Salifa al-ghaus
an Omani deep-water container port
‘pearling courts’ used to settle disputes relating to
Sambuk
pearling and the pearl trade
a type of fishing / trading vessel commonly used in the 
Gulf
Shari'a
Sharif
Islamic law
referring to the camel herding tribes who achieved a 
higher socio-economic status / noble status over their
Shaykh
Shaykhdom
ShVa
sheep herding counterparts
the leader of a tribe / a title of respect
a Shaykh’s area of influence
the general name for a large group of Muslim sects, all of
Al-Shindagha
Shura
Souq
Straits of Hormuz
which contest the recognition of ‘Ali as the legitimate 
Caliph follo wing tlie death of tlie Prophet Muhammad 
a creek side district of Bur Dubai
consultation
a town’s marketplace
the strategic straits between Iran and the Musandam 
Peninsula which all shipping must pass through in order 
to enter the Persian Gulf
Sunni orthodox Muslims accounting for the majority of the 
UAE’s Arab population
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Sur
Ta ‘addudiya
Tamima
Taraz
Tunbs
Turaih 
Ulama ’
Wadi
Wadii al-Mawt
Wahhabi / Wahhabism
Wall
Wikalat Anba' al-Imardt 
Zakat.
Zarara
Zaya
an Omani port, its slaving merchants were offered French
citizenship in the 1890s
pluralism or multi-partyism
a paramount shaykh / die ‘Shaykli of Shaykhs’
a tax collected to pay guards to protect the towns during
the pearling season when many of die men were out at sea
two small islands in the lower Gulf currently occupied by
Iran, specifically die Greater Tunbs (Tunb al-Kubra) and
the Lesser Tunbs {Tunb al-Sughrd)
cultural heritage
Islamic clergymen
a dry watercourse
the ‘Valley of Death’ - an area on the border between 
Abu Dhabi and Dubai, originally planned to be die site of 
the UAE’s new capital city
followers of Muhammad ibn Abdul-Wahhab’s movement, 
many of whom preached a purified form of Islam and 
sought to renew the Prophet’s golden era of Islam 
the ruler’s local representative in ail outlying region 
WAM - the UAE News Agency
an Islamic mandated tax levied on livestock / agricultural
production and other movable property
Abu Dhabian oilfields close to the Saudi border,
reportedly offered to Saudi Arabia in an effort to settle the
long-running BuraimT dispute
a small coastal town close to Ra’s al-Khaimah, a key
target for the British attacks in 1819
ADCCJ
ADGAS
ADIA
ADMA
ADPC
ALESCO
ARAMCO
BBME
BCCE
BCCI
COM
DCCI
DIC
DIPD
DSP’
DUBAL
ECSSR
EOI
EPZ
FATF
FDI
FNC
Abu Dhabi Chamber of Commerce and Industry 
Abu Dhabi Gas
Abu Dhabi Investments Authority
Abu Dhabi Marine Areas Limited
Abu Dhabi Petroleum Company
Arab League for Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organisation
Arab-American oil Company
British Bank of the Middle East
Bank of Credit Commerce Emirates
Bank of Credit Commerce International 
Council of Ministers
Dubai Chamber of Commerce and Industry 
Dubai Internet City
Dubai Investments Park Development Company 
Dubai Shopping Festival 
Dubai Aluminium
Emirates Centre for Strategic Studies and Research
Export Oriented Industrialisation
Export Processing Zone
Financial Action Task Force
Foreign Direct Investment
Federal National Council
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GATS
GATT
GCC
GUPAC
IDEX
ILO
IMF
IPC
1S1
ISP
LOB
NGO
OAPEC
OECD
OPEC
PDTC
POGAR
SCR
TRIPS
UAE
UNDP
UNESCO-
UNIDO
UNPAN
USSR
WAM
WTO
General Agreement on Trade in Services
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
Gulf Co-operation Council
Gulf Permanent Assistance Committee
International Defence Exhibition
International Labour Organisation
International Monetary Fund
Iraqi Petroleum Company
Import Substitution industrialisation
Internet Service Provider
Lease Office Building
Non-Governmental Organisation
Organisation of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development
Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries 
Petroleum Development Trucial Coast 
Programme oh Governance in the Arab Region 
Supreme Council of Rulers
Trade Related aspects of International Property Rights (a 
WTO agreement)
United Arab Emirates
United Nations Development Programme
United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural
Organisation
United Nations Industrial Development Organisation 
United Nations online network in Public Administration 
and Finance
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
Wikalat Anba’ al-Imarat, the UAE News Agency 
World Trade Organisation
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SELECTED SOURCES
Personal Interviews
Interviews were conducted for the purpose of this thesis between March 2001 and May 
2003 hi a variety of locations in the UAE, including Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, Ra’s 
al-Khaimah, Fujairah, and Al-‘Ayn. These encounters are listed in the endnotes in as 
specific a manner as consented to by the informants themselves.
Primary Sources (including government and NGO documents)
Sources are English or dual English / Arabic unless stated otherwise
ABU DHABI ECONOMY, Abu Dhabi Chamber of Commerce and Industry, 
Publications and press relations Department
- (2001), “A big boost for businesswomen”, May 2001
- (1999), “Abu Dhabi Economy: Special Issue”, Volume 28 Number 322, March 
1999
ABU DHABI PLANNING DEPARTMENT ECONOMIC DIVISION (1976), 
“Directive Dociunents for tlie Preparation of the Economic and Social Development 
Plan of 1977-1979”, Abu Dhabi, June 1976
BUSINESS IN DUBAI, Dubai Chamber of Commerce and Industry
- (2002), “DIFC puts emirate on International financial Map”, Volume 2 Issue 
15, March 2002
- (2002), “Family companies the day after: how would local family owned 
businesses survive in globalisation?”, Volume 2 Issue 15, March 2002
- (2001), “Foreign Investments - Total blockade vis-a-vis open door 
policy”, Volume 1 Issue 6, June 2001
- (2001), Volume 1 Issue 5, May 2001
- (2001), Volume 1 Issue 3, March 2001
BUSINESS MONITOR INTERNATIONAL
- (2003), “The United Arab Emirates”, second quarter report
- (2003), “The United Arab Emirates”, first quarter report
- (2001), “The United Arab Emirates”, second quarter report
- (2000), “The United Arab Emirates”, third quarter report
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- (1998), “The United Arab Emirates”
- (1997), “The United Arab Emirates, 1995-1997”
CITIBANK UAE (2002), “Annual report”, Citibank Dubai
CROWN PRINCE COURT DEPARTMENT OF RESEARCH AND 
STUDIES (1996), “Development Indicators in the UAE: Achievements and 
Projections”, Abu Dhabi
DUBAI CHAMBER OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY (2001), “Our Services”, 
Dubai
DUBAI DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, Government of 
Dubai
- (2002), “Development Statistics”
- (2001), “Development Statistics”
- (1999), “Development Statistics”
DUBAI DEPARTMENT OF PORTS AND CUSTOMS in DUBAI DEPARTMENT 
OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (2001), “Development Statistics”, Government 
of Dubai
- (2001), “Dubai: non-oil foreign trade - total”
- (2001), “Dubai: major (non-oil) trade partners - imports”
- (2001), “Dubai: major (non-oil) trade partners - exports”
- (2001), “Dubai: major (non-oil) trade partners - re-exports”
DUBAI GOVERNMENT (2000), “Dubai Technology, Electronic Commerce 
and Media Free Zone Law No.l”, Dubai
DUBAI INTERNET CITY (2001), official brochure
DUBAI MUNICIPALITY (1999), “Results of income and expenditure survey - 
Dubai city, 1997-1998”, Administrative Affairs Department, Statistics Centre,
May 1999
ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, London
- (2001), “United Arab Emirates”
- (2000), “United Arab Emirates”
ECSSR (2002), “UAE and the Red Crescent”, Abu Dhabi, Emirates Centre for 
Strategic Studies and Research
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EMIRATES BANKERS ASSOCIATION (1997), “Financial position of commercial 
banks of die UAE, 1996-1997”, Dubai
EMIRATES CORPORATE COMMUNICATIONS (2002), “Countdown to Dubai 
2003”, press release issued by Emirates Airlines Media Relations Department, 23 rd 
October 2002
EMIRATES MEDICAL ASSOCIATION (2002), “Annual report”, Abu Dhabi
FEDERAL RESEARCH DIVISION (2003), “United Arab Emirates: a country 
study”, Blackmask, USA
FEDERATION OF UAE CHAMBERS OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY, Abu 
Dhabi
- (1994), “The components of investment and the methods of promoting 
investment opportunities in die UAE”
- (1994), “Goals and achievements”
- (1993), "The establishment of economic enterprises in the UAE: in light of the 
provisions of the law and its executive regulations"
FOREIGN OFFICE HISTORICAL SECTION (1920), “Persian Gulf’, London, 
HMSO, Issue 76
FREEDOM HOUSE (2001), “Freedom in the World Country Ratings, 1972-73 
to 2000-2001”, New York, Freedom House
GCC DEVLOPMENT PLANS - UNITED ARAB EMIRATES (1982), “Economic 
and Social Development Plans for the UAE, 1975-1980”, Abu Dhabi
HSBC Middle East (2001), “Foreign investment statistics for GCC states”, Dubai, 
Second Quarter 2001
JEBEL ALI FREEZONE AUTHORITY (2000), investment statistics, Jebel 
Ali, Dubai
fw Arabic) AL-KAWARI, Ali Khalifa and AL-SADUN, Jasim (1996), “The 
GCC Countries: A Futuristic View”, Development Forum Annual Meeting 
Documents, January 1995, Girttas Publishing House, Kuwait
KERRY, John and BROWN, Hank (1992), “The BCCI Affair” A Report to the 
Committee on Foreign Relations in die United States Senate by Senator John 
Kerry and Senator Hank Brown”, Washington DC, 102nd Congress 2nd Session 
Senate Print, December 1992
LORIMER, JG
- (1915), “Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf, Oman and Central Arabia” Volume 1 
Historical Part 1 A, Calcutta, Superintendent Government Printing [republished 
1970 by Gregg International Publishers
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- (1915), “Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf, Oman and Central Arabia” Volume I 
Historical Part IB, Calcutta, Superintendent Government Printing [republished 
1970 by Gregg International Publishers
- (1915), “Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf, Oman and Central Arabia” Volume 1 
Historical Part II, Calcutta, Superintendent Government Printing [republished 
1970 by Gregg International Publishers]
- (1915), “Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf, Oman and Central Arabia” Volume 2B 
Geographical and Statistical, Calcutta, Superintendent Government Printing 
[republished 1970 by Gregg International Publishers]
MIDDLE EAST RESEARCH INSTITUTE OF JAPAN (2002), statistics 
relating to UAE cabinet compositions
PRESS AFFAIRS DIRECTORATE OF SHARJAH EMIRI COURT, (1988), 
“Sharjah in Fifteen Years Time: 1974-1988”, Sharjah, Al-Bayan Press
EL-SABA, Soheir (2002), “The Impediments to Industrial Development in the 
UAE”, Dubai, Dubai Chamber of Commerce and Industry Studies and Research 
Department
AL-SHARHAN INTERNATIONAL CONSULTANCY, Dubai
- (2001), “UAE Country Report 2001”
- (2000), “UAE Country Report 2000”
SHARJAH LAW (2001), Local Instructions No 1 of 2001 and Executive Council 
Resolution No 12 of 2001, supplied by AFRIDI & ANGELL, Dubai
TAMIMI LAW UPDATE (2001), “Law update: UAE committed to 
implementing WTO agreements”, Tamimi Consultants, Dubai, January 2001
UAE CENTRAL BANK (2002), “UAE and Dubai: commercial banks”, in DUBAI 
DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (2002), “Development 
Statistics”, Government of Dubai
UAE CENTRAL BANK, Abu Dhabi
- (1996), “Annual Report 1996”
- (1994), “Annual Report 1994”
- (1991), “Annual Report 1991”
UAE MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE AND FISHERIES in DUBAI 
DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (2001), “Development 
Statistics”, Government of Dubai
- (2001), “Dubai: agricultural holdings”
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- (2001), “Dubai: vegetables production”
- (2001), “Dubai: fruit production”
- (2001), “Dubai: cattle farms - milk production”
- (2001), “Dubai: fish production”
UAE MINISTRY OF EDUCATION AND YOUTH, in DUBAI DEPARTMENT 
OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (2001), “Development Statistics”, Government 
of Dubai
- (2001), “UAE and Dubai: secondary school graduates”
- (2001), “Dubai: government schools - student/teacher ratio”; “Dubai: private 
schools - teachers by sex”; and “Dubai: private schools - enrolment by sex”
UAE MINISTRY OF FINANCE AND INDUSTRY (2001), various statistics, Abu 
Dhabi
UAE MINISTRY OF HEALTH and DUBAI DEPARTMENT OF MEDICAL 
SERVICES, in DUBAI DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
(2001), “Development Statistics”, Government of Dubai
- (2001), “Dubai: health centres”, “Dubai: hospitals”, “Dubai: hospital beds”, 
“Dubai: medical doctors”
- (2001), “Dubai: musing staff’, and “Dubai: medical technical assistants”
- (2001), “Dubai: health development indicators”
UAE MINISTRY OF INFORMATION AND CULTURE, Abu Dhabi
- (2002), various statistics
- (1995), “UAE Yearbook: 1995”
- FEDERAL LAW (1988), Federal Law No. (15) of 1988
- FEDERAL LAW (1984,1988), Article 3 of Updated Federal Law No. (8) of 
1984 as amended by Federal Law No. (13) of 1988 regarding Commercial 
Companies
- FEDERAL LAW (1973,1983), No. (6) of 1973, Federal Law No. (10) of 
1973, Federal Law No. (3) of 1983
UAE MINISTRY OF PLANNING in DUBAI DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMIC 
DEVLOPMENT (2002), “Development Statistics”, Government of Dubai
- (2002), “UAE and Dubai: GDP at factor cost and per capita GDP - 2001”
- (2002), “Dubai: GDP - real growth rates”
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- (2002), “UAE and Dubai: employment by economic sectors”
- (2002), “UAE and Dubai: population”
- (2002), “Dubai: GDP at factor cost”
UAE MINISTRY OF PLANNING (1995), “Annual Statistical Report on UAE 
Hotels”, Abu Dhabi, Central Statistics Department
UAE UNIVERSITY IN AL-‘AYN (2001), “UAE University registered students”, and 
“UAE University graduates”, in DUBAI DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT (2001), “Development Statistics”, Government of Dubai
UNDP-POGAR (2002), “Programme on Governance in the Arab region - UAE”, 
various reports 
UNDP-UAE, Abu Dhabi
- (2000), “Press Release - The Launch of Ra’s al-Khaimah Vision ”, 28th March 
2000
- (2000), various reports, 27th May 2000
- (2000), “Press Release - National HRD Report”, 8th July 2000 
UNESCO
- (2001), literacy rates
- (1998/1999/2000/2001), primary, secondaiy, and tertiary enrolment ratios
UNITED NATIONS STATISTICS DIVISION (2002), various UAE-related statistics
UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU (2002), various UAE-related statistics, 
International Programs Centre, International database
UNITED STATES CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
- (2001), “Chiefs of Staff and Cabinet Members of Foreign Governments”, 1st 
August 2001
- (2001), “World Fact book: United Arab Emirates”, January 2001
- (2001), “World Fact book: Morocco”, January 2001
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
- (2001), “United Arab Emirates: Country Reports on Human Rights”, Bureau of 
Democracy, Human Rights, and Labour, 23rd Februaiy 2001
- (1975), “US policy in the area of the Persian Gulf’, Bulletin 73,14th July 1975
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